Gängige Konzepte der Filmbildung werden vorgestellt und in ihren pädagogischen Implikationen diskutiert. Dabei wird kritisch auf das Kanon-Konzept eingegangen sowie auf den vom Autor favorisierten Ansatz, Spielfilme auch als Gegenstand einer narrativen Pädagogik zu verstehen. / Common concepts of film education are presented and discussed in their pedagogical implications. In particular, the canon concept is presented as well as the approach favored by the author to understand films as a subject of a narrative educational theory.

In this thesis I present three papers on the Economics of the base metals industry. The thesis studies production, trading, and investment in the base metals industry, and thus explains some phenomena of the industry in an international context. Using the features of the base metals industry such as the practices in production and trading, physical properties, geology of the deposits and so on, we build theoretical models to simulate the behavior of the industry. In Chapter One, we study the determinants and the trend of base metals prices over time by an equilibrium model of supply and demand. Because the different types of natural resources exhibit different patterns of price changes in history, we particularly simulate the long run equilibrium to study the impacts of the determinants for base metals prices. The Cobb-Douglass production function on the supply side allows substitution among production factors. The demand function for base metals from the economy is also derived. In the long run, equilibrium of aggregate supply and demand determines the systematic price trend. We show how trends of base metals prices depend on technological progress, resource scarcity, natural resource tax, and the interest rate. Assuming constant returns to scale in base metals production, the price elasticity of the supply of base metals is relatively small. Interestingly, a high natural resource tax leads to a high price but low rate of price change over time. On the supply side, the decline of base metals relative prices can thus be explained by the inverse supply functions. On the demand side, the relative price is also declining over time as we see the implications of the inverse demand functions and our numerical illustrations. By solving the equilibrium condition, we show that the economic rent of base metals minerals in reserve may decline over time, or even not be valuable in future. The price elasticities of supply and demand are calculated and decomposed into specific effects. These are systematic components of base metal price changes in the world market. Chapter Two deals with the fluctuations in the prices of base metals. We consider the price in the short run as an equilibrium of trade. If the long run equilibrium regulates the prices and sets them in a stabilization, then the fluctuations in price are caused by the trade and speculative activities. By simulating speculative activities and optimizing the utility of agents in international exchanges, we show that the price fluctuations are the response to risk preferences of agents and the scale of international exchanges. We find out the critical point of production investment, which depends on the market demand, profitability of the metal industry, and the distribution of base metal minerals in nature. In the specific case of the industry versus the market condition when the uncertain production is above the critical point, the price of base metal fluctuates more or less according to the number of producer offers in base metal exchanges, the speculative activities, and risk preferences of agents. In contrast, if the investment level of the base metals industry in uncertain production is below the critical point, the effects of base metal exchanges scale to the price are in the reverse direction. The comparative statics inequalities are derived to clarify the responses of the price to the risk preferences of agents and scale of the international exchanges. Hence, the non-systematic changes of base metals prices in international exchanges are explained. Chapter Three studies the impact of the industrial and commercial processes on investment decisions in the base metals industry. The investment decisions of investors in the primary capital market and the stock price in the secondary capital market reflect properties of the base metals industry in capital markets. We present a model of investments, which is a two stage game that incorporates Hall-Jorgenson neoclassical investment analysis and properties of the base metals industry. The paper presents a set of explanatory parameters for the properties of base metal stocks and analyzes the investment decisions. We define the industry factor and explain the empirical observations on the beta coefficient of base metal stocks. The relationships between stock prices and base metals prices are clarified using the geology of base metals deposits. The results show that there is a strong impact of the industry factor on the volatility of base metal stock prices. Economies of scale in the mining industry lead to different effects of tax policy and output prices on investment decisions. We support conclusions of the model by evidence in the base metals industry. There are policy implications that are derived from the equations of the optimal investment. Key words : Base Metals, Price Fluctuations, Price Trends, Risk Aversion, Metals Industry, LME, International Exchange, Metal Stocks, Investment.

Cette thèse est organisée en trois chapitres. Chaque article analyse les déviations systématiques des décideurs par rapport aux prédictions économiques classiques dans certaines expériences bien connues. Les agents s’écartent de la voie optimale et explorent ou exploitent de manière excessive dans le problème du bandit manchot, ils exigent des taux d’intérêt bien plus élevés par rapport aux taux du marché financier afin de reporter leurs dépenses lorsqu’ils prennent des décisions de choix intertemporel, et ils ne se contentent pas de recevoir des petites sommes d’argent, même si, objectivement, ils devraient accepter cette offre, dans des expériences de négociation comme le jeu de l’ultimatum. Ces soi-disant «irrégularités» sont documentées dans les trois essais de thèse. Le essaies représentent une première étape afin de formuler des stratégies adaptées au profile psychologique de chaque individu, nécessaires pour surmonter les biais de décision. / This dissertation is organized in three chapters. Each chapter analyzes decision makers’ systematic deviations from economic predictions in well-known experiments. People deviate from the optimal path and excessively explore or exploit in n-armed bandit games, demand interest rates well above financial market averages in order to defer consumption in intertemporal choice settings, and do not settle for receiving small amounts of money, even though they would be better off objectively, in bargaining games such as the ultimatum game. Such “irregularities” are documented in the three dissertation essays. The essays are intended as a first step to formulate individual specific, customized decision aids, useful to overcome such decision biases.

Loss aversion is a theory which states that losses loom larger than gains. Negative outcomes are weighted heavier than positive outcomes in decision making but could this weight change when different prospects are evaluated? This thesis focuses on how the loss aversion changes toward different magnitudes of a loss for young individuals when they are faced with a 50/50 chance of winning or losing a gamble. The loss aversion is tested toward six different magnitudes of a potential loss ranging from 100 kr to 4 000 kr. The loss aversion toward these six different magnitudes is then compared to examine how the loss aversion changes. This data was collected using a survey experiment that was digitally distributed to economics students at Linnaeus University in Växjö.The results from the subsequent analysis showed that the loss aversion was not constant towards all six losses. The loss aversion was different in ten out of fifteen pairwise comparisons. Respondents became more loss averse when the loss increased but the loss aversion did however seem to be less sensitive to increases in losses above the 1 000 kr mark.

In this dissertation, I address a range of topics in the context of mutual fund performance and high frequency trading. The first chapter provides novel evidence on the role of ambiguity aversion in determining the response of mutual fund investors to historical fund performance information. It presents a model of ambiguity averse investors who receive multiple performance-based signals of uncertain precision about manager skill. A key implication of the model is that when investors receive multiple signals of uncertain quality, they place a greater weight on the worst signal. There is strong empirical support for this prediction in the data. Fund flows display significantly higher sensitivity to the worst performance measure even after controlling for fund performance at multiple horizons, performance volatility, flow-performance convexity, and a host of other relevant explanatory variables. This effect is particularly pronounced in the case of retail funds in contrast to institutional funds. The results suggest that fund investor behavior is best characterized as reflecting both Bayesian learning and ambiguity aversion. The second chapter combines data on high frequency trading (HFT) activities of a randomly selected sample of 120 stocks and data on institutional trades, I find that HFT increases the trading costs of traditional institutional investors. An increase of one standard deviation in the intensity of HFT activities increases institutional execution shortfall costs by a third. Further analysis suggests that HFT represents an opportunistic and extra-expensive source of liquidity when demand and supply among institutional investors are imbalanced. Moreover, the impact on institutional trading costs is most pronounced when high frequency (HF) traders engage in directional strategies (e.g., momentum ignition and order anticipation). I perform various analyses to rule out an alternative explanation that HF traders are attracted to stocks that have high trading costs. First, HFT is most prevalent in liquid stocks. Second, the results are robust to controls for stable stock liquidity characteristics and events that might jointly affect HFT and trading costs. Third, an analysis of the HFT behavior around the temporary short selling ban in September 2008 highlights the opportunistic nature of liquidity provision by HF traders. Finally, Granger causality tests show that intensive HFT activity significantly contributes to institutional trading costs, but not vice versa. The third chapter analyzes the implications of the tournament-like competition in the mutual fund industry using a framework that addresses the risk-taking incentives facing fund managers. The theoretical model presented in this chapter suggests that the increase in the \emph{activeness} of the interim loser manager's portfolio is directly related to the magnitude of the performance gap at the interim stage, and to the strength of the investor (cash flow) response to the relative performance rankings of the funds (i.e., the strength of the tournament effect). The empirical evidence based on quarterly Active Share data for a sample of domestic stock funds, is consistent with the key predictions of the model.

One important issue in mechanism design theory is to model agents’ behaviors under uncertainty. The classical approach assumes that agents hold commonly known probability assessments towards uncertainty, which has been challenged by economists in many fields. My thesis adopts alternative methods to model agents’ behaviors. The new findings contribute to understanding how the mechanism designer can benefit from agents’ uncertainty aversion and how she should respond to the lack of information on agents’ probability assessments. Chapter 1 of this thesis allows the mechanism designer to introduce ambiguity to the mechanism. Instead of informing agents of the precise payment rule that she commits to, the mechanism designer can tell agents multiple payment rules that she may have committed to. The multiple payment rules are called ambiguous transfers. As agents do not know which rule is chosen by the designer, they are assumed to make decisions based on the worst-case scenario. Under this assumption, this chapter characterizes when the mechanism designer can obtain the first-best outcomes by introducing ambiguous transfers. Compared to the standard approach where the payment rule is unambiguous, first-best mechanism design becomes possible under a broader information structure. Hence, there are cases when the mechanism designer can benefit from introducing ambiguity. Chapter 2 assumes that the mechanism designer does not know agents’ probability assessments about others’ private information. The mechanisms designed to implement the social choice function thus should not depend on the probability assessments, which are called robust mechanisms. Different from the existing robust mechanism design literature where agents are always assumed to act non-cooperatively, this chapter allows them to communicate and form coalitions. This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions for robustly implementing a social choice function as an equilibrium that is immune to all coalitional deviations. As there are social choice functions that are only implementable with coalitional structures, this chapter provides insights on when agents should be allowed to communicate. As an extension, when the mechanism designer has no information on which coalitions can be formed, this chapter also provides conditions for robust implementation under all coalition patterns. Chapter 3 assumes that agents are not probabilistic about others’ private information. Instead, when they hold ambiguous assessments about others’ information, they make decisions based on the worst-case belief. This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions on when a social choice goal is implementable under such a behavioral assumption. As there are social choice goals that are only implementable under ambiguous assessments, this chapter provides insights on what information structure is desirable to the mechanism designer.

We re-examine the classic problem of risk aversion and self-protection in this paper. In the beginning of this paper, we conduct comparative statics of risk aversion and prevention efforts based on the mono-periodic two states model of choice under risk. We show this new condition is effective with self-insurance-cum-protection model (Lee, 1998), in which the decision maker's activities to prevent the risk can sever both as self-insurance and self-protection. We suggest a new condition that increased risk aversion induces more prevention activities. This new condition requires only one assumption concerning fear of ruin coefficient, marginal effect of SICP activity on probability and marginal cost of SICP activity. By applying interval dominance order (Quah and Strulovici,2009), we find that a decision maker will exert higher level of SICP activity if he becomes more risk averse, under the condition that his hazard rate is higher than the 'boldness' coefficient (Aumann and Kurz,1977). This new condition is effective even when the optimal level for SICP activity is not interior solution. With our method, the assumption, that optimal solution is interior, is not necessary and marginal utility functions do not need to be monotonic on the interval [0, w0]. Based on this, the optimal solution can be corner solution or inflection point solution. And the DM's attitude towards risk can be variable. Hence, the relation suggested by our findings is more consistent with real world situations.

Dans cette thèse, j’examine l’influence d’états aversifs (e.g., émotions désagréables, issues indésirables) sur les motivations et les comportements des consommateurs. Dans le premier essai, j’explore comment des sentiments de dégoût physique ou moral peuvent mettre en péril l’estime de soi des consommateurs et les motiver à se livrer à de la consommation compensatrice. Dans le deuxième essai, j’examine pourquoi et à quels moments les consommateurs font preuve de sentiments négatifs à l’égard des entreprises qui cessent de distribuer gratuitement des échantillons ou petits cadeaux aux consommateurs. Dans le troisième essai, j’explore comment la solitude affecte les préférences des consommateurs pour des produits et services qui peuvent ou non nécessiter des interactions interpersonnelles (ex : se faire masser vs. faire des achats en ligne). Considérés ensemble, ces trois essais contribuent à la littérature sur l’émotion, les menaces identitaires, et la consommation compensatrice, à la littérature sur les promotions commerciales et à la littérature sur la solitude. De plus, les résultats ont des implications pour les praticiens en marketing en ce qui concerne la publicité, le design des promotions commerciales, et l’haptique des consommateurs. Finalement, ces travaux de recherche offrent de nouvelles perspectives concernant le bien-être des consommateurs en soulignant les conséquences inattendues des actions des marketers qui cherchent à bénéficier aux consommateurs mais génèrent en réalité des comportements compensateurs pour faire face à leur aversion. / In this dissertation, I examine the influence of aversive states (e.g., unpleasant emotions, undesired outcomes) on consumers’ motivations and behaviors. In essay 1, I explore how feelings of physical and moral disgust can be threatening to consumers’ sense of self and motivate them to engage in compensatory consumption. In essay 2, I investigate why and when consumers exhibit negative behavioral intentions against firms that terminate unconditional business-to-consumer gift-giving initiatives. In essay 3, I explore how loneliness affects consumers’ preferences for products and services that do or do not require interpersonal touch and interaction (e.g., getting a massage vs. shopping online). Together, the three essays contribute to the literature on emotion, identity threats, and compensatory consumption, to the literature on sales promotion, and to the literature on loneliness. Moreover, the research findings inform marketing practice in the fields of advertising, sales promotions design, and consumer haptics. Finally, this research provides insights into consumer welfare by bringing attention to the unforeseen consequences of marketers’ actions that seek to benefit the consumers but instead generate compensatory behaviors to cope with their aversiveness.

My thesis focuses on the risk-taking behavior of financial agents, aiming particularlyat better understanding how risk attitudes can change over time. It alsoexplores the implications that these changes have on financial markets, and on theeconomy as a whole.The first paper, which is a joint work with Kim Oosterlinck and Andrey Ukhov,studies how risk aversion of financial markets’ participants is affected by the SecondWorld War. The literature links extreme events to changes in risk aversion but failsto find a consensus on the direction of this change. Moreover, due to data limitationsand difficulties in estimation of risk aversion, the speed of the change in risk aversionhas seldom been analyzed. This paper develops an original methodology to overcomethe latter limitation. To estimate changes in attitude toward risk, we rely on thedaily market prices of lottery bonds issued by Belgium. We provide evidence on thedynamic of risk attitude before, during and after the Second World War. We findsubstantial variations between 1938 and 1946. Risk aversion increased at the outbreakof the war, decreased dramatically during the occupation to increase again afterthe war. To our knowledge, this finding of reversal in risk attitude is unique in theliterature. We discuss several potential explanations to this pattern, namely changesin economic perspectives, mood, prospect theory, and background risk. While theymight all have played a role, we argue that habituation to background risk mostconsistently explains the observed behavior over the whole period. Living continuouslyexposed to war-related risks has gradually changed the risk-taking behavior ofinvestors.In the second paper, I derive a measure of risk aversion from asset prices andanalyze what are its main drivers. Given the complexity of eliciting risk aversionfrom asset prices, few papers provide empirical evidence on the dynamics of riskaversion in a long-term perspective. This paper tries to fill the gap. First, I providea measure of risk aversion that is original, both because of the length of its sampleperiod (1958- 1991) and the methodology used. I study the relationship betweenthis new measure of risk aversion and several key economic variables in a structuralvector autoregression. Results show that risk aversion varies over the period. Aworsening of economic conditions, a decrease in stock prices or a tighter monetarypolicy lead to an increase in risk aversion. On the other hand, an increase in riskaversion is linked to a larger corporate bond credit spread and has an adverse effecton stock prices.The third paper explores the impact of asset price bubbles on the riskiness offinancial institutions. I investigate the effect of a real estate boom on the financialstability of commercial banks in the United States using exogenous variations intheir exposure to real estate prices. I find that the direction of the effect dependson bank characteristics. Although higher real estate prices have a positive impacton bank stability on average, small banks and banks that operate in competitivebanking markets experience a negative effect. I reconcile these findings by providingevidence that higher real estate prices benefit commercial banks by raising the valueof collateral pledged by borrowers but at the cost of an increase in local bankingcompetition. This increase in competition affects banks that have a low marketpower more severely, which explains why small banks and banks facing a high degreeof competition display relatively lower stability during a real estate boom. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Previous research has shown that there is a negative relationship between female elected officials and corruption in democracies. Especially in high accountability settings where corruption is stigmatized, it makes female elected officials more risk averse as a result of higher probability of being held accountable. Through a quantitative approach, this thesis examines the relationship of gender and corruption on the individual level in Swedish municipalities. To investigate if there are any differences in attitudes towards corruption among female and male local politicians, and what might cause that difference, a survey answered by local politicians from all the 290 municipalities in Sweden was used. The results showed that there is a difference in attitudes towards corruption, female local politicians seem to be more negative than their male counterparts. Female local politicians also seem to become even more negative in their attitudes towards corruption if the accountability is higher. The explanation could be that female local politicians are more risk averse than male local politicians in Swedish local councils, as the same attitude could not be found for them. However, these findings cannot exclude that other explanations can be important for the relationship between gender and attitudes towards corruption. Nevertheless, this thesis gives a starting point for further research of the connection between the individual level of attitudes towards corruption, gender and accountability in Swedish municipalities.