No description available.

Fragmented and adversarial are words used routinely to describe firstly the structure of the construction industry, and secondly the inherent culture that continues to exist within it. Both are characteristics that ultimately serve to not only routinely constrain the efficiency, performance and resultant productivity of the New Zealand building sector, but moreover they persist to play a part in increasing related costs whilst diminishing the quality of the built environment surrounding us. The ubiquity of the outsource model goes some way towards mitigating much of the risk and financial encumbrances that large construction companies have historically faced. But consequentially it is directly responsible for an industry now propagated mostly by small, specialist trade subcontracting organisations that for the most part are reliant upon securing work through construction companies. Contiguous to a degree is the propensity of an industry focussed upon procuring construction by means of competitive tendering, an approach whereby successful bids are traditionally weighted towards those incorporating the lowest initial cost. To garner an understanding of the role that contextual significance plays in construction procurement this study was facilitated by utilising a constructivist grounded theoretical approach. Data was generated by the way of fifty interviews with construction industry stakeholders, inclusive of Sub-Contractors, Main Contractors, Consultants, Architects and Clients. Subsequent analysis reveals that in response to power asymmetry and other environmental conditions, organisations have developed numerous proactive, reactive and opportunistic strategies and behaviours that become evident as the procurement process progresses. This study highlights and explains the relationships and factors from which an industry actor’s rationale is drawn. Furthermore, however, it argues that the proponents of construction industry procurement will when necessary, relax their ordinarily pre-conditioned moral constraints and consciously venture into business practices considered by their peers to be somewhat immoral.

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to fill the existing gap in the literature connected to project strategywithin the Swedish fiber infrastructure regarding the subsidy program announced by the Post- andTelecom Authority. To fulfill the purpose and address the research area two research questions have beendeveloped: RQ1: How do private companies design their project strategy competing for subsidies? RQ2:In what way does the business environment affect the design of the project strategy? Method: The study has used a qualitative research method based on a single private incumbent firmwithin the fiber infrastructure industry in Sweden. The study is based on existing literature on the subjectand complemented with 22 interviews divided into three stages to secure the quality of the data collection.The data were analyzed through a thematic analysis, which laid the foundation for the study's findings. Findings: The section presents four stages that intend to increase understanding of the subsidy program'sproject strategy and the business environment. The findings resulted in four parts, the Post- and TelecomAuthority subsidy program, the project in relation to the business environment, a life-cycle of the project,and lastly, a conceptual framework of the project strategy. The project strategy consists of sixcomponents: sub-goals, project organization and structure, risk, cost calculation, knowledge ofcompetition, and competitive tender. The strategy needs to include these components to create acompetitive tender and achieve the project goals and objectives. However, the competitive businessenvironment and Post- and Telecom Authority rules and regulations limit how the strategy can bedesigned and operationalized. Theoretical and practical implications: The study agrees with prior literature, which presents thatproject strategy is vital for project success (Shenhar et al., 2007), and that risk is a highly prominentcomponent affecting the strategy (Carbonara et al., 2015). However, the study presents new perspectiveson project strategy within public private partnerships on the Swedish fiber infrastructure and whichcomponents are the most prominent in the specific project. For managers, the study contributes with aframework intended to help assess these crucial components affecting the project strategy within theexisting context. This is to guide and assist managers in designing a more efficient project strategy andmitigates the risks associated with the subsidy program. Limitations and future research: This study is limited to investigating the project strategy related to thesubsidy program issued by the Swedish Post- and Telecom Authority. Further, the study is only based onone case company that does not present a holistic view of the project strategy of all actors involved. Thisindicating future research should investigate other companies within the market and especially publicfiber net owners with different goals and targets.

Même si la régulation est associée à l’apparition de nouvelles formes de normativité, les actes administratifs unilatéraux occupent une place importante parmi ses différents outils. Envisagée comme une police spéciale visant la protection de l’ordre public économique, la régulation trouve dans les actes administratifs unilatéraux ses moyens d’exercice naturels. Il y a quatre types d’actes administratifs unilatéraux de régulation : les autorisations d’accès au marché, les actes réglementaires qui fixent les conditions d’exercice de la concurrence en son sein, les actes de règlement des différends et les décisions adoptées en matière de sanction. Au sein du système de régulation par voie d’actes administratifs unilatéraux se rencontrent plusieurs objectifs qui participent à la confection d’un régime inédit. L’étude du régime des actes administratifs unilatéraux de régulation confirme leur spécificité. Celle-ci se manifeste tout au long de leur cycle de vie. Adoptés par des autorités administratives indépendantes, ces actes peuvent être précédés d’une consultation publique, attribués après mise en concurrence des opérateurs ou cédés par leurs titulaires. Les évolutions que connaît leur régime les rapproche du droit souple, au point de rendre parfois difficile la distinction entre les deux instruments pour les opérateurs et le juge, au détriment de la sécurité juridique. Le juge administratif occupe une place centrale au sein du mécanisme de régulation. Confronté à un mécanisme normatif à deux vitesses et aux exigences que pose la régulation, il est amené à faire évoluer ses méthodes de contrôle et à construire progressivement son office de juge de la régulation. / Regardless of the fact that sectoral regulation is usually associated with the emergence of new forms of normativity, unilateral administrative acts have a prominent place among its various instruments. Conceived of as a special mission of the Administration whose main objective is the protection of public economic order, sectoral regulation is indeed normally exercised through unilateral administrative acts. There are four types of unilateral administrative acts that serve as instruments to sectoral regulation: decisions authorising access to the market, regulatory acts that set the conditions for competition in the market, dispute resolution decisions and decisions imposing sanctions. Regulating through unilateral administrative acts serves various objectives leading to a unique regime. Studying the latter confirms the specificity of these acts, a specificity that is evident throughout their life cycle. Adopted by independent administrative authorities, these acts can be submitted to public consultation, attributed to the operators on the basis of a competitive tender or transferred from one beneficiary to another. The evolution of their regime raises the question of their relationship with soft law: the distinction between the two instruments can at times be difficult both for the operators and the judge at the expense of legal security. The Administrative Judge plays a central role in the mecanism of sectoral regulation. Confronted with a two-geared normative mechanism and with the obligations that derive from sectoral regulation, his control methods are destined to evolve and his role as a regulatory judge is progressively refined.