According to the Leniency programme that was implemented in Sweden in 2002, a company participating in a cartel can escape administrative fines if it exposes the cartel to the Swedish Competition Authority and cooperates with the Authority during its investigation. Whether cartels should be criminalized, or not, has been debated in the Swedish Parliament in recent years. If cartels are turned into a felony, the leaders of the companies involved risk being held personally responsible. This essay discusses how the incitements for unveiling cartels take form, drawing on game-theoretical models. The essay, in addition, analyses how the incitement-structure would change if cartels would become a felony, compared to the current legislation, in the form of the Leniency programme. The conclusions that the author arrives at are that the incitements to expose cartels would increase if fines were to increase. The incitements would furthermore increase if the company feared that someone within the organization could expose the cartel to the Competition Authority. Turning cartels into a felony would on the contrary decrease the incitements for unveiling the cartel. The key task for the Competition Authority, as regards to cartels, should hence be to create uncertainty for firms participating in cartels and increase the security of employees if and when exposing their employer as a participant in a cartel. / År 2002 skrevs Leniencyprogrammen in i svensk konkurrenslagstiftning. Ett företag som ingår i ett kartellsamarbete kan i enlighet med programmen undslippa konkurrensskadeavgift ifall företaget avslöjar kartellen och samarbetar med konkurrensverket. Under senare år har en debatt kring huruvida karteller bör kriminaliseras eller inte förts i Riksdagen. En kriminalisering skulle innebära personligt straffansvar för bland annat företagsledare. Uppsatsens syfte är att med spelteoretiska modeller och resonemang kartlägga och analysera hur incitamentsstrukturen för avslöjandet av karteller kan tänkas se ut. Vidare syftar uppsatsen till att föra en diskussion kring hur incitamentsstrukturen kan tänkas förändras om nuvarande lagstiftning ändras till att medföra en kriminalisering av karteller. Slutsatser som kan dras av uppsatsens analys är att incitamenten för avslöjande med nuvarande lagstiftning skulle öka om konkurrensskadeavgifterna höjs. En kriminalisering skulle minska incitamenten för avslöjande, jämfört med nuvarande lagstiftning. Incitamenten för företagen att avslöja karteller ökar om företagen befarar att någon inom organisationen har för avsikt att avslöja kartellen till konkurrensverket. Konkurrensverkets viktigaste uppgift vad gäller kartellbekämpning torde därmed bli att skapa osäkerheter för företagen på flera områden för att öka misstron mellan aktörerna samt att arbeta för att öka anställdas incitament att avslöja sin arbetsgivares inblandning i kartellsamarbeten.

The transfer system was created in order to control player movement between football clubs and has existed since the late nineteenth century. During the negotiation of today’s transfer rules FIFA, UEFA and the Commission found that a breach of contract during the season could upset the balance of competition and therefore should be restricted. It was considered necessary to strengthen the contractual stability and to apply a special rule to preserve the regularity and proper functioning of competition. This was done by the means of a provision stipulating that a football player only can be registered to play with a national association during one of the two registration periods per year, generally known as the transfer windows. Sport has never been included in the formal structures of the European Union and the regulation of sport has instead materialized through verdicts from the European Court of Justice. One of the most influential statements emerging from the Court is that sport is subject to Community law in so far it constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, if the activity is economic there is a risk that it infringes EU law. The purpose of this master thesis is to examine the FIFA transfer window system and to determine whether it violates Article 39 and/or Article 81 EC. The transfer windows, a regulation strengthened by the ECJ in the case of Lehtonen, restrict the ability of players to seek alternative employment and could therefore be regarded as a violation of the free movement of workers. In order to trigger the Treaty provisions guarding the right of freedom of movement the person in question must be a national of a Member State of the European Union and the activity must have a territorial dimension beyond the borders of a single Member State of the European Union. The person in question must also be engaged in some kind of economic activity. It is, however, clear that football players who are members of the European Union and are applying for a job in another Member State, and are performing at a certain level, fulfil these requirements. Footballers should therefore be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC and the prohibition of discrimination contained in that article which catches non-discriminatory private collective measures, such as the transfer system, invented by regulatory bodies like FIFA and UEFA. When considering the FIFA “windows system” it is clear that it is liable of restricting the ability of players to seek alternative employment in another Member State and should therefore be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. Nevertheless, restricted transfer periods have been found by the ECJ to be objectively justified as having sporting benefits in the Belgian Basketball league. It is, however, likely that the “window system”, as it operates in European football, goes beyond what is necessary to achieve team and player contract stability since it is too restrictive and somewhat redundant. Consequently, the FIFA transfer windows do not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and should therefore, if challenged, be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. The use of transfer windows in European football can also be considered to be an issue for competition law and in particular Article 81 EC. The article prohibits all agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States and has the objective to protect consumers, enhance their welfare and to facilitate the creation of a single European market. The ECJ has, however, acknowledged a certain type of sporting rule that, even though it restricts competition, will be granted immunity from Article 81 EC. The FIFA “windows system” should not be regarded as such a rule since it does not fulfil the required conditions. The transfer windows do little for the competitive balance within the European football. It may be argued that it preserves the appeal and the unpredictability of the finishing stages of a championship. However, they also prevent clubs from developing their economic activity and restrict the free play of the market forces of supply and demand. Furthermore, the “windows system” hinders certain clubs from raising the quality of their sporting performance since clubs in minor leagues with a closed window are losing their best players to clubs in a better league with an open window, without being able to replace them. All of this affects the small and economically weak clubs and strengthens the position of the financially strong clubs. As a result a few strong clubs will, contrary to the best interest of consumers, continue to dominate European football. The FIFA regulation of transfer windows is therefore likely to fall under Article 81(1) EC. It is unlikely that the pro-competitive benefits of the FIFA transfer windows outweigh its restrictive effects since it is improbable that they would be considered the least restrictive means of creating these benefits. Subsequently, the FIFA “windows system” would not qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and should, if challenged, be void under Article 81(2) EC.

This thesis aims at examining the main motives for mergers and acquisitions with special reference to the effect of globalization on these business strategies and making a comparative analysis of the Turkish merger control rules with that of the EU and the Central and Eastern European Countries so as to evaluate to what extent the Turkish legislation is in harmony with the Community acquis and whether the EU membership process had the same effect on the introduction of merger control rules in Turkey and in these ex-candidate countries.

<p>Recently, the potential conflict between intellectual property law and competition law within the European Union has become political as many of the Member States see the economic Holy Grail through the so called knowledge economy, an economy to which intellectual property is inextricable linked.</p><p>The general rule in EC-law is that a holder of an intellectual property right is not obliged to license the use of that right to others. However, the law can intervene in certain specific circumstances, forcing an owner to license his right. Remedies of this kind are called compulsory licenses and have as their purpose to work as a safety valve, hindering the possible abuse of the exclusiveness following an IPR.</p><p>An analysis of the EC Commission’s Microsoft Decision reveals that the Decision is inconsistent with settled case law from the European Court of Justice in a number of respects. The Decision is unclear and it will be difficult, close to impossible to predict how this approach will be applied in future cases.</p><p>The Decision taken by the Commission in Microsoft states a new legal and economic policy for Europe, a paradigm applying a new standard on when a compulsory license could be ordered. The analysis show that this paradigm represent a considerable loosening of the circumstances when a remedy of a compulsory license could be ordered</p><p>and, as a consequence, introduces a considerable degree of legal uncertainty. This uncertainty can have a substantial effect on innovations by market leaders around the whole world who market their products in Europe.</p>

<p>This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the relevant market within air passenger transport. Further the thesis intends to investigate if there is any difference in air passenger transport in accordance to more general business. The definition of the relevant market is an essential step in order to establish a breach under European competition law. The relevant market includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The fundamental issue in the relevant product market is whether products are considered to be substitutable and can constitute the same market. The Commission has set a notice which includes methods and criterias and serves as guidelines to courts and companies to define the relevant market. The notice is however not binding for courts. The CJ have developed implementation of the criterias which it tends to refer to even if it is a different branch, however a case-by-case based definition is needed. The definition of the relevant market is based on three main criterias: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition. Even though the supply substitutability seems not be implemented in a further extension in more general branches, it seems to be of greater importance when defining the relevant market within air passenger transport. The air passenger transport has also established a test called base of origin and base of destination which includes an analysis of price, travel frequencies, comfort of the journey, transfer time to terminals and differences in the qualities and quantities in airports.  However according to air passenger transport, travel sequences seems to be the criteria that courts focus most on.</p>

<p>Jämförande reklam innebär att en produkt ställs mot en konkurrent eller dennes produkt för att jämföra olika egenskaper. Detta kan ske direkt, genom att en produkt jämförs med en tydligt utpekad konkurrents produkt, men också indirekt genom att marknadsföra sig som ”billigast på marknaden” eller liknande uttryck och på så sätt jämför sig med konkurrenterna utan att nämna någon vid namn. Andra former av jämförande reklam är prisjämförelser samt tester och undersökningar. <strong></strong></p><p>Denna marknadsföringsform har inte alltid varit tillåten i Sverige och ansågs tidigare inte utgöra god marknadsföringssed. Den åsikten ändrades under andra hälften av 1900-talet och i 1975 års marknadsföringslag var jämförande reklam fullt tillåtet under vissa i propositionen nämnda förutsättningar. Dessa förutsättningar finns numera representerade i marknadsföringslagens 18§. De rekvisit som där återges är kumulativa för att förhindra att otillbörlig marknadsföring vilseleder konsumenterna eller snedvrider konkurrensen.</p><p>Syftet med jämförande reklam är att på ett objektivt sätt framhäva skillnader genom att särskilja varumärken. En annan effekt är att sådan reklam fungerar som en konsumentupplysning och har en konkurrensuppmuntrande effekt. Tillsammans med åsikten att reklamen skall vara skyddad av TF och YGL utgör dessa effekter de starkaste grunderna för den jämförande reklamens rättfärdigande. Eftersom dessa grunder bara kommer till uttryck i diverse förarbeten och doktrin, har det varit upp till domstolarna att bedöma deras omfattning och styrka som argument. Detta i motsats till rekvisiten för dess tillåtlighet som finns i 18§ MFL.</p><p>Konsumentupplysningen är ett argument ofta nämnt i domskälen men sällan angivet som skäl för att tillåta annars otillbörlig marknadsföring. Den konkurrensuppmuntrande effekten får anses vara ett något starkare argument, speciellt i samband med lågprisföretag. Marknadsföringsåtgärder skyddas inte av TF eller YGL om de kan anses vara av rent kommersiell natur och ha ett rent kommersiellt förhållande till föremål. Domstolen har i enlighet med uttalanden i förarbetena ansett att företräde skall ges till TF och YGL vid oklarheter. Detta med hänsyn till det intresse de anses skydda.</p> / <p>Comparative advertising means that a product is placed against a competitor in order to compare different properties. This can be done directly, by comparing a product with a well known, named, competitor’s product, but it can also be done indirectly by promoting yourself as being “the cheapest on the market”.</p><p>The purpose of comparative advertising is to highlight differences between marks in an objective way. Other effects are consumer enlightenment and the encouragement of competition. These effects combined with the opinion that comparative advertising should be protected by the freedom of speech and the freedom of press, compose the strongest argument for the justification of comparative advertising.</p><p>While the prerequisites for admissibility are clearly expressed in 18§ MFL, the arguments for the justification of comparative advertising are only mentioned in various legislative history and doctrine. This means that it is up to the courts to assess their significance and strength of argument.</p><p>Consumer information is an argument often cited in case law but rarely given as a reason to allow otherwise improper marketing. The interest of increased competition may be regarded as a somewhat stronger argument and justify some intrusions of the prerequisites in 18§, especially concerning low-cost companies. Promotional measures are not protected by TF or YGL if they are considered being of a purely commercial nature and having a purely commercial relation to the subject. Courts have ruled that when in doubt, TF and YGL has preference.</p>

<p>The transfer system was created in order to control player movement between football clubs and has existed since the late nineteenth century. During the negotiation of today’s transfer rules FIFA, UEFA and the Commission found that a breach of contract during the season could upset the balance of competition and therefore should be restricted. It was considered necessary to strengthen the contractual stability and to apply a special rule to preserve the regularity and proper functioning of competition. This was done by the means of a provision stipulating that a football player only can be registered to play with a national association during one of the two registration periods per year, generally known as the transfer windows.</p><p>Sport has never been included in the formal structures of the European Union and the regulation of sport has instead materialized through verdicts from the European Court of Justice. One of the most influential statements emerging from the Court is that sport is subject to Community law in so far it constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, if the activity is economic there is a risk that it infringes EU law. The purpose of this master thesis is to examine the FIFA transfer window system and to determine whether it violates Article 39 and/or Article 81 EC.</p><p>The transfer windows, a regulation strengthened by the ECJ in the case of <em>Lehtonen</em>, restrict the ability of players to seek alternative employment and could therefore be regarded as a violation of the free movement of workers. In order to trigger the Treaty provisions guarding the right of freedom of movement the person in question must be a national of a Member State of the European Union and the activity must have a territorial dimension beyond the borders of a single Member State of the European Union. The person in question must also be engaged in some kind of economic activity. It is, however, clear that football players who are members of the European Union and are applying for a job in another Member State, and are performing at a certain level, fulfil these requirements. Footballers should therefore be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC and the prohibition of discrimination contained in that article which catches non-discriminatory private collective measures, such as the transfer system, invented by regulatory bodies like FIFA and UEFA.</p><p>When considering the FIFA “windows system” it is clear that it is liable of restricting the ability of players to seek alternative employment in another Member State and should therefore be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. Nevertheless, restricted transfer periods have been found by the ECJ to be objectively justified as having sporting benefits in the Belgian Basketball league. It is, however, likely that the “window system”, as it operates in European football, goes beyond what is necessary to achieve team and player contract stability since it is too restrictive and somewhat redundant. Consequently, the FIFA transfer windows do not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and should therefore, if challenged, be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC.</p><p>The use of transfer windows in European football can also be considered to be an issue for competition law and in particular Article 81 EC. The article prohibits all agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States and has the objective to protect consumers, enhance their welfare and to facilitate the creation of a single European market. The ECJ has, however, acknowledged a certain type of sporting rule that, even though it restricts competition, will be granted immunity from Article 81 EC. The FIFA “windows system” should not be regarded as such a rule since it does not fulfil the required conditions.</p><p>The transfer windows do little for the competitive balance within the European football. It may be argued that it preserves the appeal and the unpredictability of the finishing stages of a championship. However, they also prevent clubs from developing their economic activity and restrict the free play of the market forces of supply and demand. Furthermore, the “windows system” hinders certain clubs from raising the quality of their sporting performance since clubs in minor leagues with a closed window are losing their best players to clubs in a better league with an open window, without being able to replace them. All of this affects the small and economically weak clubs and strengthens the position of the financially strong clubs. As a result a few strong clubs will, contrary to the best interest of consumers, continue to dominate European football. The FIFA regulation of transfer windows is therefore likely to fall under Article 81(1) EC.</p><p>It is unlikely that the pro-competitive benefits of the FIFA transfer windows outweigh its restrictive effects since it is improbable that they would be considered the least restrictive means of creating these benefits. Subsequently, the FIFA “windows system” would not qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and should, if challenged, be void under Article 81(2) EC.</p>

This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the relevant market within air passenger transport. Further the thesis intends to investigate if there is any difference in air passenger transport in accordance to more general business. The definition of the relevant market is an essential step in order to establish a breach under European competition law. The relevant market includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The fundamental issue in the relevant product market is whether products are considered to be substitutable and can constitute the same market. The Commission has set a notice which includes methods and criterias and serves as guidelines to courts and companies to define the relevant market. The notice is however not binding for courts. The CJ have developed implementation of the criterias which it tends to refer to even if it is a different branch, however a case-by-case based definition is needed. The definition of the relevant market is based on three main criterias: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition. Even though the supply substitutability seems not be implemented in a further extension in more general branches, it seems to be of greater importance when defining the relevant market within air passenger transport. The air passenger transport has also established a test called base of origin and base of destination which includes an analysis of price, travel frequencies, comfort of the journey, transfer time to terminals and differences in the qualities and quantities in airports.  However according to air passenger transport, travel sequences seems to be the criteria that courts focus most on.

Jämförande reklam innebär att en produkt ställs mot en konkurrent eller dennes produkt för att jämföra olika egenskaper. Detta kan ske direkt, genom att en produkt jämförs med en tydligt utpekad konkurrents produkt, men också indirekt genom att marknadsföra sig som ”billigast på marknaden” eller liknande uttryck och på så sätt jämför sig med konkurrenterna utan att nämna någon vid namn. Andra former av jämförande reklam är prisjämförelser samt tester och undersökningar. Denna marknadsföringsform har inte alltid varit tillåten i Sverige och ansågs tidigare inte utgöra god marknadsföringssed. Den åsikten ändrades under andra hälften av 1900-talet och i 1975 års marknadsföringslag var jämförande reklam fullt tillåtet under vissa i propositionen nämnda förutsättningar. Dessa förutsättningar finns numera representerade i marknadsföringslagens 18§. De rekvisit som där återges är kumulativa för att förhindra att otillbörlig marknadsföring vilseleder konsumenterna eller snedvrider konkurrensen. Syftet med jämförande reklam är att på ett objektivt sätt framhäva skillnader genom att särskilja varumärken. En annan effekt är att sådan reklam fungerar som en konsumentupplysning och har en konkurrensuppmuntrande effekt. Tillsammans med åsikten att reklamen skall vara skyddad av TF och YGL utgör dessa effekter de starkaste grunderna för den jämförande reklamens rättfärdigande. Eftersom dessa grunder bara kommer till uttryck i diverse förarbeten och doktrin, har det varit upp till domstolarna att bedöma deras omfattning och styrka som argument. Detta i motsats till rekvisiten för dess tillåtlighet som finns i 18§ MFL. Konsumentupplysningen är ett argument ofta nämnt i domskälen men sällan angivet som skäl för att tillåta annars otillbörlig marknadsföring. Den konkurrensuppmuntrande effekten får anses vara ett något starkare argument, speciellt i samband med lågprisföretag. Marknadsföringsåtgärder skyddas inte av TF eller YGL om de kan anses vara av rent kommersiell natur och ha ett rent kommersiellt förhållande till föremål. Domstolen har i enlighet med uttalanden i förarbetena ansett att företräde skall ges till TF och YGL vid oklarheter. Detta med hänsyn till det intresse de anses skydda. / Comparative advertising means that a product is placed against a competitor in order to compare different properties. This can be done directly, by comparing a product with a well known, named, competitor’s product, but it can also be done indirectly by promoting yourself as being “the cheapest on the market”. The purpose of comparative advertising is to highlight differences between marks in an objective way. Other effects are consumer enlightenment and the encouragement of competition. These effects combined with the opinion that comparative advertising should be protected by the freedom of speech and the freedom of press, compose the strongest argument for the justification of comparative advertising. While the prerequisites for admissibility are clearly expressed in 18§ MFL, the arguments for the justification of comparative advertising are only mentioned in various legislative history and doctrine. This means that it is up to the courts to assess their significance and strength of argument. Consumer information is an argument often cited in case law but rarely given as a reason to allow otherwise improper marketing. The interest of increased competition may be regarded as a somewhat stronger argument and justify some intrusions of the prerequisites in 18§, especially concerning low-cost companies. Promotional measures are not protected by TF or YGL if they are considered being of a purely commercial nature and having a purely commercial relation to the subject. Courts have ruled that when in doubt, TF and YGL has preference.

Europos Bendrijos ir nacionaliniai teisės aktai gina sąžiningą konkurenciją, kuriai neigiamą poveikį gali daryti tarp įvairių ūkio subjektų sudaryti susitarimai, atitinkantys draudžiamų susitarimų požymius. Tokių susitarimų pavyzdiniai sąrašai yra pateikti Europos Bendrijos Stengimo sutarties 81 straipsnio 1 dalyje ir Lietuvos Respublikos Konkurencijos įstatymo 5 straipsnio 1 dalyje. Tačiau ne visi susitarimai, patenkantys į šį sąrašą, ribojantys ar potencialiai galintys riboti konkurenciją, negalioja. Į draudimo sferą nepatenkantys susitarimai vadinami mažareikšmiais arba susitarimais, negalinčiais itin riboti konkurencijos. Jiems bei jų reglamentavimo ir vertinimo pagal Europos Bendrijos ir Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos teisę ir yra skirtas šis darbas. Jei draudžiamų susitarimų problematika ir pagrindiniai praktikos metu iškilę klausimai buvo paliesti ir iki šiol yra nagrinėjami teisinėje literatūroje, mažareikšmiams susitarimams deramo dėmesio savo darbuose neskyrė ir dabar neskiria nei Lietuvos Respublikos, nei Europos Bendrijos teisės specialistai. Šiuo darbu siekiama iš dalies užpildyti teisės literatūroje atsiradusias spragas. Mažareikšmių susitarimų (de minimis) atsiradimas siejamas su Europos Teisingumo Teismo praktika, o atsiradimo pradžia laikytinas 1969 metų sprendimas byloje „Völk v Vervaecke“, kuriame buvo suformuluota reikšmingos įtakos doktrina. Prabėgus metams po sprendimo priėmimo pasirodė pirmasis Europos Komisijos pranešimas dėl mažareikšmių... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The European Communities’ and national legal acts defend the honest competition, which may be negatively influenced by the agreements, concluded between various economic entities, which meet the indications of the prohibited agreements. The lists, containing the examples of such agreements, are submitted in part 1 of article 81 of the Agreement on flotation of the European Community and part 1 of article 5 of the Competition law of the Republic of Lithuania. However, not all the agreements, included into this list, which restrict or may potentially restrict the competition, are invalid. The agreements, which do not fall into the sphere of the prohibited ones, are deemed as the agreements of minor importance or as the agreements, which cannot restrict the competition to a significant extent. Thus, this thesis is devoted to them, to their regulation and assessment as per the European Community’s and Lithuanian Republic’s competition law. If the topic of the prohibited agreements and the principle questions, which arose in the course of gaining of the practical experience, were touched and have been analyzed till the present moment in the juridical literature, then neither the Lithuanian Republic’s nor the European Community’s legal experts did not devote and at present do not devote their attention to the agreements of minor importance in their works. The author of this thesis attempts at least partially to fill the gaps, which appeared in the juridical literature. Appearance... [to full text]