[pt] O desenho atual de mercado do seguro obrigatório de veículos no Brasil tem apresentado questionamentos em relação ao seu modelo, destacando ineficiência na transferência de recursos dos proprietários de veículos para as vítimas de acidentes de trânsito e ausência de incentivo à eficiência na gestão dos recursos. Este é um mecanismo de alta complexidade, com natureza híbrida (parcela destinada a políticas públicas e parcela de natureza indenizatória) cujo desenho é um desafio constante ao regulador brasileiro. Com o objetivo de mitigar os problemas apresentados, fornecemos uma opção ao modelo atual em que o governo define diretamente a seguradora responsável e o valor de prêmio cobrado. Este estudo propõe-se um novo desenho de mercado, com a utilização de leilões em um processo mais transparente e eficiente para alocação e descoberta de preço para o Seguro DPVAT. Em um leilão reverso multiunidade de preço uniforme, as seguradoras ofertam quantidades e valor de prêmio por categoria de veículo e Unidade da Federação. Os resultados indicam que a estrutura da indústria de seguros e as decisões do governo possuem papel fundamental no desempenho do mercado. / [en] The current market design of mandatory vehicle insurance in Brazil has raised questions regarding its model highlighting inefficiency in the transfer of resources from vehicle owners to victims of traffic accidents and lack of incentive for efficiency in resource management. This is a highly complex mechanism with a hybrid nature (public policies and private insurance) whose design is a constant challenge for the Brazilian regulator. Looking to mitigate some of the problems, we provide an option to the current model in which the government directly defines the insurance company and the premium. This study proposes a new market design, using auctions for a more transparent and efficient process for allocation and price discovery for DPVAT Insurance. In a uniform reverse multi-unit auction, insurers bid quantities and premium by vehicle category and State. The results indicate that structure of the insurance industry and government decisions play a key role in market performance.

This dissertation is a collection of articles on the design of procurement auctions. Chapter 1 provides a primer to the subsequent three essays. Rather than addressing all the issues involved, it illustrates some basic concepts about auctions, both institutionally and theoretically. It also highlights some problems that arise when auction theory is applied to procurement auctions. / Ph. D.

[pt] O trabalho desenvolve um modelo de licitações públicas com favoritismo e uma regra de decisão em dois estágios. Devido à existência de favoritismo, a qualidade mínima exigida pela agência para aprovar um projeto é determinada de forma a beneficiar uma das firmas. Mostramos que, mesmo supondo simetria ex-ante entre as firmas participantes e independência entre as distribuições de custo e qualidade, as ofertas de preço serão assimétricas em equilíbrio. Em particular, a firma beneficiada escolhe preços maiores do que as demais para um dado nível de custo. Além disso, simulações do modelo indicam que revelar o número de participantes qualificados diminui o preço que o governo espera pagar pelo bem. / [en] We study procurement auctions under favoritism and a two-stage decision rule. Because of favoritism, the minimum quality required in order to approve a project is endogenously determined to benefit the recipient of the agency s bias. We show that, even with ex-ante symmetry and independence between the distributions of costs and quality, equilibrium bidding behavior will be asymmetric and the favorite firm will bid less aggressively than the others. A mechanism design approach indicates that revealing the number of qualified participants or adopting a second-price rule would decrease expected prices and costs of realizing the project, due to the elimination of the asymmetric bidding behavior. Finally, simulations for the uniformly distributed case show that while adopting one of the alternative rules increases efficiency, it also increases the favorite firm s ex-ante profits and therefore may facilitate collusion between the agency and a firm.

This research addresses the concept of radio resource allocation for cellular communications systems operating in congested and contested environments with an emphasis on end-to-end quality of service (QoS). The radio resource allocation is cast under a proportional fairness formulation which translates to a convex optimization problem. Moreover, the resource allocation scheme considers subscription-based and traffic differentiation in order to meet the QoS requirements of the applications running on the user equipment in the system. The devised resource allocation scheme is realized through a centralized and a distributed architecture and solution algorithms for the aforementioned architectures is derived and implemented in the mobile devices and the base stations. The sensitivity of the resource allocation scheme to the temporal dynamics of the quantity of the users in the system is investigated. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the resource allocation scheme to the temporal dynamics in the application usage percentages is accounted for. In addition, a transmission overhead of the centralized and distributed architectures for the resource allocation schemes is performed. Furthermore, the resource allocation scheme is modified to account for a possible additive bandwidth done through spectrum sharing in congested and contested environments, in particular spectrally coexistent radar systems. The radar-spectrum additive portion is devised in a way to ensure fairness of the allocation, high bandwidth utilization, and interference avoidance. In order to justify the aforesaid modification, the interference from radar systems into the Long Term Evolution (LTE) as the predominant 4G technology is studies to confirm the possibility of the spectrum sharing. The preceding interference analysis contains a detailed simulation of radar systems, propagation path loss models, and a third generation partnership project compliant LTE system. The propagation models are Free Space Path Loss (FSPL) and Irregular Terrain Model (ITM). The LTE systems under consideration are macro cell, outdoor small cells, and indoor small cells. Furthermore, the resource allocation under channel consideration is formalized such that the resources are allocated under a congested environment and based on the quality of channel the users have in the network as well as the quality of service requirements of the applications running on the mobile devices. / Ph. D.

Advertising is the economic engine of the internet. It allows online platforms to fund services that are free at the point of use, while providing businesses the opportunity to target their ads at relevant users. The mechanism of choice for selling these advertising opportunities is real-time auctions: whenever a user visits the platform, an auction is run among interested advertisers, and the winner gets to display their ad to the user. The entire process runs in milliseconds and is implemented via automated algorithms which bid on behalf of the advertisers in every auction. These automated bidders take as input the high-level objectives of the advertiser like value-per-click and budget, and then participate in the auctions with the goal of maximizing the utility of the advertiser subject to budget constraints. Thus motivated, this thesis develops a theory of bidding in auctions under budget constraints, with the goal of informing the design of automated bidding algorithms and analyzing the market-level outcomes that emerge from their simultaneous use. First, we take the perspective of an individual advertiser and tackle algorithm-design questions. How should one bid in repeated second-price auctions subject to a global budget constraint? What is the optimal way to incorporate data into bidding decisions? Can data be incorporated in a way that is robust to common forms of variability in the market? As we analyze these questions, we go beyond the problem of bidding under budget constraints and develop algorithms for more general online resource allocation problems. In Chapter 2, we study a non-stationary stochastic model of sequential auctions, which despite immense practical importance has received little attention, and propose a natural algorithm for it. With access to just one historical sample per auction/distribution, we show that our algorithm attains (nearly) the same performance as that possible under full knowledge of the distributions, while also being robust to distribution shifts which typically occur between the sampling and true distributions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of uncertainty about the total number of auctions on the performance of bidding algorithms. We prove upper bounds on the best-possible performance that can be achieved in the face of such uncertainty, and propose an algorithm that (nearly) achieves this optimal performance guarantee. We also provide a fast method for incorporating predictions about the total number of auctions into our algorithm. All of our proposed algorithms implement some version of FTRL/Mirror-Descent in the dual space, making them ideal for large-scale low-latency markets like online advertising. Next, we look at the market as a whole and analyze the equilibria which emerge from the simultaneous use of automated bidding algorithms. For example, we address questions like: Does an equilibrium always exist? How does the auction format (first-price vs second-price) impact the structure of the equilibria? Do automated bidding algorithms always efficiently converge to some equilibrium? What are the social welfare properties of these equilibrium outcomes? We systematically examine such questions using a variety of tools, ranging from infinite-dimensional fixed-point arguments for proving existence of structured equilibria, to computational complexity results about finding them. In Chapter 4, we start by establishing the existence of equilibria based on pacing—a practically-popular and theoretically-optimal budget management strategy—for all standard auctions, including first-price and second-price auctions. We then leverage its structure to establish a revenue equivalence result and bound the price of anarchy of liquid welfare. Chapter 5 looks at the market from a computational lens and investigates the complexity of finding pacing-based equilibria. We show that the problem is PPAD complete, which in turn implies the impossibility of polynomial-time convergence of any pacing-based automated bidding algorithms (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions). Finally, in Chapter 6, we move beyond pacing-based strategies and investigate throttling, which is another popular method for managing budgets in practice. Here, we describe a simple tâtonnement-style algorithm which efficiently converges to an equilibrium in first-price auctions, and show that no such algorithm exists for second-price auctions (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions). Furthermore, we prove tight bounds on the price of anarchy for liquid welfare, and compare platform revenue under throttling and pacing.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal. / This thesis defines collusion broadly as play in a repeated game which differs from play in a one shot game. The analysis of collusion is an important part of many branches of economics. In industrial organization, for example, if collusion were not present then we could restrict investigation to the study of oligopolistic and competitive markets. Another important part of modern economic theory is the analysis of situations where there exists some ldnd of privileged information. Game theorists would say that in such a scenario there exists incomplete information. The predominant theme of the three essays composing this thesis is the study of repeated games under incomplete information. Typically, repeated game analyses have assumed the presence of complete information. However, many examples of repeated interaction must be treated in an incomplete information scenario. Auctions, the subject of the first essay, are the most natural example of this. The goal of this study is to understand how bidders collude in auctions. The main innovation is an explicit treatment of the repeated nature of the game to endogenize the threats necessary to support non competitive behavior. This analysis yields several testable implications about the behavior of colluding agents in auctions which are not apparent from the few models which have studied collusion in auctions from a static point of view. Nearly every model constructed to study collusion makes predictions which are at odds with accepted stylized facts. The most prominent of these paradoxes is the stability which theoretical models predict yet empirical and allegorical evidence rejects. This is the subject of the second essay. Incomplete information takes the form of how players evaluate future payoffs. This is an important detail because future payoffs are the only tool a cartel can use to enforce the play of collusive equilibria. The developed model imposes that patience is private information and heterogeneous and develops predictions which contrast strongly with accepted models of collusion. The predictions of the model are supported with discussion of some empirical evidence on cartels. The third essay develops a model which can have sociological as well as economic applications, in that it studies how rational agents form surplus creating partnerships in a repeated, incomplete information environment. Previous work has assumed an exogenous production technology which partners use to create this surplus. Furthermore an agents type, which affects surplus creation, has always been assumed to be observable. This essay studies matching with an endogenous production technology, in the sense that the surplus is a function of the level of collusion which can be supported. Collusion can be supported to varying degree based upon the type (patience, or discount factor) of each agent in the partnership. A special attention is turned to contrasting the implications of the model in the presence of complete as opposed to incomplete information.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The value of art is a critical concept in theoretical discourse. As a result, the high prices of artworks on auctions pose questions about the various processes of value construction and the status of art in these processes. This thesis adopts a sociological approach to the construction of value of art on South African auctions. This approach is situated within a socio-historical perspective, which introduces the various social structures and conditions of cultural production. The main premise of this approach is that a multiplicity of social and cultural influences permeates the art market, its processes and structures, and therefore the determination of value. This research therefore indicates that the value of art on auction is socially constructed. As such, the value of an artwork does not reside in itself, but is produced (and constantly reproduced) through processes that are subject to the codes and conventions of the art world. Within the context of the art market, artworks function as commodities for economic exchange. Since economic exchange is socially and culturally situated, the distinctive ways in which art auctions in South Africa (as a market intermediary) encompass certain social and cultural processes, is also explored. To asses the various factors that influence the value and exchange of artworks on auction, the study introduces the Components of Value Model. The Aesthetic and Historical Factors; the Supporting Documentation and Material Attributes of an artwork, as well as the Financial and Economic Factors collectively indicate that values are, first and foremost, social categories. The value of art on auction is therefore a socially constructed value. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die waarde van kuns is ‘n kritiese konesep in teoretiese gesprekvoering. Na aanleiding van die hoë pryse wat kunswerke op Suid-Afrikaanse veilings behaal, word verskeie vrae gevolglik gestel rondom die verskillende prosesse van waarde samestelling en die status van kuns in hierdie prosesse. Hierdie verhandeling neem ‘n sosiologiese benadering aan tot die samestelling van die waarde van kuns op veilings. Dié benadering is gesetel binne ‘n sosio-historiese perspektief wat verskeie sosiale strukture en voorwaardes van kulturele-produksie inlei. Die hoof premis van hierdie benadering is dat ‘n aantal sosiale en kulturele invloede die kunsmark se prosesse en trukture deurweek, en gevolglik ook die bepaling van waarde. Hierdie navorsing kom dus tot die gevolgtrekking dat die waarde van kuns op veilings sosiaal geskep word. Gevolglik is die waarde van kuns nie intrinsiek nie, maar word geproduseer (en aanhoudend geherproduseer) deur prosesse wat onderhewig is aan die kodes en konvensies van die kunswêreld. Binne die konteks van die kunsmark, funksioneer kunswerke bloot as kommoditeite vir ekonomiese verhandeling. Omdat ekonomiese vehandeling sosiaal en kultureel gesetel is, word die eiesoortige wyse van hoe kunsveilings (as ‘n marktussenganger) sekere sosiale en kulturele prosesse omvat, ook ondersoek. Om die veskeie faktore wat die waarde van kunswerke op veilings beïnvloed te ondersoek, word die ‘Komponente van Waarde Model’ ingebring. Gevolglik dui die Esteties- en Historiese Faktore; Ondersteunende Dokumentasie en Materiële Eienskappe van kunswerke asook die Finansiële en Ekonomiese Faktore gesamantlik aan dat waardes hoofsaaklik sosiale kategorieë is. Die waarde van kuns op veiling is gevolglik sosiaal gekonstrueer.

本研究配合台灣制度，以模型推導方式研究IPO承銷機制選擇(競價拍賣與公開申購)之決定因素，並以台灣資料進行實證分析。本文考慮市場因素與投資人意見差異，以發行者之觀點進行分析。模型之預測為，當投資人意見差異程度較大、承銷規模較大、或是市場情況較佳時，發行者會選擇以競價拍賣銷售新股。 實證結果顯示，發行者於選擇承銷機制時，不僅考慮市場因素，亦會參考公司特性與發行特性，此結果與本模型之預測一致。本研究亦發現，台灣之競價拍賣制度，相較於公開申購方式，並無法更有效控制折價程度；如果發行者所選用的承銷方式，不適合市場情況、公司特性或發行特性，將會使公司的IPO承受較多的折價。 / This thesis develops and tests a theoretical rationale on the choice of IPO selling methods, discriminatory auctions versus fixed-price offerings, in Taiwan. We incorporate market conditions and investors’ divergence of opinions into the model from the issuer’s point of view. Our model predicts that when the extent of investors’ divergence of opinions is high, the amount in IPOs is large, or market conditions are hot, issuers will tend to use auctions. Our examination of issuers’ choice of IPO methods on the Taiwan’s IPOs shows that issuers condition the choice of IPO methods not only on prevailing market conditions, but also on firm/IPO characteristics. The results are consistent with our model. Finally, Taiwanese auction does not lead to less under-pricing than the fixed-price offering, but an issuer choosing a selling method with a higher degree of unfitting for firm/IPO characteristics and to market conditions will suffer more under-pricing.

In this work we present a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions involving multiple items and many bidders whose values for the goods follow arbitrary continuous joint distributions over some multi-dimensional real interval. Although the single-item case has been resolved in a very elegant way by the seminal work of Myerson [1981], optimal solutions involving more items still remain elusive. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the natural geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. We demonstrate the power of the framework by applying it to various special monopoly settings where a seller of multiple heterogeneous goods faces a buyer with independent item values drawn from various distributions of interest, to design both exact and approximately optimal selling mechanisms. Previous optimal solutions were only known for up to two and three goods, and a very limited range of distributional priors. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly, for deriving the optimal mechanisms themselves. Some of our main results include: the proposal of a simple deterministic mechanism, which we call Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA) and is defined in a greedy, recursive way through natural geometric constraints, for many uniformly distributed goods, where exact optimality is proven for up to six items and general optimality is conjectured; a scheme of sufficient conditions for exact optimality for two-good settings and general independent distributions; a technique for upper-bounding the optimal revenue for arbitrarily many goods, with an application to uniform and exponential priors; and the proof that offering deterministically all items in a single full bundle is the optimal way of selling multiple exponentially i.i.d. items.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis investigates the effect that acquisition reform has had on small business participation in the Federal contracting arena. As a result of the transformation of the Federal acquisition process through acquisition reform legislation and the reduction in the acquisition workforce, small business contractors are faced with new challenges to compete for and win Federal contracts. This paper concentrates on examining contract bundling, reverse auctions, electronic commerce and multiple award schedules. It concludes that contract bundling has had a negative effect on small businesses by excluding them from many competitions. It also finds that electronic commerce has had a positive effect on small businesses by giving them greater access to Federal contract opportunities and by speeding up the acquisition process. Regarding multiple award schedules, the research supports benefits for small businesses when they are given the chance to compete through multiple award schedules. It also finds negative implications for small businesses in that multiple award schedules often favor large established businesses at the expense of small businesses. The paper finds a lack of awareness on the part of small business concerning reverse auctions and finds no major impact on small businesses resulting from reverse auctions. / Civilian, Department of the Army PEO-EIS