Cette thèse analyse l’institutionnalisation du Haut représentant de l’UE dans les négociations sur le programme nucléaire iranien entre 2003 et 2015. Si au départ le rôle qu’occupe le Haut représentant dans le dossier iranien est codifié dans les traités européens, à partir de 2006, ce sont notamment les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU qui le définissent. Ainsi mandaté par deux groupes d’acteurs distincts – les acteurs institutionnels de l’UE et les six puissances impliquées dans les négociations avec l’Iran – le diplomate en chef de l’UE est amené à endosser deux rôles contradictoires, celui du Haut représentant de l’UE et celui du Haut représentant des E3+3.En combinant la sociologie de l’UE avec la sociologie des RI, cette thèse interroge les dynamiques qui ont amené le Haut représentant à être reconnu comme légitime par l’ensemble des acteurs de la configuration du dossier nucléaire iranien. À partir de ce questionnement, ce travail propose un cadre d’analyse pour étudier l’institutionnalisation de l’Europe de la politique étrangère.La littérature sur l’institutionnalisation de l’action extérieure commune est divisée entre des travaux qui s’intéressent aux interactions entre des acteurs européens, d’un côté, et des travaux qui étudient l’institutionnalisation de l’UE sur la scène internationale, de l’autre. Ainsi, ils omettent que la construction de l’action extérieure commune est le produit de l’enchevêtrement des dynamiques globales et européennes. Cette thèse surmonte ce clivage en ce qu’elle met l’enjeu des dimensions interne et externe de l’institutionnalisation de l’UE au cœur de l’analyse. En m’appuyant sur l’hypothèse de la différenciation des espaces sociaux, je prendrai en compte les logiques distinctes structurant l’arène globale de la négociation nucléaire et l’arène de la PESC, tout en les appréhendant comme des arènes enchevêtrées. L’enquête empirique qui s’appuie sur des entretiens et des archives, met en exergue que le Haut représentant s’autonomise davantage de ses obligations du Haut représentant de l’UE pour endosser exclusivement le rôle de Haut représentant des E3+3. En outre, l’institutionnalisation de ces rôles est le produit d’une multitude d’interactions individuelles au sein et à l’intersection des espaces sociaux européens et globaux.À partir de l’analyse de l’institutionnalisation du rôle du Haut représentant dans le dossier nucléaire et en s’inspirant de la sociologie de Michel Dobry, ce travail permet de concevoir la variation de l’emprise des différents espaces sociaux sur l’institutionnalisation de l’action extérieure commune. Plutôt que de privilégier l’analyse d’une dimension sur l’autre, il est nécessaire de saisir la trajectoire de leur rapport afin d’appréhender le caractère aléatoire de la construction de l’Europe de la politique étrangère dans toute sa complexité. Au-delà de cela, l’étude de cas questionne l’idée de l’institutionnalisation de l’UE en tant que processus d’intégration. En effet, l’inscription de l’UE dans l’espace global de la diplomatie internationale nous permet de voir qu’il s’agit aussi bien d’une dynamique d’autonomisation, de différenciation et d’exclusion. / This thesis analyses the institutionalisation of the EU High Representative in the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme between 2003 and 2015. Although initially the role of the High Representative in the Iranian dossier was codified in the European treaties, from 2006 onwards, it was notably the UN Security Council resolutions that defined it. Thus mandated by two distinct groups of actors - the EU's institutional actors and the six powers involved in the negotiations with Iran - the EU's chief diplomat is led to assume two contradictory roles, that of the EU High Representative and that of the E3+3 High Representative.By combining sociology of the EU with sociology of IR, this thesis examines the dynamics that led the High Representative to be recognised as legitimate by all those involved in the configuration of the Iranian nuclear dossier. Based on this guiding question, this work proposes an analytical framework for studying the institutionalisation of Europe's foreign policy.The literature on the institutionalisation of common external action is divided between work that looks at the interactions between European actors, on the one hand, and work that studies the institutionalisation of the EU on the international scene, on the other. Thus this bifurcation in the scholarly literature precludes a vision of European integration as the product of the tangle of global and European dynamics. This thesis overcomes this divide in that it puts the internal and external dimensions of the institutionalisation of the EU at the heart of the analysis. Based on the hypothesis of the differentiation of social spaces, I will take into account the distinct logics structuring the global arena of nuclear negotiation and the arena of the CFSP, while apprehending them as entangled arenas. The empirical survey, which is based on interviews and archives, highlights that the High Representative is becoming more autonomous from his obligations as EU High Representative to assume the role of High Representative of the E3+3. Moreover, the institutionalisation of these roles is the product of a multitude of individual interactions within and at the intersection of European and global social spaces.Based on an analysis of the construction of the role of the High Representative in the nuclear dossier and drawing inspiration from the sociology of Michel Dobry, this work makes it possible to conceive the variation of the influence of various social spaces on the institutionalisation of common external action. Rather than focusing on the analysis of one dimension over the other, it is necessary to grasp the trajectory of their relationship in order to grasp the random nature of the construction of Europe's foreign policy in all its complexity. Beyond this, the case study questions the idea of the institutionalisation of the EU as an integration process. Indeed, the EU's inclusion in the global space of international diplomacy allows us to see that it is also a dynamic of empowerment, differentiation and exclusion. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

C-level Thesis in International Relations Course.

The topic of this thesis is a theoretical analysis of the institutional design of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the adoption of the Lisbon treaty. The main aim of the thesis is to reveal the reasons explaining a development towards centralization of the policy-making process of the CFSP that the Lisbon treaty introduced. Centralization is equated with a delegation of sovereignty from member states to a supranational level - High Representative for the CFSP/European External Action Service. The thesis for this purpose tests three possible explanations built upon three main theories of international relations: the centralisation as a result of the 1.decreasing EU's relative military power (neorealism) 2.deteriorating collaborative problems (neoliberalism) and 3.increasing degree of Europeanization of the nation-state identities and interests of the member states (constructivism) within covered time period from 2001 to 2007. The thesis applies a qualitative method, it is a case study. The conclusion of the thesis is that there are two reasons for the development towards more centralized policy-making process of the CFSP after the Lisbon treaty. Firstly, it is the decreasing EU's relative military power (neorealism) and secondly increasing level of Europeanization of nation-state...

In March 2021, the EU launched the European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial instrument that allows the EU to commonly fund peacekeeping and military missions. However, following the Russian aggression against Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022, the EPF has primarily been used to provide Ukraine with lethal military equipment. This research uses a modified version of Flexible Pattern Matching to examine if the original intent and structure of the EPF are uniform with how it has been used by the EU to provide support for Ukraine. The result indicates that while there are some deviations from the intended and actual use of the EPF, the instrument has been vital in the EU’s rapid response to provide support to Ukraine. The research also highlights the normative power of the EPF, a key aspect of the instrument that was not predicted when it was launched. This analysis is relevant to both researchers and policymakers, offering insight into the EPF’s role in the EU’s hard power shift, while also providing suggestions for enhancing the EPF’s effectiveness in supporting Ukraine.

No description available.

How has the EEAS affected, if in any way, the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters? In this thesis I answer this research question in order to draw a conclusion on the affect of the EEAS on the cooperation and coordination of the MS with and within the CFSP in security and defence matters. Coherence within the EU’s foreign policy is an issue that its leaders have emphasized on developing for more than four decades. The introduction of the EEAS through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 is perceived to enhance the cooperation and coordination of the MS with and within the CFSP, as well as coordinate the actions of the MS outside the boundaries of the EU. By conducting a multiple case study, in this thesis I compare how the most powerful MS: the UK, France, and Germany, interacted with and within the CFSP in the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 military intervention in Libya. Relatedly, a qualitative content analysis approach is applied in order to uncover all relevant information from the primary and secondary literature concerning the two cases. In contrast to most of the previous studies conducted on this topic, I combine and apply the theoretical perspectives of liberal institutionalism and social constructivism in order to explain and explore the phenomenon under investigation. Conclusively, this thesis suggests that the coherence of the CFSP on the vertical dimension in security and defence matters has not been affected in any way after the EEAS has been implemented in the CFSP. This is due to the inherent characteristic of the MS of always prioritizing their national interests, determined by their value-based normative ideas gained through social interaction, before a collective, effective, and coherent CFSP in defence and security terms.

<p>This thesis deals with cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom within the area of foreign and security policy. Two case studies are presented, one of them concerning cooperation between the three states within and outside institutions in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the other dealing with cooperation concerning the crisis in Macedonia in 2001. In accordance with the approach of neoliberal institutionalism the primary hypothesis is that cooperation is primarily determined by the interests of states but it is also limited by norms and affected by the institutions of which the three states are members. The study describes the large variety of forms of cooperation that exist between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in which the United States also plays an important part, and which also includes their cooperation within a number of international institutions. The study also points to the new forms of interaction between states and institutions that have come about since the Cold War ended, and which give a stronger role to institutions and the cooperation between them. Still, however, states retain a decisive role in cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy.</p>

Med anledning av den förändrade säkerhetsmiljön i Europa startade en process som syftade till att öka samarbetet inom säkerhets- och försvarsområdet inom EU. Detta försvarssamarbete kallas det Permanenta strukturerade samarbetet (Pesco) och innebär ett mer upptrappat och konkret militärt samarbete än tidigare inom EU. Genom ett medlemskap i Pesco förbinder sig medlemmarna till att mer intensivt utveckla sin egen försvarskapacitet inom forskning och anskaffning av försvarsmateriel, men även att uppbringa och bibehålla en stark försvarsbudget. Vidare ska även medlemstater bidra med stridsgrupper i beredskap för insatser inom EU:s ram. Hur kan vi förstå logiken i att Sverige ingår med i ett mer bindande försvarssamarbete som Pesco. Syftet med denna studie är att identifiera bakomliggande drivkrafter för att förstå varför Sverige beslutade att ingå i Pesco. Denna fallstudie har nyttjat ett teoretiskt perspektiv som utgått ifrån Graham Allisons konceptuella modeller för att identifiera dessa bakomliggande drivkrafter. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys studeras materialet i denna fallstudie bestående av regeringens proposition gällande deltagande i Pesco, Försvarsutskottets betänkande gällande Pesco och förvarspolitisk inriktning 2016-2020. För att komplettera textmaterialet har även mailintervjuer genomförts med strategiskt utvalda informanter i form av riksdagsledamöter och stabsofficerare i Försvarsmakten. Studiens slutsatser påvisar att de bakomliggande drivkrafterna för beslutet var flera. Den främsta drivkraften var att Sverige sedan tidigare ratificerat EU:s solidaritetsklausul och uttalat en solidaritetsförklaring gentemot övriga medlemstater i EU. Genom att ingå i Pesco förväntas det öka Sveriges trovärdighet som medlemsstat i EU. En ytterligare drivkraft var att ingå i Pesco i ett tidigt skede i syfte att forma samarbetet och ha inflytande i den riktning som Sverige anser var förenliga med militär alliansfrihet, samt att fortsatt driva den mellanstatliga prägel som samarbetet nu innehar. En drivkraft var också att bygga upp det nationella försvaret, öka den operativa förmågan och stärka totalförsvaret genom försvarssamarbetet. En majoritet av Riksdagens partier var överens om Sveriges ingående i Pesco, detta på grund av tidigare beslutad Försvarsinriktningsperiod 2016-2020 som också var en bärande drivkraft till varför Sverige valde att ingå i Pesco. / In response to the changing security environment in Europe a process started aimed at increasing cooperation in the security and defence area within the EU. This defence cooperation is called the Permanent structured cooperation (Pesco) and means a more gradual and substantial military cooperation than before in the EU. Through a membership in Pesco, the members commit to more intensively develop of its own defence capabilities in research and acquisition of defence equipment, but also to obtain and maintain a strong defence budget. In addition, the member states should also contribute with battle groups ready for military missions within the framework of the EU. How can we understand the logic of Sweden joining more binding defence cooperation like Pesco. The purpose of this study is to identify the underlying driving forces to understand why Sweden decided to join Pesco. This case study uses a theoretical perspective based on Graham Allison's conceptual models to achieve this purpose. Through a qualitative text analysis, the data that is studied in this case study consisting of Swedish government proposition and Defence committee report regarding Pesco and Defence bill 2016-2020. In order to widen the study, mail interviews were conducted with strategically selected informants. Those were members of the Swedish parliament and staff officers in the Swedish Armed Forces. The study concludes that the underlying driving forces for the decision were several. The main driving force was that Sweden previously ratified the EU solidarity clause and stated a declaration of solidarity in relation to other member states of the EU. By joining Pesco is also expected to boost Sweden's credibility as a member state of the EU. An additional driving force was to join Pesco at an early stage in order to forge cooperation and have influence in the direction in which Sweden considers compatible with own military nonalignment, and also to continue to drive the intergovernmental nature that Pesco now holds. An additional driving force was also building up the national defence, increase the operational capacity and strengthen the armed forces through the defence cooperation. A majority of the parliamentary parties agreed on joining Pesco because of the previously decided defence bill 2016-2020, which also considers as a driving force for why Sweden chose to join Pesco.

<p>The aim of this paper is to explain how the European Union’s common strategy for theCommon Foreign- and Security Policy (CFSP) will change with the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon. A comparative case study and qualitative method is used. On the basis of Smith’s theory of institutionalization we will analyze two member states: France and Denmark. Our aim is to see which standpoints these countries have taken concerning the CFSP. We have chosen, in order to analyse the inner and outer factors, to use the liberal intergovernmental “two level game” theory as a theoretical approach. The purpose of the CFSP is to gradually increase the sovereign states’ foreign policy cooperation. The aim of the CFSP is to become an international visible and active player that represents the people of the European Union. At the moment the CFSP is an intergovernmental part of the EU, however there are presentiments that this will change and that CFSP will achieve supranationality. In conclusion, the results of the case study shows that Denmark is aiming for the CFSP cooperation to remain on an intergovernmental platform. France is aiming toward supranationality and a stronger cooperation within the CFSP. In time, with the full implementation of the CFSP, the EU will be able to compete on a global platform.</p>

This thesis deals with cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom within the area of foreign and security policy. Two case studies are presented, one of them concerning cooperation between the three states within and outside institutions in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the other dealing with cooperation concerning the crisis in Macedonia in 2001. In accordance with the approach of neoliberal institutionalism the primary hypothesis is that cooperation is primarily determined by the interests of states but it is also limited by norms and affected by the institutions of which the three states are members. The study describes the large variety of forms of cooperation that exist between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in which the United States also plays an important part, and which also includes their cooperation within a number of international institutions. The study also points to the new forms of interaction between states and institutions that have come about since the Cold War ended, and which give a stronger role to institutions and the cooperation between them. Still, however, states retain a decisive role in cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy.