The purpose of this study is to compare how the issue of new shipping opportunities in theArctic region is tackled and met by the governments of Sweden and Iceland when it comes tomaritime security regime building, and to set this into perspective by looking at the shippingindustry’s seemed aspirations and interests for Arctic shipping, the latter to see if policy and“reality” appear to be corresponding. By conducting a qualitative comparative analysisthrough studying previous research, government documents and through interviewingrepresentatives from the shipping industry; using the analytical framework of Regime Theoryfor International Relations; the following research questions have been answered: - In what ways do the governments of Sweden and Iceland contribute to developments of Arctic maritimesecurity regimes, due to new shipping opportunities in the High North? - Are these contributions in line with the shipping industry’s views of and aspirations for Arctic shipping? - (How) does this differ between the countries? - (How) does the shipping industry contribute to maritime security? Sweden and Iceland differ in many aspects, but the general aims at environmental protectionare visible in both countries. Iceland has a larger focus on crisis response due to its locationalexposure and do moreover have a chance on economically exploiting new shipping activitiesfor the same reason. Sweden can be said to have a more general approach to Arctic maritimesecurity, whereas Iceland rather focuses on its own proximity.Both countries’ responses to Arctic shipping are currently to be seen as in line with theshipping industry’s views and aspirations for Arctic shipping.The shipping industry contributes to maritime security by developing new methods andtechnology for addressing the Arctic ice; collectively and on shipping company individualbasis. The shipping industry furthermore contributes by educating ship commanders as well assharing experiences and knowledge with each other.

This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence. To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community's environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory. Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative)—the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature.

This assessment of European Union foreign policy towards the South Caucasus shows that while the EU has developed a coherent transport policy since 1992, paradoxically, it has had no corresponding coherent conflict resolution policy for this region. The fact that the EU deepened transport cooperation without a mediation policy in an area with a multiplicity of protracted conflicts is a puzzle. Although the EU eventually added mediation to its policy during the Russia-Georgia armed conflict in 2008, it was unable to facilitate a political solution. The research examines what has been the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. The dissertation argues that incoherence in conflict resolution policy has been consequent upon two causal factors: (i) preferences of the EU member states conditioned by their historical experience with Russia, and (ii) institutional framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By contrast, with functional approach, the three dominant factors that have enabled coherence in transport cooperation are (i) legislative alignment, (ii) common transport area, including technical assistance for transit development, and (iii) restrictive measures. Examination of these two areas of EU foreign policy, shows a discrepancy, demonstrating its inconsistent nature. The theoretical framework of realism and liberal intergovernmentalism, is applied to empirically grounded EU foreign policy analysis. Adopting a case study methodology, this work examines the EU's policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, with special focus on Georgia between 1992 and 2014. The research combines social science methods of literature review, document analysis and expert interviews.

Au cours de cette étude, nous avons cherché à déterminer l’implication de Washington dans la sécurité de l’Indonésie. Nous nous sommes demandé comment les États-Unis pouvaient revenir dans le jeu politico-sécuritaire indonésien par le biais d’une cause devenue commune, la sécurité maritime. Après avoir examiné l’historique de la relation de l’Indonésie avec l’élément maritime et l’émergence de menaces liées au domaine maritime, nous avons conclu que la sécurisation du domaine maritime apparaît alors comme un leitmotiv sécuritaire commun pour Washington et Jakarta. Confrontée aux errements de la coopération régionale et aux difficultés relatives à sa géographie et à son déficit capacitaire, la sécurisation du domaine maritime indonésien passe donc par l’implication d’un acteur extérieur. En réussissant à convaincre leurs homologues de Jakarta de la nécessité de sécuriser le domaine maritime, les hommes et femmes du Ministère de la Défense, du Département d’État et des administrations américaines ont permis à Washington de revenir dans le jeu sécuritaire indonésien par le biais d’une coopération devenue essentielle pour les deux partenaires. / In this study, we tried to determine the exact level of involvement of Washington in Indonesia’s security. We wondered how United States could go back in Indonesian political and security games through a common cause, maritime security.. After considering indonesian maritime history and the rise of threats to maritime domain, we concluded that the securitisation of maritime realm appears as a security leitmotiv for both Washington and Jakarta. Facing with the vagaries of regional cooperation and with difficulties related to the archipelagic geography of the country and the lack of capacity, securising indonesian maritime domain requires the involvement of an external actor. By succeeding in persuading their counterparts in Jakarta of the necessity of securing the maritime domain, men and women of the U.S. Department of Defense, State Department and other agencies have allowed Washington to be back into Indonesia’s security game through an all-out cooperation.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

Les espaces maritimes font l’objet de nombreuses atteintes qui mettent en péril leur sécurité. Les faits illicites des États d’une part, et l’accroissement de la criminalité d’autre part, sont de nature à faire peser des risques dommageables importants pour la sécurité de la navigation, du milieu marin et des utilisateurs de la mer. Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui n’a pas en principe pour vocation la protection de la sécurité maritime, est régulièrement mis en oeuvre par le Conseil de sécurité en mer au cours de ses missions de maintien de la paix. A cet effet, il arrive parfois qu’il participe indirectement par ricochet à la protection des espaces maritimes contre les faits illicites des États à cette occasion. Au cours de cette dernière décennie le Conseil de sécurité utilise également le Chapitre VII pour directement protéger les espaces maritimes contre les actes de criminalité qui s’y produisent. Il se dégage ainsi une pratique ambivalente du Conseil de sécurité de mise à disposition du Chapitre VII au service de la sécurité maritime qui est révélatrice d’une contribution du droit de la sécurité collective à la consolidation du droit de la mer. / Maritime areas are subject to many violations that represent real threats to them. Wrongful Acts of States on the one hand, and the increasing number of crimes on the other hand, contribute to endanger the safety of the navigational system, but also of the marine environment and of the sea users. Although, its main purpose is not to take care of the maritime security, the Chapter VII from the Charter of the United Nations is often used by the Security Council, when they implement peace-keeping missions.Therefore, it can sometimes indirectly participate and protect maritime areas from the wrongful acts committed by some States. During the last ten years, the Security Council has also resorted to Chapter VII in order to protect the maritime areas from the criminal acts that take place there. The impression which emerges from this is that of an ambivalent policy, which is indicative of the collective security’s contribution to the Law of the Sea.