In this paper I investigate if and how strengthening creditor rights enables firms to engage in more innovation activities, using the enactment of a new property law in China as a natural experiment. By using a newly constructed measure of land unavailability, I find that firms in cities where construction is more constrained by geography substitute short-term debt with long-term debt, hold less internal cash, invest more on intangible assets and eventually generate more patents after the enactment of the law. Moreover, this positive effect of the reform on innovation is more profound for firms that have more tangible assets, that are dependent on debt financing and that are more financially constrained. Those results highlight the importance of debt financing for innovation and shed light on the underlying mechanisms through which it takes effect. / <p>Lic.-avh. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2015</p>

In research, there has been conflicting theory and evidence about the relation between creditor rights and corporate leverage. On the one hand, the supply-side view states that stronger creditor rights lead to an increased supply of credit and hence, corporate leverage increases. On the other hand, the demand-side view shows that in response to better protected creditors, managers choose to follow low-risk strategies and reduce leverage. The goal of this thesis is to develop a better understanding of the relation between creditor rights and corporate leverage. This work contributes to this stream of literature by using a large sample including 508,376 firm-years from 46,481 unique firms located in 55 countries from 1980 to 2017. The results of this thesis show that demand-side forces dominate supply-side forces as stronger creditor rights lead to a reduction of corporate leverage. Moreover, a crises variable is added as a moderator to investigate how firms change their response to creditor rights during crises. However, the results for this interaction are insignificant and hence, firms do not seem to adopt their leverage levels in response to creditor rights during crises compared to normal times.

There exists an extensive literature related to creditor protection and its relation to the financial market, but few if any studies try to asses its net impact on the stability of the economy. In this paper we investigate the effects of creditor protection on the business cycle, and the economy during times of financial distress. More precisely we investigate how creditor protection is related to the recovery from financial crises, and how it affects growth volatility. We find support for our hypothesis that creditor protection is positively related to business cycle volatility and that this effect might work through a destabilising of the credit market.

This study examines how the relation of earnings and payout is influenced by country-level moderators of investor protection and creditor rights. By using an international sample with 42,148 firm-year observations in 3,658 firms during the years 2001-2017, I find that earningspayout relation is strong. Further, I present evidence that the earnings-payout relation is alleviated in weak investor protection and creditor right countries due to the negative influence of dividends. Although share repurchases positively impact the strong earnings-payout relation, the positive effect of share repurchases is weaker compared to the negative one of dividends. As a consequence, in weak investor protection and creditor right countries, the strong earnings-payout relation is alleviated when it is tested with the logit regression.

In this study I investigate the impact that operating in specific foreign countries has on the bank loan contracts of multinational companies. While previous research has shown that increased firm globalization leads to a lower cost of bank debt, I find that this relationship is attenuated when firms operate in countries with certain institutional attributes. Using income levels, creditor rights, and property rights as institutional indices, I test the association of country-level factors with the priced and non-priced components of bank loan contracts. I find that globalized firms operating in low income countries, countries with weak creditor rights, or countries with weak property rights do not receive the same positive debt contracting features as do firms operating in high income countries, countries with strong creditor rights, or countries with strong property rights. / Ph. D.

O crédito bancário é a principal fonte de financiamento de pessoas físicas e jurídicas no Brasil. Ainda assim, comparações internacionais apontam que o mercado de crédito no Brasil é pequeno em volume de empréstimos concedidos, limitado em número de instrumentos e caro nos preços praticados. O propósito desta tese é apreender as expectativas em relação ao direito supostas em documentos oficiais do Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) que sugeriram, entre 1999 e 2006, medidas para a reversão desse quadro. Para tanto, analisa os argumentos apresentados para a implementação de um conjunto específico de medidas de reforma jurídica dos sistemas de insolvência e de cobrança de dívidas, considerados cruciais para o desenvolvimento financeiro. Como resultado da análise, foi possível identificar um continuum discursivo entre as justificativas apresentadas pelos documentos oficiais do BCB para a adoção das medidas de reforma do mercado de crédito e o que se designou de perspectiva da dotação institucional. Segundo essa visão, a clara definição de direitos de propriedade e eficientes mecanismos para o cumprimento de contratos são precondições essenciais para o crescimento econômico. / Bank loans are the main source of financing for individuals and corporations in Brazil. Nevertheless, when compared to those of other countries, the credit market in Brazil is still small in the overall amount of loans, limited in the number of loan instruments and expensive for borrowers. The present dissertation aims at identifying the role assigned to Law by official Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) documents tackling this problem issued between 1999 and 2006. In order to do so, it analyses the arguments used to justify a set of specific measures intending to reform the legal framework for dealing with two key elements for the development of the credit market: default and forfeiture. It is argued that there is a discursive continuum between the arguments present in the official BCB documents aimed at the reform of the credit market and the tenets of what is called institutional endowment. According to these tenets, the clear definition of property rights and efficient means for contract enforcement are pre-conditions for economic development.

O crédito bancário é a principal fonte de financiamento de pessoas físicas e jurídicas no Brasil. Ainda assim, comparações internacionais apontam que o mercado de crédito no Brasil é pequeno em volume de empréstimos concedidos, limitado em número de instrumentos e caro nos preços praticados. O propósito desta tese é apreender as expectativas em relação ao direito supostas em documentos oficiais do Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) que sugeriram, entre 1999 e 2006, medidas para a reversão desse quadro. Para tanto, analisa os argumentos apresentados para a implementação de um conjunto específico de medidas de reforma jurídica dos sistemas de insolvência e de cobrança de dívidas, considerados cruciais para o desenvolvimento financeiro. Como resultado da análise, foi possível identificar um continuum discursivo entre as justificativas apresentadas pelos documentos oficiais do BCB para a adoção das medidas de reforma do mercado de crédito e o que se designou de perspectiva da dotação institucional. Segundo essa visão, a clara definição de direitos de propriedade e eficientes mecanismos para o cumprimento de contratos são precondições essenciais para o crescimento econômico. / Bank loans are the main source of financing for individuals and corporations in Brazil. Nevertheless, when compared to those of other countries, the credit market in Brazil is still small in the overall amount of loans, limited in the number of loan instruments and expensive for borrowers. The present dissertation aims at identifying the role assigned to Law by official Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) documents tackling this problem issued between 1999 and 2006. In order to do so, it analyses the arguments used to justify a set of specific measures intending to reform the legal framework for dealing with two key elements for the development of the credit market: default and forfeiture. It is argued that there is a discursive continuum between the arguments present in the official BCB documents aimed at the reform of the credit market and the tenets of what is called institutional endowment. According to these tenets, the clear definition of property rights and efficient means for contract enforcement are pre-conditions for economic development.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’analyser l’existence de spécificités dans l’utilisation par les banques de la politique de dividende comme moyen de résolution des conflits d’intérêts. Il s’agit également de s’interroger sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation visant à imposer aux firmes le versement de dividendes, dans une perspective d’amélioration de la qualité de la gouvernance. Le premier chapitre analyse l’influence de deux conflits majeurs, dirigeants vs actionnaires et actionnaires vs créanciers. Il montre que les banques prennent en compte les deux types de conflits, la résolution des conflits entre actionnaires et dirigeants revêtant toutefois une importance prédominante. Les banques utilisent les dividendes comme un substitut à de faibles degrés de protection des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers. Le second chapitre explore ces conflits d’intérêt plus avant en analysant l’impact de la concentration de l’actionnariat et du degré d’opacité des banques. Que l’actionnariat soit dispersé ou concentré, un plus fort degré d’opacité favorise les comportements d’expropriation par les insiders (dirigeants ou actionnaires majoritaire) et conduit à des dividendes plus faibles. Un environnement institutionnel plus protecteur des droits des actionnaires ou un régime de supervision strict permettent de limiter l’expropriation. Une réglementation limitant le versement de dividendes, telle que définit dans Bâle III, pourraient renforcer de tels phénomènes. Le dernier chapitre s’interroge sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation de la politique des dividendes et s’intéresse au cas de l’Indonésie caractérisée un faible taux de versement et un faible degré de protection des actionnaires. En cohérence avec la théorie du cycle de vie, une telle réglementation devrait tenir compte du stade de développement de la firme et contraindre uniquement les firmes ayant atteint un stade de maturité, une réglementation uniforme de la politique de dividende n’étant donc pas souhaitable. / This dissertation aims first to investigate whether banks, which have unique characteristics, use dividends to reduce the agency conflicts between their different stakeholders. Another objective is to investigate if the implementation of a regulation of dividend policy is necessary to oblige firms to pay dividends for good governance purposes. In Chapter 1, we examine if bank managers use dividends to reduce agency cost of equity (managers vs. shareholders) and agency cost of debt (shareholders vs. creditors). We show that bank managers use dividends as substitute to weak legal protection and strike a balance in their dividend policy with however a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt. Chapter 2 further explores if the degree of ownership concentration and the level of asymmetric information (opacity) faced by outsiders influence banks’ dividend payouts. In either concentrated or dispersed ownership structure insiders (managers or majority shareholders) pay lower dividends when the degree of opacity is high. In line with the entrenchment behavior for banks, insiders extract higher levels of private benefits when it might be more difficult to detect such opportunistic behavior. Higher level of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain such behavior. These findings have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel 3 with restrictions on dividend payouts that might reinforce this entrenchment behavior. In the Chapter 3, we investigate if the implementation of a regulation to oblige firms to pay dividends for better governance is desirable. We consider the case of Indonesia, where the regulator plans to implement a mandatory regulation on dividends in a context of declining dividend payments and weak shareholder rights. The findings recommend that firms should only be required to pay dividends when they reach a certain development stage, and action should only be taken against those firms which do not pay dividends, although they should be able to. Overall, dividend policies should not be regulated by one-policy-for-all regulation.

Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T16:46:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_final.pdf: 699787 bytes, checksum: 2c7f4669c8ae8ce09d6df21d2d9b8923 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Flávia, Para que possamos dar andamento ao seu trabalho é necessário fazer alguns ajustes. Vou encaminhar para seu e-mail e apos as modificações submete-lo novamente, qualquer duvida estamos a disposição. att, Pâmela Tonsa on 2017-02-06T16:55:35Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T16:56:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_final.pdf: 699787 bytes, checksum: 2c7f4669c8ae8ce09d6df21d2d9b8923 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Segue e-mail com as instruções. on 2017-02-06T17:13:20Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T21:56:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 V_Final_Dissertação.pdf: 663080 bytes, checksum: f0dd7f728566fbdf6508116ee4f3b840 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Bom dia Flávia, Para que possamos aprovar seu trabalho é necessário alguns ajustes conforme norma ABNT/APA. * Conforme a norma é necessário ter AGRADECIMENTO, RESUMO E ABSTRACT deve ser em letra maiúscula. Após os ajustes você deve submete-lo novamente para analise e aprovação. Qualquer duvida estamos a disposição, Pâmela Tonsa 3799-7852 on 2017-02-07T10:27:49Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-07T11:54:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação 7 fev.pdf: 663438 bytes, checksum: da318f2809429d14d0837b10759e9367 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-02-07T12:20:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação 7 fev.pdf: 663438 bytes, checksum: da318f2809429d14d0837b10759e9367 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-07T17:13:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação 7 fev.pdf: 663438 bytes, checksum: da318f2809429d14d0837b10759e9367 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-20 / A dissertação teve o objetivo de investigar de que forma os Mecanismos Externos de Governança (MEG) impactam a alavancagem da empresa, em uma amostra de 40 países, que engloba um total de 12.968 empresas. O diferencial do estudo está na distinção entre os MEG que afetam a proteção dos acionistas daqueles que afetam os direitos dos credores. Os resultados sugerem que as empresas se alavancam de maneira coerente ao previso pela Teoria da Pecking Order. Observou-se os MEG associados à proteção dos investidores, de fato, influenciam na escolha pela estrutura de capital da empresa. Empresas com alta proteção aos direitos dos acionistas foram, em média, menos alavancadas do que empresas com baixa proteção aos acionistas. Alta proteção dos credores possui impacto positivamente relacionado com a alavancagem, o que sugere que alta proteção aos credores diminuem o custo da dívida e fazem com que as empresas deem preferência a este tipo de financiamento externo. Os resultados se mostraram robustos diante de algumas variações no modelo. / This study aimed to investigate how the External Governance Mechanisms (EGM) impact the company’s leverage, in a sample of 40 countries, including a total of 12,968 companies. The differential of the research lies in the distinction between EGMs that affect the protection of shareholders from those that affect the creditors rights. The results suggest that firms leverage are consistent to what was predicted by the Pecking Order Theory. It was observed that EGMs associated with investor protection do in fact influence the choice of the firm’s capital structure. Companies with high protection of shareholder rights were, on average, less leveraged than companies with low shareholder protection. High creditors protection has a positive impact on leverage, which suggests that high creditors protection reduces the cost of debt and makes companies prefer this type of external financing. The results were robust considering some variations in the model.

La première rédaction enquête sur la politique de dividende récemment établie sur le marché boursier vietnamien et expérimente les périodes condensées de forte croissance et chute brutale avec une approche en deux étapes. Les résultats de la recherche montrent : (1) Les investisseurs sont d’avantage expropriés dans les entreprises dont la part de détention d’actions des initiés est plus élevée ; (2) Les investisseurs tendent à percevoir le versement de plus faibles dividendes comme un signal relatif à la rentabilité espérée dès lors que l’asymétrie d’information est réduite ; (3) Les investisseurs dans les entreprises contrôlées par l’Etat sont plus enclins à recevoir des dividendes que celles qui ne le sont pas. La seconde rédaction pose que le marché vietnamien des actions est un laboratoire prometteur pour enquêter sur le comportement des cours de marché le jour du Exdividende. Les résultats des recherches suggèrent que les investisseurs du marché boursiervietnamien sont indifférents à l’écart dans l’application de taxe sur les revenus des dividendes. Ils cherchent à capter des dividendes s’ils trouvent des opportunités de profit. Par conséquent, les investisseurs achètent des actions le jour du Cum-dividende et les vendent le Ex-dividende pour exploiter les opportunités de profit générées par le paiement de dividendes. La dernière rédaction examine les effets des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers sur la politique de dividende lorsqueles frais de représentation des actionnaires et des créances tendent à augmenter. Ses découvertes indiquent que les actionnaires et les créanciers sont plus souvent expropriés et l’augmentation des expropriations des créanciers (actionnaires) est plus élevée si les actionnaires (créanciers) sont fortement protégées par la réglementation. / The first essay investigates dividend policy in Vietnamese stock market which is newly established and experiences short booming and crashing periods with a two-step approach. The research findings show: (1) investors are expropriated more in firms with higher insider ownership; (2) Investors tend to receive smaller dividends paid as a signal of expected profitability when information asymmetry is lower; (3) investors in state-controlled firms are more likely to receive dividends than those in non-state-controlled firms. The second essay posits that Vietnamese stock market is a promising laboratory to investigate stock price behavior on ex-dividend day. The research results imply that investors in Vietnamese stock market is indifferent to the difference in tax treatment of capital gains to dividends, they try to capture dividends if they find profit opportunities. Therefore, investors buy stocks on the cum-dividend day and sell them on the exdividend to exploit profit opportunities created by dividend payment. The third essay examines the effects of shareholder rights and creditor rights on dividend policy when agency costs of shareholders and creditors tend to increase. Its findings indicate that are more expropriated and theincrease in the expropriation of creditors (shareholders) is higher if shareholders (creditors) are protected strongly by law.