Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinkingsteps variety where subjects differ in the number of levels of iterated reasoning they perform. Camerer et al. (2004) claim that substituting the Poisson parameter = 1:5 yields a parameter-free PCH model (pfPCH) which predicts experimental data considerably better than NE. We design a new multi-person game, the Minimizer Game, as a testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK. Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject NE and LK, but are well in line with the point-prediction of pfPCH.

Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinking-steps variety where subjects differ in the number of levels of iterated reasoning they perform. Camerer et al. (2004) claim that substituting the Poisson parameter tau = 1.5 yields a parameter-free PCH model (pfPCH) which predicts experimental data considerably better than NE. We design a new multi-person game, the Minimizer Game, as a testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK. Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject NE and LK, but are well in line with the point prediction of pfPCH. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This thesis consists of four independent chapters, in which well-known economic theories are employed to investigate, and better understand, data and facts from the real world. Although in fairly distant topics, each paper is an example of how economics, and more precisely microeconomics, offers a rigorous and effective framework to reason about what happens around us. In this sense, my dissertation fully represents what I have learnt in these five years. The first paper addresses the experimental behavior of subjects that interact with each other, non-cooperatively, in a laboratory setup. The experimental evidence is found to be at odds with the predictions of classical game-theory, and I explore whether a model of bounded rationality can instead succeed in explaining the data. The second paper looks at another type of data, historical rather than experimental. Together with Björn Wallace, we raise doubts, methodological and interpretational, regarding the validity of a recent finding that documents a sizeable effect of Africa's past slave trades on current economic performance. The last two papers investigate the phenomenon of limited records, understood as the limited availability of past public data regarding a transacting partner. The former is a survey, written jointly with Giancarlo Spagnolo, wherein we discuss the literatures that have independently studied whether limited records may actually prompt beneficial reputation effects. We argue that what is known about this type of informational arrangement is little and scattered, and that this is problematic given the large number of real-life situations featuring limited records. These conclusions prepare the ground for the last paper of this dissertation, which presents a model of limited credit records. The model aims at providing a framework for evaluating the current privacy provisions in the credit market which mandate the removal of information about borrowers' past performance from public registers after a finite number of years. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2011

<div>This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I investigate the effects of complexity in various voting systems on individual behavior in small group electoral competitions. Using a laboratory experiment, I observe individual behavior within one of three voting systems -- plurality, instant runoff voting (IRV), and score then automatic runoff (STAR). I then estimate subjects' behavior in three different models of bounded rationality. The estimated models are a model of Level-K thinking (Nagel, 1995), the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model (Camerer, et al. 2004), and a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). I consistently find that more complex voting systems induce lower levels of strategic thinking. This implies that policy makers desiring more sincere voting behavior could potentially achieve this through voting systems with more complex strategy sets. Of the tested behavioral models, Level-K consistently fits observed data the best, implying subjects make decisions that combine of steps of thinking with random, utility maximizing, errors.</div><div><br></div><div>In the second chapter, I investigate the relationship between the mechanisms used to select leaders and both measures of group performance and leaders' ethical behavior. Using a laboratory experiment, we measure group performance in a group minimum effort task with a leader selected using one of three mechanisms: random, a competition task, and voting. After the group task, leaders must complete a task that asks them to behave honestly or dishonestly in questions related to the groups performance. We find that leaders have a large impact on group performance when compared to those groups without leaders. Evidence for which selection mechanism performs best in terms of group performance seems mixed. On measures of honesty, the strongest evidence seems to indicate that honesty is most positively impacted through a voting selection mechanism, which differences in ethical behavior between the random and competition selection treatments are negligible.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>In the third chapter, I provide an investigation into the factors and conditions that drive "free riding" behavior in dynamic innovation contests. Starting from a dynamic innovation contest model from Halac, et al. (2017), I construct a two period dynamic innovation contest game. From there, I provide a theoretical background and derivation of mixed strategies that can be interpreted as an agent's degree to which they engage in free riding behavior, namely through allowing their opponent to exert effort in order to uncover information about an uncertain state of the world. I show certain conditions must be fulfilled in order to induce free riding in equilibrium, and also analytically show the impact of changing contest prize structures on the degree of free riding. I end this paper with an experimental design to test these various theoretical conclusions in a laboratory setting while also considering the behavioral observations recorded in studies investigating similar contest models and provide a plan to analyze the data collected by this laboratory experiment.</div><div><br></div><div>All data collected for this study consists of individual human subject data collected from laboratory experiments. Project procedures have been conducted in accordance with Purdue's internal review board approval and known consent from all participants was obtained.</div>

<p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2008 Sammanfattning jämte 5 uppsatser</p>

Biodiversity loss is one of the major environmental threats facing the planet. Incentive-based conservation is one means to reduce human pressure on wildlife by providing economic incentives for resource-dependent people to protect the environment. Marine wildlife tourism is one of the fastest growing tourism sectors globally and is viewed as an important incentive-based approach for achieving marine conservation goals. However, few studies have linked participation in the provisioning of marine wildlife tourism activities with positive social and ecological conservation outcomes. The goal of this dissertation is to provide greater understanding of the conservation value of marine wildlife tourism using whale shark tourism as a case study with a main focus on social conservation outcomes amongst tourism providers. Positive changes in perceptions, attitudes and values towards target species and their environments can be an important element of incentive-based conservation. The study has the following objectives: (1) to assess the status of the global whale shark tourism industry, including types (e.g., captive, non-captive), real and potential impacts, conservation value and management challenges and best practices; (2) to examine the ethics of provisioning whale sharks in Oslob, Philippines, the largest, non-captive viewing site in the world; (3) to determine if working in ecotourism changed the attitudes and behaviours of locals towards whale sharks and the ocean, and if tourism type affects those outcomes; (4) to assess the marine wildlife value orientations of locals working in whale shark tourism to achieve greater understanding of the factors influencing their conservation attitudes and behaviours; (5) to explore the potential long-term impacts of poorly conceived incentive-based conservation projects on social and ecological conservation outcomes; and (6) to re-examine and update the conceptual and theoretical background for wildlife tourism in light of the findings of this study. Methods include a comprehensive literature review, tourist surveys, social media content analysis, and interviews with locals working in whale shark tourism at four sites in the Philippines. Results suggest that marine wildlife tourism can play an important role in changing locals’ attitudes and behaviours towards the focal species and habitat; however, smaller-scale, more established sites had greater conservation value than the mass tourism or failed sites suggesting that small-scale, community-based ecotourism is the best approach to meeting conservation goals of marine wildlife tourism. Yet, few tourism sites meet these standards. Global standards are needed to ensure whale shark tourism activities meet desired conservation goals. Such standards should include management requirements (e.g., licensing, mandatory education program) and interaction guidelines (e.g. minimum viewing distances, limits on the number of swimmers/boats, etc.). The findings also emphasise that economics should not be the only or primary metric used to measure conservation success; rather, the focus should be on assessing a more comprehensive range of social and ecological conservation outcomes of these activities. / Graduate / 2020-04-16