This paper argues that credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. In United States, the previous “reputational model” as well as the current proposals aimed at reducing reliance on rating agencies, enhancing competition and increasing transparency is not sufficient to improve the integrity of rating agencies. This paper suggests that imposing stricter liability on rating agencies is necessary. The proposal to eliminate the exemption of NRSROs under Section 11 of the Securities Act is necessary but not sufficient for holding rating agencies accountable. The first amendment defense always shields rating agencies from legal liability, while the absence of a common standard make it hard to impose liability for negligent ratings. Finally, this paper suggests that the courts should not award the rating agencies First Amendment protection and consider the distinguished characteristics of rating agencies, when examining the professional liability of the agencies.

This paper argues that credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. In United States, the previous “reputational model” as well as the current proposals aimed at reducing reliance on rating agencies, enhancing competition and increasing transparency is not sufficient to improve the integrity of rating agencies. This paper suggests that imposing stricter liability on rating agencies is necessary. The proposal to eliminate the exemption of NRSROs under Section 11 of the Securities Act is necessary but not sufficient for holding rating agencies accountable. The first amendment defense always shields rating agencies from legal liability, while the absence of a common standard make it hard to impose liability for negligent ratings. Finally, this paper suggests that the courts should not award the rating agencies First Amendment protection and consider the distinguished characteristics of rating agencies, when examining the professional liability of the agencies.

The aim of the thesisis an analysis of EU credit rating agencies legal regulation in comparison with regulation in the USA. This analysis outlines the crucial and less important aspects of regulation in EU and USA. One of Chapters of this study is also describing the reflection of EU credit rating agencies regulation to Czech law. The thesis is composed of five chapters. First of them explains basic context and position of credit rating agencies. Chapter two is focused on EU legislation. Chapter Three briefly describes the position of credit rating agencies in the Czech Republic. Chapter Four illustrates the credit rating agencies legal regulation in USA. The text is mainly focused on Two of the EU regulations and, regarding the US legislation, on the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, part of the Dodd - Frank Act and some of the more important rules conducted by Security Exchange Commission. The comparison of both legal systems is placed in Chapter Five and completed with commentary.

Credit rating agencies are controversial yet influential financial gatekeepers. Many have attributed the recent failures of credit rating agencies to conflicts of interest, such as the agencies’ issuer-pays business model and the agencies’ provision of ancillary services. This report identifies these conflicts; examines recently-finalized Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations proscribing these conflicts; and suggests other possible regulatory measures. The strategies available to regulators are diverse and differ widely in their political and administrative feasibility. These strategies include outright prohibition of conflicts; removing regulatory references to credit ratings; enhancing agency liability; organizational firewalls; performance disclosures; demonstrating due diligence and its results; increasing competition; staleness reforms; internal governance; administrative registration; and requiring alternative business models. While the report primarily focuses on how the most recent financial crisis—and the related market for asset-backed securities—highlighted conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies, this report also examines how credit ratings—and their limitations—affect sovereign debt markets. / text

<p>This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency’s (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors’ perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets.</p> / Dissertation

Background: The credit rating agencies have been heavily contested and criticized. In addition to this, other informational sources may potentially deliver the information that the CRA is intended to provide. This may have changed their role in reducing information asymmetry in the financial market. Purpose: This thesis will investigate (i) whether changes (upgrade/downgrade) in credit ratings lead to abnormal returns in share value, and thereby provide useful information to potential and current investors. The thesis will also (ii) examine whether there are significant differences between the periods before and after the GFC in 2008. Method: Regression based event study using a dummy-variable approach. Conclusions: No strong evidence that credit ratings have a significant effect on stock prices in the European stock market. Small indications that the market is responding more strongly to a rating change announcement during the period 2000-2008 compared to 2009-2019.

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We study the effect of conflicts of interest on credit ratings and analyze the rating maintenance of credit rating agencies for various clienteles. By examining the rating-transition path, we found that rating agencies favor their valued clients by stepwise downgrades and full and timely upgrades. Favored clients could, therefore, save capital cost and possibly gain a larger investor base for their new issues. However, such rating behavior would undermine the rating quality and reputation of rating agencies in the long term. Our results provide evidence for the meager literature on rating-agency conflicts from the rating-maintenance perspective. Our findings also lend support to the growing literature that rating agencies do not provide quality services to investors when the regulation is indulgent or the competition within the rating industry is severe.

Financial sector of an economy plays an important role in its economic development and prosperity of the country. Banking industry serves as the backbone of the financial sector that accumulates saving from surplus economic units in the form of deposits and provides it to deficit economic units in the form of advances. Banking industry provides support to economy and industries in specific in the time of recessions and economic crisis. But when banks are at the heart of economic recession or banks are the cause of financial crisis like the recent past financial crisis 2007-09, it makes the situation worst for economic recovery. So it is of great importance to keenly observe the performance of the banks and their compliance with the regulatory requirements.   Performance of the banks is measured at two levels, one is at the management and regulatory level of the banks and another is at external rating agencies. Purpose of regulatory and supervisory rating systems is to measure the bank performance at internal level and its compliance with regulatory requirements to keep the bank on right track. These ratings are highly confidential and are only available to the bank management.  External credit rating agencies examine and evaluate the banks and issue ratings for the general public and investors in particulars. It is of great importance that both these ratings present the same results about the condition of the banks to provide clear information to investors and management. In past several banks suffer from bankruptcy that was the failure of both internal rating systems and credit rating agencies.   CAMELS is the supervisory and regulatory rating system implemented by State Bank of Pakistan. It takes into account six important components of a bank when it evaluates performance of the bank. These components are Capital, Assets, Management, Earning, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. Ratings is assigned to theses components on the scale of 1 to 5 and that is a base for composite rating that also ranged from 1 to 5. PACRA rating agency is the dominant credit rating agency of Pakistan that performs ratings for most banks and industries in the country. In our research we examine the similarities in the results generated by CAMELS rating system and PACRA rating agency. For that purpose we sample seventeen commercial banks of Pakistan Banking industry.   We observed that results generated by sample banks do not show any similarities with each other. This might be an indication of the banks that went on to bankruptcy in past three to four years or a future threat to financial sector of Pakistan.

Credit granting is not only one core business but also the major profit source of banks. Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPL Ratio) is an important index to evaluate the quality of credit granting and to influence profitability of banks. Recently, NPL ratio, which soared to record level, of local banks does not only hurt their asset quality but also threaten their surviving space due to the changes of internal structure, overbanking, internationalization of local banking industry, economic recession, the subprime crisis in 2007. Theoretically, banks have their own credit granting policy and credit examination system; however, there is soaring NPL ratio to cause huge NPL losses in banks because of the differences of credit grating practices. Nevertheless, there are some local banks which have lower NPL ratio. Therefore, this research is to help us to understand the possible factors of overdue loan that happened in corporate banking, and try to discover the key factors. Also, try to sampling those key factors from the past experiences for future crediting reference. The main profit from a bank is the margin of deposit and credit loan interest. Therefore, the overdue loan is highly related to a bank¡¦s profit. Moreover, it is necessary for banks to pay more cost to make up the losses which are caused by the NPL. Certainly, it is safest way for banks to acquire 100% collaterals for creditors¡¦ right, although 100% collaterals could be acquired, the creditors cannot ignore the impacts (on the creditors¡¦ profitability) of the necessary litigation expenses for disposing the collaterals. As a result, fully recognize the customers¡¦ credit condition before drawing is the only way to avoid the NPL loss and ensure the profit.