Organizational justice scholars have ignored the influence that the nature of a decision outcome has upon reactions to perceived injustice, yet research on loss aversion demonstrates that people react more strongly to situations that result in a loss than those that result in an anticipated gain failing to materialize (non-gain). Furthermore, research on regulatory focus has found that the nature of a decision outcome can itself elicit different emotions. Based on this, a cognitive appraisal model of the relationship between injustice and emotions is proposed that accounts for the effect of decision outcome. This model predicts that emotional reactions to injustice will differ according to the nature of the received decision outcome as well as the fairness of the procedure used to reach that outcome. Specifically, it is hypothesized that a loss decision outcome will elicit a prevention focus and lead to greater agitation-related emotions, whereas a non-gain decision outcome will elicit a promotion focus and result in greater dejection-related emotions. In addition, it is predicted that, in the presence of an unfair procedure, outward-focused, foci-related emotions will be reported and that perceptions of procedural injustice will be related to increased retaliation especially following a loss. To test these predictions, participants were asked to provide their reactions to vignettes describing aloss or non-gain reached via a fair or an unfair procedure. Although all hypotheses were not supported, it was found that decision outcome produced a significant main effect on emotions, such that participants reported higher levels of negative emotions after a loss and higher ratings of positive emotions after a non-gain. In addition, it was found that procedural injustice was related to higher levels of outward-focused, negative emotions and increased retaliation.

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Humans show such strong sensitivity to whether resources are distributed fairly that they sacrifice personal gain to avoid distributional inequity. This inequity aversion plays an important role in guiding human social decision-making and appears to be ubiquitous across human populations. However, we currently do not understand whether or how inequity aversion evolved over the course of human evolution or how it develops in children. / Human Evolutionary Biology

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Den traditionella förväntade nyttoteorin har kritiserats för att inte vara realistisk i sina förutsägelser om hur beslut tas vid risk. Eftersom de flesta situationer innefattar någon form av risk är det viktigt att utreda ifall man bör söka efter en alternativ teori. I denna uppsats undersöks hur väl nyttoteorin och en konkurrent till denna, prospektteorin, kan förklara riskbeteendet hos Black Jack-spelare. Detta görs genom en studie av fem individers spelbeteende på en krog i centrala Jönköping. Materialet analyseras både grafiskt och statistiskt genom att undersöka om individernas beteende förändras beroende på utfallet dels i de fem senaste händerna och dels under hela spelomgången. Resultaten tyder på att individer tar bättre beslut om de har en ackumulerad vinst och sämre beslut om de har en ackumulerad förlust under den tidigare spelomgången, vilket är förenligt med prospektteorin. Samtidigt upptäcks en uttröttningseffekt som leder till sämre beslut tagna ju längre man har spelat, som ingen av teorierna förutsäger. En spelare som har en vinst kan kompensera för denna effekt, men en spelare med förlust kommer att ta sämre beslut både på grund av förlusten och på grund av uttröttning i något som kan kallas för en förlustspiral.

The major internet auction sites eBay and Yahoo have developed innovative hybrid auction designs that incorporate buy prices. My dissertation focuses on the Buy It Now (BIN, hereafter) version of the auctions on eBay, the largest online auction site. The BIN hybrid auction combines a standard ascending bid auction with a posted-price offer. A seller in a BIN auction lists his auction with a "buy price". A bidder may purchase the item immediately at the buy price and end the auction. If he places a bid instead, the option to purchase the item at the buy price disappears and the subsequent bidders participate in the standard eBay auction. This auction format has been very popular with both buyers and sellers. In 2005 eBay's sales in fixed price platform (BIN and Half.com) totaled $13.8 billion, which was 33.1% of eBay's total sales.The dissertation explores the BIN auctions using theory, experiments and field data. Chapter 1 theoretically analyzes BIN auctions within the common values framework. An equilibrium is characterized, shown to exist, and the revenues generated by BIN and standard eBay auctions are compared. Chapter 2 compares the bidding behavior and the revenue implications of BIN auctions in lab experiments under common and private value assumptions. The third develops an "incomplete" theoretical model of BIN auctions within the private values framework. An "incomplete" empirical specification is derived and then field data collected from eBay's BIN auctions are used to estimate the primitives of the model, including the bidders' risk aversion and time preference. I then explore how heterogeneity of sellers and items influence these primitives. Chapter 1 (Common Values Auctions with a Buy Price: the case of eBay): Several explanations for the popularity of buy price have been provided for independent private value auctions. Risk aversion and impatience of either the bidders or the seller have mainly been used to explain the popularity of buy prices in IPV models. This paper, using a pure common value framework, models auctions with eBay-style "temporary" buy prices, when the bidders and the seller are either risk neutral or risk averse. It characterizes equilibrium bidding strategies in a general setup and then analyzes a seller's incentive to post a buy price when there are two bidders. When bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse there is no incentive to post a buy price for a risk neutral seller. But when the seller is risk averse, a suitably chosen buy price can raise the seller's expected utility when the bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse. Chapter 2 (An Experimental Study of Auctions with a Buy Price Under Private and Common Values): We use experiments to examine several predictions from the theoretical studies of buy prices. The theoretical predictions from Wooders and Reynolds (2003) and Chapter 1 show that the introduction of a buy price causes the seller's revenue to move in opposite directions in private value and common value settings. Meanwhile, Mathews and Katzman (2006) find that risk averse sellers might find buy prices advantageous because they reduce the variance in seller revenue in eBay auctions with risk-neutral bidders. The lab experiments are used to answer three key questions. (a) Can a buy price raise seller revenue and lower the variance of seller revenue in an independent private value auction? (b) Does a buy price lower seller revenue in common value auctions? (c) If the theoretical predictions do not hold, can a behavioral model explain the patterns observed in the data? Using a between-subjects design the results show that the use of a buy price has a positive and statistically significant effect on seller revenue in private value auctions. The buyers are risk averse. The estimate of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) index of 1.11 for the bidders is equivalent to a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) index of 0.62 which is centered within the range of other estimates of relative risk aversion. As predicted by the theory when buyers are risk averse, the use of a buy price yields a statistically significant reduction in the variance of seller revenue. Hence, as predicted, the use of a buy price is advantageous to the seller when either the bidders or the seller are risk averse. The results for common value auctions are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. Use of a buy price did not lower seller revenue, and the bidders' behavior departed from theoretical predictions in several respects. As a result, we develop and estimate a behavioral model of common value BIN auctions based on the winner's curse and overweighting of a bidder's private information. We find statistically significant evidence of overweighting of the bidder's own signal and estimated a CARA index of 0.001. This behavioral model explains all the departures from the rational model we found in the common values experiments. Chapter 3 (The Buy-it-now Option, Risk Aversion, and Impatience in an Empirical Model of eBay Bidding): Haile and Tamer (2003) first used an incomplete econometric model in an auction context, assuming that bidders bid up to their values and do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat. Canals-Cerda and Pearcy (2004) used a similar incomplete econometric model to study eBay auctions while adding the assumption that the maximum of all the bids placed by the bidder with the second highest value is exactly equal to his value. Chapter 3 extends these incomplete models to eBay's BIN auctions. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model for BIN independent private value auctions with a stochastic and unknown number of potential bidders who enter the auction sequentially. In the model risk averse and time impatient bidders buy at the BIN price because it allows them to avoid the uncertainties and delay of the ascending bid auction that takes place if no one chooses the BIN option. As a result, the bidders' decisions to choose the BIN option in BIN auctions of different lengths can be used to identify the bidders' risk aversion and time preference parameters. Our model is "incomplete" in the sense that we do not impose any stylized structure on bidding in the ascending bid auction and, although bid revision is allowed, the process is not explicitly described. Our "incomplete" econometric model uses a partial likelihood approach proposed by Cox (1975) that allows the analysis to bypass modeling bidding and the bid revision process. The model is estimated using a new data set of 3245 eBay auctions of Pentium-3 laptops that ran between 22 July to 10 August 2005.

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We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment behaviour under risk. We find that both, investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments. However, when given the choice, subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback. Exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention that increases investment levels. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

The thesis consists of three self-contained essays on public policy in the macroeconomy. “Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors” quantitatively investigates the interaction between the firms' choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement. Taxes, enforcement, and regulation are incorporated in a general equilibrium model of firms differing in their productivities. The model quantitatively accounts for the keys aspects in the data and allows me to back out country-specific enforcement levels. Some policy reforms are analyzed and the welfare gains can be fairly large. “Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D Intensive Foreign Direct Investment” studies the determinants of capital intensity and technology content of FDI. Using industry data on U.S. FDI abroad and data on many different host countries' institutional characteristics, we show that there is a differential response of FDI flows to investment climate according to the capital intensity of the industries receiving the investments. We find that better protection of property rights has a significant positive effect on R&D intensive capital flows. We find evidence that an increase in workers' bargaining power results in a reduction of both kinds of FDI. “Ambiguity Aversion, the Equity Premium, and the Welfare Costs of Business Cycles” examines the relevance of consumers’ ambiguity aversion for asset prices and how consumption fluctuations influence consumer welfare. First, in a Mehra-Prescott-style endowment economy, we calibrate ambiguity aversion so that asset prices are consistent with data: a high return on equity and a low return on risk-free bonds. We then use this calibration to investigate how much consumers would be willing to pay to reduce endowment fluctuations to zero, thus delivering a Lucas-style welfare cost of fluctuations. These costs turn out to be very large: consumers are willing to pay over 10% of consumption in permanent terms.

This paper examines the optimal production and export decisions of an international firm facing exchange rate uncertainty when the firm's preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm's uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the exchange rate risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the exchange rate risk. Within this framework, we show that ambiguity has no impact on the firm's propensity to export to a foreign country. Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, however, are shown to have adverse effect on the firm's incentive to export to the foreign country.