Three important Irish texts use revelations about Irish involvement in the First World War as a lens through which to examine contemporary Ireland: Jennifer Johnston’s novel How Many Miles To Babylon (1974), Frank McGuinness’s play Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching Towards the Somme (1985), and Sebastian Barry’s A Long, Long Way (2005). Because significant critical attention has been paid to the texts of Johnston and McGuinness, and because access to Barry’s archive in the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas further illuminates the process by which Barry represents this crucial moment in Irish history, his novel is the focus of this paper. Unlike Johnston and McGuinness, whose projects use the First World War to interrogate the Ireland in which they are writing and force the reader to grapple with their own historically (or mythically) constructed identities, Barry’s A Long, Long Way denies personal culpability and allows for a view of history in which the individual stands forever as a tragic or pathetic victim. Barry’s novel details the experiences of one Irish soldier, Willie Dunne, on the Western Front and plots his changing attitude towards Irish soldiers’ involvement in the War following the Easter 1916 Rising. Exposed to both nationalist and loyalist perspectives, and to the horrors of war, Willie increasingly develops sympathy with the nationalist position, though he never abandons his principal loyalty to his father. While Willie’s narrative presents a more complicated vision of the Dunne family—Barry’s ancestors who have figured prominently in his oeuvre—it fails to escape the tragic impulse in much of Barry’s fiction, in which history is an immovable and oftentimes malevolent force. Such a vision of history allows individuals like Willie Dunne to disavow responsibility for their personal fate and for their roles within a larger Irish history. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 177-179).

The purpose of this study is to examine what Barry Goldwater did in his 1963 speeches before Republican audiences in order to project himself as the candidate for nomination, to consider the persuasive appeals he made and their rhetorical merit.

A Justiça como Imparcialidade de Brian Barry propõe uma teoria de justiça imparcial como única solução legítima para uma sociedade encontrar princípios com os quais todos possam consentir. Essa concepção de justiça não pode impor aos indivíduos um comportamento de primeira-ordem. Ao contrário, deve se referir unicamente às instituições e estas devem acomodar as diversas concepções de Bem da sociedade. Se a sociedade for capaz de encontrar tais princípios, então será possível a vida em sociedade com tolerância mútua. Esta dissertação explora as razões de Barry para escolha dessa abordagem e aponta possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / Brian Barrys Justice as Impartiality conceives a theory of impartial justice as the only legitimated solution to a society who wants to find principles according to those everybody might consent. This theory should not impose a first-order behavior to individuals. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Barry to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

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A Justiça como Imparcialidade de Brian Barry propõe uma teoria de justiça imparcial como única solução legítima para uma sociedade encontrar princípios com os quais todos possam consentir. Essa concepção de justiça não pode impor aos indivíduos um comportamento de primeira-ordem. Ao contrário, deve se referir unicamente às instituições e estas devem acomodar as diversas concepções de Bem da sociedade. Se a sociedade for capaz de encontrar tais princípios, então será possível a vida em sociedade com tolerância mútua. Esta dissertação explora as razões de Barry para escolha dessa abordagem e aponta possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / Brian Barrys Justice as Impartiality conceives a theory of impartial justice as the only legitimated solution to a society who wants to find principles according to those everybody might consent. This theory should not impose a first-order behavior to individuals. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Barry to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

Ce travail est une démarche d'évaluation des industries du Badegoulien en Auvergne au travers d'une analyse techno-typologique fine des séries de deux gisements : la grotte du Rond-du-Barry (Haute-Loire) et le site de plein air de la Contrée Viallet (Allier). Les caractères marquants et ceux plus discrets de ces industries ont été identifiés et comparés à ceux d'autres gisements de l'espace régional (Cottier, la Roche à Tavernat, Le Blot, la Goutte Roffat, la Grange Jobin et la Faye Godet). Nombre de chaînes opératoires ont été reconstituées en fonction de la variété des matériaux exploités. Il en ressort la mise en évidence de la souplesse technique du Badegoulien.En Velay, dans la grotte du Rond-du-Barry, le niveau F2 présente une diversité de faciès culturels du Badegoulien. Le Badegoulien ancien s'y caractérise par l'abondance des outils composites, l'absence de raclettes et par une production laminaire de supports épais. Le Badegoulien récent est marqué par des traditions techniques variées, en lien avec le sud du Bassin parisien et l'espace méditerranéen.Les sites de plein air du Bourbonnais (La Contrée Viallet et la Faye Godet), montrent la diversité technique du Badegoulien auvergnat : débitage d'éclat sur face inférieure de gros support éclat (méthode Kombewa), production lamellaire autonome, débitage sur tranche transversale et longitudinale d'éclat, débitage lamellaire sur face inférieure (pièce de la Bertonne).L'ensemble de ces données, intégrées à celles des autres sites du Velay (La Roche à Tavernat, le Blot, Cottier) et du Forez (La Goutte Roffat, la Grange Jobin) permettent de proposer une structuration de l'espace auvergnat au Badegoulien, entre plaine et montagne. / We present an evaluation of the Badegoulian of Auvergne after a detailed technological and typological approach of the lithic series from two sites, the Rond-du-Barry cave in Haute-Loire and the open-air site of La Contrée Viallet in the Allier. The characters of these series are compared with those from other sites located in the same area (Cottier, La Roche à Tavernat, Le Blot, La Goutte Roffat, La Grange Jobin and La Faye Godet). Numerous chaînes opératoires have been reconstructed according to the nature of the raw materials utilized. They demonstrate the technical adaptivity of the Badegoulian.In Velay, unit F2 of the Rond-du-Barr cave exhibits a diversity of Badegoulian cultural fascies. Ancient Badegoulian is characterized by the abundance of multiple tools, the absence of raclettes and a production of thick blades.The recent Badegoulian is marked by various technical traditions linked with thoose from the South of the Paris Basin and from the Mediterranean area.The open-air sites in the Bourbonnais (La Contrée Viallet and La Faye Godet) reveal the technical diversity of the Badegoulian of the Auvergne : flakes production from large flakes (Kombewa), autonomous bladelets production, débitage on flakes flanks and bladelet production on ventral surfaces (pièce de la Bertonne).All these data, when connected with those from the other sites of the Velay (La Roche à Tavernat, Le Blot, Cottier) and the Forez (La Goutte Roffat, la Grange Jobin) allow us to propose a model of structuration of the Badegoulian in the Auvergne, between lowlands and mountains.

The epistemological problem of the external world asks: (1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible?” This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick 1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks: (2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?” Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the first question. Meta-epistemological scepticism is the thesis that a satisfying philosophical explanation of how our knowledge of the world is possible is itself not possible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the second question. In this thesis, I explore the prospects of meta-epistemological scepticism. In particular, I structure the thesis around two master arguments from Stroud (1984, 2000, 2004, and 2009) for meta-epistemological scepticism. The first argument is what I call “Stroud’s puzzle”, and the second argument is “Stroud’s dilemma” (cf. Cassam 2009). I argue that Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. However, I also argue that Stroud’s dilemma withstands serious objections (e.g., from Sosa 1994, Williams 1996, and Cassam 2009). In short, while Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism, Stroud’s dilemma does seem to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. This thesis therefore represents a partial defence of meta-epistemological scepticism. Meta-epistemological scepticism is therefore a live option in epistemology. In Chapter 1, I explain what meta-epistemological is, present Stroud’s puzzle and Stroud’s dilemma for meta-epistemological scepticism, and argue that meta-epistemological sceptics are not committed to first-order scepticism. In Chapter 2, I examine what I call the “anti-revisionist” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 3, I examine the “conditional scepticism” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 4, I look at Williams’s (1996) master argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and argue that it fails. In Chapter 5, I look at externalist responses to Stroud’s dilemma, and in particular, Sosa (1994). I argue that Sosa’s objection fails, and therefore Stroud’s dilemma survives serious externalist objections. In Chapter 6, I explain Cassam’s (2009) argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and I argue that it fails. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, summarising the main results.