南海為東亞重要的戰略樞紐。除東協各國涉及南海爭議之外，美日等大國亦因自身利益考量涉足南海問題，使形勢更為複雜。自90年代末期以來，發展及運用軟實力成為中國重要的政策，中國大陸除避免在南海問題上與各國發生重大衝突外，並以各種不同層面之軟實力策略增進改善與東協之關係。雙方雖已建立密切合作關係，但南海問題卻成為衝突點。 本文研究目的在於從軟實力面向檢視中國大陸在東南亞地區如何運用其軟實力，且是否對南海情勢造成影響，並檢視其侷限所在，最後並對應中國大陸近年來在南海問題上展現出的策略轉變。 研究發現儘管中國大陸的軟實力在東南亞地區甚至是亞洲地區雖都呈現上升的態勢，但仍落後於美國、歐洲及日本，其軟實力內涵不僅仍有待加強，面對國際化的南海問題，亦難以完全施展其軟實力之影響力，在此種狀況下在南海問題取得重大進展並不容易。

中共近年由於經濟實力增強，進而積極發展軍事武力，然其深知要得到國際社會認同，必須操作「軟實力」，重建和形塑對外的文化主權與和平形象，具體實踐即是廣設孔子學院。 鑑於中共運用「軟實力」逐漸成為國際社會具關鍵性影響力大國已指日可待，屆時對我台灣政治、經濟各層面之安全影響至鉅，因此冀望藉由本文的探討，深入了解中共廣設孔子學院之意涵，進而發掘其可能面臨之困境與挑戰，俾利我因應兩岸局勢發展。 從國際間對設置孔子學院接受程度與存在戒心的弔詭情況觀之，顯然各界對中華文化的濃厚興趣，並不等同於對中共政體的善意理解，換言之，中共欲真正透過孔子學院來達到其軟實力的提升，進而消除外界對其「和平崛起」的誤解，恐怕還有待商榷。

「軟實力」是中國大陸崛起過程中的重要理念，良好的國家形象是軟實力建設的核心組成部分，公共外交則是展現軟實力的手段之一。 中國大陸與世界聯繫日益緊密，經濟實力更是快速且大幅成長，使得中國大陸在國際事務中的地位日顯重要，同時，「中國威脅論」等論調伴隨而來，國際社會十分關心中國大陸將在世界舞台上扮演什麼樣重要的角色?中國大陸為了消弭「中國威脅論」的負面形象，塑造對其有利的國際環境，需要有新的積極作為。北京奧運、上海世博為其軟實力的培育提供了重要的契機;孔子學院的廣佈強化了中華文化的感染力，體育外交、救援外交等公共外交途徑體現了國家親和力;運用現代傳播手段，爭取國際話語權，2008年金融危機爆發，更是提供中國大陸改善形象千載難逢的機遇期。中國大陸期待向世界樹立一個和平、發展、和諧、富強、文明、慈悲且大國風範的國家形象。 中國大陸建設國家形象強化國家軟實力，再以國家軟實力提升國家形象。數據顯示，中國大陸國家形象在近幾年確實大幅提升，但侷限性甚大，因中國大陸在大力建設國家形象工程之餘，尚有許多社會、人權、誠信、政府職能、貪污等諸多問題，都使得這些國家形象的建設大打折扣，畢竟公共外交需聚焦於透過言行一致的方式型塑國內、外受眾心目中的國家形象。

Through its history, Chinеsе culturе has always playеd an important rolе in dеfining thе Chinеsе nation, contributing to China’s national powеr, and influеncing China’s forеign rеlations with othеr statеs and еthnic groups. Thеrеforе, as onе of thе instrumеnts of soft powеr, cultural soft powеr or cultural diplomacy has a vеry important placе in China. Thеrе arе somе important quеstions that nееd to bе answеrеd. What is soft powеr and cultural diplomacy? What kind of powеr is it? How many forms, fеaturеs, and shapеs doеs it takе? How can wе rеcognizе and managе it? How do scholars dеscribе it? Doеs China havе soft powеr? What is China’s soft powеr? What arе China’s own soft powеr rеsourcеs？Thеrеforе, apart from thе tеrm cultural diplomacy itsеlf, this MA thеsis will еxplorе anothеr notion ‘soft powеr’. Thе soft powеr of a country rеsts primarily on thrее rеsourcеs: its culturе, its political valuеs, and its forеign policiеs. I will primarily focus on cultural aspеct of soft powеr, which is known as cultural diplomacy, in China. With its rapid еconomic growth and dееpеning intеgration into thе global systеm, Chinеsе lеadеrs sее thе first 20 yеars of thе 21st cеntury as an 'important pеriod of stratеgic opportunity' for China. China undеr Hu Jintao's lеadеrship had chosеn a nеw path of pеacеful risе. To facilitatе such a pеacеful risе, Chinеsе Communist Party has gradually adoptеd a soft powеr stratеgy. Bеijing's publicity blitz bеgan in 2007 undеr Prеsidеnt Hu Jintao, and it has intеnsifiеd undеr Prеsidеnt Xi Jinping. In 2014, Xi announcеd, “Wе should incrеasе China’s soft powеr, givе a good Chinеsе narrativе, and bеttеr communicatе China’s mеssagеs to thе world.” China's diplomatic and dеvеlopmеnt schеmеs form just onе part of a much broadеr agеnda aimеd at еnhancing its soft powеr in еducation, publishing, mеdia, thе arts, sports, and othеr domains. This MA thеsis aims to answеr thеsе and othеr quеstions rеgarding thе dimеnsion of soft powеr with a spеcific focus on China’s cultural diplomacy. This dissеrtation also will attеmpt to answеr thеsе important quеstions; how is culturе utilizеd in intеrnational rеlations? How havе Chinеsе cultural rеsourcеs contributеd to China’s national powеr in history and in its modеrnization procеss? What is China’s soft powеr in thе pеrspеctivе of cultural attractivеnеss? How has China wiеldеd its cultural powеr in its forеign rеlations? Also, my thеsis will analysе discussions, rеsourcеs, and prospеcts for cultural diplomacy in China, focusing on thе Bеijing Consеnsus, forеign policy, which posits that thе China's rеcognition of cultural diplomacy and its application to national policiеs is an important factor in еxplaining China's rapidly incrеasing influеncе in thе world.

當全世界風起雲湧將目光投注中共自2004年開始建置之「孔子學院」佈局全球，甚至引發新一波中國「文化威脅論」之際，中共另一「軟實力」（Soft Power）卻正悄悄崛起，其受中共國家領導人重視程度較「孔子學院」有過之而無不及，定位與位階也遠遠高於「孔子學院」之上，那是直屬中國文化部之海外「中國文化中心」。 　　中共於海外設立「中國文化中心」是其整體文化「走出去」戰略實踐方案之一，具有因應國際背景與現實需求、提高國家文化地位、擴大對外影響力與軟實力、以及加深中西文明對話與認同的目的；而在海外設立文化中心是二戰之後全球主要強權國家普遍採用的文化「走出去」戰略，是其推廣本國文化、傳播思想價值、樹立國家形象的重要方式，也是提升國家軟實力重要平臺。 　　在中共30年傲人的經濟發展下，自江澤民於1988年在非洲模里西斯及貝寧設立海外「中國文化中心」開始，目前已在全球建成30個海外「中國文化中心」，預定在2020年達成建設50家的目標，確定從「經濟走出去」到「文化走出去」之戰略布局。近年來，隨著中國國際地位和影響力的迅速提升，海外「中國文化中心」的發展來到前所未有的機遇；惟全球設立家數與主要強權如法國、英國、德國等，仍有相當差距且分布不均，未來中共如何運用中國綜合國力及落實提高國家軟實力，明確制定宏觀總體戰略布局以展現全球文化「魅力攻勢」有其迫切性與挑戰性。 / When the world pays more attention to the Confucius Institute, which has been built by the Chinese Communist Party since 2004, even sparked a new wave of culture threat theory, the other soft power of the Chinese Communist Party is quietly rising. That is the Overseas China Cultural Center, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China. It is not only highly valued by the leaders of the CCP than the Confucius Institute, but also has a much higher position and rank than the Confucius Institute. 　　The Overseas China Cultural Center is one of the practices of its comprehensive culture going out strategy by the Chinese Communist Party. It has the purpose of improving the national cultural status, expanding its influence and soft power in response to the international affairs and realistic needs, and deepening the dialogue and identity between Chinese and Western civilizations. The establishment of the Cultural Center abroad is a major policy of culture going out strategy between great powers around the world after World War II. It is an important approach to promote national culture, disseminate ideological value and establish a national image. It is also an important platform to enhance national soft power. 　　In the 30 years of economic development of the Chinese Communist Party, President Jiang Zemin has set up the first overseas China Cultural Center in the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of Benin in 1988. So far, it has been built 30 Cultural Centers in the world. China Cultural Center is also scheduled to reach 50 targets by 2020. The layout of going out strategy was transitioned from economy to culture. In recent years, with the rapid advancement of China's international status and influence, the development of overseas China cultural center has come to unprecedented opportunities. However, there is still a considerable gap in the number of centers with great powers, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, etc. How can the Chinese Communist Party employ its comprehensive national strength and implement the national soft power in the future, and it is urgent and challenging to formulate the overall strategic layout to demonstrate the global cultural charm offensive.

自1990年代初期Joseph S. Nye提出「軟權力」的概念後，隨之促成相關應用研究如雨後春筍般湧現。尤其是在中國，「軟權力」遵循著其的發展脈絡逐漸被轉化與重構成為「文化軟實力」一詞，並服膺於國家的發展戰略與目標。同時間，世界遺產公約自1972年通過以來，至今已累積超過40年的發展歷程，其著眼於對世界各種具備「突出普遍性價值」的遺產類型之強調，以呼籲世界各國及全人類共同予以保護，被視為是當今國際社會中舉足輕重的一項國際制度。 本研究即是由以上兩方面歸納出欲探討之問題——了解中國參與世界遺產公約是否可被視為中國「文化軟實力」？以此，本研究的內容主要分成四個部分，首先，闡釋中國「文化軟實力」概念的發展意涵；其次，說明世界遺產公約的緣起內涵；再次，則是陳述中國參與世界遺產公約的內容成果；最後統合以上，連結文化軟實力與世界遺產，為本文問題意識提出明確解釋。本研究企圖經由上述四個部份的論述鋪陳，進一步增添並豐富無論是中國「文化軟實力」本身，抑或世界遺產公約的相關研究成果。

中國於1971年加入聯合國，藉此重返國際社會；但在毛澤東主政下，中國仍自我封鎖。鄧小平於1976年接替毛澤東後，終於在1979年開啟中國的大門；此時國際環境中現有的規則、制度及價值，大多為西方國家所主導。中國做為後來者，在二十年間成為亞洲經濟的動力來源，世界各國無不密切觀察其快速的崛起；對於中國在國際體系中扮演的角色，以及該如何面對中國竄升的實力，國際間出現兩種看法。 第一種看法將中國視為必須加以防堵的威脅，第二種則將中國視為可透過交往加以運用的機會。「中國威脅論」之說，在1989年的六四天安門鎮壓事件發生後到達顛峰，中國面臨遭到國際孤立的局面，中國政府因此深刻體認到國際聲譽及形象受損的嚴重後果。而當中國共產黨執政的正當性日益仰賴經濟改革成果之際，中國政府更急於塑造友善的國際環境，使其經濟改革得以前進。中國政府開始啟動了全面的國際形象改造，以緩和將中國視為威脅的國際氛圍。 中國領導人自此大力宣傳其「和平崛起」，並在其傳統文化中尋找「軟實力」元素，做為推展多面向公眾外交的後盾。本文內容主要檢視中國擁有的軟實力資源，及其推動高層官員出訪、積極參與國際論壇、主辦北京奧運及上海博覽會等公眾外交作為，結論認為中國的國際形象改造計畫，在全球不同的區域獲致不同的成效。 / China reentered the international community in 1971 when it joined the United Nations, but it remained a closed country under Mao’s watch. Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao in 1976 and he opened China’s door in 1979 to a global environment where existing rules, institutions, and values had been largely shaped by western countries. In two decades the latecomer has become the economic powerhouse in Asia and has had other states watching its rapid rise in the global community. Two rival views have since emerged as to China’s role in the international order and how to deal with its rising power. The first deems China as a threat to be contained. The second projects China as an opportunity that can be employed through engagement. The “China threat” argument reached its height after the crackdown on student protest at the Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. The aftermath of international isolation seriously alerted the Chinese government to the effect of severe damage to its reputation and image internationally. As the Chinese Communist Party’s power legitimacy increasingly relies on delivering economic success, the Chinese government became ever more eager to create a friendly international environment where its economic development may be furthered. The Chinese government has since launched a sweeping reform of its global image to smooth away the perception of China as a threat. Chinese leaders have since touted its “peaceful rise” and turned to its traditional culture for soft power resources to better support its public diplomacy on all possible fronts. Examining China’s soft power resources and its efforts in staging high-level official visits, actively participating in international forums, and hosting the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai World Exposition, this thesis finds that China’s global image promotion has reaped various degree of success in different regions.

不同於一般學術文獻在研究中共的Soft Power時，多習於從Nye的敘事體系出發，本論文則是直接從文本分析進入中共的系絡，探究問題之所在。 本論文所欲探討的問題意識包括：Nye 的Soft Power究竟是放諸四海皆準的真理，抑或是鑲嵌於某一特定歷史系絡中的特殊存在？若為後者，則屬於此一系絡之問題意識與政策建議為何？其是否同樣適用於其他行動者身上呢？其次，作為Soft Power的主要引介者，中共知識份子究竟係以何種方式承接此一概念？是全盤接收之，抑或是採批判方式引入Nye的觀點？倘若為後者，則其批判的部分為何？改造的部分又為何？進一步言，中共知識份子所建構的「軟實力」，究竟與Soft Power有何不同？第三，就官方的角度來看，中共領導人是如何看待「軟實力」？特別是「軟實力」對其而言應定位在何處？其所指涉的意涵又為何？而此是否與學術界存在著認知上的差異？第四，在中共的系絡中，其對「軟實力」一詞係以何種傳統承接之，甚者，其又是以何種未來戰略想定對此加以定位？第五，對中共而言，「軟實力」的具體內涵為何？有哪些具體政策或措施有助於提升「軟實力」？又，這些政策或措施的成效應如何衡量？ 本論文不在證明或否證某個理論或論述，亦非志在建構一個放諸四海皆準的社會科學理論；甚者，作為一個開放的文本，本論文更非旨在宣示另一套絕對的「客觀」或「真理」。透過對「軟實力」之「建構的建構」，本論文期望呈現的是「語言／文字／符號」表象下的權力關係網絡，以及這些「能指」(signifying)對中共自我建構的意義。 / A way of seeing is a way of not seeing. Those who study Chinese soft power usually accept the legitimate of the narrative system of Joseph Nye's soft power theory. But the Chinese do not tranlate it that way. China has its own distinctive history, context, political economy system, and national grand strategy. So, it is dangerous and harmful to view the young rising global power as the same as the current dominant global power---USA. Obviously, China is marching on a very path to construct its soft power compared to the U.S.. Through the analysis of meta-narrative, the author find many interesting espects that cannot be seen via Nye's theory. These espects are in-ward dimension, highly connected with propagada and united front, mainly focus on Chinese characteristic culture . The CCP take the Chinese culure as its outside appearance and socialism value system as its guiding core. This dissertation is not intended to construct a grand theory or something. All it want to do is to disclose the hidden dimension of the Chinese characteristic soft power.

根據Joseph Nye的定義:軟實力是透過吸引和説服，而非以強迫或收買，使你得到想要的東西的能力。最近，為了推動他們的「和平崛起」，中國政府致力於軟實力的發展。其焦點是採用非威脅的、基於文化的方法以迎合世界其他國家，進而達到展現中國是新興超級強國的目的。 已知電影為強而有力的文化工具，而在二十一世紀美國好萊塢的電影產業一向穩占世界主導地位。但在世紀之交，中國把本土的電影業市場化，將此媒介從純粹的宣傳工具變成一個文化產業。根據胡錦濤二零零七年的敦促，中國需要進一步發展文化上的軟實力以因應國家快速的崛起。發展至今，固然中國電影業的軟實力尚未能與美國電影業相比擬，但它在過去十年的進步仍然令人難以置信。 若中國確實將電影業視為國家重要的軟實力資源之一，則仍然有許多障礙需要克服。 但所謂的障礙究竟是什麽？本論文將評論中國電影業的軟實力發展。我們將蒐集與評估現有的資料以研究其進化與現況。更將進一步分析， 在針對中國特定的軟實力目標上，該產業的成功與不足。 / According to Joseph Nye, “Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (2004, 256). Recently, China has been making a soft power push to promote its “peaceful rise,” focusing on a non-threatening culture based approach, with the aim of ingratiating themselves as an emerging super power to the rest of the world. Film remains a powerful cultural tool, one that the U.S. industry in Hollywood has dominated throughout the twenty-first century. But as China marketized its own film industry at the turn of the century, the medium there has moved away from being purely a propaganda apparatus to more of a cultural industry. Upon Hu Jintao’s urging in 2007, China must better develop its cultural soft power to accommodate its meteoric rise. While the Chinese film industry’s soft power development has not yet reached the ranks of the U.S.’s, it has made incredible strides over the past decade. There are still many hurdles for it to surpass if it truly intends to become a significant soft power resource for the country, but what are they? This thesis will evaluate the Chinese film industry’s soft power development by surveying existing material, data, and research on the subject, by examining its evolution, by reviewing its current environment, and by analyzing its successes and its shortcomings against the framework of China’s specific soft power objectives.

孔子學院是中國軟實力政策的展現。它創設的是目的為了向世界推廣中國文化與漢語，增進世界各國對中國的瞭解，目前全球已設有443所孔子學院與648間孔子課堂。 俄羅斯是中國最友好的朋友之一，也是重要的政治、經濟、戰略夥伴。因為兩國的關係不斷地發展，俄羅斯人對漢語的興趣也越來越高。為滿足俄羅斯人的需要，中國遂把在俄羅斯設立孔子學院列為積極推動的項目。俄羅斯目前已經有18所孔子學院與5間孔子課堂。 本論文的題目是『孔子學院在莫斯科：國家的形象與在地認知』，旨在瞭解在俄羅斯漢語教師與學生對孔子學院的觀感為何。 本論文所採用用的研究方法為面對面訪問跟次級資料分析。 分析的結果顯示，大部分受訪者持正面的看法，並對孔子學院給予高度評價，以及認為孔子學院對中俄關係的發展產生很重要的作用。雖然有一些人認為，孔子學院是中國政府情報機關的部分，但是總的印象是正面的。中國在俄羅斯成功地建立其自身的良好形象，而孔子學院是它以達到其目的使用的工具之一。 / Abstract Confucius Institute (CI) is one of China's soft power policy initiatives. It aims to promote Chinese language and culture all over the globe, enhance the world's understanding of China. Today there are already 443 Confucius Institutes and 648 Confucius Classrooms in the world. Russia is one China’s closest friends and allies, as well as its important political, economic and strategic partner. Due to the continuous development of the bilateral relations, Russian people are more and more interested in Chinese language. To meet their need in studying Mandarin, China is actively promoting the establishment of the Confucius Institute there. Now there are already 18 Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classroom 5 in Russia. The name of this thesis is: "Confucius Institutes in Moscow: national image and local perception." It aims at understanding what kind of attitude Russians, who teach or study Chinese either at the CI or somewhere else, have towards the Confucius Institute. Besides, it was also important to understand whether Sino-Russian relations play a crucial role in shaping people’s attitude towards the CI. Throughout the research the author used primary data sources (field work, interviews), as well as secondary data sources. Field research was conducted only in Moscow, the rest of the information about the development of the CIs in Russia is observed through the secondary data sources (reports, newspapers, journals). Results of the analysis indicate that the majority of Russian people, on the example of Moscow, have favorable attitude towards the Confucius Institute. Although in general there are also those who are skeptical about this initiative in Russia, stating that China is using the CIs as a part of its intelligence network, but the overall impression is positive. The PRC managed to create a favorable image of itself in Russia, and the Confucius Institute is one of the tools it uses in order to reach its aim.