Diss.--Hamburg--Universität, 1990.

Texte remanié de: Ph. D. thesis--Aberdeen--University, 1993. / Bibliogr. p. [348]-365. Index.

Th. Etat--Paris VIII (Saint-Denis), 1996? / Daté d'après la date de dépôt. Liste des ms. conservés (t.1) f. 123-158. Bibliogr. f. 194-202. Index alphabétique et chronologique.

Diss.--Fachbereich Philologie I--Mainz--Universität, 1977-78. / Bibliogr. p. 360-367.

Diss.--Philosophie--Evanston, Ill., 1997. / Contient des analyses d'articles parus dans les périodiques suivants : Revue de musique ancienne et moderne, Le Plain-chant, Revue de musique sacrée ancienne et moderne, le choeur, la Maîtrise. Bibliogr. p. 518-535.

Texte remanié de: Th. Ph. D.--Sociologie--Uppsala university. / Bibliogr. p. 178-202.

Proefschrift--Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1992. / Résumé en anglais et en italien.

This thesis offers a reconsideration of the contentious relationship between Michel Foucault and postcolonial thought through the decolonial turn, by interpreting critique as attitude. The discussion of continuity in Foucault’s work on subjectivity, between his genealogical and ethical periods, leads to an understanding of critical attitude as a mode of critique and self-critique that depends on genealogy as a method of historical inquiry. Meanwhile, the shift away from European modes of rationality described by the decolonial turn in philosophy, proposes an approach to social transformation and the dismantling of Eurocentrism through understanding critique as operative in terms of the decolonial attitude. A comparison of these two attitudes as modes of critique provides common ground for the recognition of their mutual compatibility as techniques for reinterpreting history that also work in the service of contending with coloniality.

Using the scholarship of Robert Cushman to navigate Plato’s dialogues, Chapter 1 of this thesis establishes their multifaceted model of philosophy as therapeia. Said model includes Plato’s practical diagnosis of the human condition, his many notions formulated as a cure, and this first chapter ends by briefly responding to some of Martha Nussbaum’ recent criticisms of "Platonism," within The Therapy of Desire, and expounding upon the dialogue Phaedrus as Plato's therapeutic treatment of eros. Chapter 2 looks to the works of Dieter Henrich and T.K Seung in order to explore their proposed links between the philosophies of Plato and Kant, carving out a space for a new connection of therapeia. Chapter 3 discusses The Critique of Pure Reason in light of Plato’s own therapeutic philosophy, analyzing Kant’s unique diagnosis of a further, intellectual aspect of the human condition, his basic means of treating it, and the ideal form of human activity toward which he intends to direct our abortive intellectual desires.

FundaÃÃo de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Cearà / Cette recherche se propose d‟analyser la pensÃe de Jacques Derrida et plus particuliÃrement ce que se cache dans la vraie idÃe de la deconstruction. J‟examine d‟avant tout deux possibilitÃs de lectures de la pensÃe de Derrida. La premiÃre lecture est la lecture critique de J.Habermas, qui soutient que la deconstruction derridienne doit Ãtre interprÃtÃe comme une thÃorie de la connaissance. Cette position me semble extremement erronÃe, puis que la pensÃe de Derrida ne repose pas sur un fond rationaliste traditionnel. Par opposition à la lecture habermasienne, je veux dÃvÃlopper une interpretation de la deconstruction derridienne sur une prisme essentiellement Ãthique. En ce sens, je dÃfend la thÃse que la pensÃe de Derrida ne peut pas Ãtre compris en profondeur sauf quand on la situe à la proximità de la philosophie pratique de Emannuel LÃvinas. L‟erreur de Habermas et de tous les autres intÃrpretes qui voient le discours derridienne comme une discours contradictoire rÃside en quâils prendrent la deconstruction en un sens strictement ÃpistÃmologique, au pas que je veux dÃmontrer que la vrai idÃe de la deconstruction se rapporte avec le champ de l‟Ãthique. / Este trabalho pretende analisar o pensamento de Jacques Derrida, em especial o lugar em que se situa sua idÃia de desconstruÃÃo. Nesse sentido, procuro abordar duas possibilidades de leituras do pensamento derridiano. A primeira leitura consiste na leitura crÃtica de Habermas, que sustenta que a desconstruÃÃo derridiana deve ser compreendida como uma teoria do conhecimento. Tal posiÃÃo me parece extremamente problemÃtica, tendo em vista que o pensamento de Derrida nÃo repousa sobre um fundo racionalista tradicional. Em contrapartida, eu pretendo desenvolver uma interpretacÃo da desconstruÃÃo derridiana sobre um prisma essencialmente Ãtico. Neste caso, defendo a tese que o pensamento de Derrida nÃo pode ser tomado em profundeza salvo quando situado prÃximo da filosofia prÃtica de Emannuel LÃvinas. O erro de Habermas e de todos outros intÃrpretes que enxergam o discurso derridiano como um discurso contraditÃrio reside em tomar a desconstruÃÃo sob uma Ãtica estritamente epistemolÃgica, ao passo que, a meu ver, a verdadeira idÃia da desconstruÃÃo se relaciona com questÃes do campo da Ãtica.