While the consequences of political distortions on fiscal cyclicality have been thoroughly analyzed, there are few studies that specify which political variables create these distortions. In this paper I use political-economy theories of the deficit as a basis as to why fiscal cyclicality deviates from what is predicted by tax-smoothing and Keynesian models. Specifically, I examine the effects of political polarization, the years an incumbent has been in office, party affiliation, and fiscal federalism to partition how political characteristics affect fiscal responses to changes in GDP growth. I find that governments tend to be more responsive to changes in GDP growth further away from elections, left leaning governments are more responsive than right leaning governments, mixed results for political polarization, and that unitary governments are more responsive than federalist governments.

This diploma thesis focuses on political-business cycle which is a theme frequently omitted in discussions about economic situation in the Czech Republic. Theoretical part of the work will provide readers with the topic of political-business cycle and its basic models which will serve as a support to the statistical research in the analytical part. Is fiscal policy in hands of Czech politicians an efficient tool to manipulate voters? The aim of the work is to answer this question and thus give a detailed look of political-business cycle on example of four regular electoral periods of Czech Parliament. To reach the goal of diploma thesis, we used regressive analysis to examine hypothesis if the date of elections influences certain folders of income and expenses of government budget. This hypothesis was not accepted on the significance level of 5 per cent. The reasons are mainly short time series of tested indicators.

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政府預算是政府施政的參考，民主國家的民意機關無不以控制預算，做為 監督行政機關的重 要手段。政府預算對納稅義務人而言，具有最直接的 影響；行政機關是否以人民的福祉作為最高目標，總決算可以將一切透明 化。因此，研究政府歷年預決算，以了解政府預算執行效能，遂成為本文 撰寫的動機。本文首先探討我國、美國（總統制）、日本（內閣制）的財 務機關，比較其預算籌編的權限；並且研析先進國家如何統一事權，以增 進財務行政效能，同時提供我國主計處作為改革的參考。繼之，分析我國 、美國（總統制）、日本（內閣制）的預算週期，預算週期是預算籌編、 審議、執行、決算等步驟的總和，預算週期中可以明瞭行政、立法兩部門 權力的消長；透過研究外國預算週期的長處，可以提供我國增進預算執行 效能的參考。最後，實際探討我國各級政府（中央政府、各級地方政府） ，民國７６∼８０年預算執行效能，並分析各級政府預算效能低落的原因 ，同時建議政府未來改革參考。本文的研究發現：各級政府因為行政資源 豐沛程度不一，所以，財務行政效能也有相當差異，中央政府因為擁有完 整的行政資源，其預算執行效能，較各級地方政府為優；資本支出的運用 效率，也是以中央政府與較高層級之地方政府為優，除了近年重大公共建 設陸續推動外，中央政府也因具有較完備的法令，而在資本支出的運用較 其他各級政府為優。層級越高的政府則對預算經費的估列，有較佳的預估 能力，以致於經資門的差異能較合理。資本門的保留狀況，地方政府有逐 年遞增的趨勢，使得資本支出的運用有惡化的現象，地方建設的延遲發包 及工程進度的落後，都使得地方民眾的權益受損；多數地方政府並未確實 辦理歲出應付款，省政府與各縣市政府的權責發生轉入數及未結清數，正 逐年增加中。 ~i;

Il primo capitolo offre un sommario della letteratura teorica ed empirica relative ai cicli di bilancio a livello nazionale e locale, iniziando dai primi cicli politici di bilancio detti “tradizionali” fino ad arrivare ai modelli detti di “political agency”. Viene discusso il filone di letteratura che scaturisce da quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica, cominciando dai primi modelli di segnalazione fino ai più recenti modelli teorici sull’effetto di selezione e di disciplina svolto dalle elezioni politiche. Un’enfasi particolare viene data alla rassegna dei test empirici basati su quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica e, in particolare, sul nesso tra decentralizzazione e trasparenza a livello locale. Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sulle tematiche del ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassazione e alla spese in un campione di comuni italiani. Le stime econometriche indicano un forte ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassa comunale sugli immobili (ICI) e, utilizzando le predizioni teoriche dei modelli a informazione incompleta sul differente comportamento dei sindaci che possono correre per un secondo turno e di quelli che sono invece impossibilitati a ricandidarsi, viene mostrato come i sindaci al primo turno che possono ricandidarsi manipolano in maniera più intensa l’imposta comunale sugli immobili applicata alla prima casa. Le stime effettuate sul comportamento differente dei sindaci con limite di mandato e senza limite di mandato, relative alle scelte di tassazione applicate alla base imponibile ICI ordinaria, indicano pure la presenza di un effetto di disciplina di partito. Questo capitolo, inoltre, compie un passo avanti rispetto a precedenti stime sui cicli elettorali fondati solo sulla dinamica delle spese correnti e in conto capitale senza tenere in considerazione la natura di competenza o cassa delle poste di bilancio corrispondenti. Sono presentate alcune evidenze in merito all’esistenza di un ciclo elettorale nella spesa in conto capitale registrata in contabilità come di cassa. Viene fornito anche un test econometrico sull’effetto dei vincoli del patto di stabilità interno sui comportamenti di spesa dei comuni. Nell’ultimo capitolo, sono ulteriormente approfonditi i risultati presentati nel secondo capitolo relativi alle scelte differenti dei comuni sulle aliquote ICI ordinaria e prima casa, esplorando il nesso tra cicli opportunistici razionali e trasparenza degli strumenti fiscali. Viene presentato un modello formale a informazione incompleta che predice come gli incentivi politici per usare due diversi strumenti fiscali possono essere diversi, a seconda delle caratteristiche di trasparenza annesse ai medesimi strumenti. Le predizioni teoriche sottoposte a stima empirica sono le seguenti: 1) i sindaci al primo mandato utilizzano maggiormente l’addizionale IRPEF introdotta per i comuni nel 1999 rispetto ai sindaci che non possono più correre; 2) il turnover politico dovrebbe diminuire dopo la riforma che ha introdotto l’addizionale IRPEF e, in particolare, per i sindaci che usano maggiormente tale strumento; 3) la riforma dovrebbe agevolare la decisione dei sindaci di correre per un secondo mandato, essendo agevolata la probabilità di rielezione. I test empirici presentati utilizzando un campione di comuni italiani confermano le predizioni teoriche contenute nel modello. / The first chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature about political budget cycles at national and local level, starting from earlier traditional political business cycles models to political agency models. This last strand of literature is discussed, starting from earlier signalling models to the more recent advancements in theoretical predictions about the selection and disciplining effect of elections on politicians. A particular emphasis is given to the full review of empirical tests based on political agency models predictions about the links between accountability and decentralization, especially at the local level. The second chapter focuses on the issues of electoral cycles in taxes and expenditures for a sample of Italian municipalities. Econometric estimates show a strong electoral cycle on municipal property tax, and extending political agency models' implications about the differences in tax-setting behavior between first- and second-term mayors, evidence is shown of a stronger electoral manipulation of property rates applied to main residence tax base when mayors run for re-election. Estimation of property tax rates' sensitivity to term-limited mayors' fiscal behaviors also uncovers a party discipline effect on tax rates applied to business and non homeowner property tax base. Furthermore, this chapter goes beyond previous econometric estimates of expenditure cycles focusing solely on the dynamics of current and capital expenditures without taking into account the basis on which outlays are recorded in local budgets. Some preliminary evidence points to the existence of an electoral cycle in cash-recorded budgetary investment outlays. An econometric test on the effect of formal expenditures restraints on municipal spending behaviors concludes the chapter. In the last chapter, results from the second chapter relative to business and main residence property tax rates’ choices are further investigated, exploring the link between opportunistic rational cycles and accountability of tax instruments. A formal political agency model predicts that the political incentives for using the two different property taxes may be different, according to their level of transparency. Three empirically testable implications derives from theoretical predictions: 1) first-term mayors should use a local income tax surcharge, introduced in 1999 in Italy, more than second-term mayors; 2) political turnover should be lower following the reform, and in particular for mayors using more the local income tax surcharge and 3) the reform might also affect the decision to run again by mayors, as it should be easier to get re-elected after the reform. Empirical estimates using a sample of Italian municipalities are presented, confirming theoretical predictions of the model.

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No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Roberto R M Ribeiro 2017.pdf: 2409539 bytes, checksum: ebee5deb818bd06bd771308b4fdaf29b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-01 / This thesis makes an empirical study about the budget cycle in a municipality, from the inquiry of those responsible for the process, with a view to know in detail how the same occurs throughout its cycle and, therefore, established as objective of the study investigate The Budgetary Cycle of the Health Sector in the Municipality of Maringá, in the period of 2013 and 2014. In order to conduct the research, in terms of an empirical object, the Budgetary Cycle was proposed before the Municipal Health Plan of the Municipality of Maringá, through The accomplishment of a research that, methodologically, fits as being of descriptive nature, of applied form, analyzed qualitatively, with the use of documentary techniques and survey. With regard to the collection of data, public health documents were used, which are composed of the Municipal Health Plan, the Pluriannual Plan, the Budgetary Guidelines Law, the Annual Budget Law and the Annual Management Report, as well as the Semi-structured interview with those responsible for the budget process, analyzed through the technique of content analysis. The findings of the research show that, in relation to the established variables, which, regarding the formation of the responsible, is adequate to the function; Already the elaboration of the budget in operational terms meets the criteria of public planning and it meets the established in the Municipal Plan of Health and Plurianual Plan. Therefore, there is synergy between the elements of planning. Regarding the role of the actors, the study shows that there is an effective participation in the elaboration phase of the budget proposal and that they are diminishing in the other phases of the cycle. Regarding the use of information technology for cycle management purposes, the research demonstrated that there is a satisfactory system. Regarding the review of expenses, the constant realization is close to what is verified in the literature, soon there is effective management of the financial aspects. Finally, in the verification of the autonomy, it was verified that the professional responsible for the budget process has a greater degree of autonomy in front of the other public agents involved. / Esta tese realiza um estudo empírico sobre o ciclo orçamentário em um município, a partir da inquirição dos responsáveis pelo processo, com vistas a conhecer em detalhes como o mesmo se dá ao longo de seu ciclo e, para tanto, estabeleceu como objetivo do estudo investigar o Ciclo Orçamentário do Setor da Saúde no Município de Maringá, no período de 2013 e 2014. Elegeu-se, para a realização da pesquisa, em termos de objeto empírico, o Ciclo Orçamentário ante o Plano Municipal de Saúde do Município de Maringá, mediante a realização de uma pesquisa que, metodologicamente, enquadra-se como sendo de natureza descritiva, de forma aplicada, analisada qualitativamente, com uso de técnicas documentais e levantamento. No que se refere à coleta dos dados, utilizou-se de documentos públicos da Saúde, que são compostos pelo Plano Municipal da Saúde, Plano Plurianual, Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias, Lei do Orçamento Anual e Relatório Anual de Gestão, bem como da realização de entrevista semiestruturada com os responsáveis pelo processo orçamentário, analisada mediante a técnica de análise de conteúdo. Os achados da pesquisa evidenciam, em verificação ante às variáveis estabelecidas que, no tocante à formação do responsável, é adequada à função; já a elaboração do orçamento em termos operacionais atende aos critérios de planejamento público e atende ao estabelecido no Plano Municipal de Saúde e Plano Plurianual. Portanto, há sinergia entre os elementos de planejamento. Sobre o papel dos atores, o estudo demonstra que há participação efetiva na fase de elaboração da proposta orçamentária e que vão diminuindo nas demais fases do ciclo. No que tange ao uso de tecnologia da informação para fins de gerenciamento do ciclo, a pesquisa demonstrou haver sistema satisfatório. Com relação à revisão de despesas, denota-se a realização constante próxima ao que se verifica na literatura, logo há gerenciamento efetivo dos aspectos financeiros. Por fim, na verificação da autonomia se averiguaram que o profissional responsável pelo processo orçamentário possui maior grau de autonomia ante os demais agente públicos envolvidos.

The present thesis is concerned with the existence of political cycles in European Union member states between 1990 and 2013. These cycles are of two types: political business cycles and political budget cycles. The analysis was performed by means of the fixed effects method (using first differences) along with a visual analysis of data. The results obtained from three types of data sets show that two years before elections, inflation grows at 0.47%, unemployment rate at 0.5%, and structural balance at 0.8%. One of the data sets reveals that structural balance is reduced by 0.39% in election years. The visual analysis clearly demonstrates that there exist political business cycles in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden. Political budget cycles have been proven to exist in Belgium, France, Cyprus, Malta, Germany, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.