Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 486-512). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-217).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2010. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 613 p. : col. maps. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 597-613).

No description available.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-17T15:26:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-04-30. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2015-09-17T15:46:01Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000842431.pdf: 1911473 bytes, checksum: c6e09e7ca21ad0f70a7687b58cd17b22 (MD5) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A dissertação analisa as dificuldades domésticas apresentadas à formulação e à aprovação de política externa comercial nos EUA durante o governo de Bill Clinton (1993-2001) e a forma pela qual o Executivo se ajustou a esses obstáculos. Faz-se uma narrativa analítica, tendo com ênfase 1) a aprovação do NAFTA (1993), 2) os entraves ao processo de renovação do fasttrack (1997), 3) as relações comerciais com a China (1993-1996) e com o Japão (1993-1995), 4) a normalização das relações comerciais com a China e reunião ministerial da OMC em Seattle (1999-2000). O quadro analítico contém elementos de distintas abordagens, como a das unidades de decisão e da política burocrática, partindo da premissa de que o processo decisório em política externa comercial se dá por meio de coalizões. Argumenta-se que a forma como se elaborou a política comercial durante o governo Clinton foi essencial para que se chegasse aos resultados obtidos, sendo que os entraves no processo foram resultado das divisões no Congresso, na sociedade e no Executivo e das dificuldades de coordenação entre esses atores. Conclui-se que a análise oferecida, ao considerar os principais atores e seu relacionamento no processo decisório, permite entender com mais clareza os entraves domésticos à política externa comercial, bem como o modo pelo qual o Executivo se ajustou a tais entraves. / This dissertation analyzes the domestic constraints that arose during the formulation and voting of US trade policy throughout Bill Clinton's administration (1993-2001) and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles. An analytical narrative is undertaken with emphasis on: 1) the approval of NAFTA (1993); 2) the constraints to the renewal of fast-track authority (1997); 3) trade relations with China (1993-1996) and with Japan (1993-1995), 4) the normalization of trade relations with China and the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle (1999-2000). The analytic framework contains elements of different approaches such as decision units approach and bureaucratic politics model, based on the assumption that decision is made through coalitions. We argue that the way trade policy was formulated was essential for the results achieved and that the constraints were the result of divisions in the Congress, society and Executive and the difficulties related to the coordination of these actors. We conclude that the analysis provided allows us to understand more clearly the domestic constraints to the US trade policy and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles by considering the relationship among the main actors within the decision-making process.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-01-26T13:21:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012Bitstream added on 2015-01-26T13:30:45Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000800464.pdf: 575118 bytes, checksum: 05fe0183c01cfb9084de37c067e7839c (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O fim da Guerra Fria provocou questionamentos sobre a ordem internacional e a posição dos Estados Unidos, em particular. Ao fim do conflito, os EUA possuíam uma superioridade militar e política como nenhum outro Estado tivera ao longo da história. Assim, durante esse período, ressurgiu o antigo desejo norte-americano de remodelamento da ordem à sua imagem e semelhança, ou seja, a promoção de seus valores pelo mundo. Nesse sentido, os dois primeiros presidentes eleitos após o fim da Guerra Fria, Bill Clinton e George W. Bush, retomaram a abordagem wilsoniana para a política externa dos Estados Unidos. Ao mesmo tempo, o descongelamento das tensões políticas globais e regionais e a ausência da influência bipolar possibilitaram o surgimento de inúmeros problemas nos mais diversos cantos do globo. Nem todos estavam diretamente relacionados à estabilidade do sistema, mas que mesmo assim ofereceram desafios na abordagem de política externa dos Estados Unidos. Assim, o presente trabalho procura, a partir da leitura de diversos textos escritos sobre o período, fazer uma analise sobre a utilização do wilsonismo ao longo desses governos, enfatizando dois momentos distintos: a estratégia do engajamento e expansão no governo Clinton e a doutrina Bush. A analise pretendida na pesquisa procura demonstrar que apesar das diferenças, os dois presidentes utilizaram a abordagem para o mesmo fim: justificar sua atuação em política externa. A pesquisa também apresenta as discussões em torno do conceito de wilsonismo, tendo como base suas características mais fundamentais. Por fim, procurou-se apresentar os desafios à abordagem wilsoniana em um mundo ainda em transformação. / The end of the Cold War led to questions about the international order and the position of the United States in particular. At the end of the conflict, the United States had political and military superiority as no other state throughout History. During this period, there was renewed the longstanding desire of America to remodel the order according to its image, ie. the promotion of its values around the world. Thus, the first two presidents elected after the end of the Cold War, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, retook the wilsonian approach to U.S. foreign policy. At the same time global and regional tensions and the lack of bipolarity influence enable the emergence of problems all around the globe. Not all were directly related to system stability, but still offered challenges for United States foreign policy. This paper seeks, based on the reading of various texts written about the period, to make an analysis on the use of wilsonianism over these governments, emphasizing two distinct periods: the strategy of engagement and expansion in the Clinton administration and the Bush doctrine. The analysis required in the research seeks to show that despite their differences, both used the approach for the same purpose: to justify their actions in foreign policy. The research also presents discussions around the concept of wilsonianism, based on its most fundamental characteristics. Finally, we tried to present the challenges to wilsonian approach in a world still in transformation.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:28:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-12-10Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:36:58Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 santos_ap_me_mar.pdf: 950253 bytes, checksum: 7601b476c061519eea6ce697c91ff403 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A década de 1990 representa um marco no Sistema Internacional pelo fim da bipolaridade que atingiu tanto as potências como os países que pertenciam ao Terceiro Mundo. Neste contexto, pretende-se destacar o estudo das relações Brasil x EUA a fim de identificar os elementos da agenda de cada um dos países isoladamente e a projeção destes nas relações bilaterais. De modo complementar propõe-se uma incursão sobre as teorias de relações internacionais desenvolvidas à época a fim de verificar se as abordagens que surgem neste período são capazes de fundamentar solidamente a constituição do Sistema Internacional neste novo momento, bem como, as relações dos países destacados para estudo / International negotiations under the climate change gain prominence in recent years. There are growing concerns about environmental disasters on the planet, causing global impacts. International efforts to curb climate change policy framework are carried out with the United Nations (UN), inside the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Brazil has over the years played an important role in the negotiations, being the host country on the establishment of the Convention, during the Rio-92. In recent years the Lula da Silva government, it has established the resumption of domestic climate policies and also the continuity of effective participation in international negotiations. During the Copenhagen Conference, Brazil assumed as a goal emission reductions, but voluntarily. However, the country has always been opposed to these goals. The central theme of our research is to analyze the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy in the global climate negotiations. It aims the understanding the of a set of factors, both internal and external, that have influenced the evolution of foreign Brazilian policy climate

Le 6 avril 1994 débutait le génocide le plus rapide de l'histoire de l'humanité: dans les cent jours qui suivirent, plus de 800000 Tutsis et Hutus modérés furent massacrés à coups de machettes et de gourdins selon un plan méticuleusement préparé et exécuté par une clique extrémiste ne voulant pas perdre son pouvoir et ses privilèges. Devant ces atrocités, la communauté internationale demeura passive et ce n'est que le 21 juin qu'une grande puissance décida d'intervenir, en l'occurrence la France avec l'Opération Turquoise, opération sanctionnée par les Nations Unies, pour mettre fin aux massacres. Plusieurs experts considèrent que ce triste événement est le cas le plus patent de génocide depuis l'Holocauste de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Presque dix ans plus tard, un autre événement faisait les manchettes pour des raisons similaires. En février 2003, la région occidentale du Soudan, le Darfour, s'embrasa à son tour à la suite du soulèvement de groupes rebelles et de la répression gouvernementale qui s'en suivit. Lors des célébrations entourant le dixième anniversaire du génocide au Rwanda, plusieurs personnalités publiques mirent en garde la communauté internationale que le « Plus jamais! », véritable slogan politique scandé sur toutes les tribunes après le Rwanda, perdrait toute sa signification si rien n'était fait pour mettre un terme aux violences. Quoique la nature et la définition des violences fassent encore l'objet d'un débat constant au sein de la communauté internationale, il est clair que la situation demeure extrêmement problématique et que la population civile du Darfour fait les frais de ces affrontements entre rebelles et forces gouvernementales. En 1994, l'administration Clinton fut complètement silencieuse durant le génocide, ne voulant même pas reconnaître publiquement que c'était un génocide. En comparaison, l'administration de George W. Bush a été très bruyante à propos du Darfour, décrivant la situation comme étant un génocide, émettant des sanctions sévères et poursuivant des résolutions contraignantes au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Par contre, il y a des similarités frappantes entre les politiques étrangères de ces deux administrations alors qu'aucune d'entre elles n'a été en mesure de mettre un terme aux violences. L'objectif de ce mémoire est donc de répondre à la question suivante: qu'est-ce qui peut expliquer les différences et les ressemblances entre la politique étrangère de l'administration Clinton et celle de George W. Bush? Un des principaux arguments afin d'expliquer l'inaction américaine en 1994 est que la société civile et le Congrès furent totalement silencieux et ne mirent pas de pression sur le gouvernement américain pour que ce dernier change sa politique. Cette leçon semble avoir été retenue dans le cas du Darfour, car rarement a-t-on vu autant de groupes différents se mobiliser pour un enjeu de politique étrangère. C'est une des raisons qui explique, à notre avis, les différences entre les deux politiques étrangères. Pour expliquer les ressemblances, plus frappantes que les différences, nous aurons recours aux variables perceptuelles, c'est-à-dire l'influence de la perception de l'environnement extérieur de la part des dirigeants, et bureaucratiques, c'est-à-dire l'influence des différentes entités bureaucratiques qui composent le gouvernement américain. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Rwanda, Darfour, États-Unis, Génocide, Politique étrangère.

The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response to incidents of international terrorism. Key players in each administration and whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm approach to counterterrorism are examined. In addition, Koh's pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations. An assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations' counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests future administrations will adhere to it. During the George W. Bush administration, Koh's pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to create a 'perfect storm' known as the 'war on terror'. The research also analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations. Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.

The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response to incidents of international terrorism. Key players in each administration and whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm approach to counterterrorism are examined. In addition, Koh¿s pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations. An assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations¿ counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests future administrations will adhere to it. During the George W. Bush administration, Koh¿s pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to create a ¿perfect storm¿ known as the ¿war on terror¿. The research also analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations. Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.