The Interest of the Business Corporation and its Protection Abstract This thesis is about the general interests of business corporations. It creates a comprehensive overview, designed to enable the reader to become acquainted with the basic factors which are shaping such interests. While maintaining the link to Czech legal regulation and jurisprudence, it describes the nature of business corporations' interests at a basic level and it points to legal institutions that might indirectly complement this idea. The objectives detailed above are pursued in three ways, each of which is considered in one of the three parts of the thesis. The three parts follow each other sequentially, leading the reader through a comprehensive path to understanding some areas of the law that, at first, might seem unrelated. It sets basic distinguishing criteria for the different types of business corporations. These criteria are important for the thesis' eventual conclusions, which are in the theoretical level related primarily to capital companies. In the first part of the thesis, there is a brief summary of the historical development the economic aspect of business corporations and a discussion on conflict of interest issues, both inside and outside the corporation, which influence corporate interest. The second part deals with...

Le droit de vote est la prérogative politique suprême de l’associé. Si de nombreux débats se sont intéressés à son caractère essentiel et à ses conditions d’attribution, peu de réflexions se sont concentrées sur ses modalités d’exercice. Celles-ci font pourtant l’originalité de ce droit individuel qui ne peut s’exercer que collectivement et sont déterminantes de son effectivité, lui qui ne peut se manifester qu’épisodiquement au gré des réunions de la collectivité des associés. La recherche des principes gouvernant son exercice, sujet méconnu car relevant surtout de la pratique, devrait permettre de mieux cerner sa portée. Sur le plan individuel, le principe essentiel est celui de la liberté du vote, qui peut même neutraliser partiellement les règles de son attribution, comme en cas d’abstention ou d’activisme actionnarial. Cette liberté suppose toutefois que l’intégrité du vote et son caractère éclairé soient préservés. Or il peut être altéré par des pressions extérieures, motivées par la valeur économique du droit de vote, ce qui requiert des dispositifs renforcés de protection. Sur le plan de l’organisation collective du scrutin, l’accent est mis sur l’intérêt social, justifiant la prédominance de la loi de la majorité et venant tempérer la liberté du vote. Ces règles organisationnelles, tout en garantissant le droit de participer aux décisions collectives, promeuvent une certaine loyauté du vote, notamment en sanctionnant les abus du droit de vote, et une certaine éthique du vote, comme au travers du say on pay. Cette prise en compte croissante des intérêts collectifs lors du vote invite à renouveler certaines réflexions majeures du droit des sociétés. Elle interroge en particulier sur le rôle de l’associé et sur le bien-fondé de certains principes tels que celui qui prohibe les cessions de droits de vote. / The right to vote is the supreme political prerogative of shareholders. While many debates have focused on its essential nature and the conditions under which it is granted, little thought has been given to how it should be exercised. The mode of exercise makes the right to vote unusual in that it arises from an individual right which can only be exercised collectively and indeed is critical for its effectiveness since voting rights can only be utilized episodically within the framework of general meetings of shareholders. The consideration of the principles governing the exercise of voting rights, a relatively unexplored topic since most effort in this area refers to practical aspects, should clarify the impact of this mechanism. At the individual level, the freedom to vote is a key principle, which can even partially neutralize the rules of its allocation, as in the case of abstention or shareholder activism. However, this freedom presupposes that the integrity of the vote and the right to information related to it are preserved. However, these features can be altered by external pressures motivated by the economic value of voting rights, which leads to a requirement for reinforced protection measures. At the collective level of the organisation of the ballot, the emphasis is placed on corporate interests, justifying the predominance of the majority rule and tempering the freedom to vote. These organisational rules, while guaranteeing the right to participate in collective decisions, promote a certain loyalty, in particular by punishing abuses of the right to vote, and via the application of a collective ethical approach (e.g. say-on-pay). This growing influence of collective interests in the voting process invites us to reconsider certain major company law principles. In particular, questions are around the role of the shareholder and the validity of certain of those principles such as that prohibiting the sale of voting rights.

L’intérêt social est la raison d’être principale de la règlementation des conventions réglementées. Il est délimité par des intérêts voisins et par l’intérêt personnel abrité par ces conventions, dont le jeu conflictuel peut léser la société. L’existence d’un conflit et de sa justification peuvent être présumées. L'intérêt social est désormais celui de l’entreprise vue dans son contexte économique large. Un intérêt de groupe est distinctement reconnu. La qualification des conventions sert à identifier celles qui doivent être contrôlées. La mise en oeuvre de la protection de l’intérêt social s’opère à travers la prévention des conflits d’intérêts, moyennant une révélation de l'intérêt personnel. Cette révélation déclenche la procédure d'appréciation par les organes sociaux concernés. Des garanties législatives et jurisprudentielles assurent la primauté de l’intérêt social, par la limitation de l’exercice de certains droits et par l’application judiciaire stricte du respect des obligations légales qui pèsent sur les intéressés. La convention frauduleuse est nulle. Celle non autorisée qui est préjudiciable à la société est annulable; et ses conséquences sont supportées par l’intéressé qui engage sa responsabilité civile et même parfois sa responsabilité pénale. La comparaison du traitement de ce sujet dans les trois systèmes juridiques libanais, français et américains a dévoilé des failles dans les deux premiers ; des projets de réforme sont proposés. / The corporate interest is the main reason behind the regulation of related party transactions. Its limits are defined by similar interests and the personal interest embodied in these transactions. The inter-action of these conflicting interests may harm the company. The existence of a conflict and of its justification may be presumed. The corporate interest is from now on that of the enterprise seen within its wide economic context and the interest of a group of companies is distinctively acknowledged. The qualification of those transactions helps identify those that are subject to scrutiny. The protection of the corporate interest is achieved by the prevention of the conflicts of interests through the disclosure of the personal interest. This disclosure triggers the concerned corporate bodies’ evaluation process. Legislative and jurisprudential guarantees ensure the predominance of the corporate interest through limitations on the exercise of certain rights and a strict judicial enforcement of legal duties laid on the interested party. The fraudulent transaction is void. The unauthorized one that is damaging to the company is voidable and its consequences are assumed by the interested party who may be exposed to civil and, sometimes, criminal liability. The comparison of the treatment of this subject in the Lebanese, French and American legal systems revealed the weaknesses in the first two; amendment proposals are made.

La ricerca prende avvio dalla ricostruzione dei processi socio-economici che hanno portato alla crisi del modo di produzione taylorista-fordista. Muovendo da tali riflessioni, si constata come le imprese “post-fordiste” si avvalgano in misura crescente di lavoratori autonomi, un tempo coordinati e continuativi e, oggi, a progetto (artt. 61 e ss., d.lgs. 276/2003). Tali collaboratori sono, dunque, soggetti ad un potere (contrattuale) di coordinamento del committente che, alle volte, si somma ad una condizione di dipendenza economica dal committente medesimo. Si crea, quindi, una differenziazione interna all'area dell'autonomia coordinata che non pare adeguatamente valorizzata dal legislatore ordinario, ma che sembra interessare i sindacati. Il dato reale vede, infatti, agire rappresentanze varie, sicché occorre circoscrivere l'ambito di applicabilità degli artt. 39 e 40 Cost. L'assenza di un genuino interesse collettivo e di un'effettiva attività di autotutela inducono a ritenere che i collaboratori “forti” e il relativo associazionismo possano beneficiare delle sole tutele poste dagli artt. 2, 18 e 41 Cost. A conclusione si affrontano le problematiche che la ricostruzione così svolta solleva, ovverosia come garantire l'effettività delle tutele riconosciute al sindacalismo dei collaboratori “deboli” e come contemperare l'associazionismo dei collaboratori “forti” con il diritto antitrust comunitario. / The search starts with the reconstruction of socio-economic processes. Moving from these reflections, it's possible to see that today's companies take advantage of increasingly self-employed coordinated and continuous and, after d.lgs. 276/2003 “lavoratori a progetto”. These employees are, therefore, subject to a power (contractual) coordination of the customer that, at times, it adds up to a state of economic dependence by the same. It then creates an internal differentiation into autonomy area that does not seem properly valued by the ordinary legislator, but that seems to involve trade unions. Given that in reality there are different representations, we move to circumscribe the scope of applicability of the Arts. 39 and 40 Const. The absence of a genuine interest and genuine self activities suggest that employees "strong" and its associations can only benefit from the protections posed by Arts. 2, 18 and 41 Const. At the end tackling the problems so that the reconstruction turn raises, namely how to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguards recognized unionism collaborators "weak" and reconcile the associations of employees "strong" with the antitrust law.