Section 23(5) of the Constitution entrenches trade unions, employer's organisations and employers' right to engage in collective bargaining. For employees, collective bargaining is the key which opens the door to better wages, improved working conditions and an overall better standard of living to name but a few. The Labour Relations Act was promulgated to give effect to section 23 of the Constitution. However, in section 2 of the Labour Relations Act, members of the South African National Defence Force were excluded from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act (LRA). After the Constitutional Court regarded members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to be "workers", they also had the right to engage in collective bargaining. However, because of the special duty that the members of the SANDF have to fulfil namely to ensure the safety of the republic and its citizens, they are not awarded the right to strike. The question therefor is: How do the members of the SANDF compel the SANDF to bargain with them? The aim of this study is to establish if a duty to bargain was implemented by Chapter XX of the General Regulations of the South African National Defence Force and the Reserve. Firstly, the new dispensation of voluntarism under the new LRA is examined to understand how collective bargaining would work in a normal situation and not that of the members of the SANDF. Freedom of association is also discussed. The reason for this was because members of the SANDF also have to right to associate with a trade union of their choice by sections 18 and 23(2) of the Constitution. Under the new LRA, organisational rights also play a major role in the bargaining process and afford trade unions more bargaining power. The voluntarist approach followed by the new LRA effectively removed the duty to bargain from collective bargaining. As explained above, the special situation applicable to the SANDF and its members are not governed by the LRA and therefor a duty to bargain might still exist in this specific system of collective bargaining managed by the regulations. The duty to bargain is based on representativeness and good faith which are also examined in this study. To establish if a duty to bargain was created by the courts, an examination of the judgements of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court reiterated that there is no legally enforceable duty to bargain between the SANDF and the South African National Defence Union (SANDU). If Chapter XX of the regulations is scrutinised, it can however be seen that there is an initial duty on the SANDF to bargain with a registered military trade union over matter set out in regulation 36 which include most if not all matters of mutual interest. Therefor it would seem that a duty to bargain is created by Chapter XX. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Section 23(5) of the Constitution entrenches trade unions, employer's organisations and employers' right to engage in collective bargaining. For employees, collective bargaining is the key which opens the door to better wages, improved working conditions and an overall better standard of living to name but a few. The Labour Relations Act was promulgated to give effect to section 23 of the Constitution. However, in section 2 of the Labour Relations Act, members of the South African National Defence Force were excluded from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act (LRA). After the Constitutional Court regarded members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to be "workers", they also had the right to engage in collective bargaining. However, because of the special duty that the members of the SANDF have to fulfil namely to ensure the safety of the republic and its citizens, they are not awarded the right to strike. The question therefor is: How do the members of the SANDF compel the SANDF to bargain with them? The aim of this study is to establish if a duty to bargain was implemented by Chapter XX of the General Regulations of the South African National Defence Force and the Reserve. Firstly, the new dispensation of voluntarism under the new LRA is examined to understand how collective bargaining would work in a normal situation and not that of the members of the SANDF. Freedom of association is also discussed. The reason for this was because members of the SANDF also have to right to associate with a trade union of their choice by sections 18 and 23(2) of the Constitution. Under the new LRA, organisational rights also play a major role in the bargaining process and afford trade unions more bargaining power. The voluntarist approach followed by the new LRA effectively removed the duty to bargain from collective bargaining. As explained above, the special situation applicable to the SANDF and its members are not governed by the LRA and therefor a duty to bargain might still exist in this specific system of collective bargaining managed by the regulations. The duty to bargain is based on representativeness and good faith which are also examined in this study. To establish if a duty to bargain was created by the courts, an examination of the judgements of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court reiterated that there is no legally enforceable duty to bargain between the SANDF and the South African National Defence Union (SANDU). If Chapter XX of the regulations is scrutinised, it can however be seen that there is an initial duty on the SANDF to bargain with a registered military trade union over matter set out in regulation 36 which include most if not all matters of mutual interest. Therefor it would seem that a duty to bargain is created by Chapter XX. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This comparative study between the Malawian and the South African Labour Relations Act examines whether local industries in Malawi could benefit more from the new Act in comparison to the South African industries which also were exposed to a new Labour Relations Act. South Africa is the biggest exporter to Malawi representing 31% of total imports. Malawi is a net importer of goods relying on agricultural products such as tobacco, tea and sugar to earn foreign currency. The majority of manufactured goods are imported competing against a relative small local industry, which is not competitive and relies on import tariff for protection against cheaper imports. However, Malawi is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and is committed to import tariff reduction and eventual tariff elimination amongst SADC countries of which South Africa is also a member. This will have a devastating effect on Malawi's manufacturing industry if it cannot improve its competitiveness. One aspect that can assist local industries to become more competitive is the advent of the new Labour Relations acts introduced in both South Africa and Malawi following the historic and co-incidental change in both countries to multiparty democracy during 1994. Both acts recognise collective bargaining as the best means of resolving industrial disputes of interests. In order to make collective bargaining more effective, both acts require employers to disclose information deemed necessary for effective negotiations and bargaining. The acts attempt to assist in the process of reaching agreement between the parties. In Malawi, unresolved disputes must be referred to the Industrial Relations Court whereas the South African act replaced the Industrial Court with a new Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. In addition, the South African Labour Relations Act introduced the workplace forums which are organisations consisting of elected employees who have the right to consult with the employer to reach joint agreement on matters of mutual concern. The Malawian Labour Relations Act requires an employer to recognise a trade union for collective bargaining if the trade union membership represents at least twenty per cent of the employees. However, the South African Labour Relations Act attempts to create a spirit of industrial democracy through joint decisionmaking and promotes the concept of majoritarianism and collective bargaining at industry level. In Malawi, if a dispute is unresolved and it concerns the interpretation of statutory provisions or any provisions of a collective agreement or contract of employment, either party to such a dispute may apply to the Industrial Relations Court for determination of the dispute. However, the South African Labour Relations Act has created two new structures, bargaining councils and statutory councils. These structures perform primarily a dispute resolution function as part of what is referred to in the Act as the self-regulation principle which underlines the entire Act. The South African Labour Relations Act thus promotes self-regulatory principles whereas the Malawian Labour Relations Act promotes dispute resolution measures through statutory structures. In terms of both acts, employees have the right to strike and employers have the right to initiate a lock-out. It is important to note that, in the case of Malawi, seven days notice prior to taking industrial action is required whereas in South Africa only forty-eight hours notice is required. The South African Labour Relations Act has introduced workplace forums for the purpose of preventing or minimising unilateral decision making by employers. It therefore encourages worker participation in managerial decision making through workplace forums. The Malawian Labour Relations Act has not made any provision for workplace forums or any similar structure. This is a significant weakness in the Malawian Labour Relations Act as the encouragement of worker participation in managerial decision making might well be instrumental in the reduction of conflict at the workplace and for both employees and employers to appreciate each others contending goals. Unlike the new Malawian Industrial Relations Act, the new South African Act has replaced the Industrial Court with a new dispute resolution system in the form of a Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, which attempts to resolve disputes through the process of mediation and arbitration. The South African Labour Relations Act contains a whole chapter on unfair dismissals whereas the Malawian Labour Relations Act does not specifically address this issue. As to the effectiveness of the Malawian industrial relations system, several recommendations have been made in the following key areas: • Union representation; • Workplace forums; • Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration; and • Unfair dismissal. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie vergelykende studie van die Malawiese en Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge ondersoek of plaaslike nywerhede in Malawi meer kan baat van die nuwe Wet in vergelyking met die Suid-Afrikaanse nywerhede wat ook aan die nuwe Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge blootgestel is. Suid-Afrika is die grootste uitvoerder na Malawi, met 'n 31 persent verteenwoordiging van die totale invoere. Malawi is 'n netto invoerder van goedere en maak staat op boerderyprodukte soos tabak, tee en suiker om buitelandse valuta te verdien. Die meerderheid van die vervaardigde goedere word ingevoer en ding mee teen 'n redelike klein plaaslike industrie wat nie kompeterend is nie en vir beskerming teen goedkoper invoere op invoertariewe staatmaak. Malawi is egter 'n lid van die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap en is daartoe verbind om invoertariewe te verlaag en dit uiteindelik tussen die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap-lande, waarvan Suid-Afrika ook 'n lid is, uit te skakel. Dit sal 'n vernietigende uitwerking op Malawi se vervaardigingsindustrie hê as hulle nie hul mededinging kan verbeter nie. Een aspek wat plaaslike nywerhede kan help om meer mededingend te word, is die koms van die nuwe Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge wat, na aanleiding van die geskiedkundige en gelyktydige veranderinge in beide lande na veelpartydemokrasie in 1994, in beide Suid-Afrika en Malawi ingestel is. Beide wette erken kollektiewe bedinging as die beste manier om arbeidsgeskille oor belange te besleg. Om kollektiewe bedinging doeltreffender te maak, vereis beide wette dat werkgewers inligting openbaar maak wat nodig geag word vir doeltreffende onderhandelinge en bedinging. Die wette probeer help dat ooreenkomste tussen die partye bereik word. In Malawi moet geskille wat nie besleg kan word nie, na die Arbeidsbetrekkingehof verwys word terwyl die Suid-Afrikaanse wet die Nywerheidshof met 'n nuwe Kommissie vir Versoening, Bemiddeling en Arbitrasie vervang het. Hierbenewens het die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge die werkplekforums ingestel. Dit is liggame wat bestaan uit werknemers wat gekies is en die reg het om met die werkgewer te beraadslaag om 'n gemeenskaplike ooreenkoms oor gemeenskaplike belange te bereik. Die Malawiese Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge vereis dat 'n werkgewer 'n vakbond erken vir kollektiewe bedinging as die vakbond ledetal minstens 20 persent van die werknemers verteenwoordig. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge poog egter om 'n gevoel van arbeidsdemokrasie te skep deur gesamentlike besluitneming en bevorder die konsep van meerderheid en kollektiewe bedinging op industrievlak. As 'n geskil in Malawi nie bygelê kan word nie en dit raak die interpretasie van statutêre bepalings of enige bepalings van 'n kollektiewe ooreenkoms of dienskontrak, kan enigeen van die party tot so 'n geskil by die Arbeidsbetrekkingehof aansoek doen om 'n beslissing oor die geskil. Die Suid- Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge het egter twee nuwe strukture geskep, onderhandelingsrade en statutêre rade. Hierdie strukture verrig hoofsaaklik 'n geskilbyleggingsfunksie as deel van waarna in die wet as die selfreguleringsbeginsel verwys word en wat die hele wet versterk. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge bevorder dus selfreguleringsbeginsels terwyl die Malawiese Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge geskilbyleggingsmetodes deur statutêre strukture bevorder. Ingevolge beide wette het werknemers die reg om te staak en werkgewers het die reg om 'n uitsluitaksie te inisieer. Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat in die geval van Malawi, sewe dae kennis gegee moet word voor dat die nywerheidsaksie ingestel kan word, en in Suid-Afrika word slegs 48 uur kennis verlang. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge het werkplekforums ingestel met die doel om eensydige besluitneming deur werkgewers te voorkom of tot die minimum te beperk. Dit moedig dus werkerdeelname in bestuursbesluitneming deur werkplekforums aan. Die Malawiese Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge het nie vir werkplekforums of enige soortgelyke struktuur voorsiening gemaak nie. Dit is 'n groot swakheid in die Malawiese Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge omdat aanmoediging van werkerdeelname in bestuursbesluitneming straks instrumenteel kan wees in die vermindering van konflik in die werkplek en beide werknemers en werkgewers mekaar se strydende doelwitte kan waardeer. Anders as die nuwe Malawiese Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge, het die nuwe Suid- Afrikaanse wet die Nywerheidshof vervang met 'n nuwe geskilbeslegtingstelsel in die vorm van 'n Kommissie vir Versoening, Bemiddeling en Arbitrasie, wat poog om geskille deur die proses van bemiddeling en arbitrasie by te lê. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge bevat 'n hele hoofstuk oor onregverdige afdanking waar die Malawiese Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge dié saak nie spesifiek aanroer nie. Wat die doeltreffendheid van die Malawiese arbeidsverhoudinge-stelsel betref, is verskeie aanbevelings op die volgende gebiede gedoen: • Vakbondverteenwoordiging • Werkplekforums • Kommissie vir Versoening, Bemiddeling en Arbitrasie • Onregverdige afdanking

State of Objectives: This paper addresses the question of how the presumption-rent system has developed during ten years of its introduction to the rental market, with a particular emphasis on the investors’ perspective. The study has three focus areas, firstly an emphasis on how the real estate investors within the private and public sectors reacted to the introduction of the presumption-rents. Secondly, it examines whether the trends have changed during the course of these ten years. Finally, it observes how the presumption-rent system, as a rent-setting method for new residential rental constructions, is perceived and evaluated by the investors. Methodology: The empirical study focuses on the rent market in Stockholm, and it is articulated through a holistic multiple case-study of six public-and private real estate companies with rental dwellings in Stockholm. In order to examine the developments of the presumption-rent structures in these companies, a numerical analysis of the rent structures through a quasi-experimental design is as well conducted. Empirical Findings: The results in general prove that the rent-setting within the presumption rent system is unpredictable and subjective, because it is influenced by conflicting interests and different perceptions. The implication of this for the application of the presumption-rents is that it is depended on a complex, ambiguous and vague negotiation structure, rather than being based on a systematized rent-setting procedure. Furthermore, it is noted that the collective bargaining system, which sets the standards for the rent negotiations, is undergoing a slow process of change, as the law amendment in 2011 has caused paradigm-shits within the rental market. One dimension of this is that the rent-negotiations noticeably do not influence the investment decisions anymore, but the rent negotiations certainly have an impact on the rent-setting method. The implication for the application of the presumption-rentsystem, including its negotiation framework, is that it is applied when it meets the criteria for the investment decision, otherwise it is ignored. Finally, it is showed that nor the public neither the private companies perceive the presumption-system as a long-term and sustainable solution to the prevailing challenges with the Swedish rent-setting system. What is clear is that the system is mainly considered as a temporality solution to a course of disorders that have emerged from prolonged institutional negligence and error that have impaired the rental markets.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This assignment investigates the bargaining relationship between multinational corporations (MNCs) and developing countries. The units of analysis of this study in Global Political Economy are MNCs (non-state actors) and nation-states. In the contemporary global production structure the 'balance of power' between MNCs and developing countries has shifted in favour of MNCs. Descriptive secondary sources were used to illustrate the MNC-State bargaining relationship in telecommunications privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the contemporary global economy nation-states only rarely still compete for territory, but rather for wealth-creating activities to be located within their borders. Important changes in the global production structure have resulted in the increased mobility and economic power of MNCs. These developments have affected the strategic relationship between MNCs and nation-states and the former have used their advantage to gain preferential treatment in the bargaining process. The nation-states are also competing amongst themselves for the investment and technology and knowledge transfers from these firms. Privatisation programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa have substantially increased MNC participation on the continent, which has been historically marginalised from global foreign direct investment receipts. Research has shown that MNC participation in infrastructure service provision is more efficient than government ownership. However, this does not constitute a loss of sovereignty, but rather emphasises the changing role of nation-states as facilitators of global market relations. On examination, the distinct bargaining relationship in telecommunications privatisation clearly illustrates the dependence of Sub-Saharan African countries on technologically advanced MNCs. Thus, the 'balance of power' has shifted more to MNCs in the global political economy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie navorsingswerkstuk ondersoek die bedingingsverhouding tussen multinasionale korporasies (MNKs) en ontwikkelende lande. Die ondersoekeenhede in die studie van die Globale Politieke Ekonomie is MNKs (nie-staatrolspelers) en regeringstate. In die huidige globale produksiestruktuur het die mag tussen MNKs en ontwikkelende lande verander sodat die MNKs nou die magsoorwig het. Beskrywende sekondêre bronne is gebruik om die MNK-regeringstaat se bedingingsverhouding in telekommunikasie privatisering in Sub-Sahara Afrika te illustreer. In die teenswoordige globale ekonomie kompeteer regeringstate selde met mekaar om territoriale mag, maar oorwegend om welvaartskeppende bedrywe binne hul grense aan te moedig. Belangrike veranderings in die globale produksiestruktuur het MNKs se mobiliteit en ekonomiese mag verhoog. Hierdie ontwikkelinge het die strategiese verhouding tussen MNKs en regeringstate verander. MNKs gebruik hierdie invloed om voordeel te trek uit regeringstate wat kompeteer vir belegging en die tegnologie- en kennisoordrag van hierdie korporasies. Privatiseringsprogramme in Sub-Sahara Afrika het MNK-deelname op die kontinent verhoog, wat histories gemarginaliseer is van buitelandse direkte belegging. Navorsing dui daarop dat MNKs se deelname in infrastruktuurdienslewering meer doeltreffend is, as wanneer dit onder staatsbeheer is. Dit lei egter nie tot 'n verlies aan soeweriniteit nie, maar beklemtoon die regeringstaat se veranderde rol as fasiliteerder van globale markverhoudinge. Die ondersoek na die uitsonderlike bedingingsverhouding in die privatisering van telekommunikasie beklemtoon Sub-Sahara Afrika se afhanklikheid van tegnologies-ontwikkelde MNKs. Die magsbalans het gevolglik na die MNKs oorskuif in die globale politieke ekonomie.

直到今日，兩岸常處於敵對緊張狀態，但並不會遏止台商申請赴大陸投資的意願。原因何在？因大陸人口超過12億，是一個擁有廣大市場與充沛廉價勞動力的國家。換言之，中國大陸是一個充滿無限商機的市場並吸引無數台商以各種不同管道赴大陸投資，且兩岸商業上的往來已處於合則兩利，分則兩害之唇齒依存關係，就算兩岸在政治上乃於敵對狀態，仍阻擋不了台商赴大陸投資意願。 惟大陸方面在政治上是中國共產黨專政，在經濟上試圖引進自由經濟競爭體制，在法制上乃處於從人治到法制的過渡時期，因此，台商赴大陸投資也擔負一定風險，也讓不少人鎩羽而歸。尤其，大陸是以無產階級之工農鬥爭取得政權，對勞工權益保護之重視，從早期人民公社吃大鍋飯，採取固定工制度；到為了改革經濟採取全員勞動合同制，即是在謀取勞動者就業，社會安定與經濟發展的平衡點下所作之折衷。且中共建國初期，非常重視運用法律手段推行集體合同制度，以保護集體合同雙方當事人權益。 隨著時代變遷，大陸已不能自外在世界潮流，必須經由對外貿易交流來滿足其所需並供給其所有，尤其自1979年後提出建立社會主義經濟體制改革，即使市場在國家總體調控下，作合理資源分配，並堅持以公有制為主體，改革國有企業經營體制，且加速引入外資，朝向多元經濟為發展目標。因此，舊有之勞資關係已不符合時代需要，故大陸在1992年4月及1994年7月分別頒佈《中華人民共和國工會法》及《中華人民共和國勞動法》，也替集體合同規定提供較為明確之法律依據，並在1994年12月由大陸國務院之勞動部發佈《集體合同規定》，而此規定是否能給大陸由社會主義勞資關係轉成偏向資本主義勞資關係所帶來之衝擊(如勞資糾紛)提供預防措施？並給予勞動者權益的保障？或只是中共為攏賂勞工所為的政治煙幕？而集體合同制度實施對台商赴大陸投資及台商派駐大陸勞工有何影響，且台商對集體合同制度看法與因應之道，都是我們觀察的重點。 總之，不論大陸從1995年1月1 日開始實施之集體合同制度有否達到當初既定目標，了解大陸集體合同制度已是刻不容緩的重要課題。其次，筆者希望透過本論文介紹，讓有意或已赴大陸工作或經商的國人了解對岸現今集體合同制度實際運作情況，並給予建議，使其對大陸集體合同制度有所認識並提早因應，以免產生嚴重的勞資糾紛而造成巨大損失，這也是本論文最大目的所在。 因此，本論文架構共計七章，簡單敍述如下： 第一章 緒論 首先說明本論文之研究動機與背景，以及筆者在現有資源下所採研究方法與所遭遇到的研究限制，並對研究範圍加以扼要說明。 第二章 大陸地區集體合同制度之基本概念 本章最主要是在介紹，大陸學者對集體合同基本概念了解，其主要為集體合同意義、本質及定位、歷史演進、種類、作用….等概念，以方便讀者了解大陸地區對集體合同看法。 第三章 集體協商 在簽訂集體合同前，勞資雙方要先經過集體協商之法定程序，故，本章針對集體協商之概念、代表、內容、程序…等內涵作一完整介紹。 第四章 集體合同之內涵 在排除與前二章內容重覆部分，本章主要在介紹集體合同效力、行政審核與檢查監督、爭議處理….等內涵介紹。 第五章 集體合同之問題、原因、建議與呼應 本章最主要是在介紹大陸集體合同制度實施後所遭遇到的實際問題與主要原因，及大陸專家學者對集體合同制度改革建議與2004年新修正《集體合同規定》之呼應。 第六章 集體合同流程與現況及對台勞與台商之影響 本章以圖表形式介紹大陸集體合同實施流程，並以問卷調查方式，來探討集體合同制度與大陸台商及台商派駐大陸勞工之關係。 第七章 結論 在最後，綜合整理新舊《集體合同規定》之比較觀察及對赴大陸投資台商及台商派駐大陸勞工之建議，對本論文作一結論。

Before the introduction of the Euro many observers had expected an increase of inflationary pressures due to a de-coordination-shock to national wage bargaining. However, if anything systematically happened after the introduction of the Euro wage restraint increased (Posen and Gould 2006). A possible explanation for this finding is that a system of pattern bargaining has emerged with Germany figuring as a "centre of gravity" for European wage bargains (Traxler et al. 2008, Traxler and Brandl 2009). This paper studies wage and nominal unit labour cost spill-overs for the EMU for a panel over 13 manufacturing sectors from 1992-2005 and quantifies the effects of different countries. It turns out that there are strong interdependencies across EMU-members with regard to nominal wage growth. Indeed, a leading role accrues to Germany whose wage developments are twice as influential as those of the next important countries. Remarkably, the strong interdependence of wage growth is not reflected with regard to unit labour costs. Here, only the development in a core group composed of Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, is bound to each other. The development of nominal unit labour costs in other countries is largely independent from each other and especially from this core group. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This Dissertation evaluates the potential opportunities, challenges and outcomes attendant on Vietnam’s modernisation effort through the incorporation of International Labour Organisation (ILO) Core International Labour Standards (CILS) on freedom of association and collective bargaining into Vietnam law. The Dissertation shows that although Vietnam is likely to benefit from incorporating the CILS on freedom of association and collective bargaining into its legal system, its constitutional value system is not currently consistent with those of particular ILO CILS. It offers recommendations on pre- substantive and procedural measures necessary to ensure the successful reception of ILO CILS on freedom of association and collective bargaining into Vietnam legal practice.

The right to strike and lock-out This master's thesis deals with the topic of the right to strike and right lock-out, which has proven to be a rather controversial theme in the Czech Republic and Czech law discourse. The thesis ponders the subject in its broad context in the Czech law environment as well as examines its relations towards International and European law context. The main aim is to provide a complex and through insight on the matter, define it and state its main challenges and pitfalls, and valorise Czech law environment around the strike. The structure of the thesis consists of two main parts. The first part focuses on the right to strike in detail and is divided into eight chapters, whereas the second part deals with the right to lock-out. The first chapter serves as an introductory to the examined matter and defines the basic terms such as "strike" or "walkout" and puts their meaning into the law context. Furthermore it describes various methods and kinds of strikes, actors and participants and scale of strikes. The second chapter examines the historical developments and ramifications. From medieval times to the state-capitalist dictatorships before the year 1989, it seeks to draw the main lines of development and the driving force behind it. The third chapter focuses on the related rules...

This mixed-methods study examines factors determining employees' desire to reduce worktime. The results of a binary logit regression model, based on data from the Austrian Microcencus 2012, suggest that employees who prefer shorter weekly working hours are older, higher educated and work longer hours in white-collar positions, compared to those who do not wish to change their hours. Gender differences are greatest in terms of household and family characteristics, supporting the 'male breadwinner & part-time' model. Qualitative interviews have been conducted among employees who had the possibility to choose between a pay increase and equivalent leisure time via a new worktime policy ("Freizeitoption") implemented in 2013. The results suggest that employees with higher education tend to reduce worktime. The fact that money is valued from a long-term, security perspective, as well as the tendency of assessing work performances by output indicators can be regarded as major obstacles for worktime reductions. / Series: WWWforEurope