This research aims to dispel the myth that export cartels should be prohibited because they restrain competition and, thus, holds back economic development. It also proposes the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In contrast to the myth, this research argues that, when it comes to economic development, competition is not always desirable and, therefore, that export cartels should be formed under certain conditions. In other words, the doctrine that maximum competition is optimal competition is not applicable when the objective is economic development. Moreover, as export cartels from developing countries do not possess market power in the global market, if they facilitate their firms, which are mainly SMEs, to be able to export, competition in the global market is increased, rather than decreased. We then propose the concept of competition relocation, which argues that cartelisation does not eliminate competition but relocate competition from the activity being cartelised into other activities. The concept rejects the conventional interpretation of competition as a unidimensional action, in which cartels always decrease competition. On the contrary, competition is multidimensional, i.e., firms compete across different activities. Therefore, cartelisation may not eliminate or decrease competition but simply relocates it across different activities and the overall degree of competition might even increase. Export cartels is simply a tool to relocate competition. Based on the concept of competition relocation, we argue further that, in order to promote economic development, we must make sure that whenever cartelisation promotes the long-term productive capabilities more than competition does, cartelisation should be promoted. To derive the conditions under which export cartels should be promoted, we used both history and game theory. We study the historical lessons of now-developed countries, including Germany, the US, and Japan and draw a game-theoretical model to derive the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In terms of game theory, we propose that the situation in which export cartels should be promoted resembles the stag-hunt game, where both cartelisation and competition are Nash equilibria. Even though it is more productive to hunt a stag together, each hunter has an incentive to deviate and catch a hare. The model shows that, whenever the benefit of sharing resources between firms is sufficiently large (in comparison with other parameters), export cartels are more productive than competition. Therefore, most export cartels have been promoted among SMEs. Moreover, it also shows that, even though each firm may be able to export (due to abundant exclusive resources), the environment, which supports the use of resources across firms, could still make export cartels more productive.

Implementation of competition policies is one of the most recommended strategies to developing countries as a tool for achieving economic development. Using a panel dataset of over 100 countries and 7 years (from 2005-2011), I estimate the effect of competition on economic development, and also determine which of the comprehensive policy factors are the most relevant for increasing competition. A fixed effects instrumental variable approach is used.I find that competition intensity positively impacts economic development. The estimate is highly significant when effectiveness of antimonopoly policy and squared years of experience handling competition law are used as instruments for competition intensity. Political stability is shown to be a determinant for higher achievement in development. Macroeconomic environment and financial market development are also significant factors that contribute to higher economic development. Less developed countries should work intensively to improve their institutional quality and implement pro-competitive policies that are not only related to competition laws. / La implementación de políticas de competencia es una de las estrategias más recomendadas para países en desarrollo para conseguir el desarrollo económico. Usando un conjunto de datos panel de más de cien países durante siete años (desde 2005-2011), estimo el efecto de la competencia en el desarrollo económico. También determino cuáles de los factores de política integral son los más relevantes para incrementar la competencia. Se usa un enfoque con variables instrumentales de efectos fijos.Encuentro que la intensidad de la competencia impacta positivamente sobre el desarrollo económico. La estimación es altamente significativa cuando se usan como instrumentos de la intensidad de competencia: la efectividad de la política antimonopolio y los años de experiencia manejando leyes de competencia al cuadrado. Se demuestra que la estabilidad política es un determinante de mayor éxito y desarrollo. El entorno macroeconómico y el desarrollo del mercado financiero también son factores significativos que contribuyen a un mayor desarrollo económico. Los países menos desarrollados deben trabajar intensamente para mejorar su calidad institucional e implemente políticas pro-competencia que no solo estén relacionadas a las leyes de competencia.

There is an increasing recognition of the international presence and regulatory influence of the EU in competition policy. Despite a scholarly focus on its international dimension, the issue of nationality-based (non-) discrimination has insufficiently been investigated in the existing literature on EU competition policy. Thus, this research aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining whether the EU internally and externally utilizes its competition rules for the objective of promoting (potential) national and European champions, while disadvantaging non-EU based companies operating inside and outside the European internal market. Empirical findings validate two hypotheses of this research: that the supranational institutional setting of the EU in competition policy constrains the ability of member states to use their competition policies for neomercantilist, and even for protectionist purposes; and that the institutional setup assures nationality-blind enforcement by EU competition regulators, even vis-à-vis non-EU based companies. The research also identifies key systemic factors which either constrain or empower the EU as a regulatory power in the competition policy domain. The empirical analysis draws on both quantitative data and in-depth studies of recent major cases. Most cases are from the period between September 1990 and August 2015, involving American and Japanese companies, which have a strong presence in European economies.EU competition policy is highly supranational and has a distinctive goal of market integration. In order to understand better how these features shape EU competition policy, this research proposes an original model of ‘stringent competition policy’, drawing on the theory of regulatory states. This model is more useful than the essentially neomercantilist model of strategic competition policy in explaining the EU’s enforcement without regard to the nationality of firms. Internally, the supranational institutional setting significantly constrains the ability of the member states to utilize their competition policies for neomercantilist and protectionist purposes. Regarding external consequences of this policy, the EU stringently enforces its competition rules regardless the nationality of firms involved in law infringements, though some cases involving non-EU firms were highly politicized and contested. To ensure that its stringent competition policy does not deteriorate the international competitiveness of European firms, the EU has been promoting competition policy externally, especially since the 1990s. However, the EU’s ability to play a leadership role in global multilateral fora is limited, despite its dedication and ambitions. This is because the EU’s regulatory power is fundamentally constrained by systemic factors such as a sharp increase in the number and heterogeneity of competition policies around the world, the deadlock of WTO negotiations on world competition law, and the emergence of transgovernmental networks such as the ICN. At the same time, these systemic factors have created the demand of younger competition authorities for reference points, if not models, and this opened up a window of opportunity for the EU to promote its competition policy rules and norms more extensively in third states. Overall, this research contributes to the EU competition policy literature by firmly placing it in a wider debate on competition and/versus competitiveness in the study of global political economy. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Airport regulation regimes are under revision in many countries. The decision about the extent of airport regulation is based on an economic analysis of market power, which is done in two steps. The first step involves defining the relevant markets the airport is operating on. This in turn is based on an economic analysis of the particular circumstances of the airport, and must be compatible with competition law. The second step consists of the evaluation of the airport's competitive position in all identified markets. Due to industry particularities, many diverse issues must be taken into account in this process, such as questions of upstream and downstream market interaction, airport congestion, peak-load pricing, or offsetting bargaining power. Many of these questions have been theoretically analyzed in the industrial organization literature, but have only rarely been applied in practical competition analysis with respect to airports. This paper builds a bridge between the theoretical insights and their practical application to airport regulation policy. We derive the principles for a sound economic analysis of the market power of airports, given the time and data constraints encountered in practice by the regulatory authorities and other involved parties, and propose a general framework for the analysis of market power of airports. We focus on hub airports, as the analysis of these gateways covers all the relevant issues, including countervailing power of the hub operator.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariana Cavichiloli Gomes de Almeida.pdf: 1078182 bytes, checksum: 57c0e10552c8851088a9015d231d5ae5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-04 / The purpose of this research is to expose how innovation has been addressed under the Brazilian Competition Defense System and how the analysis by the authorities is related to the major strands of political economy. Regarding the theoretical frameworks discussed herein, this approach is initiates with the presentation of some neoclassical theories, whose economic models are widely reflected in legislation and analysis carried out by the Brazilian authorities. Then it goes to the study of evolutionary economics according to Schumpeter, and Celso Furtado s proposals, which are important additional basis in recent decisions of CADE involving innovation, mainly because of developmental dictates of the Constitution of 1988. The last reference is the Marxist approach, which is the least supported in CADE s competition policy so far, but also discusses current and important issues involving innovation in the context of the regime of accumulation. The conclusion is that there is no uniformity in competition policy applied by CADE to promote technology development and national autonomy, what means that its jurisprudence is not based on one specific theoretical framework. The effective legislation, as well as the economic analysis and case law reveal the use of concepts related to various strands of political economy worked here. / Trata-se aqui da forma com que a questão da inovação tem sido trabalhada no âmbito do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência e como a análise realizada pelas autoridades relaciona-se com as principais vertentes da economia política. Com relação aos referenciais teóricos objeto de estudo, inicia-se com a apresentação dos neoclássicos, cujos modelos econômicos são amplamente refletidos na legislação e na análise levada a cabo pelas autoridades brasileiras. Em seguida, passa-se ao estudo da economia evolucionária na obra de Schumpeter, e das propostas de Celso Furtado, que foram tidas como bases suplementares importantes em votos recentes do CADE envolvendo inovação, principalmente em decorrência dos ditames desenvolvimentistas da Constituição Federal de 1988. O último referencial consiste na abordagem marxista que, até o momento, é a que menos encontra respaldo na política de concorrência aplicada pelo CADE, mas que problematiza questões atuais e importantes envolvendo a inovação naquilo que a vertente determina como regime de acumulação vigente. Ao proceder a análise da forma jurídica e de alguns casos julgados pelo CADE, conclui-se que a política de concorrência não é uniforme e nem adota apenas um marco teórico específico quando sua função aproxima-se da promoção do desenvolvimento e autonomia tecnológica. Tanto a legislação aplicável, como a análise econômica e a jurisprudência do Conselho transparecem conceitos ligados às diversas vertentes da economia política aqui trabalhadas.

This thesis analyzes the state aids policy in EU especially by taking the post-2008 crisis implementations in the banking sector into consideration. The main goal of the thesis is to examine the questions about how the EU directs the considerably strict state aids policy in the crisis term and whether or not there has been a turn in state aids policy tradition during the crisis. For this purpose, the study, first, evaluates the competition policy as the umbrella title for state aids policy, the definition and components of state aids and international rapprochements to state aids policy. Then, the tradition of state aids policy in EU is explained by taking the history and sources of this policy into consideration. Under the light of this advance information, actions of the Union during the post-2008 financial crisis related to the banking sector are tried to be evaluated. State aids implementations in general, attitudes in crisis periods and recent efforts in legislation processes about state aids in Turkey as a candidate country make it worth to link the subject of state aids in Turkey with the study as a subordinate title.

Confrontés au pouvoir de marché croissant de la grande distribution française, les fournisseurs n’ont cessé de demander l’intervention de l’Etat. Cette intervention a pris la forme du titre IV du livre IV du Code de commerce, un ensemble de règles juridiques encadrant les négociations commerciales annuelles entre distributeurs et fournisseurs. Cette thèse décrit les transformations du Titre IV et évalue la portée du recours au droit dans un contexte marchand. L’enquête porte sur l’élaboration des règles du Titre IV, le contrôle entrepris par la DGCCRF (une administration du ministère de l’Economie et des Finances) ainsi que l’appropriation de ces règles par l’une des enseignes de la distribution française. Les résultats éclairent les conditions sociales d’efficacité des lois destinées à protéger des acteurs économiques faibles. Pour rendre le Titre IV efficace, l’administration a introduit dans le droit des principes moraux et a incité les juges à s’écarter des normes écrites pour évaluer les situations au cas par cas. Les résultats montrent également les ambiguïtés d’un tel recours au droit. Pour s’approprier et contourner les règles dirigées contre elle, la grande distribution s’est dotée de ressources juridiques. Face à cela, l’administration a réagi en rendant les règles plus précises, facilitant ainsi de nouveaux contournements par les distributeurs. Le recours au droit crée également une solidarité entre les professionnels du Titre IV, qu’ils soient affiliés à l’administration, aux fournisseurs ou aux distributeurs. Chez ces professionnels, la défense de l’autonomie du monde du Titre IV finit par primer sur les intérêts des acteurs qu’ils sont censés représenter. / Faced with the increasing market power of French mass retail, suppliers lobbied the state into protecting them. The state intervened by creating a new set of rules (“Titre IV du livre IV du Code de commerce”: henceforth “Title IV”) that specifically targeted the annual bargaining process between retailers and suppliers. This dissertation describes the transformation of Title IV and questions whether law constitutes a useful resource to settle structural economic imbalances. To achieve this, I investigated how Title IV was drafted and enforced by DGCCRF (a department of the French ministry of Finance) and how retailers responded to those rules. Results show how to turn economic and commercial law into an effective weapon in the hands of weaker market players. To make Title IV effective, the state regulator incorporated moral principles into statutes and encouraged judges to adjudicate on a case-by-case basis, rather than strictly following the letter of the law. However, results also show the limits of law as a means of settling economic imbalances. By hiring lawyers and complying symbolically with regulations (rather than obeying the letter of the law), mass retailers gradually internalized Title IV. DGCCRF responded by drafting more precise rules. This had the unexpected consequence of making symbolic compliance even more widespread. Title IV had another unexpected effect. It created a sense of solidarity among a group of legal professionals and civil servants. To that group, defending the boundaries of Title IV as a field of expertise became more important than defending specific economic interests.

Esta tesis es una colección de tres ensayos en el campo de la economía industrial. Los dos primeros ensayos son contribuciones empíricas en el tema de la discriminación de precios. El último ensayo está relacionado con la heterogeneidad en las expectativas futuras de precios. Ese ensayo es una contribución a la literatura que trata el tema de demanda dinámica. El objetivo del primer capítulo es determinar la relevancia de la discriminación de precios en los mercados de alimentos orgánicos (cereales para desayuno). El principal problema al responder a esta pregunta es que los costes no son observables y, por lo tanto, a priori, no puedo saber si el sobreprecio de los alimentos orgánicos se debe a la discriminación precios o simplemente por diferencias de costes. Para evitar este problema, utilizo un modelo de elección discreta para obtener la elasticidad de la demanda y, con un modelo de oferta, obtener el valor de los costes marginales. Lo resultados indican que, aproximadamente, el 6% de la diferencia de precio entre productos orgánicos y productos no orgánicos se debe a la discriminación de precios. Además, yo encuentro que un impuesto en los productos no orgánicos no es suficiente para disminuir la discriminación de precios, y tiene un efecto negativo en el bienestar social: hay reducción en el excedente del consumidor que es superior al aumento de los beneficios de las empresas. Por fin, encuentro que la discriminación de precios resulta de la existencia de consumidores con renta alta en el mercado. En el segundo capítulo yo estudio si hay una relación no monótona entre los descuentos por cantidad y el nivel de competencia en el mercado. Los resultados encontrados sugieren que la relación es sí no-monótona y que tiene formato en U. Eso implica que los descuentos por cantidad son más comunes en los mercados menos concentrados y en los más concentrados. Además, los resultados sugieren que la firma líder es la responsable por esa situación. Por fin, el tercer capítulo analiza la heterogeneidad en la expectativa de precios en el mercado de un bien no duradero (refrescos) y que son comprados con alta frecuencia. Los resultados sugieren que, en media, los consumidores son racionales y forman expectativas con respecto al futuro. Sin embargo, consumidores de baja renta forman expectativas basadas en un modelo de Markov de primer orden (donde solo importa el precio actual y del período anterior para formar sus expectativas), y a los consumidores con renta mediana solo les importa el precio actual al decidir comprar (o sea, son impacientes - miopes).

The purpose of this study is to conceptualize the ideational influence of Ordoliberalism on EU Competition Law while addressing a problematic social issue that has been witnessing a surge in the number of cases, which is excessive price abuse under Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) within the spectrum of pharmaceutical sector. By utilizing Nedergaard (2020)’s analytic framework for Ordoliberalism’s operationalization, the study successfully proves the impacts of five characteristics of Ordoliberalism, including Politics by rules, Economic Constitution, Market Construction, Role of Consumers and Role of the states towards consumers, on the practices of EU Competition Law, using the empirical data collected from two excessive pricing examples: Aspen in Italy and Pfizer/Flynn in the United Kingdom. The study also highlights the unique features of the pharmaceutical market due to its significant impacts on public healthcare and medicine assessment. At the end of the study, some recommendations are provided for further investigations.

Dans de nombreuses industries, les producteurs doivent passer par des intermédiaires afin de distribuer leurs produits sur les marchés. Par exemple, dans le secteur de la grande distribution alimentaire, les producteurs vendent leurs produits à des distributeurs qui ont un accès direct aux consommateurs finaux; dans les secteurs de la santé, les fournisseurs de soins médicaux (e.g., les hôpitaux) traitent avec les assureurs afin d’avoir accès aux patients. Toutes ces industries sont souvent caractérisées par une structure oligopolistique bilatérale avec un petit nombre d'entreprises opérant sur les deux côtés du marché, impliquant des relations commerciales complexes entre les acteurs. En effet, les externalités contractuelles sont omniprésentes dans ce type d’environnement puisque la valeur générée par une transaction et partagée entre un fabricant et un détaillant dépend généralement des décisions contractuelles des autres entreprises opérant sur le marché. Un certain nombre de pratiques, communément appelées « restrictions verticales », peuvent également survenir, telles que des contrats d'exclusivité, des pratiques de ventes liées, ou bien des fixations de prix de revente. En outre, les conditions tarifaires sont principalement déterminées par un processus de négociation entre les entreprises. L’objet de ma recherche consiste à analyser comment les relations verticales entre entreprises dans un contexte aussi complexe que celui des oligopoles bilatéraux peuvent avoir un impact sur le surplus du consommateur et le bon fonctionnement de l’industrie. Dans le premier chapitre de ma thèse, j’élabore un modèle d’économétrie structurelle afin d’analyser empiriquement les relations producteur- distributeur dans des oligopoles bilatéraux avec produits différenciés. L’approche contraste avec la plupart des méthodes empiriques antérieures et permet d’identifier la division du surplus entre les entreprises sans la nécessité d’avoir des données sur les contrats de gros et les coûts marginaux des firmes. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’étude des effets générés par la formation d’alliances entre distributeurs pour négocier des tarifs communs et acheter des produits auprès de leurs fournisseurs. En utilisant des données d’achats sur les eaux embouteillées réalisés par un panel de consommateurs représentatif de la population Française, j'estime un modèle structurel de demande et d'offre. Je réalise ensuite des simulations pour étudier les effets de trois alliances formées par des distributeurs dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire en France. Les résultats montrent que le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs est affaibli, le profit total de l'industrie diminue, et que les consommateurs finaux font face à des prix plus élevés. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse analyse la pratique du «full-line forcing» comme mécanisme d’éviction sur les marchés verticalement liées. Je considère un modèle dans lequel un producteur multi-produit offre une marque leader et une marque secondaire sur laquelle il est en concurrence avec une entreprise plus efficace. Le modèle permet de mettre en évidence que le « full-line forcing » est une stratégie de négociation efficace car elle permet au producteur multi-produit d’influer sur les points de menace dans les négociations et d’imposer son portefeuille de marques sur les étagères du distributeur, excluant ainsi le producteur concurrent. Cette stratégie émerge à l’équilibre sous trois conditions : (i) la marque leader de l’entreprise multi-produit est suffisamment forte, (ii) son inefficacité sur la marque secondaire n’est pas trop sévère, et (iii) le fournisseur concurrent est assez puissant dans sa négociation avec le distributeur. Les résultats suggèrent que les consommateurs finaux et le bien-être total peuvent être réduit alors que, dans certains cas, le distributeur bénéficie d’une telle stratégie d’éviction. / In many economic environments, producers need to deal with intermediaries to supply their products on markets. Examples include grocery markets in which food manufacturers sell their products to retailers who have direct access to final consumers; pharmaceutical industries where manufacturers distribute their drugs on markets through drugstores; multichannel television industries where cable channels sell their programs to multichannel video program distributors who then charge fees to consumers; private healthcare sectors in which medical providers (e.g., hospitals) deal with insurers to have access to sick patients. One particular feature of such industries is that they are often characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure with a small number of firms operating on both sides of the market, resulting in complex vertical relationships. Contracting externalities are indeed intrinsic to such environments because the value generated by a transaction and shared between a manufacturer and a retailer generally depends on the contracting decisions of other firms operating on the market. A number of practices, commonly referred to as vertical restraints, may also arise such as exclusive dealing, bundling and tying, resale price maintenance, or quantity discounts. Furthermore, trading terms are mostly determined through a bargaining process between upstream and downstream firms rather than being fixed by one-side of the market. My research consists in analyzing how vertical relationships between firms in such complex settings impact consumer surplus and total welfare. To this end, I rely on both theoretical models and empirical methods to derive predictions of the effects of contractual arrangements within the supply chain. In the first chapter of this dissertation I design a structural framework to analyze manufacturer-retailer relationships in bilateral oligopolies with differentiated products. Our approach contrasts with most prior empirical models of bargaining and allows to identify the division of surplus between firms without data on wholesale contracts and marginal costs. The second chapter investigates the economic effects of alliances formed by retailers to negotiate common prices and purchase products from manufacturers. I use household- level scanner data on bottled water purchases and estimate a structural model of demand and supply. I perform simulations to study the economic effects of three buyer alliances that have been formed by competing retailers in the French food retail sector. Results show that the bargaining power of retailers is weakened, total industry profit decreases, and final consumers face higher prices. The third chapter examines the case of full-line forcing as a foreclosure device in vertically related markets. We consider a setting in which a multi-product manufacturer offers a leading brand and a secondary brand for which it competes with a more efficient single-product firm. We show that full-line forcing is an efficient bargaining strategy as it allows the multi-product manufacturer to affect threat points and impose its brand portfolio on the retailer’s shelves therefore excluding the rival supplier. This strategy arises in equilibrium under three conditions (i) the leading brand of the multi- product firm is strong enough, (ii) the inefficiency on the secondary brand is not too severe, and (iii) the rival supplier is powerful enough in its bargaining with the retailer. Our results suggest that final consumers and total welfare may be harmed whereas, in some cases, the retailer benefits from such a foreclosure strategy.