Les législations concernant les marchés financiers régissent non seulement les marchés, mais également les acteurs, les produits ainsi que les activités dans les marchés. En utilisant ces outils juridiques indispensables, les législateurs des deux côtés de l'Atlantique visent, entre autres, à protéger les investisseurs dont la confiance est primordiale pour les marchés, d'une part, et à diminuer les risques systémiques dont le déclenchement pourrait survenir dans un contexte financier de plus en plus globalisé, d'autre part. En effet, après la crise financière globale de 2008, les risques systémiques ont attiré davantage l'attention législative. À partir desdits objectifs que les législateurs veulent atteindre, nous essayons de trouver et analyser les particularités des législations concernées, tant en France ou dans l'Union européenne qu'aux États-Unis, en passant par la comparaison des dispositions législatives ou des initiatives législatives à travers l'Atlantique, avec la considération de l'évolution législative respective. Nous apportons aussi nos réflexions sur les insuffisances ou les déficiences à l’égard de mesures ou d’efforts législatifs pris en compte par les législateurs transatlantiques en vue de réaliser ces objectifs. Face à une crise financière sans précédent à nos jours, et donc à l'exigence d'une réaction législative active, appropriée, opportune et raffinée, il nous semble qu’il est le temps pour les législateurs en France, dans l'Union et aux États-Unis d'approfondir leurs connaissances sur des produits financiers en innovation sans cesse, de mieux adapter leurs stratégies législatives aux développement des activités financières et des entités finiancières, et de renforcer leurs coopérations et coordinations en profondeur dans le domaine de réglementation et supervision financière, et enfin, de mieux réaliser leurs buts poursuivis. / The legislations concerning financial markets govern not only the markets, but also the participants, the products and the activities as well in the markets. By using these indispensable legal tools, the legislators of both sides of Atlantic aim at, among others, protecting the investors whose confidence is of top priority to the markets, on the one hand, and reducing the systemic risk which would occur in a more and more globalised financial context, on the other. Indeed, after the global financial crisis of 2008, systemic risk has drawn more legislative attention. From the abovementioned objectives which the legislators would like to achieve, we try to find and analyze the particularity of the legislation concerned, both in France or in the European Union and in the USA, by way of comparison of legislative dispositions or legislative initiatives across the Atlantic, with the consideration about their respective legislative evolution. We also give our reflections on the insufficiencies or the deficiencies with regard to the legislative measures or efforts taken by the transatlantic legislators to realize those objectives. Facing the actual and unprecedented financial crisis, and thus a requirement of dynamic, appropriate, timely and refined legislative reaction, it seems to us that it is the time for legislators in France, in the EU and in the USA to deepen their knowledge about financial products of non-stop innovation, to better adapt their legislative strategies to the development of financial activities and financial entities, to reinforce their cooperation and coordination in depth and in width in the field of financial regulation and supervision, and finally, to better fulfill their pursuing goals.

L’oggetto del presente lavoro è rappresentato dall'esame del rapporto tra l'attuale regolamentazione delle agenzie di rating e le regole di responsabilità civile cui le stesse agenzie possono essere assoggettate, anche alla luce del trattamento normativo riservato alle agenzie di rating dalla legislazione e dalla giurisprudenza statunitensi e delle teorie sviluppate dalla dottrina sul tema della responsabilità da informazione inesatta al mercato. L’attuale regolamentazione introdotta dall'Unione Europea svolge un ruolo determinante sia sotto il profilo dell'individuazione del fondamento della responsabilità, sia sotto quello della ricostruzione degli obblighi, della diligenza e della causalità materiale e giuridica. La disciplina comunitaria, anche alla luce della giurisprudenza statunitense, consente di prospettare uno scenario in cui i rater sono soggetti a regole di responsabilità differenziate in ragione del diverso status riconosciuto dalla normativa rilevante. La nuova regolamentazione comunitaria è chiamata a svolgere il duplice ruolo di fondare una sorta di private action da inadempimento in capo a qualunque investitore nei confronti di un’agenzia registrata e di contribuire a definire il perimetro degli obblighi esigibili da parte dell’agenzia, rafforzando la posizione del terzo investitore danneggiato dal rating inesatto e fornendo un efficace supporto agli strumenti di tutela di tipo pubblicistico. / The present work is focused on the examination of the relationship between the current regulation of credit rating agencies and the rules of civil liability to which agencies may be subject to, in light of the regulatory treatment of the U.S. credit rating agencies, both according legislation and case law, and the legal theories developed on the case of liability for incorrect information to the market. The regulation introduced by the European Union plays a major role to find out the basis of liability, the duties of diligence and the legal and material causality nexus. EU regulation, in light of U.S. case law, can envisage a scenario in which the raters are subject to different rules of liability on the basis of the different status recognized by the relevant legislation. The new EU regulation is called to play a dual role: to establish, although not explicitly, a sort of private action for negligence on the part of investors against a registered agency, and to help in defining the scope of the obligations of the credit rating agency, strengthening the position of the third investor damaged by inaccurate ratings and providing an useful support to the public enforcement remedies.

Genom styrning av finansiella medel har gröna obligationer fått en viktig roll i utvecklingen mot ett miljömässigt hållbart samhälle. Extern granskning av gröna obligationer styrs idag genom frivilliga marknadsstandarder, varav GBP är den vanligaste. Dessutom har EU nyligen presenterat en egen frivillig standard med särskild tillsyn. Bättre tillgång till klimatrelaterad information samt tydliga och gemensamma definitioner av gröna aktiviteter är förutsättningar för att investerare mer effektivt ska flytta kapital till miljömässigt hållbara verksamheter för att stötta omställningen till en mindre fossilbaserad ekonomi. I den här uppsatsen visas att dagens betygsättning, olika bedömningsmetoder till trots, torde vara relativt pålitlig, men att det finns utrymme att önska högre jämförbarhet och därmed ökad investerartillit. Tydligare marknadsstandarder kan vara en viktig aspekt för att öka betygens pålitlighet allt eftersom marknaden för gröna obligationer expanderar. Analysen visar att lagstiftning som leder till ökad mängd publicerad granskning genom gröna betyg torde gynna transparensen samtidigt som ryktesrisken vid intressekonflikter bör innebära motvillighet gentemot felaktig bedömning. Samtidigt kan överdriven reglering begränsa möjligheterna för innovation, utveckling och expansion av marknaden som helhet. Det torde därmed vara i lagstiftarens intresse att inte införa alltför sträng reglering, eftersom risk att inte kunna uppnå den finansiering av klimatmålen som önskas då uppstår. Eftersom gröna obligationer är ett internationellt fenomen behöver världens länder arbeta tillsammans mot gemensamma standarder i syfte att nå klimatmålen.  I det fall tvingande reglering ska införas bör den vara på som lägst EU-nivå. För marknadsbalans mellan aktörerna och jämförbarhet mellan obligationerna är det viktigt att regleringen inte upplevs otydlig. Regleringen måste dessutom vara generell och så pass flexibel att den kan möta teknologisk utveckling och förändrade förhållanden på marknaderna utan att processen blir för långdragen. Så länge målet är att ha en europeisk kapitalmarknad där aktörerna kan tillhandahålla finansiella tjänster nationsövergripande krävs finansiell tillsyn som inte stannar vid nationsgränserna. På sikt torde Esma vara lämpligast att överse samtliga granskare av gröna obligationer verksamma på den europeiska marknaden. För detta krävs utökad reglering som ger Esma ökad behörighet såväl som ökade resurser för att effektivt kunna utföra tillsynsarbetet. / Through the management of financial resources, green bonds have received an important role in the development towards an environmentally sustainable society. External review of green bonds is today subject to voluntary market standards, of which GBP is the most common. In addition, the EU has recently presented its own voluntary standard, which includes supervision. Better access to climate-related information and clear and harmonised definitions of green activities are prerequisites for investors to move capital more efficiently to environmentally sustainable businesses to support the transition to a less fossil-based economy. With this paper it is shown that the current rating, despite different assessment methods, should be relatively reliable, but that there is room to wish for higher comparability and thus increased investor confidence. Clearer market standards can be an important aspect in increasing the reliability of ratings as the market for green bonds expands. The analysis shows that legislation that leads to an increased number of published reviews through green ratings should promote transparency, while the risk of rumors in the event of conflicts of interest should imply reluctance to make incorrect assessments. At the same time, excessive regulation may limit the opportunities for innovation, development and expansion of the market as a whole. Thus, it should be in the interest of the legislator not to introduce a regulation which is too strict, as the risk of not being able to achieve the desired financing of the climate goals then arises. As green bonds are an international phenomenon, all countries need to work together towards common standards in order to achieve the purpose of the climate goals. In the event that mandatory regulation is to be introduced, it should at least be at EU level. For market balance between the market participants as well as comparability between the bonds, it is important that the regulation is not perceived as unclear. In addition, regulation must be general and flexible enough to meet technological developments and new market conditions without the process becoming too lengthy. As long as the goal is to have a European capital market where market participants can provide financial services nationwide, financial supervision that does not stop at national borders is required. In the long run, ESMA should be the most appropriate authority to oversee all examiners of green bonds operating in the European market. This requires increased regulation that gives ESMA increased authority, as well as increased resources in order to be able to carry out the supervisory work effectively.