The maritime industry is an economic activity that enables global trade and travel. However, the transportation network is threatened by security risks that seek to exploit vulnerabilities and cause damage to ships, interrupt the global supply chain network, and endanger the lives of crewmembers and passengers. While policies exist to aid in the prevention of attacks, these policies, alone, are insufficient to sustain global maritime domain security and awareness. Policies must be effectively enforced and complemented with highly trained crewmembers who have the knowledge and skills to efficiently prevent, detect, and respond to threats. This study analyzed maritime security policies and model courses to benchmark training requirements and create a topic development matrix for a centralized training academy for maritime security personnel. A course overview, syllabus, and learning objectives were created to reflect required and recommended security training components, with a focus on the cruise industry. This study concluded that a centralized training academy has significant benefits not only directly to the company where it is applied, but also to the maritime industry as a whole. Additional research would conduct evaluations of the academy and customize this curriculum for other companies engaged in ocean trade to enhance global maritime security and awareness.

Beyond possible sovereignty disputes resulting from melting Arctic ice, very little is said or written about the maritime security implications of climate change. What does climate change mean for Canadian maritime security, and how can Canada adequately prepare to ensure continued safe and secure use of the world’s oceans in an era of climate change? Climate change is relevant to maritime security through two chief dimensions. First, navies will more frequently be tasked to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the wake of more intense natural disasters. Second, increasing disorder on land will ‘slop over’ into the world’s oceans, threatening the safety of maritime commerce. Canada has stakes in both of these dimensions, and so there is great impetus for preparedness. The recommended model for preparedness sees Canada’s navy adopting a more varied fleet structure, one better suited for constabulary and diplomatic functions as opposed to traditional military functions.

The increasing volume of container trade poses formidable security challenges. As a result of terrorist attacks, a variety of compulsory and voluntary security measures have been introduced to enhance and secure maritime container trade. The United States (US) Container Security Initiative (CSI) was claimed to impose serious problems in European Union (EU) ports, and in particular it was claimed to affect EU container port competitiveness due to compliance cost and operational inefficiency. This research aimed to analyse the impact of the CSI on EU container seaport competition. Following an abductive approach, a conceptual model was developed based on the literature review. This directed the design of a Delphi study, which was used to test the opinions of academic, industrial and administrative experts. The Delphi results showed the necessity of implementing maritime security measures integrated into the entire supply chain. The negativity effects of additional costs and operational obstructions are insignificant compared to the overall benefits from a secure supply chain. The CSI is a successful and appropriate maritime security measure. With regard to its effects on the EU container seaport competition, the CSI has not distorted port competition and small ports have not lost market share. It helps the member ports to create new revenue streams and attract more container traffic, hence enhancing their competitiveness. Moreover, it facilitates global trade by reducing total transit time. A model which contains four factors was built to interpret the results of the Delphi research. This model helps to analyse how a maritime security policy will affect the EU port industry. This research also reveals two major issues under the current supply chain security framework, which are the substantial liability problem and unbalanced bilateral relations. A proposal for developing a comprehensive multilateral regime that is fully integrated into the entire supply chain is recommended as a sustainable solution.

This thesis examines the expansion of private maritime security provision, its regulation and implications for national and global security. The main research question addressed is: How are private maritime security companies (PMSCs) regulated in the context of the contemporary trend towards international security privatisation? However, further questions stem from this: Is the complex framework of the PMSCs’ business model adequately regulated? To what extent could the existing practices and regulatory framework affect international security in governance and policy, strategic, social and commercial terms? Qualitative research methods were used, strongly supported by empirical data collection – available due to extensive professional experience and personal engagement of the author with the private maritime security industry. Using a case study of PMSCs’ operations off Somalia from 2005-2013, and a plethora of selected data from primary sources and semi-structured interviews, the paper argues that there is need for more effective regulation of PMSCs and the establishment of international standards. Following an analysis of the current conceptual framework of private security, focussing particularly on maritime security, in the context of contemporary academic literature and professional practice, the paper provides a detailed theoretical justification for the selection of the methodology used. After broadening and deepening the analysis of the privatisation of security ashore, the concerns raised are then transferred to the maritime domain. The situation becomes even more complicated in the high seas due to inconsistencies between flag states’ regulations, the unregulated vastness of the oceans and the reluctance of any international body (such as the IMO) to undertake the essential task of regulating PMSCs. Building on this, an analytical framework that enables the integration of maritime security and contemporary piracy into the contemporary paradigm of global security is developed. An historical overview of piracy then demonstrates that modern piracy is an ancient phenomenon with contemporary local characteristics. The maritime crime’s causal factors remain more or less the same throughout human history and, the paper argues, PMSCs serve as a short term response to address the symptoms rather than the root causes. Given that PMSCs have so far been used primarily as measures against Somali piracy, activities in this specific region provide an appropriate case study. The development of a typology of piracy offers a deeper understanding of the regional distinctiveness of the phenomenon, which is essential to acquiring a holistic picture of the operational environment in which PMSCs are deployed. The above considerations are used as a basis for analysing the complexities of the PMSCs’ business model, in legal, operational and ethical terms. The questionable practices involved in these are not fully regulated by national states. Hence, their contract and deployment raise ethical, legal and operational concerns. In the penultimate chapter, these are further assessed in terms of the extent to which the existing regulatory framework and PMSCs’ practices affect international security in governance and policy, strategic, social and commercial terms. The research indicates that states are increasingly outsourcing the monopoly they have exercised in security provision - a trend that has also expanded the private sector’s activities and business at sea. However, the lack of international laws and the consequent unstandardized plethora of flag states’ regulations has meant that the burgeoning private security services are dependent on the global market to regulate themselves. States’ reluctance and/or inability to regulate these companies has allowed controversial practices to persist and the lack of an international body responsible for their regulation and vetting on a worldwide basis has inevitable consequences in terms of global security. The overall outcome of this thesis is an elucidation of the potential implications of the privatisation of maritime security - both positive and negative. Most significantly, it suggests this could present a significant threat to international security in the near future.

<p>Maritim säkerhet har sedan terrorattentatet i New York 2001-09-11 varit ett begrepp utan en tydlig definition. Trots detta används det frekvent i Sverige när frågor angående säkerhet till havs diskuteras. Utgångspunkten i uppsatsen är en egen definition av begreppet och hur hoten bör hanteras. I likhet med det vidgade säkerhetsbegreppet krävs samarbete mellan civila och militära aktörer. Det för att uppnå de mål som sätts upp i Sveriges säkerhetspolitik angående säkerhet på den maritima arenan. Maritim säkerhet hanteras bäst med närvaro till sjöss av statliga enheter med befogenhet att agera. I denna uppsats undersöks Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska mål angående säkerhet på den maritima arenan. Därefter undersöks hur målen används till styrning av Kustbevakningen och Försvarsmakten och vidare hur de omsättsi interna dokument hos aktörerna. Undersökningen visar att det genomgående, från politiska mål till styrningar av Försvarsmakten och Kustbevakningen, talas om samarbete, samverkan och närvaro till sjöss. Ordet samarbete nämns dock inte lika frekvent i styrningarna inom Marinen och Kustbevakningen. Det finns dock flera anledningar till varför det inte finns ett operativt samarbete. Dels på grund av rådande lagstiftning, dels till följd av relationen mellan myndigheterna. Dessa kan göra att det operativa samarbetet inte utvecklas i linje med de politiska målen.</p> / <p>Maritime security has since the attack in New York 2001-09-11 been a concept without a clear definition. In spite of this, it is frequently used when questions about security in the maritime arena is discussed. The starting point of this essay is a definition of the concept and how it is best handled. As in accordance with the broader security concept it takes cooperation between civil and military actors. This in order to achieve the goals set in the Swedish security policy regarding security in the maritime arena. Maritime security is best handled by ships in governmental service, such as the Coast Guard and the Royal Swedish Navy, which has the authority to act against crimes at sea. This essay examines Swedish security policy and its objectives regarding maritime security, how these are drafted into regulations for the Coast Guard and the Armed forces and further more how these are translated into internal documents by the actors. The survey shows that overall, from political objectives down to guidelines for the Coast Guard and the Armed forces, the words cooperation, collaboration and presence at sea are occurring. However, cooperation and collaboration are not as frequently used in the internal guidelines. The current laws make it hard for the Coast Guard and the Navy to cooperate. Although this is not the only reason, further cooperation is hampered by the relationship between the authorities, the perception of them selves and of each other. Because of this the cooperation is not progressing as the political aims intend to.</p>

Maritim säkerhet har sedan terrorattentatet i New York 2001-09-11 varit ett begrepp utan en tydlig definition. Trots detta används det frekvent i Sverige när frågor angående säkerhet till havs diskuteras. Utgångspunkten i uppsatsen är en egen definition av begreppet och hur hoten bör hanteras. I likhet med det vidgade säkerhetsbegreppet krävs samarbete mellan civila och militära aktörer. Det för att uppnå de mål som sätts upp i Sveriges säkerhetspolitik angående säkerhet på den maritima arenan. Maritim säkerhet hanteras bäst med närvaro till sjöss av statliga enheter med befogenhet att agera. I denna uppsats undersöks Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska mål angående säkerhet på den maritima arenan. Därefter undersöks hur målen används till styrning av Kustbevakningen och Försvarsmakten och vidare hur de omsättsi interna dokument hos aktörerna. Undersökningen visar att det genomgående, från politiska mål till styrningar av Försvarsmakten och Kustbevakningen, talas om samarbete, samverkan och närvaro till sjöss. Ordet samarbete nämns dock inte lika frekvent i styrningarna inom Marinen och Kustbevakningen. Det finns dock flera anledningar till varför det inte finns ett operativt samarbete. Dels på grund av rådande lagstiftning, dels till följd av relationen mellan myndigheterna. Dessa kan göra att det operativa samarbetet inte utvecklas i linje med de politiska målen. / Maritime security has since the attack in New York 2001-09-11 been a concept without a clear definition. In spite of this, it is frequently used when questions about security in the maritime arena is discussed. The starting point of this essay is a definition of the concept and how it is best handled. As in accordance with the broader security concept it takes cooperation between civil and military actors. This in order to achieve the goals set in the Swedish security policy regarding security in the maritime arena. Maritime security is best handled by ships in governmental service, such as the Coast Guard and the Royal Swedish Navy, which has the authority to act against crimes at sea. This essay examines Swedish security policy and its objectives regarding maritime security, how these are drafted into regulations for the Coast Guard and the Armed forces and further more how these are translated into internal documents by the actors. The survey shows that overall, from political objectives down to guidelines for the Coast Guard and the Armed forces, the words cooperation, collaboration and presence at sea are occurring. However, cooperation and collaboration are not as frequently used in the internal guidelines. The current laws make it hard for the Coast Guard and the Navy to cooperate. Although this is not the only reason, further cooperation is hampered by the relationship between the authorities, the perception of them selves and of each other. Because of this the cooperation is not progressing as the political aims intend to.

Reissued 13 Mar 2013 to rearrange reference list and change distribution code from F to A. / Energy and maritime-history affairs have played particularly important parts in the alignment of regional and international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey has played a pivotal regional role in all these matters. This study examines the role of Turkey as it explores the Middle East more generally, from World War II to the present day, asking how dynamic strategic alliances and regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been regulated in terms of energy and maritime-security issues. The thesis has five chapters: Chapter II discusses the geographic, political, military, and especially economic importance of the region. Chapter III provides a historical review of energy and maritime-related crises and case studies that occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean and their effect on the alignments of strategic alliances. Chapter IV presents the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of energy and maritime security and examines Turkey`s increasing strategic role in the region. This chapter provides information about the importance of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources, the geopolitical importance of Turkey as an energy hub, probable energy problems in default of delimitation of the maritime area, strategic-alliance problems and the militarization of energy security. Chapter V summarizes the main analyses and presents the importance of the current geostrategic alignment of alliances in terms of energy and maritime security, and Turkey’s key role in the settlement of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

abstract: This dissertation seeks to theorize small state strategic culture with special reference to the attitude of the ASEAN states toward institutionalizing regional cooperative security architectures. The quantitative case studies show that in small states where historically rooted strategic preferences may be limited, material influences and situational considerations take precedence over ideational factors in the making of the state's strategic culture. Second, the content of small state strategic culture focuses primarily on foreign and security policy issues that originate in their neighborhood. Lastly, Small states' threat perceptions from the neighborhood over time dictate the formation of strategic culture (provocative vs. cooperative). The qualitative case studies demonstrate that small Southeast Asian states (Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia) exhibit a higher tendency for conflict. Multilateral cooperation is at best selective. Bilateral means is still the preferred policy approach when dealing with other states. This dissertation concludes with a pessimistic remark on the prospects for the development and maturation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community. At its current stage, the APSC appears to be a policy instrument created only to reinforce ASEAN's centrality in charting the region's security architecture. This is no small accomplishment in itself nonetheless. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Political Science 2011

Uppsatsen syftar till att analysera de förmågor som den maritima säkerheten i Sveriges närområde kräver. Dessa behov har sedan jämförts med aktuella maritima resurser genom en avslutande diskussion. Utgångspunkt har tagits i Regeringens havs –och utrikespolitik med inriktning på den maritima säkerheten.I uppsatsen motsvaras begreppet ”maritima enheter” av Kustbevakningen och marinen. Hoten mot den maritima säkerheten har identifierats utifrån de uppsatta mål som de maritima enheterna arbetar mot. Dessa har fördelats över Geoffrey Tills fem underkategorier för maritim säkerhet.Begreppet maritim säkerhet har sedan brutits ned till handlingsvägar och medel, det vill säga förmågor. Handlingsvägarna och medlen leder fram till målet, som är just maritim säkerhet.Resultatet från uppsatsen visar att Sverige som småstat ständigt måste kompromissa för att optimera sina maritima enheters förmågor för att uppnå målet maritim säkerhet. Vidare dras slutsatsen att internationella samarbeten spelar en viktig roll för Sverige i detta sammanhang. Slutligen konstateras att det finns brister i de maritima enheternas förmågor och att ett fortsatt aktivt prioriterings –och förbättringsarbete är mycket viktigt för att bibehålla nödvändiga, grundläggande förmågor inom den maritima arenan. / The aim of the report is to analyze the abilities that maritime security in thesurroundings of Sweden demands. These needs are then compared to maritimeresources in a finishing discussion.The Swedish government´s foreign policy and policy for the sea, with focus onmaritime security, has been used as a starting point.In this report, the concept “maritime units” is represented by the Swedish coastguard and the Swedish navy. The threats against the maritime security have beenidentified from the goals that the maritime units are working against. Thesethreats have been divided into Geoffrey Till´s five subcategories for maritimesecurity. The concept maritime security is then broken down into ways of actionand means, in this case abilities. The ways of action and the means lead up to thegoal, that is maritime security.The result from the report shows that Sweden as a small country always need tocompromise to optimize the abilities of its maritime units to achieve the goal ofmaritime security. Henceforth is the conclusion that international cooperationplays an important role for Sweden in this context. Finally it is established that theabilities of the maritime units contain flaws and that continuing work ofimprovement and continuing to prioritize is very important to sustain thenecessary and fundamental abilities within the maritime arena.

La piraterie maritime est communément perçue comme le crime international originel en ce qu’elle a de manière consensuelle ouverte la possibilité aux états de procéder à sa répression sans aucune distinction au nom de la préservation des intérêts communs de la communauté internationale. Cette compétence universelle a largement contribué à l’élargissement du champ d’application du droit international, en particulier pénal, alors même que ce droit apparait aujourd’hui paradoxalement inadapté pour répondre aux exigences de lutte contre la piraterie moderne. Le contexte ainsi que les caractéristiques singulières des actes de piraterie actuels constituent un enjeu tant dans l’application des dispositions du droit international mais également de manière plus général à la coopération internationale indispensable pour lutter contre les crimes transfrontaliers. Ce projet se propose de mener une réflexion sur, d’une part, les raisons de l’inadaptabilité des dispositions du droit international et, d’autre part, la nécessité d’élaborer un nouveau cadre juridique de lege feranda répondant aux nouvelles réalités de la piraterie maritime. / Maritime piracy is commonly considered as the original international crime. In the name of the common interest, states acknowledged the need to repress the crime of piracy regardless of nationalities or places of occurrence.. This piracy-inspired universal jurisdiction has contributed to broaden the scope of international law. Paradoxically, the latter appears inadequate to meet the necessary requirements to fight against modern piracy. The singular characteristics and the context of modern piracy are both a challenge, not only for the application of international law but also more broadly for the international cooperation essential to fight cross-border crimes. This project studies the reasons for the inadaptability of international law provisions and also the need to develop a new legal framework lege ferenda that will meet the new realities of maritime piracy. This new legal framework should take into account the needs to harmonize legislations in order to establish cooperation at the national, bilateral, regional and international level.