The history or the human race is replete with accounts of conflicts that originated in disputes over the ownership of land. Some of these disputes have been between nations, some have been between political subdivisions within nations, and others have been between individual landowners. It is to the latter of these that this writing is directed. In some nations most of the land is owned by a few wealthy people, and it is rented to those in the lower economic group for an annual stipend in agricultural products, money, or some other form of compensation. America is a nation of home owners and landowners which makes the question of adequate property descriptions one of common interest. When the country was first settled this problem was not serious as there was more then enough land for everyone, but as the population density and land values increased, so did the number of disputes over property boundaries. These arguments result in expensive litigation, ill-feeling between neighbors, and, sometimes, murder. People derive a peculiar satisfaction and joy in knowing that "that certain parcel of land" is really their own, and they fight any encroachment, real or imaginary, with dogged determination. In most boundary disputes each person is convinced that he is right, and that the other fellow is the thief. The unfortunate part of it is that the dividing line ie so poorly described that a surveyor has a very difficult time in locating it. Sometimes the evidence is so meager that arbitration is the only alternative. Those intimately acquainted with existing conditions are fully aware of the inadequacies of boundary surveys. Even though land represents a very large percent of the national wealth, it is probably the poorest described and the least negotiable of all forms of wealth. The difficulties involved in the transfer of real estate are out of all proportion to the difficulties involved tn the transfer of other types of property. This situation can be, and should be, corrected. It seems that the logical and intelligent approach would be to determine first wherein the difficulties lie, and then take appropriate and adequate steps to eliminate them. This means, of course, that action will have to replace inertia in order to resolve a tremendous conglomeration of pyramided faults into an intelligible and logical form. / Master of Science

Cette thèse étudie les politiques de sécurité et de défense développées dans la corne de l’Afrique. Notre objectif principal est de montrer qu’en Somalie, en Érythrée, en Éthiopie et à Djibouti les facteurs politiques, historiques, économiques et sociaux se combinent pour expliquer la situation d’insécurité totale qui règne dans la région. Sa position géostratégique fait d’elle, une zone très convoitée pour mieux lutter contre le terrorisme et la piraterie. Cet avantage géographique est peu rentabilisé à cause des guerres civiles, des contentieux territoriaux et des catastrophes naturelles qui ont engendré l’une des plus grandes crises humanitaires et alimentaires au monde. Devant cet état de fait, les politiques de sécurité et défense, qu’elles soient régionales et continentale, semblent être impuissantes. Les échecs de ces politiques découlent, d’une part ; des discordes entre les chefs d’État et, d’autre part ; du manque de moyens financiers des États, de l’Union africaine et de ses organismes sous régionaux (l’IGAD et le COMESA). En étudiant le cas de Djibouti, nous montrerons que la politique de sécurité nationale souffre de plusieurs maux. En effet, la corruption, le clientélisme, le tribalisme et le détournement des deniers publics affaiblissent la politique sécuritaire et incitent les populations appauvries aux soulèvements. Djibouti, étant l’un des pays le plus stable de la région, constitue un baromètre pour mieux mesurer les nouvelles menaces qui déstabiliseraient la zone. Pays limitrophes des foyers du terrorisme et de la piraterie, il est le choix d’implantation, par excellence, des bases militaires françaises, américaines, japonaise et de plusieurs autres contingents. Ainsi, en bénéficiant de l’aide et de la protection de ces États, il devient, par conséquent, une cible des groupes terroristes. L’apport sécuritaire et économique des bases sont indéniables. Cependant, elles ne manquent pas d’impacter négativement sur son environnement social. / This thesis studies the politics of security and defence that have been developed in the Horn of Africa. Our main objective is to show that in Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti there are political, historical, economical and sociological factors that explain the prevailing insecurity within the region. Its geostrategic position makes it a coveted area for fighting terrorism and piracy. Nevertheless this geographical advantage is not as profitable as it could be because of civil wars, boundary disputes and natural disasters that have generated one of the world’s biggest humanitarian and food crisis. Security and defence policies, whether regional or continental, have shown to be powerless when facing these realities. The failures of these policies are due to disagreements between Heads of State and to the lack of financial resources within States, the African Union and its sub-regional agencies such as IGAD and COMESA. By studying the case of Djibouti we will prove that national security policies have been weakened by corruption, clientelism and tribalism, which has lead to the insurgence of the impoverished population. Because Djibouti is one of the most stable States in the region, it serves as a barometer that measures new treats to the stability of the zone. As a neighbouring country to the hotbeds of terrorism and piracy, Djibouti is where the French, the American and the Japanese have settled their military bases; it has also consequently become the target of terrorist groups. The military bases have certainly improved the security and the economy of the area but they have also had a negative impact on its social environment.

Conflict over territory is a major concern to scholars and policymakers, and much of conflict over territory is driven by the issues that make territory more or less attractive, or salient, to states. I examine the impact that tangible and intangible issue salience has on territorial claims, and in particular, how it drives both conflict and conflict escalation. I argue that intangible issues, such as ethnic or religious kin, plays a greater role in driving more severe forms of armed conflict and conflict escalation, compared to tangible factors such as natural resources. This is theorized to be due to the difficulty in dividing territory with intangible elements, as well as domestic political pressure driving leaders to escalate. These suppositions are supported, with the finding that identity plays a particularly crucial and unique role in driving states to more severe forms of armed conflict. Further, I examine how natural resources may be viewed by states by their type and form of utilization, with certain resources likely to be more valuable or strategic to states based on their rarity, concentration, or ease of substitution, based in part on a state's level of development. The results support a fairly uniform role of natural resources, with particular resources and combinations of resources serving to drive low level conflict, but with generally little impact on severe forms of armed conflict. Development also is found to play a role, driving poorer states to dispute natural resources of certain types. Lastly, I return to the topic of conflict over territory with an ethnic dimension by examining the role of issue indivisibility in the negotiations process, and find that negotiated settlements are harder to reach, and states more likely to favor unilateral action when disputing territory with an ethnic or religious component compared to other types of issues in claimed territory.

S’estudia el procés de delimitació de la frontera hispanofrancesa, partint del Tractat dels Pirineus (1659) fins als Tractats de Límits de Baiona (1856-1868), fent especial esment al tram que correspon a la província de Girona. Amb el Tractat dels Pirineus les dues monarquies es van repartir el territori però no van arribar a fer una delimitació precisa de la línia fronterera. Durant el segle XVIII es van fer algunes delimitacions parcials i hi va haver diversos intents de fer-ne una de sencera. Va caldre esperar a la constitució de la Comisión Mixta de Límites de 1853 per a que es pogués portar a terme. La Comisión Mixta de Límites va treballar durant 15 anys i va haver de fer de mitjancera en una gran diversitat de conflictes que enfrontaven a les comunitats d’una i altra banda, la majoria dels quals relacionats amb l’aprofitament econòmic de les zones a cavall de la frontera (pastures, boscos, aigua, conreus, etc.). L’estudi es fa a dues escales: una de general, de mar a mar, on es descriuen les diferents problemàtiques i s’analitzen les solucions adoptades als Tractats de Límits de Baiona; una altra a escala local, centrada a la província de Girona, que descriu l’activitat de la Comisión Mixta de Límites, des de les negociacions fins als treballs d’afitament de la frontera. A més, es planteja un model relacional entre les diferents parts que intervenen al procés de delimitació i s’aporta el catàleg de totes les fites frontereres a Girona i el traçat fronterer desenvolupat a escala 1:25.000. Finalment, es discuteix sobre el paper d’aquest tipus de tractats tant en el Dret Internacional com a l’àmbit de les relacions de veïnatge i de l’ordenació del territori. / Summary of the thesis “The delimitation of the spanish-french border (1659-1868)” by Joan Capdevila Subirana We study the delimitation of the border between Spain and France since the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) to the Border Treaties of Bayonne (1856-1868), with particular emphasis on the section corresponding to the province of Girona. With the Treaty of the Pyrenees the two monarchies divided the territory but failed to make a precise demarcation of the border. During the eighteenth century there were some partial demarcations and there were several attempts to complete one. It was the Joint Boundary Commission (Comisión Mixta de Límites) established in 1853 who succeeded in bringing out the entire border demarcation by the Border Treaties of Bayonne. The Joint Boundary Commission worked for 15 years and had to mediate in a variety of conflicts facing the communities of both sides, most of which were related to the economic use of the areas on the border. The study was performed at two scales: on the one hand, a study on a general scale, from sea to sea, which describes the different problems and what were the solutions adopted; on the other hand, a local-scale study focusing on the province of Girona, which describes the activity of the Joint Boundary Commission, from the negotiations until the work of demarcation of the border. It also presents a relational model between the different parties involved in the process of demarcation, it provides the catalog of all border markers in Girona and the border is drawn on 1:25,000 scale mapping. Finally, we discuss the role of such treaties in both international law and in the field of neighborly relations between local communities.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.