Cognitive scientists seeking a computational account of consciousness almost universally opt for a process theory of some kind: a theory that explains phenomenal experience in terms of the computational processes defined over the brain's representational vehicles. But until recently cognitive science has been dominated by the classical computational theory of mind. Today there is a new player on the scene, connectionism, which takes its inspiration from a computational framework known as parallel distributed processing (PDP). It is therefore appropriate to ask whether connectionism has anything distinctive to say about consciousness, and in particular, whether it might challenge the dominance of process theories. I argue that connectionism has the resources to hazard a vehicle theory of consciousness. A vehicle theory places consciousness right at the focus of cognition by identifying it with the explicit representation of information in the brain. Classicism can't support such a theory because it is committed to the existence of explicit representations whose contents are not phenomenally conscious. The connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness aligns phenomenal experience with stable patterns of activation in neurally realised PDP networks. It suggests that consciousness is an amalgam of phenomenal elements, both sensory and non-sensory, and the product of a multitude of consciousness-making mechanisms scattered throughout the brain. This somewhat unorthodox picture is supported, I claim, by careful analysis of experience, and by the evidence of the neurosciences. One obstacle facing this account is the apparent evidence, both direct and indirect, for the activity of unconscious explicit representations in human cognition. I establish that much of the direct evidence for this thesis is open to doubt on methodological grounds. And studies that support the dissociation thesis indirectly, by way of an inference to the best explanation, are vulnerable to alternative connectionist explanations of the relevant phenomena. What is most significant about the connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness is not the fact that it's a connectionist theory of consciousness, but that it's a vehicle theory - an account which takes cognitive science into largely unexplored territory, but in so doing brings into clearer focus the issues with which any theory of consciousness must contend. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Department of Philosophy, 1998.

<p>In this work we explore how close the artificial intelligence community has come to model the human mind regarding representation and processing of sequences. We analyse results produced by cognitive psychologists, who explore real minds, for features exhibited by human short- and long-term memory when representing and processing sequences. We compare these features with theories and models from the AI community divided into two types of theories: intrinsic and extrinsic theories. We conclude that the intrinsic theories have managed to explain most of the features, whereas the extrinsic theories still have a lot to do before exhibiting all features. We also present several suggestions for continued research to the AI community within the area of sequence representation and processing in the human mind.</p>

The paper discusses the basics of Cognitive Science and describes the achievements of research at the field of Artificial Intelligence. / Die im Rahmen des Seminars "Language - Mind - Brain: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics" der englischen Sprachwissenschaft entstandene Arbeit befasst sich mit den Grundlagen der Kognition und diskutiert die Ergebnisse der Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Künstlichen Intelligenz.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 205-215). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 205-215). Also available on the Internet.

This project provides a detailed examination and critique of current philosophical, linguistic, and cognitive accounts of first language acquisition. In particular, I focus on the concept of "innate" and how it is embraced, marginally utilized, or abandoned altogether in efforts to describe the way that a child comes to be a competent user of a language. A central question that naturally falls out of this general inquiry is therefore what exactly is supposed to be "innate," according to various theories? Philosophically, the theory of innate ideas put forth to explain human learning has existed for centuries and hence, this thesis as it relates to language is discussed. The revival of nativism by linguists like Chomsky is thus a central theme of the first chapter. Universal Grammar and the various arguments for it are closely scrutinized, and I close this chapter with what I take to be the commitments of linguistic nativism, how its proponents conceive of "innate," and several possible objections to the arguments they put forth. Just as the theory of innate ideas has had its contesters throughout the history of philosophy, so too have linguists and cognitive scientists rejected Universal Grammar and other forms of linguistic nativism. Thus, the second chapter presents several of these alternative explanations of language acquisition. Namely, I divide the chapter into three sections, Usage-Based Linguistics, Emergentism, and Sociolinguistic Acquisition, as it is my suggestion that most of the anti-UG attacks are levied from one of these three fields. In discussing the details of each, two distinctions become of particular concern: first, a large part of the differing conceptions of "innate" seem to hinge on what is meant by "learning" and "acquiring," and therefore second, a fine line between UBL and Emergentism can be drawn, a relationship that is otherwise conflated in the literature. Because chapter two involves a brief account of the way in which connectionist simulations are often utilized to model or represent language acquisition, particularly from an Emergentist perspective, chapter three begins by examining this feature of Emergentism in more detail. Due to its explanatory power, ability to be effectively modeled, and the evidentiary support found in neuroscience, Emergentism would appear to be the most tenable position to maintain regarding language acquisition. This possibility seems further strengthened when we take into account the neuroscientific data often used to bolster anti-nativist claims. Nevertheless, reflecting on the overarching concern of the project, regarding what is really meant by "innate," it is shown that this attack on nativism might stand on shakier ground than was originally assumed. Finally, based on these considerations, a case is made for an intermediary position, a theory of "Minimally Innate Ideas."

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Leiden University. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 265-280) and index.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Leiden University. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 265-280) and index.

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (Ph. D.)--Leiden University. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 265-280) and index.

This work discusses a way of thinking the normative practices as a phenomenon better understood through a pragmatic account of social practices. We claim that an appropriate approach to normativity should accept the presence, in the normative creature, of natural capacities intrinsically related to norm-governed activities, especially what we call a normative attitude. Thus, we present a discussion on the rule-based account of normativity understood as a sort of intersubjective practice grounded in practical skills and learning processes as well. We also indicate why the pragmatic model appropriately fits with a connectionist model of cognition. Finally, we argue that normative practices should be understood primarily in terms of internal patterns, functionally defined, instituted as nonexplicit, non-conscious individual processes. The consequence is a practical, inferentialist, connectionist, and implicit approach to the normativity. / Este trabalho discute um modo de pensar as práticas normativas como um fenômeno melhor entendido através de uma explicação pragmática das praticas sociais. Afirmamos que uma estratégia apropriada para entender a normatividade deve aceitar a presença, nas criaturas normativas, de capacidades naturais intrinsecamente relacionadas às atividades governadas por normas, especialmente o que chamamos de atitudes normativas. Assim, apresentamos uma discussão de uma abordagem da normatividade baseada em regras entendidas como um tipo de prática intersubjetiva fundada em habilidades práticas e, também, em processes de aprendizado. Indicamos, então, por que um modelo pragmático se adéqua apropriadamente a um modelo conexionista de cognição. Finalmente, argumentamos que as práticas normativas devem ser entendidas primeiramente em termos de padrões internos, funcionalmente definidos, instituídos como processos individuais não explícitos e não conscientes. A consequência é uma explicação prática, inferencialista, conexionista e implícita da normatividade.