Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-06-30T14:37:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_LUIZ_PAULO_DA_CAS_CICHOSKI_COMPLETO.pdf: 1758729 bytes, checksum: 5d01f795a90116b18dbf55169d2ce1ca (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-30T14:37:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_LUIZ_PAULO_DA_CAS_CICHOSKI_COMPLETO.pdf: 1758729 bytes, checksum: 5d01f795a90116b18dbf55169d2ce1ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-16 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / Quando n?s falamos sobre entidades coletivas, a??o ? o tipo de atribui??o mais comum. N?s rotineiramente falamos coisas tais como: ?China suspende todas as importa??es de carv?o da Coreia do Norte?; ?Uber est? investigando acusa??es de ass?dio feitas por ex-funcion?rio?; ?A Suprema Corte estuda o caso de um tiro disparado nos E.U.A. que matou um adolescente no M?xico?; ?Mal?sia retira embaixador na Coreia do Norte?; ?SpaceX lan?a foguete a partir da hist?rica ?plataforma da lua? da NASA.?. S?o essas atribui??es verdadeiras? Com certeza todas elas poderiam ser meramente metaf?ricas. N?s poder?amos tomar entidades coletivas como agentes somente como uma maneira de falar. Neste trabalho, eu argumento em favor de uma posi??o realista a respeito de entidades coletivas e seu status de agente; tornando algumas dessas senten?as verdadeiras. Ultimamente, muitos fil?sofos t?m abordado esse t?pico, mas a discuss?o tende a ser guiada pelo problema da intencionalidade coletiva, o problema de como entidades coletivas podem possuir estados mentais. Meu trabalho tenta trazer mais elementos da filosofia da a??o para a investiga??o de a??es coletivas. Eu tomo como guia o problema da individua??o da a??o, porque esse t?pico aborda quest?es de central import?ncia para a??es coletivas. Especialmente a quest?o das a??es agregadas: a??es que s?o compostas de outras a??es, que parecem ser os casos paradigm?ticos de a??es coletivas, na medida em que a??es coletivas s?o, presumivelmente, compostas de a??es individuais. O problema da individua??o da a??o nos leva a dois conceitos centrais da natureza da a??o: a??o b?sica e inten??o. Neste trabalho, eu mostrarei como uma investiga??o sobre a??o b?sica pode nos ajudar a localizar o lugar das contribui??es individuais em a??es coletivas e como uma investiga??o sobre inten??o pode localizar um elemento fundamental da a??o que ? irredut?vel e distintivamente coletivo nos casos de a??es coletivas. Depois de explorar esses dois conceitos centrais, eu ofere?o uma defini??o de a??o que leva a s?rio o lugar da inten??o como guia para identificar quando um evento constitui uma a??o. / When we talk about collective entities, action is the most common kind of ascription. We regularly say things such as ?China suspends all coal imports from North Korea?; ?Uber is investigating harassment claims by ex-employee?; ?Supreme Court considers case of a shot fired in U.S. that killed a teenager in Mexico?; ?Malaysia recalls ambassador to North Korea?; ?SpaceX launches rocket from NASA?s historic moon pad.? Are those ascriptions true? For sure, they could all be metaphoric. We could take collective entities as agents just as a way of speaking. In this work, I argue in favor of a realist position regarding collective entities and their status of agent; rendering some of these sentences true. Recently, many philosophers are addressing this topic, but the discussion tends to be guided by the problem of collective intentionality, the problem of how collective entities can have mental states. My work tries to bring more elements of philosophy of action to the investigation of collective action. I take as a guide the problem of action individuation, because this topic addresses questions of central importance for collective action. Especially the question of aggregate actions, actions that are composed of other actions, which seems to be the paradigmatic case of collective action, insofar as they are presumably composed of individuals? actions. The problem of action individuation leads us to two central concepts on the nature of action: basic action and intention. In this work, I will show how an investigation on basic action can help us locate the place of individuals? contributions in collective action and how an investigation on intention can locate a fundamental element of action that is irreducible and distinctively collective in collective action cases. After exploring these two core concepts, I provide a definition of action that take seriously the place of intention as a guide to identify when an event constitutes an action.

Il est courant de faire remonter l’origine du «problème corps-esprit» à Descartes et à sa distinction radicale des substances pensante et étendue. La question est bien connue : comment l’esprit, n’étant pas corporel, pourrait-il agir sur le corps et le mouvoir, et comment le corps pourrait-il agir en retour sur l’esprit, en causant ses sentiments et ses passions ? Si Descartes ne voyait là aucune difficulté qui aurait mérité d’abandonner la distinction des substances, ou au contraire la thèse d’une interaction causale réelle entre l’esprit et le corps, tel n’aura pas été le cas de ses lecteurs et interprètes. Ces derniers n’ont eu de cesse de faire valoir l’incohérence de son «dualisme interactionniste», souvent invoquée pour rendre compte de l’abandon, à l’âge classique, des relations causales entre l’esprit et le corps, et à l’époque contemporaine, du dualisme des substances au profit d’une ontologie physicaliste. Dans ce travail, nous revenons sur les difficultés engendrées par le cartésianisme concernant les rapports de l’esprit et du corps, en combinant trois perspectives qui associent réceptions classiques et contemporaines : celle des premiers objecteurs de Descartes ; celle de ses successeurs cartésiens, en s’intéressant à leur traitement de la difficulté liée à l’interaction âme-corps ; et celle des philosophes de l’esprit contemporains, dans le cadre de leur réflexion autour du Mind-body problem. Les problèmes philosophiques ainsi mis au jour sont utilisés pour relire les thèses de Descartes et proposer une nouvelle évaluation des doctrines sur la base des phénomènes psychophysiques qu’elles permettent ou non d’expliquer. / It is common to trace back the origin of the “mind-body problem” to Descartes and to his radical distinction between extended and thinking substance. The question is well known: how can the immaterial mind act on the body and move it, and how can the body, in turn, act on the mind by causing its feelings and passions? While Descartes did not regard this as the source of any difficulties that might have necessitated the rejection of the distinction between substances or, inversely, of the theory of real causal interaction between mind and body, his readers and interpreters did. They constantly insisted on the inconsistency of his “interactionist dualism,” which is often invoked as a reason for discarding the theory of causal relation between mind and body in the classical period, and for replacing substance dualism with a physicalist ontology in the contemporary period.In this work, we return to the difficulties generated by Cartesian philosophy about the relationship between mind and body from three interrelated perspectives, which combine classical and contemporary receptions of Descartes: that of the first objectors to Descartes; that of his successors, with special consideration of their treatment of the difficulties involved in explaining mind-body interaction; and that of contemporary philosophers of mind, whose reflections on the mind-body problem are examined. Our approach to the philosophical issues thus brought to light allows us to revisit Descartes’s theses, and to propose a new evaluation of the doctrines on the basis of the psychophysical phenomena that they are capable of accounting for or not.

This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis develops many further commitments: That action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned; that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why these objections ought to be rejected.