The purpose of the present study was to establish evidence for the suggested integration of the theories of connectionism and leadership. Recent theoretical writings in the field of leadership have suggested that the dynamic representations generated by the connectionist perspective is an appropriate approach to understanding how we perceive leaders. Similarly, implicit leadership theory (ILT) explains that our cognitive understandings of leaders are based on a cognitive structure that we use as a means of understanding and categorizing the behaviors of individuals we believe to be leaders. It was predicted that when asked to select a leader from a group of potential leaders, individuals select the leader based on personal belief alignment when the context of the leader selection is personally relevant, or based on cognitive expectations when the context is low in personal relevance. In addition, when experiencing moments of greater personal relevance, individuals will experience a more dynamic cognitive representation of a leader that those experiencing the moment as less personally relevant. Sixty-seven individuals provided usable data from a repeated measures design that asked participants to record their cognitive representations of a leader, participate in a leader selection task, and provide information about their cognitive representations of a leader after the selection task. The results of the study provide support the expectations of the experimenter and the suggestions of the connectionist perspective. / Master of Science

This thesis puts forward a formal theory of levels and algorithms to provide a foundation for those terms as they are used in much of cognitive science and computer science. Abstraction with respect to concreteness is distinguished from abstraction with respect to detail, resulting in three levels of concreteness and a large number of algorithmic levels, which are levels of detail and the primary focus of the theory. An algorithm or ideal machine is a set of sequences of states defining a particular level of detail. Rather than one fundamental ideal machine to describe the behaviour of a complex system, there are many possible ideal machines, extending Turing's approach to reflect the multiplicity of system descriptions required to express more than weak input-output equivalence of systems. Cognitive science is concerned with stronger equivalence; e.g., do two models go through the same states at some level of description? The state-based definition of algorithms serves as a basis for such strong equivalence and facilitates formal renditions of abstraction and implementation as relations between algorithms. It is possible to prove within the new framework whether or not one given algorithm is a valid implementation of another, or whether two unequal algorithms have a common abstraction, for example. Some implications of the theory are discussed, notably a characterisation of connectionist versus classical models.

Orientador: Marcos Antonio Alves / Banca: Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Júnior / Banca: Max Rogério Vicentini / Resumo: Nesta Dissertação desenvolvemos uma análise do estatuto científico da ciência cognitiva, em sua fase inicial, mais especificamente no período entre as décadas de 1940 e 1970. Como ponto de partida, utilizamos a abordagem epistemológica de Thomas Kuhn sobre as revoluções científicas. Para alcançar esse objetivo, dividimos a dissertação em três capítulos. No primeiro, expomos alguns dos principais conceitos relacionados à abordagem de Kuhn referentes à estrutura das revoluções científicas. Um dos conceitos-base dessa perspectiva é a noção de paradigma. Um paradigma estabelece e norteia a atividade de uma comunidade científica. Ele é constituído, dentre outras coisas, por teorias empiricamente testáveis, métodos de pesquisa, experimentos, formas de procedimentos, conjuntos de leis e princípios. Indica, ainda, os problemas a serem desenvolvidos pela comunidade científica, determinando uma agenda científica. Via de regra, a fase inicial de uma nova área de pesquisa é marcada por um momento de luta paradigmática, caracterizando-se pela existência de diversos paradigmas rivais. Desde o momento em que um deles passa a ser dominante, a área de pesquisa alcança o estatuto de ciência normal. Uma vez apresentada, de maneira geral, a abordagem de Kuhn, no segundo capítulo passamos a tratar da ciência cognitiva em sua fase inicial. Ainda com raízes na cibernética, esse movimento intelectual, em seus primeiros momentos, almejava instaurar uma ciência dos processos cognitivos. Essa perspecti... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: In this dissertation, we seek to develop an analysis of the scientific status of cognitive science in its initial phase, more specifically the period between the 1940s and 1970s. As a starting point for this analysis, we use Thomas Kuhn's epistemological approach to revolutions scientific research. To achieve this goal, we divided the dissertation into three chapters. In the first, we present some of the main concepts related to Kuhn's approach to the structure of scientific revolutions. One of the basic concepts of this perspective is the notion of paradigm. A paradigm establishes and guides the activity of a scientific community. It is constituted, among other things, by empirically testable theories, methods of research, experiments, forms of procedures, sets of laws and principles. It also indicates the problems to be developed by the scientific community, determining a scientific agenda. As a rule, the initial phase of a new area of research is marked by a moment of paradigmatic struggle, characterized by the existence of several rival paradigms. From the moment one of them becomes dominant, the area of research reaches the status of normal science. Having presented, in general, Kuhn's approach, in the second chapter we turn to cognitive science in its initial phase. Still rooted in cybernetics, this intellectual movement, in its first moments, aimed to establish a science of cognitive processes. This perspective adopts by methodological principle the conception that cer... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

1. Intuitions are often treated in philosophy as a basic evidential source to confirm/discredit a proposed definition or theory; e.g. intuitions about Gettier cases are taken to deny a justified-true-belief analysis of ‘knowledge’. Recently, Weinberg, Nichols & Stitch (WN&S) provided evidence that epistemic intuitions vary across persons and cultures. In-so-far as philosophy of this type (Standard Philosophical Methodology – SPM) is committed to provide conceptual analyses, the use of intuition is suspect – it does not exhibit the requisite normativity. I provide an analysis of intuition, with an emphasis on its neural – or connectionist – cognitive backbone; the analysis provides insight into its epistemic status and proper role within SPM. Intuition is initially characterized as the recognition of a pattern. 2. The metaphysics of ‘pattern’ is analyzed for the purpose of denying that traditional symbolic computation is capable of differentiating the patterns of interest. 3. The epistemology of ‘recognition’ is analyzed, again, to deny that traditional computation is capable of capturing human acts of recognition. 4. Fodor’s informational semantics, his Language of Thought and his Representational Theory of Mind are analyzed and his arguments denied. Again, the purpose is to deny traditional computational theories of mind. 5. Both intuition and a theory of concepts – pragmatic conceptualism - are developed within the connectionist computational paradigm. Intuition is a particular sort of occurrent signal, and a concept is a counterfactually defined set of signals. Standard connectionist theory is significantly extended to develop my position, and consciousness plays a key functional role. This extension – taking connectionism seriously – is argued to be justified on the basis of the failure of the traditional computing paradigm to account for human cognition. 6. Repercussions for the use of intuition in SPM are developed. Variance in intuition is characterized – and expected - as a kind of bias in the network, either inherent or externally-provoked. The WN&S data is explained in the context of this bias. If SPM remains committed to the use of intuition, then intuition must be taken as a part of a larger body of evidence, and it is from experts – not the folk – that intuitions should be solicited.

1. Intuitions are often treated in philosophy as a basic evidential source to confirm/discredit a proposed definition or theory; e.g. intuitions about Gettier cases are taken to deny a justified-true-belief analysis of ‘knowledge’. Recently, Weinberg, Nichols & Stitch (WN&S) provided evidence that epistemic intuitions vary across persons and cultures. In-so-far as philosophy of this type (Standard Philosophical Methodology – SPM) is committed to provide conceptual analyses, the use of intuition is suspect – it does not exhibit the requisite normativity. I provide an analysis of intuition, with an emphasis on its neural – or connectionist – cognitive backbone; the analysis provides insight into its epistemic status and proper role within SPM. Intuition is initially characterized as the recognition of a pattern. 2. The metaphysics of ‘pattern’ is analyzed for the purpose of denying that traditional symbolic computation is capable of differentiating the patterns of interest. 3. The epistemology of ‘recognition’ is analyzed, again, to deny that traditional computation is capable of capturing human acts of recognition. 4. Fodor’s informational semantics, his Language of Thought and his Representational Theory of Mind are analyzed and his arguments denied. Again, the purpose is to deny traditional computational theories of mind. 5. Both intuition and a theory of concepts – pragmatic conceptualism - are developed within the connectionist computational paradigm. Intuition is a particular sort of occurrent signal, and a concept is a counterfactually defined set of signals. Standard connectionist theory is significantly extended to develop my position, and consciousness plays a key functional role. This extension – taking connectionism seriously – is argued to be justified on the basis of the failure of the traditional computing paradigm to account for human cognition. 6. Repercussions for the use of intuition in SPM are developed. Variance in intuition is characterized – and expected - as a kind of bias in the network, either inherent or externally-provoked. The WN&S data is explained in the context of this bias. If SPM remains committed to the use of intuition, then intuition must be taken as a part of a larger body of evidence, and it is from experts – not the folk – that intuitions should be solicited.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-145).

Connectionism, a new technique for modeling cognitive processes, has been presented by its supporters as a revolutionary advance that will soon replace conventional artificial intelligence (AI) research based on the serial computer. In this thesis, I identify three 'gambits' with which critics attempt to undermine connectionist claims, and show that use of these gambits depends on the status of the respondent's own discipline. I argue that in cases where the respondent's discipline has an accepted identity, for example biology and psychology, they take contradictory stances on the issue of continuity between their discipline and connectionism. By contrast, responses from supporters of AI, which has an uncertain status, insist on a continuous relationship between connectionism and AI. To account for this, I suggest that claims made by both supporters and critics of connectionism, which those actors would regard as purely cognitive, are tacitly structured by Kuhn's model of scientific change. As certain claims which the actors would describe as purely cognitive can be accounted for by the presence in common scholarly parlance of a particular philosophical model of scientific change, I conclude that in the confrontation between connectionism and conventional AI there exists a complex relationship between social and cognitive processes. / Master of Science

This work discusses a way of thinking the normative practices as a phenomenon better understood through a pragmatic account of social practices. We claim that an appropriate approach to normativity should accept the presence, in the normative creature, of natural capacities intrinsically related to norm-governed activities, especially what we call a normative attitude. Thus, we present a discussion on the rule-based account of normativity understood as a sort of intersubjective practice grounded in practical skills and learning processes as well. We also indicate why the pragmatic model appropriately fits with a connectionist model of cognition. Finally, we argue that normative practices should be understood primarily in terms of internal patterns, functionally defined, instituted as nonexplicit, non-conscious individual processes. The consequence is a practical, inferentialist, connectionist, and implicit approach to the normativity. / Este trabalho discute um modo de pensar as práticas normativas como um fenômeno melhor entendido através de uma explicação pragmática das praticas sociais. Afirmamos que uma estratégia apropriada para entender a normatividade deve aceitar a presença, nas criaturas normativas, de capacidades naturais intrinsecamente relacionadas às atividades governadas por normas, especialmente o que chamamos de atitudes normativas. Assim, apresentamos uma discussão de uma abordagem da normatividade baseada em regras entendidas como um tipo de prática intersubjetiva fundada em habilidades práticas e, também, em processes de aprendizado. Indicamos, então, por que um modelo pragmático se adéqua apropriadamente a um modelo conexionista de cognição. Finalmente, argumentamos que as práticas normativas devem ser entendidas primeiramente em termos de padrões internos, funcionalmente definidos, instituídos como processos individuais não explícitos e não conscientes. A consequência é uma explicação prática, inferencialista, conexionista e implícita da normatividade.

Wong, Chun Kit. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves ). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Bodily Sensation in Contemporary Extreme Horror Film provides a theory of horror film spectatorship rooted in the physiology of the viewer. In a novel contribution to the field of film studies research, it seeks to integrate contemporary scientific theories of mind with psychological paradigms of film interpretation. Proceeding from a connectionist model of brain function that proposes psychological processes are underpinned by neurology, this thesis contends that whilst conscious engagement with film often appears to be driven by psychosocial conditions – including cultural influence, gender dynamics and social situation – it is physiology and bodily sensation that provide the infrastructure upon which this superstructure rests. Drawing upon the philosophical works of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and Alain Berthoz, the argument concentrates upon explicating the specific bodily sensations and experiences that contribute to the creation of implicit structures of understanding, or embodied schemata, that we apply to the world round us. Integrating philosophy with contemporary neurological research in the spheres of cognition and neurocinematics, a number of correspondences are drawn between physiological states and the concomitant psychological states often perceived to arise simultaneously alongside them. The thesis offers detailed analysis of a selection of extreme horror films that, it is contended, conscientiously incorporate the body of the viewer in the process of spectatorship through manipulation of visual, auditory, vestibular, gustatory and nociceptive sensory stimulations, simulations and the embodied schemata that arise from everyday physiological experience. The phenomenological film criticism of Vivian Sobchack and Laura U. Marks is adopted and expanded upon in order to suggest that the organicity of the human body guides and structures the psychosocial engagement with, and interpretation of, contemporary extreme horror film. This project thus exposes the body as the architectural foundation upon which conscious interaction with film texts occurs.