Although the wave of democratization already took place in Latin America, Venezuela has experienced a reversal in the past decade. In earlier years, the higher courts (although independent) had no impact on society; the justice members only assumed a symbolic role with no real importance, but with time, this characteristic started to interchange and the Judicial branch began to get involved in issues regarding its civil society. Consequently, the elected President Hugo Chavez decided to neutralize the power of all branches of government, including the judiciary, by enacting a set of rules not commonly seen in a democratic country, which concentrated the majority of power in his hand, eliminating the concept of Checks and Balances. This imbalance of power between the Executive and all other branches of government, has led to the deterioration, and almost elimination, of the independence within the judiciary. Therefore, the more the executive controls the judiciary, the less autonomy and less self-sufficiency it will have, thus eliminating the checks and balances in the Venezuelan government. In this negative relationship, the excessiveness of power exerted by the Executive branch is the main variable that controls the judicial branch. I will present valuable background information to this topic, and I will then suggest a concise solution to the problem of government imbalance between the branches in the Venezuelan government.

O presente trabalho analisa o desempenho do Tribunal de Contas da União no que diz respeito ao controle do uso de recursos públicos federais. Mais especificamente buscou estimar o impacto de variáveis políticas e institucionais sobre a probabilidade das contas de unidades jurisdicionadas pelo TCU serem fiscalizadas e julgadas por irregularidade das contas. Considerando os limites impostos por seu desenho institucional, além da análise descritiva dos dados, modelos de dois estágios (modelo de Heckman) foram aplicados para evitar o viés de seleção provocado pelo fato de que nem todos os jurisdicionados pelo Tribunal de Contas são fiscalizados. Os resultados indicam que variáveis ligadas ao perfil político e técnico dos ministros são menos importantes para explicar a variação de desempenho do Tribunal de Contas, quando comparadas a variáveis institucionais ligadas ao tipo de iniciativa que provocou a fiscalização. Tal resultado contraria duas expectativas presentes em grande parte da literatura especializada, segundo as quais o perfil dos dirigentes do TCU e a coordenação do TCU com outras instituições seriam os fatores explicativos chaves para o padrão de desempenho da instituição. Ao contrário, os resultados sustentam a hipótese de que o sucesso da instituição no que se refere a identificar contas irregulares está mais associado ao empenho dos próprios integrantes do Tribunal de Contas, quando comparado às provocações de outras instituições autorizadas a solicitar fiscalização. / This study analyzes the performance of the Brazilian Federal Audit Court with regard to the control of federal public values. More specifically it sought to estimate the impact of political and institutional variables on the probability of the jurisdictional units accounted by TCU are audited and judged from irregular accounts. When considering the limits imposed by TCUs institutional design, in addition to the descriptive analysis of the data, two-stage models (Heckman model) were applied to avoid selection bias caused by the fact that not all the jurisdictional units are monitored. The results indicate that variables related to political and technical profile of the ministers are less important in explaining the variation in performance of the Court of Auditors, than institutional variables related to the type of initiative that triggered the inspection. This result contradicts the expectation of the literature according to which the composition of TCU\'s leaderships and coordination between TCU and other institutions would be the key factors to explain the standard performance of the institution. Rather, the results support the hypothesis that the success of the institution regarding to identify irregular accounts is more associated with the members efforts of the Court of Auditors, if compared to the initiative of other institutions authorized to request supervision.

O presente trabalho analisa o desempenho do Tribunal de Contas da União no que diz respeito ao controle do uso de recursos públicos federais. Mais especificamente buscou estimar o impacto de variáveis políticas e institucionais sobre a probabilidade das contas de unidades jurisdicionadas pelo TCU serem fiscalizadas e julgadas por irregularidade das contas. Considerando os limites impostos por seu desenho institucional, além da análise descritiva dos dados, modelos de dois estágios (modelo de Heckman) foram aplicados para evitar o viés de seleção provocado pelo fato de que nem todos os jurisdicionados pelo Tribunal de Contas são fiscalizados. Os resultados indicam que variáveis ligadas ao perfil político e técnico dos ministros são menos importantes para explicar a variação de desempenho do Tribunal de Contas, quando comparadas a variáveis institucionais ligadas ao tipo de iniciativa que provocou a fiscalização. Tal resultado contraria duas expectativas presentes em grande parte da literatura especializada, segundo as quais o perfil dos dirigentes do TCU e a coordenação do TCU com outras instituições seriam os fatores explicativos chaves para o padrão de desempenho da instituição. Ao contrário, os resultados sustentam a hipótese de que o sucesso da instituição no que se refere a identificar contas irregulares está mais associado ao empenho dos próprios integrantes do Tribunal de Contas, quando comparado às provocações de outras instituições autorizadas a solicitar fiscalização. / This study analyzes the performance of the Brazilian Federal Audit Court with regard to the control of federal public values. More specifically it sought to estimate the impact of political and institutional variables on the probability of the jurisdictional units accounted by TCU are audited and judged from irregular accounts. When considering the limits imposed by TCUs institutional design, in addition to the descriptive analysis of the data, two-stage models (Heckman model) were applied to avoid selection bias caused by the fact that not all the jurisdictional units are monitored. The results indicate that variables related to political and technical profile of the ministers are less important in explaining the variation in performance of the Court of Auditors, than institutional variables related to the type of initiative that triggered the inspection. This result contradicts the expectation of the literature according to which the composition of TCU\'s leaderships and coordination between TCU and other institutions would be the key factors to explain the standard performance of the institution. Rather, the results support the hypothesis that the success of the institution regarding to identify irregular accounts is more associated with the members efforts of the Court of Auditors, if compared to the initiative of other institutions authorized to request supervision.

No description available.

No description available.

Magister Legum - LLM

The aim of this diploma paper is to analyse and define the nature of secret exercise of public authority and to asses this phenomena in respect of the fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law. Any secrecy in exercising public authority is in fact a clear contradiction to a natural concept of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore the republic, as a public institution, should not have too many secrets to hide away from the people if its own principles are not to be completely disgraced. Secrecy in exercising public authority is a specific feature often related to the areas such as securing the sovereignity and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, protecting its democratic foundations, protection of the lives and health of the population as well as the right to own the property. This is in full accordance with the constitutional duty of the state. Limited access to the information has a unique and 84 inevitable role in these areas and it is clearly mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the European Convention of Human Rights and Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The question of choice between the security and the liberty has been recently heavily discussed by the people as a natural follow up to the...

There is currently no satisfactory account of how judges of the Supreme Court of India and High Courts in the states are appointed, transferred, impeached or employed postretirement. For a higher judiciary commanding immense public attention, enjoying wide constitutional powers of judicial review, this is a conspicuous gulf in academic literature. This thesis intends to bridge this gulf by providing such an account. Part I extracts the Constituent Assembly Debates pertaining to these four facets of judicial functioning, describes key developments over time and analyses the extant processes in operation today. On this basis it makes three arguments: first, appointments to the higher judiciary and transfer of judges between High Courts follow processes that are indefensible as a matter of constitutional law; second, impeachment operates in an excessively slow and inefficacious manner; third, the pervasiveness of post-retirement employment of judges in government-appointed positions demonstrates inadequate attention to institutional design. Most crucially, each of these four aspects gives rise to significant concerns pertaining to judicial independence, accountability or both. This is not a peculiarly Indian problem— in several countries, the values of judicial independence and accountability have been deemed to be in tension, often irreconcilably. Part II tackles this widely articulated tension by providing a conceptual framework to understand these concepts. Its main argument is that both judicial independence and accountability are necessary for 'an effective judiciary'. Whether indeed the processes governing the four selected facets of judicial functioning in India lead to an effective judiciary is assessed in Part III. Where they are found lacking, appropriate reform is suggested. Such reform is intended to ensure that the selected processes operate in a manner that is justifiable in terms of judicial independence and accountability in principle and is efficacious in practice.

Partout où l'homme est libre, il se croit dans les fers. Tel est le paradoxe démocratique qui ouvre à l'individu moderne un espace important de liberté, tout en lui conférant en parallèle le sentiment d'en être privé. A la séparation traditionnelle des pouvoirs, se superpose désormais celle des acteurs, organisés en société politique et civile. C'est dans la patrie des Lumières que ces notions chemineront le plus singulièrement. Historiquement confondues, elles vont progressivement se détacher l'une de l'autre, pour aujourd'hui s'opposer. Il est vrai que d'importantes secousses traversent la société politique et la mettent en difficulté. Il convient néanmoins, de s'interroger sur leur nature afin de déterminer si elles constituent le fondement d'une crise ou celui d'une mutation. Le recours politique a une société civile ainsi idéalisée remet en cause le lien essentiel qui agrège l'individu à l’Etat, à travers la citoyenneté. Conjugué à la montée de l'individualisme, comment alors restaurer le lien social dans lequel s'inscrit toute société ? La diversité de ces questions illustre l'intérêt de cette recherche qui permet d'une part,d'aborder les préoccupations actuelles à la lumière des sources de notre organisation politique et, d'autre part, d'observer les enjeux contenus dans les changements de comportement des différents protagonistes. Cette étude n'a pas la prétention de dresser un programme de travail dont le risque serait de déboucher sur une synthèse encore très prématurée. Nous nous sommes fixés pour objectif, moins d'apporter des réponses objectives ou de faire valoir des certitudes sur l'intégralité de ces thèmes, que de rassembler les principaux points de repère et de les organiser pour soumettre la problématique d'ensemble au débat. / Everywhere man is free, he fells in chains. Such is the democratic paradox which gives the modern individual both a large space of freedom and the feeling to be deprived of any. On top of the traditional separation of powe rs or Checks and Balances now lies the one of actors, organized within a Political and Civil Society. It is in the homeland of Enlightenment that these notions are so singular.. Historically merged, they progressively broke apart and are now opposed to each other. It is true that the Political Society is going through important jolts, putting it in a difficult situation. However, one needs to specify the nature of these changes in order to determine if they are the symptoms of a crisis or the ones of a transformation. The political recourse to a Civil Society indeed idealized questions the essential link between theState and the individual, in other words citizenship. Combined with the rise of individualism, how can we reinstate the Social Link so essential in every society? The diversity of these questions illustrates the interest of this research. It analyzes both current issues by the light ofthe sources of our political organization and the stakes of the behavioral changes of our system’s protagonists. This research does not aim at building a work plan whose risk would be to result to definite conclusion. Its goal is certainly not to bring objective answers or certitudesto all these issues but to gather the main landmarks and to organize them to subject our problematic to the debate.

Esta tese volta-se à análise crítica da garantia institucional de independência do Ministério Público brasileiro sob dois aspectos: de um lado, a sua independência em relação às esferas organizacionais dos poderes clássicos do Estado; e, de outro, os limites da independência funcional que visa a assegurar, para os seus membros, o livre desenvolvimento das funções institucionais. Sob o influxo do processo de reconhecimento universal dos direitos humanos a partir da Declaração de 1948, o valor da dignidade da pessoa humana representa o fundamento central do Estado Democrático de Direito da Constituição Federal de 1988, constituindo a fonte jurídica do vasto conjunto de direitos fundamentais dela constante. A proteção dos direitos fundamentais da pessoa humana é indissociável de um regime político democrático, que não pode prescindir de um sistema eficaz de controle do exercício do poder político para a persecução de tal desiderato. Daí a importância da efetividade dos mecanismos de controle recíproco entre os órgãos estatais, no comando do princípio fundamental projetado por Montesquieu que, atualmente, não mais se reduz à formula tríplice de distribuição das funções legislativa, executiva e judicial. É nesse contexto que se pretende introduzir a análise da garantia institucional de independência do Ministério Público, à luz, especificamente, de determinadas funções que lhe foram atribuídas para o controle de decisões de outros órgãos estatais, sobretudo do Executivo, envolvendo a tutela dos direitos fundamentais de proteção da dignidade da pessoa humana. A hipótese é a da existência de aspectos organizacionais condicionando o funcionamento do Ministério Público em dissonância de sua plena afirmação como novo ator político; quais sejam: a) a ausência de limites precisos à garantia de independência funcional no desenvolvimento de suas atividades; b) um sistema autocrático de gestão orientando as decisões sobre todas as políticas institucionais; c) a manutenção dos vínculos que prendem a instituição ao Executivo do Estado, concebido como o ramo hegemônico do regime político brasileiro. O trabalho pretende investigar as causas das incorreções, correlacioná-las e apontar os seus equívocos, para a identificação dos pontos relevantes sujeitos a uma pronta alteração de cunho organizacional, de modo a serem reproduzidos no funcionamento do Ministério Público brasileiro os valores republicanos e democráticos que devem informar um regime político como Estado Democrático de Direito. / This thesis offers a critical analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Brazilian Public Attorney\'s Office regarding two aspects: on one hand, its independence concerning the organizational spheres of the classical branches of the State; on the other hand, the limits of the functional independence that aims at securing free development of the institutional functions to the members of the Public Attorney\'s Office. Due to the process of universal acknowledgement of human rights since the Declaration of 1948, the value of a human being\'s dignity represents the central basis of the Democratic Rule of Law of the 1 988 Federal Constitution, establishing a legal source for the vast set of fundamental rights contained in it. The protection of the fundamental rights of a human being is intrinsic to a democratic political system, which cannot dispense with an efficient procedure to control the use of political power for pursuing such desideratum. Hence the importance of the efficiency of the mechanisms of checks and balances among state agencies, in carrying out the fundamental principle proposed by Montesquieu that is no longer limited nowadays to the triple distribution formula of legislative, executive and judiciary functions. It\'s in this context that the present work intends to introduce the analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Public Attorney\'s Office, specifically examining certain functions attributed to it for the control over decisions by other state agencies, particularly in the executive branch, that involve the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of protection of a human being\'s dignity. The hypothesis is the existence of organizational aspects stipulating the operation of the Public Attorney\'s Office in discordance with its full role as new political agent, such as: a) absence of precise limits to guarantee functional independence in the development of its activities; b) an autocratic ruling system guiding decisions on all institutional policies; c) maintenance of the bonds linking the institution to the executive branch, which is conceived as the hegemonic branch of Brazil\'s political system. This work intends to investigate the causes of those problems, correlate them and pinpoint mistakes, in order to identify the relevant points that would be subject to a swift alteration in terms of organization, so the republican, democratic values that ought to conduct a political regime as a Democratic Rule of Law may be reproduced in the operations of the Brazilian Public Attorney\'s Office.