Global ETD Search

1	Naturally we : a philosophical study of collective intentionality Gallotti, Mattia Luca January 2010 (has links) According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to ‘share’ the mental states of others and to form collective intentional states. Collective intentionality has been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of its reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related, and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In this thesis I set out a theory of the naturalization of collective intentionality that draws a line between naturalizability arguments and theories of collective intentionality naturalized. The former provide reasons for believing in the naturalness of collective intentional states based on our commonsense understanding of them; the latter offer responses to the ontological question about the existence and identity of collective as distinct from individual intentionality. This model is naturalistic because it holds that the only way to establish the place of mental entities in the order of things is through the theory and practice of science. After reviewing naturalizability arguments in philosophy, I consider an influential research program in the cognitive sciences. On the account that I present, the irreducibility of collective intentionality can be derived from a theory of human development in scientific psychology dealing with phenomena of sociality like communication, recently refined by Michael Tomasello. 100
2	The AU and Issues of Institutional Capacity and Enforcement Imoedemhe, Ovo 20 June 2023 (has links) Yes / In light of the emerging African Union (AU) legal order, this chapter examines AU’s institutions and courts to situate AU law in the wider context of AU’s enforcement mechanisms. In the nearly two decades of the operational phase of the AU, several institutions and courts have arguably ensured enforcements of its laws, policies, and decisions. Added to its judicial, human rights, and legal organs, the African Court of Human Rights has been at the disposal of the AU in the fight against human rights abuses and implementation of regional and international instruments in environmental and criminal law matters. What could potentially be the impact of these institutions on AU law? Also, will the evolving AU law require a separate enforcement mechanism, or could it rely on pre-existing institutions and courts? These issues become necessary in view of the AU’s commitment to implement Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063, which amongst other things, envisions respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law within the region. The chapter argues that the challenges of weak institutions, corruption, and internal conflicts are endemic within the continent. Therefore, it takes the view that a system of normative, cultural, and cognitive institutional reforms and transformation will be valuable. African Union AU institutional reforms Institutional theory Enforcement mechanisms Agenda 2063 Collective intentionality
3	The foundations of international political virtue Malone, Christopher David January 2013 (has links) This thesis provides the theoretical groundwork for a 'virtue ethical' account of international political conduct. The project begins by investigating the distinct patterns of normative theorising within international scholarship, noting not only that moral philosophical foundations are unpronounced and interchangeable, but that even in this diminished capacity the influence of virtue ethical thought is limited and fragmentary relative to its competitors. Redressing this underrepresentation is thus dually motivated: developing a fresh perspective on important global issues, whilst also subjecting the theory to an atypical angle of scrutiny. Adapting virtue ethics to the international realm requires, most essentially, that we settle the level at which its concepts should be applied. Can the theory’s central focus on character be reconciled with the collective nature of global political interaction? Can we accurately ascribe virtues and vices to governments and states? These questions of group agency form the heart of thesis investigation. Beginning from abstract foundations, the possible justification for such ascriptions is sought in competing theories of joint action and attitude. The 'individualist' accounts of Searle and Bratman are ultimately rejected in favour of Gilbert's non-reductive 'plural subject' theory, and - presenting group-level accounts of intention, motivation, practical wisdom, emotion and disposition around her concept of 'joint commitment' - a general model of collective character is constructed. Allied to additional requirements of moral responsibility, this framework is then used to assess the virtue-capability of actual political bodies, considering the decision-making hierarchy of the United Kingdom as a case study for the modern state. Tracing the route of policy authorisation across cabinet, government and parliament, a sophisticated yet ultimately impermanent picture of group-virtue-ethical agency is established, in tension with the notion of enduring state liability. By shifting focus to the national level, it is argued that this fluctuating footprint of agency can nevertheless be unified, modifying Gilbert’s notion of a 'population joint commitment' to tie institutional virtue and vice to a persisting state identity. This provides a template for international character evaluation. 327.101
4	The ontological structure of collective action / Estrutura ontol?gica de a??es coletivas Cichoski, Luiz Paulo da Cas 16 March 2017 (has links) Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-06-30T14:37:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_LUIZ_PAULO_DA_CAS_CICHOSKI_COMPLETO.pdf: 1758729 bytes, checksum: 5d01f795a90116b18dbf55169d2ce1ca (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-30T14:37:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_LUIZ_PAULO_DA_CAS_CICHOSKI_COMPLETO.pdf: 1758729 bytes, checksum: 5d01f795a90116b18dbf55169d2ce1ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-16 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / Quando n?s falamos sobre entidades coletivas, a??o ? o tipo de atribui??o mais comum. N?s rotineiramente falamos coisas tais como: ?China suspende todas as importa??es de carv?o da Coreia do Norte?; ?Uber est? investigando acusa??es de ass?dio feitas por ex-funcion?rio?; ?A Suprema Corte estuda o caso de um tiro disparado nos E.U.A. que matou um adolescente no M?xico?; ?Mal?sia retira embaixador na Coreia do Norte?; ?SpaceX lan?a foguete a partir da hist?rica ?plataforma da lua? da NASA.?. S?o essas atribui??es verdadeiras? Com certeza todas elas poderiam ser meramente metaf?ricas. N?s poder?amos tomar entidades coletivas como agentes somente como uma maneira de falar. Neste trabalho, eu argumento em favor de uma posi??o realista a respeito de entidades coletivas e seu status de agente; tornando algumas dessas senten?as verdadeiras. Ultimamente, muitos fil?sofos t?m abordado esse t?pico, mas a discuss?o tende a ser guiada pelo problema da intencionalidade coletiva, o problema de como entidades coletivas podem possuir estados mentais. Meu trabalho tenta trazer mais elementos da filosofia da a??o para a investiga??o de a??es coletivas. Eu tomo como guia o problema da individua??o da a??o, porque esse t?pico aborda quest?es de central import?ncia para a??es coletivas. Especialmente a quest?o das a??es agregadas: a??es que s?o compostas de outras a??es, que parecem ser os casos paradigm?ticos de a??es coletivas, na medida em que a??es coletivas s?o, presumivelmente, compostas de a??es individuais. O problema da individua??o da a??o nos leva a dois conceitos centrais da natureza da a??o: a??o b?sica e inten??o. Neste trabalho, eu mostrarei como uma investiga??o sobre a??o b?sica pode nos ajudar a localizar o lugar das contribui??es individuais em a??es coletivas e como uma investiga??o sobre inten??o pode localizar um elemento fundamental da a??o que ? irredut?vel e distintivamente coletivo nos casos de a??es coletivas. Depois de explorar esses dois conceitos centrais, eu ofere?o uma defini??o de a??o que leva a s?rio o lugar da inten??o como guia para identificar quando um evento constitui uma a??o. / When we talk about collective entities, action is the most common kind of ascription. We regularly say things such as ?China suspends all coal imports from North Korea?; ?Uber is investigating harassment claims by ex-employee?; ?Supreme Court considers case of a shot fired in U.S. that killed a teenager in Mexico?; ?Malaysia recalls ambassador to North Korea?; ?SpaceX launches rocket from NASA?s historic moon pad.? Are those ascriptions true? For sure, they could all be metaphoric. We could take collective entities as agents just as a way of speaking. In this work, I argue in favor of a realist position regarding collective entities and their status of agent; rendering some of these sentences true. Recently, many philosophers are addressing this topic, but the discussion tends to be guided by the problem of collective intentionality, the problem of how collective entities can have mental states. My work tries to bring more elements of philosophy of action to the investigation of collective action. I take as a guide the problem of action individuation, because this topic addresses questions of central importance for collective action. Especially the question of aggregate actions, actions that are composed of other actions, which seems to be the paradigmatic case of collective action, insofar as they are presumably composed of individuals? actions. The problem of action individuation leads us to two central concepts on the nature of action: basic action and intention. In this work, I will show how an investigation on basic action can help us locate the place of individuals? contributions in collective action and how an investigation on intention can locate a fundamental element of action that is irreducible and distinctively collective in collective action cases. After exploring these two core concepts, I provide a definition of action that take seriously the place of intention as a guide to identify when an event constitutes an action. Collective Action Collective Intentionality Philosophy of Action Individuation of Action Basic Action Intention A??o Coletiva Intencionalidade Coletiva Filosofia da A??o Individua??o da A??o A??o B?sica Inten??o CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
5	Intentionalitet i kollektiva beteenden hos en artificiell svärm / Intentionality in collective behaviors of an artificial swarm Stenfelt, Matilda January 2020 (has links) Målet med den här datorbaserade filosofiska utredningen inom kognitionsvetenskap är att utforska intentionalitet i kollektiva beteenden hos artificiella svärmar. Två definitioner av intentionalitet utforskades; som representationer hos agenter och som observerbara attribut hos agenter, även kallat intentional stance. För den representativa definitionen användes en modell av kollektiv intentionalitet som integrerar två olika ståndpunkter, singularståndpunkten och pluralståndpunkten av kollektiv intentionalitet. Modellen har fem villkor för intentionalitet enligt SharedPlans. Genom att använda Belief-Desire-Intention-modellen för intelligenta agenter operationaliserades villkoren till möjliga representationer. En implementation av en målinriktad artificiell svärm i NetLogo analyserades genom att studera hur väl den uppfyllde de operationaliserade villkoren. Fyra av fem villkor var uppfyllda. Flera simuleringar med olika hastighet genomfördes även under observation. Dessa visade att processen kunde delas upp i tre faser med olika egenskaper. Den utforskande fasen hade gemensam intentionalitet centrerad till ett fåtal aktiva individer. Beslutsfasen hade individuella intentioner som kunde stå i konflikt med varandra medan gemensamma intentioner strävade mot samma mål. I flyttfasen var de individuella intentionerna att förhålla sig till varandra, vilket fick gruppen att upplevas som en enhet med intentionen att flytta gruppen. Resultaten visade att intentionalitet kan observeras och analyseras hos den här artificiella svärmen. Däremot har svärmen inte kollektiv intentionalitet utifrån båda ståndpunkterna. computational philosophy artificial life swarm intelligence collective intentionality SharedPlans intentional stance Belief-Desire-Intention model BeeSmart Hive Finding model Computer and Information Sciences Data- och informationsvetenskap Philosophy Filosofi
6	Roadblocks and gateways in the human domain : A cognitive interoperability framework for allies and partners Haas, Silvia January 2023 (has links) This thesis contributes to our understanding of cognitive interoperability by explor-ing barriers, facilitators, and contextual factors to create a framework. With the ad-vent of the cognitive domain in warfighting, the adversary pursuit of military strate-gic advantage through cognitive science demands that we seize the initiative and seek cognitive superiority with allies and partners. Prior research acknowledges the importance of human interoperability but is limited to singular studies at the opera-tional and national level. This thesis shifts focus to the military strategic and multi-national level to uncover cognitive and cultural inhibitors and enablers of cognitive interoperability. The empirical data is drawn from a distinct case study that examines senior military officers during a combined exercise. The analysis explores compe-tencies that foster strategic empathy and collective intentionality with identity and human connectivity as major catalysts. Individuals are agents who collectively con-struct cognitive interoperability, setting conditions for cognitive dominance in future military competition. Cognitive interoperability cognitive superiority cooperation theory collective intentionality cultural dimen-sion theory cross-cultural competence perspective taking alliance theory professional military education Other Social Sciences Annan samhällsvetenskap
7	Kollektives Verstehen Hauswald, Rico 14 July 2020 (has links) Many epistemic attitudes including belief and knowledge have already been examined to determine the extent to which they can be attributed to collectives. The epistemological literature on explanatory understanding and objectual understanding, on the other hand, has focused almost exclusively on individual subjects. However, there are many situations that can be described by sentences of the form “We understand P”, “We understand why p”, “Group G understands P”, or “G understands why p”. As I shall show, these situations can be classified into five categories: distributive, common, joint, deferential, and cooperative understanding. Based on a definitional scheme, according to which the general concept of understanding has a cognitive component, a factivity component, and an epistemic-pro-attitude component, this paper aims to analyse these five types. info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/100 ddc:100
8	I problemi del fondamento e della genesi delle azioni collettive nel sistema filosofico di John Searle. Zucatti, Tommaso 26 July 2022 (has links) La presente tesi ha come oggetto due problemi della filosofia di John Searle, entrambi definibili come problemi del fondamento. Il primo è il problema del fondamento vero e proprio, e cioè il problema del tentativo di Searle di ancorare la mente umana (con la sua irriducibilità ontologica) alla realtà fisica e naturale, attraverso un’inedita soluzione del problema mente-corpo che prende il nome di naturalismo biologico. Il secondo è, invece, il problema del fondamento della realtà sociale, e cioè il problema del tentativo di Searle di collocare tanto l’origine ontologica quanto il principio esplicativo della realtà sociale e istituzionale dentro la coscienza (ogni singola coscienza) e, in particolare, nell’intenzionalità collettiva. In questo senso, la presente tesi ha lo scopo di mostrare che i tentativi di Searle non sembrano essere andati del tutto a buon fine. Per quanto riguarda il primo – e cioè il problema del fondamento vero e proprio – si cercherà di mostrare che a) il naturalismo biologico sembra essere fondato su una metafisica a livelli non adeguatamente sviluppata per sorreggerlo e giustificarlo, e che, di conseguenza, b) il naturalismo biologico non sembra essere quella soluzione semplice al problema mente-corpo che pretende di essere. Per quanto riguarda il secondo – e cioè il problema del fondamento della realtà sociale – si cercherà di mostrare che a) il costruttivismo sociale di Searle sembra sfociare in una forma di solipsismo apparentemente incompatibile con qualsiasi concetto di intenzionalità collettiva, ma che, ciononostante, b) sembra esserci una soluzione per questo problema non solo interna alla filosofia della mente di Searle, ma anche in grado di svilupparne le potenzialità inespresse. Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica
9	La structure de la réalité sociale abstraite inhérente aux sociétés prescrites : La quiddité des liens et des structures de coopérations intra-organisationnels issus de l’activité réelle, dans le cas du processus de co-construction de sens découlant des décisions stratégiques / The structure of abstract social reality inherent to prescribed societies : the quiddity of intraorganizational cooperation links and structures resulting from the actual activity, in the case of the sensemaking process deriving from strategic decisions Dandelot, Damien 15 May 2012 (has links) Partant de l’idée que des filiales d’une entreprise sont en mesure de remettre en cause les décisions de la direction générale (maison-mère), l’approche holistique développée dans ce travail part du principe qu’une organisation peut être un « être », laissant entendre ainsi que les informations dont elle dispose seraient extérieures aux individus qui la composent. Ce qui conduit à s'interroger s’il est concevable d’ignorer l’individu dans une telle relation de domination. Cette thèse propose justement un modèle autour de résultats qui montrent la difficile exclusion de l’individu dans un contexte méta-organisationnel (dans lequel les membres seraient des organisations et non des individus). Dans cette veine, ce sont les dynamiques humaines de l’organisation qui sont au cœur de ce travail : il existe par et au travers de l’individu une dynamique issue de l’activité réelle qui permet de faire vivre l’organisation par elle-même, mais également qui permet au prescrit de cette dernière d’évoluer. Bien que les résultats obtenus montrent que l’organisation n’est pas un objet mort et sans force et qu’elle a bien la possibilité de vivre par elle-même, ce sont les individus qui — par leurs engagements conditionnels — permettent cette existence propre de l’organisation comme structure intra-consciente qui impose des droits et des obligations. Dans cette perspective, le modèle proposé vise à dessiner les structures de la réalité sociale abstraite (dénommé dans la recherche menée, l’Entité X) en montrant les forces et les contraintes organisationnelles qui pèsent sur les individus-membres, tout en relevant les capacités humaines à sortir des structures prescrites par la co-construction de liens et de structures transversales de coopérations issus de l’activité réelle. / Based on the idea that the subsidiaries of a company are able to call into question the decisions of senior management (the parent company), the holistic approach developed in this study assumes that an organization can be a “being”, implying thereby that the information in its possession is external to the individuals who compose it. This raises the question of whether it is conceivable to ignore the individual in such a relationship of domination. This thesis proposes a model based on the results which show the difficult exclusion of the individual in a meta-organizational context (in which members would be organizations and not individuals). Along these same lines, the organization’s human dynamics are at the heart of this research: there exists by and through the individual a dynamic resulting from actual activity that allows the organization to live by itself, while also allowing prescribe to evolve. Although the results show that the organization is not a dead and strengthless object, and it has the opportunity to live by itself, it is the individuals who —through their conditional commitments— allow the separate existence of an organizational structure’s intra-consciousness, which imposes rights and obligations. In this perspective, the proposed model aims to draw the structures of abstract social reality (referred as Entity X in this study) by showing the strengths and organizational constraints that weigh on individual members, while raising the human capacity to emerge from the structures prescribed by the sensemaking of links and transversal structures for cooperation that originate from the actual activity. Co-construction de sens Décision stratégique Échanges transversaux méta Enaction « Entité X » Formes de régulation méta Gouvernance Holisme Individualbased organizations Intentionnalisme Intentionnalité collective Intra-conscience Inter-subjectif Individu vs organisation Individualisme L’invariance et le système Jeux de pouvoir / Stucture de jeux Légitimation inter-groupe / entité Management International Méta-organisation Ordre global Ordre social Organizing / Changing Plus structurel qu’organisationnel Phénomènes sociaux / Faits sociaux Réalité sociale humaine Résistance / Révolte Socio-pouvoir Sujet pluriel Violence symbolique Sensemaking Strategic decision Transversal Meta exchanges Enaction “Entity X” Forms of Meta regulations Governance Holism Individualbased organizations Individualism Collective intentionality Intra- conscience Inter-subjective Individual vs organization Individualism The invariance and the system Power games/Game structures Inter-group/entity legitimation International Management Meta-organization Global order Social order Organizing/Changing More structural than organizational More structural than organizational Human social reality Resistance/Revolt Social power Plural subject Symbolic violence 650

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