For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the study of these wars has been largely ignored. Existing scholarship on wartime alliances focuses almost exclusively on the causes of alignment or the onset of conflict ignoring the conduct and consequences of these arrangements. Wartime partnerships exhibit enormous variation in their structure, however. What accounts for the varied multinational security arrangements states adopt in wartime? I argue that the choices states make in constructing these wartime partnerships have important consequences for both the conduct and outcome of conflicts. Following the institutional design literature, I argue that these differences are purposeful and originate from the rational calculations and strategic interactions among the actors creating them. I focus on one design feature of multinational military structures in particular, that of command and control (C2). The enormous variation visible in multinational command and control structures in wartime begs two questions: First, why do states adopt different command and control structures? Second, what drives actors to abandon one structure in favor of another? To answer these questions, I develop a theory of failure-driven change. Because conventional wisdom suggests that greater cooperation is beneficial, yielding gains for all, the puzzle naturally arises as to why all wartime partnerships don’t start out in the tightest configuration possible, that of unified command. After all, the benefits of greater wartime integration are seemingly vast; from the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs to the conferral of legitimacy, tightly integrated arrangements confer distinct advantages. Despite the many benefits wartime integration confers, however, I argue states are reluctant to adopt unified command for fear of having to surrender operational control over their military forces. Yet even a cursory examination of wartime multinational partnerships reveals that states do sometimes enter into more integrated command relationships, leading to the (second) question of what motivates them to do so. Here, I argue that one factor in particular, that of battlefield performance, leads states to abandon their intrinsic reluctance toward unity of command. Specifically, I argue that when faced with military defeat on the battlefield, states often respond by experimenting with new command and control arrangements. The learning process is often tentative and slow yet over time leads to greater integration. Additionally, I argue that greater integration in multinational command and control structures is correlated with improved military performance. In short, failure leads to adaptation which then leads to success. To test my theory of institutional learning, I employ comparative historical analysis, specifically process tracing and the congruence method. The universe of cases consisted of all multinational wars since 1816, some 38 conflicts. However, because a number of these cases featured multinational parties on both sides, this yielded a total of 43 cases. Three cases were chosen on the basis of representativeness and variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest. The cases examined were the Entente and Central Powers in World War I and the UN coalition in the Korean War. Overall, the cases provide strong support for my theory of wartime learning. The findings suggest that failure is a key determinant of wartime integration.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 491-501). / Microfiche. / xv, 501 leaves, bound 29 cm

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 set Europe in sorrow, distress, and emergency. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is something Sweden has refrained from joining due to the country’s neutral stance. However, despite Sweden's long-standing neutrality of over 200 years, it was abandoned within only weeks. The short timeframe of decision-making raised questions about the level of rationality in the decision of the Swedish NATO application. Scholars and researchers have through different methods and theories attempted to explain this unpredictable shift, but still, the process appears to lack a clearly defined rationale. This case study seeks to understand the decision-making process of the government in times of crisis, examining how the rationality of such decisions may have been compromised by analyzing secondary data. The aim is to address the research gap, concerning the rapid and framed process for Sweden to join NATO. Analyzing the decision through the lens of Bounded Rationality Theory, applying variables such as (1) time pressure, (2) cognition, and (3) access to information (Simon, 1947), the possibility arises to shred light on the factors contributing to Bounded Rationality in the Swedish NATO process. These aspects were all present in the Swedish NATO process. In combination with characteristics of a government in crisis (Boin, Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005), one can to a great extent understand the significant shift in stance towards NATO membership, given that governments tend to act differently when being subject to a crisis. It can be concluded that rationality was significantly bounded by limited access to information, to some extent by the ability to process information, and comprehensively by the constraints of time pressure. The Swedish NATO process, consisting of a government amid a crisis, was subject to and exemplifies Bounded Rationality in decision-making.

Avant les Conventions de Genève de 1949, seuls les conflits armés internationaux étaient réglementés par le droit de la guerre. Ce dernier ne pouvait s’appliquer dans les guerres civiles qu’après la reconnaissance des forces rebelles comme partie belligérante. Or, depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale on a assisté à une multiplication des conflits armés non internationaux. Mais les Conventions de Genève de 1949 leur ont consacré seulement l’article 3 commun ; puis le Protocole II additionnel de 1977 est venu le compléter. Ces deux textes comportent de nombreuses lacunes, notamment l’absence de définition des « combattants » et des « civils », rendant ainsi difficile le respect du principe de distinction pourtant essentiel à la protection des populations civiles. Ces dispositions ne réglementent pas non plus les moyens et méthodes de guerre. Outre les lacunes normatives, il y a des problèmes matériels qui compliquent la mise en œuvre efficace des règles pertinentes. Il s’agit notamment de la participation des populations civiles aux hostilités, y compris les enfants-Soldats et les mercenaires. L’absence du statut de combattant dans les conflits armés non internationaux apparaît comme le problème principal compromettant l’efficacité du DIH. Celle-Ci ne contribue-T-Elle pas au non respect de ce droit par les groupes armés ? Faudrait-Il conférer ce statut à ces derniers en vue de les amener à appliquer le droit international humanitaire ou envisager d’autres moyens ? Lesquels ? / Before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, only the international armed conflicts were regulated by the law of the war. This last one could apply in the civil wars only after the recognition of the rebel forces as belligerent party. Now, since the Second World War we attended an increase in non-International armed conflicts. But the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dedicated them only the common article 3; then the additional Protocol II of 1977 came to complete it. These two texts contain numerous gaps, in particular the absence of definition of the "combatants" and the "civilians", making so difficult the respect for the principle of distinction nevertheless essential for the protection of the civil populations. These rules do not regulate either the means and the war methods. Besides the normative gaps, there are material problems which complicate the effective implementation of the relevant rules. It is in particular about the participation of the civil populations in the hostilities, including the children-Soldiers and the mercenaries. The absence of combatant's status in the non-International armed conflicts appears as the main problem compromising the efficiency of the international humanitarian law. Does not this one contribute to the non compliance with this law by the armed groups? Would it be necessary to confer this status to these last ones to bring them to apply the international humanitarian law or to envisage the other means? Which one?