Depuis le début du vingt-et-unième siècle, la République Populaire de Chine (RPC) est engagée dans une spectaculaire offensive de charme sur le continent africain. Cette stratégie chinoise n’est pas nouvelle et s’inscrit dans le cadre légal fixé par la Déclaration finale de la conférence de Bandung de 1955. Depuis cette date, et davantage depuis la création du FOCAC en 2000, l’importance de l’Afrique dans la quête d’influence globale de la Chine Populaire n’a cessé de croitre, alliant désormais influence économique et influence culturelle. L’Afrique subsaharienne francophone est un terrain propice à l’étude de cette nouvelle stratégie chinoise. Ce cadre spatial nous permet de constater qu’à travers les Instituts Confucius, les médias publics chinois et la médecine chinoise dite « traditionnelle » (MTC), les dirigeants chinois entendent tout mettre en œuvre afin de préserver leurs intérêts économiques en Afrique et faciliter l’intégration de leurs entreprises et communautés diasporiques. Précisons tout de même qu’à travers l’apprentissage du mandarin, les africains parviennent à tirer avantage de ce soft power chinois. Toutefois, la relative intégration des chinois, le caractère propagandiste des IC et médias chinois, ainsi que le recourt par les entreprises chinoises basées en Afrique à de l’importation de main d’œuvre, pratique encore en vigueur aujourd’hui, contribuent à ternir l’image de la Chine Populaire auprès des opinions publiques africaines. En outre, cette percée culturelle chinoise en Afrique subsaharienne francophone a eu un impact notoire sur la diplomatie culturelle du partenaire historique, la France, mais aussi sur la Francophonie. De ce fait, elle contribue à une redéfinition des rapports de forces et a induit l’émergence de partenariats trilatéraux. / Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has embarked in a spectacular charm offensive in Africa. This Chinese strategy is not new and falls within the legal framework established by the Bandung Final Declaration of 1955. Since then, and particularly since the establishing of FOCAC in 2000, the importance of Africa for the Global influence of the People's Republic of China has continued to grow, combining economic influence with cultural influence. Francophone sub-Saharan Africa is a good ground for studying this new Chinese strategy. This space frame allows us to see through the Confucius Institutes, the Chinese public media and the “traditional Chinese medicine (TCM)”, the Chinese leaders intend to make every effort to preserve their economic interests in Africa and facilitate the integration of their businesses and diasporic communities. It should be noted that Africans are able to take advantage of this Chinese soft power. However, the relative integration of Chinese, the propagandist character of IC and the Chinese media, as well as the importation of labor by the Chinese companies’ bases in Africa, contribute to tarnish the image of Popular China among African public opinion. In addition, this Chinese cultural breakthrough in francophone sub-Saharan Africa has had an endless impact on the cultural diplomacy of the historical partner, France, and also on Francophonie. As a result, it contributes to a redefinition of the balance of power and to the emergence of trilateral partnerships.

當全世界風起雲湧將目光投注中共自2004年開始建置之「孔子學院」佈局全球，甚至引發新一波中國「文化威脅論」之際，中共另一「軟實力」（Soft Power）卻正悄悄崛起，其受中共國家領導人重視程度較「孔子學院」有過之而無不及，定位與位階也遠遠高於「孔子學院」之上，那是直屬中國文化部之海外「中國文化中心」。 　　中共於海外設立「中國文化中心」是其整體文化「走出去」戰略實踐方案之一，具有因應國際背景與現實需求、提高國家文化地位、擴大對外影響力與軟實力、以及加深中西文明對話與認同的目的；而在海外設立文化中心是二戰之後全球主要強權國家普遍採用的文化「走出去」戰略，是其推廣本國文化、傳播思想價值、樹立國家形象的重要方式，也是提升國家軟實力重要平臺。 　　在中共30年傲人的經濟發展下，自江澤民於1988年在非洲模里西斯及貝寧設立海外「中國文化中心」開始，目前已在全球建成30個海外「中國文化中心」，預定在2020年達成建設50家的目標，確定從「經濟走出去」到「文化走出去」之戰略布局。近年來，隨著中國國際地位和影響力的迅速提升，海外「中國文化中心」的發展來到前所未有的機遇；惟全球設立家數與主要強權如法國、英國、德國等，仍有相當差距且分布不均，未來中共如何運用中國綜合國力及落實提高國家軟實力，明確制定宏觀總體戰略布局以展現全球文化「魅力攻勢」有其迫切性與挑戰性。 / When the world pays more attention to the Confucius Institute, which has been built by the Chinese Communist Party since 2004, even sparked a new wave of culture threat theory, the other soft power of the Chinese Communist Party is quietly rising. That is the Overseas China Cultural Center, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China. It is not only highly valued by the leaders of the CCP than the Confucius Institute, but also has a much higher position and rank than the Confucius Institute. 　　The Overseas China Cultural Center is one of the practices of its comprehensive culture going out strategy by the Chinese Communist Party. It has the purpose of improving the national cultural status, expanding its influence and soft power in response to the international affairs and realistic needs, and deepening the dialogue and identity between Chinese and Western civilizations. The establishment of the Cultural Center abroad is a major policy of culture going out strategy between great powers around the world after World War II. It is an important approach to promote national culture, disseminate ideological value and establish a national image. It is also an important platform to enhance national soft power. 　　In the 30 years of economic development of the Chinese Communist Party, President Jiang Zemin has set up the first overseas China Cultural Center in the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of Benin in 1988. So far, it has been built 30 Cultural Centers in the world. China Cultural Center is also scheduled to reach 50 targets by 2020. The layout of going out strategy was transitioned from economy to culture. In recent years, with the rapid advancement of China's international status and influence, the development of overseas China cultural center has come to unprecedented opportunities. However, there is still a considerable gap in the number of centers with great powers, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, etc. How can the Chinese Communist Party employ its comprehensive national strength and implement the national soft power in the future, and it is urgent and challenging to formulate the overall strategic layout to demonstrate the global cultural charm offensive.

本研究旨在探討中國大陸如何運用經濟工具與菲律賓、越南應處南海爭端。參照Keohane及Nye非對稱互賴理論（asymmetrical interdependence）提出之敏感性（sensitivity）、脆弱性（vulnerability）概念，本研究分析中國大陸自1997年採取「魅力攻勢（Charm Offensive）」策略，為其創造可供運用經濟誘因（economic attraction）及經濟脅迫（economic coercion）之戰略空間，期能使菲、越等經濟實力相對弱勢國家，在領土爭端方面知所退讓。然而，從經濟誘因之敏感性以觀，研究發現菲、越兩國例證，均無以支持經濟誘因能說服相對弱勢國家減緩聲索之論述。針此，研究者提出「信任（trust）」或可作為補強Keohane及Nye分析框架要項之一；意即中國大陸與其經濟夥伴之間若政治信任不足，則中國大陸欲藉提供經濟誘因，促其經濟夥伴在領土爭端有所退讓，勢必存在相當難度。另從經濟脅迫之脆弱性以觀，研究發現菲、越兩國例證顯示，有別於運用實質性手段（substantive measures）施壓造成之短期損失，採取象徵性手段（symbolic measures）所映射之高度風險與不確定性，對於威懾經濟實力相對弱勢國家，可能更具效力。 / This study explores how China has employed economic instruments in handling South China Sea disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam. Borrowing Keohane and Nye’s notations of sensitivity and vulnerability in asymmetrical interdependence, this study analyzes how China’s charm offensive strategy developed since 1997 has created tactical spaces for China to utilize economic attractions and economic coercions in making her weaker economic partners to concede in territorial disputes. In terms of sensitivity to economic attractions, nevertheless, findings in both cases fail to support the argument that economic incentives would persuade the weaker parties to refrain their claims. I argue that one of the missing elements in Keohane and Nye’s analytical framework is “trust”. Without sufficient political “trust” between China and her economic partners, economic attractions to induce concessions could hardly work. In terms of vulnerability to economic coercions, findings in both cases suggest that compared to the substantive measures stressing the short-term loss, the symbolic measures projecting to high degree of risks and uncertainties might be more effective to deter the weaker parties.