At the crossroads of insolvency and securities law lies the question as to whether defrauded shareholders should rank equally with unsecured creditors in cases involving fraudulent or misleading behaviour. Important questions arise at this juncture concerning the efficiency, certainty, transparency and fairness of the treatment of such claims in insolvency situations. In Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1, the High Court chose not to apply a rule said to be germane to insolvency cases involving fraudulent or misleading conduct inducing share purchase known as the rule in Houldsworth??s Case. The ??rule?? said to have been developed in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 had up until the High Court??s decision been used to interpret legislative provisions concerning shareholder claims, resulting in problematic determinations in the context of modern developed markets. While it is submitted the High Court was justified in choosing not to apply the rule in Houldsworth??s Case and thus allowing shareholders to claim as unsecured creditors, the rule may still prove good law in certain cases. Indeed, the referral of the High Court??s decision to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee for review may result in legislative change which reverts to the traditional treatment of shareholders in such circumstances. Accordingly this dissertation engages in a doctrinal analysis of historical precedent on defrauded shareholder claims in the UK and Australia to demonstrate that the decision in Houldsworth and subsequent interpretation and application of the ??rule?? therein suffer from deep flaws, and have been productive of relative injustice. It is argued that it is necessary to put the current uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Houldsworth in Australia beyond doubt through legislative abrogation of the rule in Houldsworth??s Case. As the result of such abrogation would represent a significant policy shift in Australian corporate law, the merits and difficulties of the resulting position will be addressed by this dissertation. It will be argued that a policy of shareholder parity with unsecured creditors best meets the goals of insolvency and securities law regimes while contributing to the sustainability of a fair and efficient market, and investor participation in it.

At the crossroads of insolvency and securities law lies the question as to whether defrauded shareholders should rank equally with unsecured creditors in cases involving fraudulent or misleading behaviour. Important questions arise at this juncture concerning the efficiency, certainty, transparency and fairness of the treatment of such claims in insolvency situations. In Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1, the High Court chose not to apply a rule said to be germane to insolvency cases involving fraudulent or misleading conduct inducing share purchase known as the rule in Houldsworth??s Case. The ??rule?? said to have been developed in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 had up until the High Court??s decision been used to interpret legislative provisions concerning shareholder claims, resulting in problematic determinations in the context of modern developed markets. While it is submitted the High Court was justified in choosing not to apply the rule in Houldsworth??s Case and thus allowing shareholders to claim as unsecured creditors, the rule may still prove good law in certain cases. Indeed, the referral of the High Court??s decision to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee for review may result in legislative change which reverts to the traditional treatment of shareholders in such circumstances. Accordingly this dissertation engages in a doctrinal analysis of historical precedent on defrauded shareholder claims in the UK and Australia to demonstrate that the decision in Houldsworth and subsequent interpretation and application of the ??rule?? therein suffer from deep flaws, and have been productive of relative injustice. It is argued that it is necessary to put the current uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Houldsworth in Australia beyond doubt through legislative abrogation of the rule in Houldsworth??s Case. As the result of such abrogation would represent a significant policy shift in Australian corporate law, the merits and difficulties of the resulting position will be addressed by this dissertation. It will be argued that a policy of shareholder parity with unsecured creditors best meets the goals of insolvency and securities law regimes while contributing to the sustainability of a fair and efficient market, and investor participation in it.

This paper examines shareholder disapproval of CEO compensation as expressed through their advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay) as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Using a sample of 884 votes by S&P 500 firms in 2011 and 2012, I find that higher CEO salary, a weak link between pay and performance, and higher dilution from stock option grants are associated with lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, I find evidence that shareholders are sophisticated in their examination of CEO compensation by voting against excess compensation over what is deserved due to performance and other determining factors.

In this dissertation, I investigate whether corporate governance affects the negative association between investment and future excess returns. Shareholders are concerned with the effectiveness of the firm's governance regime as a tool to reduce agency costs. In the absence of strong control over firm assets, managers may choose to invest in value-decreasing projects. The probability that managers select value-decreasing projects is an increasing (decreasing) function in investment activity (governance regime). At the time of investment, the capital market prices expected returns to the investment activity conditioned on the governance regime in place. This study examines future risk-adjusted returns to investment activities conditioned on low and high governance regimes. If the market correctly prices the governance environment and the expected returns to expenditures at time t, there should be no future risk-adjusted returns to either governance or expenditure information. I find that for firms with low external monitoring, and separately, for firms with high shareholder rights, lower (higher) investment activity results in positive (negative) future risk-adjusted returns. Implementing a trading strategy which holds low investment firms and shorts high investment firms results in 7.1% and 5.6% annual risk-adjusted returns when conditioned on low institutional holdings and high shareholder right, respectively. This study also provides preliminary evidence that outside blockholder and activist ownership is effective in mitigating the negative association between investment activity and future excess returns through the shareholder rights mechanism. Finally, I provide evidence that the diversification discount associated with multi-segment firms is generally invariant to investment activity levels.

We compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. We provide evidence that the reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is not related to the insiders' cash-flow rights but it is significantly positively related to the insiders' voting rights and wedge between the insiders' voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that acquiring dual-class IPOs perform better in the long-run than acquiring single-class IPO firms, and the better performance is mainly due to acquisitions in innovative industries. The results suggest that insiders of dual-class IPOs try to retain control during subsequent M&A activities. The governance structure in such firms allows them to make investments in high risk projects that enhance shareholder value in the long-run. Next, we examine the acquisition performance of family and non-family firms in the S&P 500 universe. Using style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and controlling for firm and merger characteristics, we find that the post-merger performance of family firms is significantly better than that of non-family firms. In particular, the mean one-year style-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal return is around 18% higher for family acquirers than for non-family acquirers. Further, contrary to the argument that founding family members make value-destroying diversifying acquisitions to minimize the risk of their personal portfolio, we do not find that family firms lose value in diversifying acquisitions. This result is consistent with Stein's model (1997) showing that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the firm.

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles. / The delegation of power to corporate directors and officers (Insiders), an essential trait of modern firm management in the context of capitalism, presents desirable efficiency advantages. However, it also confers broad discretion to Insiders . This discretion, when unchecked, may lead to self‐interested opportunistic behaviour detrimental to the firm and to the outside shareholders (Outsiders) who supply finance to the firm but do not have management power. Conflicts between Insiders and Outsiders may emerge from either general governance decisions or from particular transactions (ie. takeovers). In extreme cases, these conflicts can lead to the bankruptcy of the firm or, in more typical cases, to the extraction of private benefits for Insiders, shareholder expropriation and value‐reducing actions for the firm. We take the perspective of an outside shareholder to explore corporate governance mechanisms available in the US and Canada. After reviewing in Part 1 the core theories underlying the study of power in the modern corporation (separation of ownership and control and agency conflicts), we focus in Part 2 on the (1) internal governance, (2) regulatory and (3) market mechanisms through which both Insiders and Outsiders draw power. We examine how Outsiders can harness these mechanisms to check Insiders, as well as to prevent and resolve various types of conflicts. In Part 3, we explore a corporate power equilibrium that helps to minimize Insider opportunism, while reserving sufficient Insider discretion for effective firm management. We make the case for strengthening protections for shareholders and provide an overview of potential legislative reform paths.

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles. / The delegation of power to corporate directors and officers (Insiders), an essential trait of modern firm management in the context of capitalism, presents desirable efficiency advantages. However, it also confers broad discretion to Insiders . This discretion, when unchecked, may lead to self‐interested opportunistic behaviour detrimental to the firm and to the outside shareholders (Outsiders) who supply finance to the firm but do not have management power. Conflicts between Insiders and Outsiders may emerge from either general governance decisions or from particular transactions (ie. takeovers). In extreme cases, these conflicts can lead to the bankruptcy of the firm or, in more typical cases, to the extraction of private benefits for Insiders, shareholder expropriation and value‐reducing actions for the firm. We take the perspective of an outside shareholder to explore corporate governance mechanisms available in the US and Canada. After reviewing in Part 1 the core theories underlying the study of power in the modern corporation (separation of ownership and control and agency conflicts), we focus in Part 2 on the (1) internal governance, (2) regulatory and (3) market mechanisms through which both Insiders and Outsiders draw power. We examine how Outsiders can harness these mechanisms to check Insiders, as well as to prevent and resolve various types of conflicts. In Part 3, we explore a corporate power equilibrium that helps to minimize Insider opportunism, while reserving sufficient Insider discretion for effective firm management. We make the case for strengthening protections for shareholders and provide an overview of potential legislative reform paths.

The theme of this diploma thesis is " Contracting autonomy in construction of types of shares and its limits". Its aim was to analyse the domestic legal regulation and to clarify the limits in the construction of types of shares. To achieve this aim, the author tried to interpret the limits of the key provisions of the Business Corporation Act with the support of professional literature and comparisons with foreign legal systems, especially with the United Kingdom. The aim of the thesis was fulfilled. The key provisions were analysed, and the limits were set. The author of the thesis concluded that the current legislation would merit an amendment to achieve legal certainty and to eliminate the non-compliance of the practical and theoretical level. At the time of elaboration of this work, it was submitted an amendment to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as a Parliamentary Press No. 207, which should solve most of the problems. The first chapter deals with the concept and definition of the share, in particular as a part of the share capital, as a set of shareholder rights and obligations of the shareholder and as a security. The second chapter reflects the historical genesis of the kinds of shares in the Czech Republic and deals with the different types of shares in the...

Submitted by Luiz Carlos Moura (lcarlos_moura@hotmail.com) on 2017-06-22T12:12:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Luiz Carlos Moura.pdf: 2925493 bytes, checksum: aa0b6504529bc4a71035f39aef7b6b02 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2017-07-12T16:46:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Luiz Carlos Moura.pdf: 2925493 bytes, checksum: aa0b6504529bc4a71035f39aef7b6b02 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-20T20:21:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Luiz Carlos Moura.pdf: 2925493 bytes, checksum: aa0b6504529bc4a71035f39aef7b6b02 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-10 / Research on corporate governance has made a substantial effort to determine its impact on the stock market, albeit little attention has been given to testing the value of distinct listing segments of transparency. Building on the asymmetric information and investor awareness literatures, we test the relative importance of each level of corporate governance in the Brazilian Stock Exchange and how they are perceived among shareholders. Using an event study methodology, we provide clear evidence that investors are willing to reward high levels of transparency, although it is not the smartest investment choice in the short-term as one might expect. Finally, our last analysis explores situations in which the relationship between transparency and the firms’ cumulative abnormal returns can be enhanced. For this purpose, we make use of the Altman Z-score (2000) and present clear reasons of whether and how this strong relationship can be moderated. The results are robust to alternative event windows, different time-periods in the comparison, alternative sets of control variables, and distinct measures of financial health.

La première rédaction enquête sur la politique de dividende récemment établie sur le marché boursier vietnamien et expérimente les périodes condensées de forte croissance et chute brutale avec une approche en deux étapes. Les résultats de la recherche montrent : (1) Les investisseurs sont d’avantage expropriés dans les entreprises dont la part de détention d’actions des initiés est plus élevée ; (2) Les investisseurs tendent à percevoir le versement de plus faibles dividendes comme un signal relatif à la rentabilité espérée dès lors que l’asymétrie d’information est réduite ; (3) Les investisseurs dans les entreprises contrôlées par l’Etat sont plus enclins à recevoir des dividendes que celles qui ne le sont pas. La seconde rédaction pose que le marché vietnamien des actions est un laboratoire prometteur pour enquêter sur le comportement des cours de marché le jour du Exdividende. Les résultats des recherches suggèrent que les investisseurs du marché boursiervietnamien sont indifférents à l’écart dans l’application de taxe sur les revenus des dividendes. Ils cherchent à capter des dividendes s’ils trouvent des opportunités de profit. Par conséquent, les investisseurs achètent des actions le jour du Cum-dividende et les vendent le Ex-dividende pour exploiter les opportunités de profit générées par le paiement de dividendes. La dernière rédaction examine les effets des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers sur la politique de dividende lorsqueles frais de représentation des actionnaires et des créances tendent à augmenter. Ses découvertes indiquent que les actionnaires et les créanciers sont plus souvent expropriés et l’augmentation des expropriations des créanciers (actionnaires) est plus élevée si les actionnaires (créanciers) sont fortement protégées par la réglementation. / The first essay investigates dividend policy in Vietnamese stock market which is newly established and experiences short booming and crashing periods with a two-step approach. The research findings show: (1) investors are expropriated more in firms with higher insider ownership; (2) Investors tend to receive smaller dividends paid as a signal of expected profitability when information asymmetry is lower; (3) investors in state-controlled firms are more likely to receive dividends than those in non-state-controlled firms. The second essay posits that Vietnamese stock market is a promising laboratory to investigate stock price behavior on ex-dividend day. The research results imply that investors in Vietnamese stock market is indifferent to the difference in tax treatment of capital gains to dividends, they try to capture dividends if they find profit opportunities. Therefore, investors buy stocks on the cum-dividend day and sell them on the exdividend to exploit profit opportunities created by dividend payment. The third essay examines the effects of shareholder rights and creditor rights on dividend policy when agency costs of shareholders and creditors tend to increase. Its findings indicate that are more expropriated and theincrease in the expropriation of creditors (shareholders) is higher if shareholders (creditors) are protected strongly by law.