The purpose of the present thesis is to analyse the relationship between competition law and economics on the example of the USA and the EU. In the first chapter is mentioned the context that led to the issuance of antitrust laws in the USA, the EU and other countries, as well as the most significant economic theories which had a major influence on the application of competition law. This is followed by the description of the institutional framework of competition law in the USA and the EU, their respective primary sources of law, including non-legislative documents. The second chapter analyses the most significant anticompetitive conducts for both antitrust areas (i.e. anticompetitive agreements and unilateral conducts), with a special attention to the most harmful anticompetitive conducts (e.g. horizontal price fixing) and to relatively new and dynamically developing areas of antitrust law (e.g. refusal to deal related to intellectual property). Each selected conduct is introduced by the description of potential anticompetitive effects of the conduct and it is followed by relevant significant American and European precedents. The last sub-chapters analyse non-legislative documents issued by the FTC, DoJ and EC which enable to educe their current general approach to mergers.

In this study, I consider the performance of simple forecast models frequently applied in counterfactual analysis when the information at hand is limited. Furthermore, I discuss the robustness of the standard t-test commonly used to statistically detect cartels. I empirically verify that the standard t-statistics encompasses parameter estimation uncertainty when one of the time series in a two-sided t-test has been estimated. Thereafter, I compare the results with those from a corrected t-test, recently proposed, where the uncertainty has been accounted for. The results from the study show that a simple OLS-model can be used to detect a cartel and to compute a counterfactual price when data is limited, at least as long as the price overcharge inflicted by the cartel members is relatively large. Yet, the level of accuracy may vary and at a point where the data used for estimating the model become relatively limited, the model predictions tend to be inaccurate.

No description available.

Ce mémoire s'intéresse au comportement des firmes faisant l'extraction d'une ressource naturelle non renouvelable dans des marchés oligopolistiques. Il étudie d'abord les répercussions de la contrainte associée à la ressource sur le comportement dynamique du monopole et du duopole à la Cournot. Lors de l'application des résultats théoriques à une extraction totale de la ressource en deux périodes, on trouve que les ensembles des stocks initiaux permettant respectivement une extraction à durée symétrique pour les deux firmes et une extraction à durée asymétrique coïncident en partie. Ainsi, si les stocks initiaux se retrouvent dans l'intersection de ces ensembles, il existe deux politiques d'extraction qui satisfont à une maximisation dynamique des profits des firmes en présence d'une ressource non renouvelable. Cette conclusion est contraire aux résultats traditionnels en économie des ressources naturelles et représente une voie intéressante pour la recherche future dans le domaine.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal. / This thesis defines collusion broadly as play in a repeated game which differs from play in a one shot game. The analysis of collusion is an important part of many branches of economics. In industrial organization, for example, if collusion were not present then we could restrict investigation to the study of oligopolistic and competitive markets. Another important part of modern economic theory is the analysis of situations where there exists some ldnd of privileged information. Game theorists would say that in such a scenario there exists incomplete information. The predominant theme of the three essays composing this thesis is the study of repeated games under incomplete information. Typically, repeated game analyses have assumed the presence of complete information. However, many examples of repeated interaction must be treated in an incomplete information scenario. Auctions, the subject of the first essay, are the most natural example of this. The goal of this study is to understand how bidders collude in auctions. The main innovation is an explicit treatment of the repeated nature of the game to endogenize the threats necessary to support non competitive behavior. This analysis yields several testable implications about the behavior of colluding agents in auctions which are not apparent from the few models which have studied collusion in auctions from a static point of view. Nearly every model constructed to study collusion makes predictions which are at odds with accepted stylized facts. The most prominent of these paradoxes is the stability which theoretical models predict yet empirical and allegorical evidence rejects. This is the subject of the second essay. Incomplete information takes the form of how players evaluate future payoffs. This is an important detail because future payoffs are the only tool a cartel can use to enforce the play of collusive equilibria. The developed model imposes that patience is private information and heterogeneous and develops predictions which contrast strongly with accepted models of collusion. The predictions of the model are supported with discussion of some empirical evidence on cartels. The third essay develops a model which can have sociological as well as economic applications, in that it studies how rational agents form surplus creating partnerships in a repeated, incomplete information environment. Previous work has assumed an exogenous production technology which partners use to create this surplus. Furthermore an agents type, which affects surplus creation, has always been assumed to be observable. This essay studies matching with an endogenous production technology, in the sense that the surplus is a function of the level of collusion which can be supported. Collusion can be supported to varying degree based upon the type (patience, or discount factor) of each agent in the partnership. A special attention is turned to contrasting the implications of the model in the presence of complete as opposed to incomplete information.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research study analyzes the Mexican drug war’s impact on the state’s federal political system of shared sovereignty. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) such as drug cartels have grown in strength due to shifting dynamics of the global drug trade. This growth in power, both in relation to the use of physical force and the influence over Mexican society, has challenged the state’s authority and monopoly of violence. After the inauguration of President Felipe Calderón in 2006, the government launched an all-in offensive, dedicating the entire state system to ridding the country of the drug cartels. Results of the offensive have been mixed and vary from area to area. However, trends indicate that the offensive has caused power vacuums and increased rivalry among the drug cartels. National homicide statistics show the government offensive has distorted the balance of power among the drug cartels, causing increased competition in an already hypercompetitive market. The majority of Mexico’s modern history consists of the era of single-party dominance, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated the political system on both vertical and horizontal levels. The recent growth of federal executive power during Calderón’s administration has caused concern about whether the democratic progress made during the last decade could be reversed – returning the country back to former autocratic practices of governance. This reversal also involves the concentration of power in the center. For the last few decades, the country has been decentralizing its political system in accordance to federal principles laid down by its Constitution. The involvement of the military, a federal instrument of security that has in some cases taken over jurisdiction from state and local authorities, has been causing debate on whether the executive power is violating its constitutional limits of power. With this, the primary research question of this study uses theoretical concepts and is formulated thusly: How do violent non-state actors (VNSAs) impact federalism in Mexico? Mexico was chosen as a case study because of its growing struggle against the drug cartels, a sub-branch of non-state actors (NSAs). The Westphalian state order has changed dramatically with globalization, changing realities with regard to the use of physical violence. This is especially the case in reference to VNSAs, where the use of violence maintains an informal system of order. With the rise of the powerful drug cartels, a direct result of the global drug trade that hides in the shadows of globalization, Mexico’s case is not unique. Colombia struggled with a similar scenario during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the security situation in Mexico has proven to be constantly evolving and very intense during a time of political transition. This study shows that the federal executive branch of the Mexican government has not violated its constitutional limits of the use of power, although the Mexican Constitution of 1917 has proven to be vague in reference to the use of the military in peacetime. This vagueness could undermine regional sovereignty and federal principles laid down by the Constitution. The study also indicates that the increasing levels of violence are affecting the functionality of regional governance, as well as freedom of the press. Homicide statistics show that since the government launched its offensive in 2006, there has been a significant increase in assassinations targeting both mayors and journalists. Overall, there is no indication that the drug war has influenced federalism in Mexico. Rather, the drug war has exposed institutional weaknesses, causing increased demand for and investment in professionalizing state institutions. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie navorsingstudie analiseer die impak van die Meksikaanse dwelmoorlog op Meksiko se federale politieke stelsel van gedeelde soewereiniteit. Transnasionale kriminele organisasies (TKO’s), byvoorbeeld dwelmkartelle, se mag het toegeneem as gevolg van die verskuiwende dinamika in globale dwelmhandel. Die staat se gesag en magsmonopolie word uitgedaag as gevolg van hierdie toename in mag, beide met betrekking tot die owerhede se gebruik van fisieke mag en hul gesag oor die Meksikaanse gemeenskap. Na die inhuldiging van president Felipe Calderón in 2006, het die regering ’n alles insluitende offensief van stapel gestuur om van die land se dwelmkartelle ontslae te probeer raak. Hierdie offensief toon wisselende vordering en die impak daarvan verskil van area tot area. Ten spyte van hierdie mate van vordering, het die offensief egter aanleiding gegee tot magsvakuums en ’n toename in wedywering tussen dwelmkartelle. Nasionale moordsyfers dui daarop dat hierdie regeringsoffensief die magsbalans tussen dwelmkartelle versteur het, wat gelei het tot ’n toename in kompetisie in ’n reeds uiters kompeterende mark. Meksiko se moderne geskiedenis bestaan hoofsaaklik uit ’n era van eenpartydominansie, waar die Institusionele Rewolusionêre Party (Institutional Revolutionary Party, IRP) die politieke stelsel op beide vertikale en horisontale vlak gedomineer het. Die onlangse opkoms van die federale uitvoerende mag tydens die Calderón-administrasie wek kommer dat die vordering wat in die laaste dekade gemaak is ten opsigte van demokratisering van die politieke stelsel, omvergewerp sal word en dat Meksiko die gevaar sal loop om terug te keer na sy voormalige outokratiese en gesentraliseerde regeerpraktyke. Oor die afgelope paar dekades het die land juis pogings aangewend om sy politieke stelsel te desentraliseer na aanleiding van federale beginsels soos neergelê in die grondwet. Die weermag – ’n federale instrument vir sekuriteit – het alreeds op sekere plekke jurisdiksie by staats- en plaaslike owerhede oorgeneem. Dit het gelei tot debatte oor of die uitvoerende mag sy grondwetlike magsbeperkinge oorskry. Na aanleiding van Meksiko se huidige politieke situasie, asook teoretiese konsepte soos die staat, federalisme, nie-staatsakteurs en globale dwelmhandel, word die primêre navorsingsvraag vir hierdie studie soos volg geformuleer: Hoe beïnvloed gewelddadige nie-staatsakteurs federalisme in Meksiko? Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord, word daar gebruik gemaak van sekondêre bronne, (beperkte) insig oor die dwelmkartelle se handelspraktyke en ’n ondersoek na die linguistiese beperkinge op die gebruik van amptelike Meksikaanse regeringspublikasies. Meksiko is as gevallestudie vir hierdie navorsingsprojek gekies vanweë die land se toenemende stryd teen dwelmkartelle, ’n subvertakking van nie-staatsakteurs. Die Westfaalse staatsorde wat eeue lank die wettige gebruik van fisieke geweld beheer het, het dramaties verander met die opkoms van globalisering. Dit is veral die geval by gewelddadige nie-staatsakteurs, waar die gebruik van geweld tans ’n informele stelsel van orde handhaaf. Die opkoms van Meksiko se magtige dwelmkartelle, ’n direkte gevolg van globale dwelmhandel (wat in die skadu van globalisering skuil), is egter nie enig in sy soort nie. Alhoewel Colombië byvoorbeeld in die 1980’s en 1990’s ’n soortgelyke probleem ondervind het, het die sekuriteitstoestand in Meksiko getoon dat dit steeds ontwikkelend van aard en hewig ten tye van politieke oorgang is, wat dit toepaslik vir hierdie studie maak. Die gevolgtrekking waartoe daar in hierdie studie gekom word, is dat die federale uitvoerende tak van die Meksikaanse regering tot dusver nie sy grondwetlike beperkinge ten opsigte van die uitoefening van mag oorskry het nie. Die Meksikaanse grondwet van 1917 is egter vaag oor die weermag se bevoegdheid om gesag af te dwing tydens vredestye. Hierdie vaagheid kan moontlik die streeksoewereiniteit en federale beginsels wat deur die grondwet verskans word, ondermyn. Daar is ook bepaal dat die toenemende geweld sowel die funksionaliteit van die streeksregering as die vryheid van die pers, beïnvloed. Moordsyfers in Meksiko dui daarop dat daar sedert 2006 ’n beduidende toename in sluipmoordaanvalle op burgemeesters en joernaliste was. Alles in ag genome, is daar egter geen aanduiding daarvan dat die dwelmoorlog wel federalisme in Meksiko geraak het nie. Die impak wat dit wel gemaak het, is om institusionele swakheid in die regering te openbaar, wat tot ’n toename in die aanvraag na en investering in die professionalisering van staatsinstellings gelei het.

The thesis aims to understand the development of cement market in Cisleithanien and Czechoslovakia and its cartelization. The subject of research is the organization of cement cartels and it's role as a structure which influences the functionality of the market, related industries and national economic policy (tarrifs, export and import restrictions and state's contracts). The thesis focuses on the abilities of the cement cartels how they control the market and affect customers. The thesis is limited by the year 1900, when the first cement cartels emerged, and the years 1938-1939, during which the significant economical and legal change occurred. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Juliana Oliveira Domingues.pdf: 2326011 bytes, checksum: 148f72fc5d3e915290167f2a57667018 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-11-12 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The discussion about the relationship between competition defense and international trade is not a novelty. However, even in the globalized world there are countries that still lack the necessary expertise to deal with conducts of foreign agents that may distort the competition within their markets. International organizations have taken steps to discuss best practices and offer support to countries that intend to develop or improve their competition laws and policies and, in particular, to fight against the effects of anticompetitive practices. In the past it was argued that a set of multilateral competition rules should be created in view of international anticompetitive conducts and the use of artificial protectionist measures directed to annul the competition of imported products. However, the creation of multilateral competition rules has not been the focus of recent debates. The present study starts from the premise that the law is fundamental to development. The notion of development adopted herein is extensive, and based mainly in the new institutionalism (Douglass North) and in development as freedom (Amartya Sen). The analysis performed in this study was directed to export cartel practices that are antitrust exemptions in most jurisdictions and may be harmful to development. Export cartels may generate international trade distortions, especially in less developed or developing countries that do not have the expertise to handle such conducts. This theme has not been sufficiently debated even because it is a very particular conduct that relies on governmental support more often than not. Notwithstanding, in light of the need to foment development and based on the premises adopted in the present study, it is clear that such theme should be granted proper treatment considering the existing interface between competition and international trade. So, this study intends to deepen the analysis of export cartel exemptions and, within the development context that was adopted, indicate the need to create specific multilateral rules to regulate such practice / A discussão sobre a relação entre a defesa da concorrência e o comércio internacional não é nova. Entretanto, mesmo no mundo globalizado existem países que ainda carecem do conhecimento necessário para tratar das condutas de agentes estrangeiros que possam distorcer a concorrência em seus mercados. As organizações internacionais têm envidado esforços para discutir as melhores práticas e para oferecer suporte aos países que desejam criar ou aprimorar suas leis e políticas de concorrência, especialmente para combater os efeitos de práticas anticoncorrenciais. No passado houve muita argumentação sobre a necessidade de se criar um conjunto de regras multilaterais de concorrência em razão das condutas anticoncorrenciais que tem dimensão internacional e também pelo uso de medidas artificiais com fins protecionistas direcionados a anular a concorrência dos produtos importados. No entanto, a criação de regras multilaterais de concorrência não tem sido o foco dos debates recentes. No presente estudo, parte-se da premissa que o direito possui um papel fundamental na promoção do desenvolvimento. A noção de desenvolvimento adotada é mais ampla, baseada principalmente no novo institucionalismo (Douglass North) e no desenvolvimento como liberdade (Amartya Sen). A análise realizada voltou-se à prática dos cartéis de exportação, que são isenções antitruste em grande parte das jurisdições e que podem prejudicar o processo de desenvolvimento. Os cartéis de exportação podem gerar distorções ao comércio internacional, especialmente aos países menos desenvolvidos ou em desenvolvimento que não possuem expertise para lidar com essas condutas. Esse tema tem sido pouco debatido até mesmo por tratar-se de conduta com muitas particularidades e que conta, muitas vezes, com o apoio governamental. Contudo, diante da necessidade de fomentar o desenvolvimento e com base nas premissas adotadas neste estudo, entende-se que o tema precisa ter um tratamento adequado, considerando a interface existente entre a concorrência e o comércio internacional. Assim, o presente estudo aprofundará a análise das isenções aos cartéis de exportação e, dentro do contexto de desenvolvimento adotado, apontará a necessidade de criação de regras multilaterais específicas que regulem essa prática

Universiẗat, Diss., 2006--Köln.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho examina as razões dos procedimentos de urgência nos projetos do Executivo junto à Assembléia Legislativa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul entre 1999-2006. Para tal, o texto discute os fundamentos e algumas implicações de teorias sobre a organização legislativa, especialmente as vertentes partidária e informacional, situando, primeiramente, o debate sobre a política regional gaúcha e as relações Executivo-Legislativo no âmbito subnacional brasileiro. O objetivo do estudo é analisar a rationale dos procedimentos de urgência utilizados pelo Governador, unilateralmente, e pelo próprio Legislativo, através de seu Colégio de Líderes, para acelerar a tramitação dos projetos do Executivo, retirando a matéria das Comissões permanentes antes da aprovação de parecer. Empiricamente, a pesquisa investiga se a presença de cartéis legislativos e a distância das preferências do Governo em relação às do mediano do Plenário da Assembléia têm efeitos sobre as chances de utilização de tais procedimentos. Assim, avalia a possibilidade de conjugação da teoria partidária com problemas informacionais para a análise do processo decisório legislativo no âmbito subnacional. O exame conclui que tanto a urgência governamental quanto o acordo de lideranças possuem padrões distintos apresentando resultados diversos que dependem do tamanho das forças políticas e da distribuição de preferências, figurando as instituições como fatores intervenientes, de modo que tais procedimentos obedecem a uma lógica partidária, mas colocada diante de problemas informacionais / This paper examines the reasons of the urgency procedures in the Executive bills at the state legislature of Rio Grande do Sul from 1999-2006. To this end, the text discusses the fundamentals and some implications of theories on legislative organization, especially partisan and informational aspects, placing first the debate on regional politics and Executive- Legislative relationship at subnational scope. The goal is to analyze the rationale of the urgency procedures used by the Governor unilaterally and by the Legislature, through partisan leaders, to accelerate the conduct of executive bills, removing them from committees before approving reports. Empirically, the research investigates whether the presence of legislative cartels and Government distance of preferences in relation to the median of the floor Assembly have effects on the odds of using such procedures. Thus, it evaluates the possibility of combining partisan theory with informational problems for the analysis of legislative decision-making at subnational levels. It concludes that both the gubernatorial urgency procedure and the leaderss agreement have distinct patterns showing different results depending on the size of political forces and the distribution of preferences, with the institutions figuring as intervenient factors, so that such procedures follow a partisan logic, but placed in front of informational problems