Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T23:01:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo8618_1.pdf: 1604073 bytes, checksum: d9765092ab2a50cd8b1426f73b5ed129 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Este estudo é uma revisão narrativa da literatura sobre os paradigmas computacionais, as modelagens naturais conexionistas e a investigação dos fenômenos psicopatológicos. O objetivo geral foi realizar uma coleta de informações sobre os trabalhos publicados, até então, que contemplassem os modelos de processamento de informações no cérebro humano, a analogia com Redes Neurais Artificiais e a aplicação de métodos investigativos nas psicopatologias. A seleção dos estudos foi baseada principalmente pesquisas em bancos de dados digitais: Medline, Períodos CAPES, MIT Search, Scholar Google e PsychInfo, usando os descritores neural networks, neurocomputation, psychopathology, connectionism, mood disorders, depression, cognition e artificial intelligence, em mecanismos de busca digital. Foram selecionados os estudos considerando os critérios de inclusão a partir dos descritores, o aspecto cronológico, a adequação e pertinência dos estudos e o impacto destes artigos na comunidade científica. A literatura clássica também foi incluída. O estudo buscou estabelecer relações entre as pesquisas que utilizaram ferramentas computacionais, visando a criação de modelos que simularam o funcionamento cognitivo do cérebro humano. Destes modelos, as Redes Neurais Artificiais Conexionistas (RNA) mostraram-se as mais promissoras dentre as demais. Conclui-se que as investigações dos fenômenos psicopatológicos baseadas em modelagem computacional conexionista constituem em uma importante estratégia para compreensão do funcionamento da mente humana e de como se processam as alterações psíquicas

In this work we explore how close the artificial intelligence community has come to model the human mind regarding representation and processing of sequences. We analyse results produced by cognitive psychologists, who explore real minds, for features exhibited by human short- and long-term memory when representing and processing sequences. We compare these features with theories and models from the AI community divided into two types of theories: intrinsic and extrinsic theories. We conclude that the intrinsic theories have managed to explain most of the features, whereas the extrinsic theories still have a lot to do before exhibiting all features. We also present several suggestions for continued research to the AI community within the area of sequence representation and processing in the human mind.

A new computing platform, the General Purpose Reprsentation and Association Machine is studied and simulated. GPRAM machines use vague measurements to do a quick and rough assessment on a task; then use approximated message-passing algorithms to improve assessment; and finally selects ways closer to a solution, eventually solving it. We illustrate concepts and structures using simple examples.

This project forms part of a growing engagement with biology by critical psychology and, more broadly, body studies. The specific focus is on the neurological body whose dogmatic exclusion from critical endeavours is challenged by arguing that neuroscience offers a vital resource for emancipatory agendas. Rather than conversely treating biology as a site for the factual supplementation of social theory the aim is to engage (negotiate) with neuroscience more directly and critically. In this process a discursive reductionism and attempted escape from complicity associated with critical psychology are addressed. Similarly a naïve and apolitical empiricism claimed by neuroscience is disrupted. The primary objective is however to demonstrate the utility of neuroscience in developing critical theory. These objectives are pursued through the ‘method’ of deconstruction, (mis)reading several highly regarded neuroscience texts written by prominent neuroscientists, working within the convolutions of these texts so as develop openings for critical conceptualisations of (neural) corporeality. In this manner the various spectres associated with neurology, including essentialism, determinism, individualism, reductionism and dualism, are displaced. This includes, amongst others, the omnipresent mind/body and body/society binaries. The (mis)readings address a number of prominent themes associated with contemporary neuroscience: Attempts at specifying an identity for (part of) the brain are shown to rely on a necessary relationship with the excluded other (such as the body, the socio-cultural, and the environment). Similarly, attempts at articulating a centre, a point from which agency can proceed, which finds existing identity in the functions of the prefrontal cortices, are also undone by the (multiple, affective, and unconscious) other which decentres the centre by being the essential supplement for any such claims. The causal metaphysic must likewise proceed within the play of différance, a logic of difference and deferral that undermines causal routes, innate origins and autocratic centres. Finally, reductionism must advance as a necessary strategy through which to engage with complexity, its ambitions always impossible as the aneconomic is forever in excess of any economy. The emancipatory viability of such (mis)readings is discussed within a context where the open and malleable body has been co-opted by contemporary neo-liberal geoculture. / Psychology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Psychology)

This project forms part of a growing engagement with biology by critical psychology and, more broadly, body studies. The specific focus is on the neurological body whose dogmatic exclusion from critical endeavours is challenged by arguing that neuroscience offers a vital resource for emancipatory agendas. Rather than conversely treating biology as a site for the factual supplementation of social theory the aim is to engage (negotiate) with neuroscience more directly and critically. In this process a discursive reductionism and attempted escape from complicity associated with critical psychology are addressed. Similarly a naïve and apolitical empiricism claimed by neuroscience is disrupted. The primary objective is however to demonstrate the utility of neuroscience in developing critical theory. These objectives are pursued through the ‘method’ of deconstruction, (mis)reading several highly regarded neuroscience texts written by prominent neuroscientists, working within the convolutions of these texts so as develop openings for critical conceptualisations of (neural) corporeality. In this manner the various spectres associated with neurology, including essentialism, determinism, individualism, reductionism and dualism, are displaced. This includes, amongst others, the omnipresent mind/body and body/society binaries. The (mis)readings address a number of prominent themes associated with contemporary neuroscience: Attempts at specifying an identity for (part of) the brain are shown to rely on a necessary relationship with the excluded other (such as the body, the socio-cultural, and the environment). Similarly, attempts at articulating a centre, a point from which agency can proceed, which finds existing identity in the functions of the prefrontal cortices, are also undone by the (multiple, affective, and unconscious) other which decentres the centre by being the essential supplement for any such claims. The causal metaphysic must likewise proceed within the play of différance, a logic of difference and deferral that undermines causal routes, innate origins and autocratic centres. Finally, reductionism must advance as a necessary strategy through which to engage with complexity, its ambitions always impossible as the aneconomic is forever in excess of any economy. The emancipatory viability of such (mis)readings is discussed within a context where the open and malleable body has been co-opted by contemporary neo-liberal geoculture. / Psychology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Psychology)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-22T17:26:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ZIMMER CHAGAS.pdf: 539724 bytes, checksum: 65a542236921405361c8bea7e90202d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-10-28 / One of the main questions towards the second language acquisition theories by the late learners is about how the process of language is done. Some researchers say that in one hand, the L1 learning is implicit, as in automatic, and on the other hand, L2 learning is characterized for being explicit and the learner develops their own strategies in order to solve problems. This thesis does a systematic review of some original studies results which relates implicit and explicit knowledge during the process of a second language acquisition. The objectives of this study are to analyze classic theories as well as the literature of this area of thought and the implicit-explicit work. The methodology used for those studies are also analyzed. The review of classic theories and learning models also figures in this work in the last part of it, but this time within the implicit-explicit view by using the HipCort Model and the connectionist model / Uma das principais questões no que concerne às teorias de aquisição de uma segunda língua pelo adulto diz respeito à maneira pela qual se dá seu o processamento. Existem teóricos que propõem que enquanto o aprendizado de L1 é implícito, automático, a aprendizagem de L2 por adultos se caracteriza por ser explícita e pelo desenvolvimento de estratégias para a resolução de problemas. O presente trabalho aborda a relação entre os conhecimentos implícito e explícito durante a aprendizagem de uma segunda língua, em particular a língua inglesa. Para isso, os seguintes passos são seguidos: 1) são apresentados alguns temas clássicos nos estudos da aprendizagem da L2, como o papel do input, a interlíngua, o input e a fossilização; 2) a literatura e os principais estudos envolvendo a interação entre conhecimento, aprendizagem e instrução implícitos e explícitos são revisados; 3) questões metodológicas e modelos de bilingüismo são problematizados; e 4) os temas clássicos são revisitados à luz dos temas implícito e explícito. Por fim, algumas considerações finais são feitas

This work deals with the field of artificial intelligence and the interconnected question of the possibility to make thinking machines. The natural and human intelligence evolution summary outlines the starting points of the field. To give the clearer picture of the problem, I also describe the development of artificial intelligence branch and the development of computers. My work combines informatics and philosophical approaches. In the scope of the first one, I summarize different approaches to AI, with emphasis on sub-symbolic methods which are used afterwards to explain the concept of intelligence development. In the scope of the philosophical approach, the text deals with different philosophical points of view on making intelligent machines, which comment phenomena like consciousness, subjective experience or the body-mind problem. I contradict the use of intuition to solve the thought experiments dealing with mind and I argue for the possibility to make intelligent machines. The futurology visions are the last starting point for stating my opinion on the future development of IA and human ability to make the thinking machine.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Les structures du système nerveux responsables des modalités de la prise de décision forment un circuit constitué par les ganglions de la base, le cortex, le thalamus et leurs nombreuses interconnexions. Ce circuit peut être décrit comme un ensemble de boucles fonctionnant en parallèle et interagissant en différents points. Des interactions entre ces boucles et de la plasticité de leurs connexions émergent les choix et donc les actions d’un individu. Ces comportements émergents et les phénomènes d’apprentissage qui en découlent sont abordés à travers une approche en boucle fermée dans laquelle le modèle théorique est en interaction constante avec l’environnement où se déroule la tâche comportementale étudiée. A cette fin, des outils de modélisation neuronale et d’analyse dédiés ont été développés dans le laboratoire d’accueil. Nous explorons donc ici la dynamique des flux d’information au sein de ce circuit à travers un modèle computationnel décrit à l’échelle du neurone et de la synapse. A partir d’observations expérimentales préalables réalisées sur le primate et de modèles computationnels antérieurs, nous avons développé de manière incrémentale un réseau capable d’apprendre à réaliser les tâches comportementales dans plusieurs protocoles et conditions. Le résultat obtenu ici est un modèle computationnel d’apprentissage et de prise de décision dans les ganglions de la base qui permet de tester des hypothèses expérimentales et d’effectuer des investigations physiopathologiques ou pharmacologiques in silico à l’échelle cellulaire. Le développement de ce modèle computationnel a été mené en parallèle avec l’étude expérimentale d’un protocole de prise de décision et la mise au point d’un modèle de maladie de Parkinson chez la salamandre (Pleurodeles waltlii). / The nervous system structures involved in decision making constitute a circuit formed by the basal ganglia, the cortex, the thalamus and their numerous interconnections. This circuit can be described as a set of loops operating in parallel and interacting at different points. The decisions and therefore the actions of an individual emerge from the interactions between these loops and the plasticity of their connections. These emerging behaviors and arising learning processes are addressed through a closed-loop approach in which the theoretical model is in constant interaction with the environment of the task. To this end, neural modeling and dedicated analysis software tools were developed in the laboratory. We explore here the dynamics of information flows within this circuit through a computational model described at the neuron and synapse level. Taking into account previous experimental observations from primates and earlier computational models, we incrementally developed a network capable of learning to perform behavioral tasks under several protocols and conditions. The result here is a computational model of learning and decision making in the basal ganglia that allows for the testing of experimental hypotheses and also to conduct in silico pathophysiological or pharmacological investigations at the cellular level. The development of this computational model was conducted in parallel with the development of an experimental protocol of decision making and with the adjustment of a model of Parkinson disease in the salamander (Pleurodeles waltlii).