本文主要目的在於對《純粹理性批判》B版〈先驗演繹〉的結構有一定的理解，並希望藉由這個理解能康德的哲學有進一步的掌握。 德國學者Dieter Henrich於1969所發表論文〈康德先驗演繹的證明結構〉中，對於《純粹理性批判》B版〈先驗演繹〉的論證結構提異於過往的詮釋。他以「論證重構」（argumentative reconstruction）的方式重新地闡釋了B版〈先驗演繹〉造成廣泛的迴響。 本文將順著康德在《純粹理性批判》的理路尋找出他的問題意識。第一章將描述康德所處時代的知識論困境以及他為解決此一困境所做的「哥白尼式的革命」。「哥白尼式的革命」也使得康德走向「先驗哲學」之路。 第二章首先說明康德「先驗演繹」任務。為達成「範疇作為主觀思維形式具有客觀有效性」這個任務，康德在A版〈先驗演繹〉由經驗出發，透過對「三重綜合」的分析，得出先驗統覺。再由感性構想力與先驗統覺的結合，使得對象呈顯於意識之中作為實在的表象進而完成「先驗演繹」的任務。B版則由對「聯結」的分析中向上尋找出「先驗統覺」從而推導出範疇。最後知性透過「構想力」使經驗成為可能。知性如同時間空間言形式一般，是為經驗得以可能的必要條件，因而達到先驗演繹的目的。然而，A、B兩版的〈先驗演繹〉如此的差異正導致了兩者孰為先孰為後的優越性爭議，即A、B兩版在論證結構以及對於康德哲學基本立場相適應的問題。 在A、B兩版〈先驗演繹〉的爭論中，Dieter Henrich提出對於B版〈先驗演繹〉著名的「一個證明兩個步驟」見解。他認為先驗演繹作為一個單一的論證。在20節康德論證了範疇對於一切「具有統一性的直觀」的有效性；26節所證明的是：「所有人類的感性直觀皆具有統一性」。範疇的效力達到一切人類所擁有的經驗性直觀。結合這兩個步驟，先驗演繹的完整結論：「範疇對於一切感性經驗的對象皆具有效性」，才能被達成。 透過Dieter Henrich「一個證明兩個步驟」的詮釋顯現出康德哲學「綜合統一」的特性，知性與感性作為意識活動的不可化約作為必要條件，意識活動得以被說明。如此避免了A版中先驗演繹視為某種意識理論的語意分析，或是由自我意識分析地衍生出來的成素，而保持知性與感性各自的獨立並綜合地統一於自我意識的統一性中。 最後，筆者認為將B版〈先驗演繹〉視為一個分為兩部分的單一論證是一個良好的詮釋模型，並於文末再提出另一個學者Henry E. Allison作為此種詮釋模型的另一個展示。

Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura. / In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura. / In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Neste trabalho é apresentada e defendida a tese segundo a qual o projeto filosófico de Arthur Schopenhauer deve ser entendido como o estabelecimento de um sistema de filosofia transcendental, constituído de uma teoria da experiência coordenada a uma teoria geral das faculdades cognitivas e a um “primeiro princípio”, que apresentamos e discutimos. Assim compreendida, a filosofia de Schopenhauer guarda uma relação peculiar de continuidade com a filosofia transcendental de Kant: herda e reformula o projeto de Karl Leonhard Reinhold, articulado em resposta aos céticos Salomon Maimon e Gottlob Ernst Schulze, edificando um sistema de filosofia transcendental que contempla as ambições fundacionistas presentes no projeto de Reinhold, as críticas que esse projeto recebera e críticas endereçadas à própria teoria da experiência de Kant no contexto de recepção da Crítica da Razão Pura. / In this work is presented and defended the thesis according to which Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood as aiming at putting forward a system of transcendental philosophy. That system comprises a theory of experience coordinated to a general theory of cognitive faculties and to a “first principle” which we present and discuss. So understood, Schopenhauer’s philosophy exhibits a peculiar relationship of continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it inherits and reformulates Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s project as it was conceived in response to the skeptics Salomon Maimon and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, building a system of transcendental philosophy which encompasses the foundationalist ambitions of Reinhold’s project and the criticisms which that project had received, as much as some criticisms which was addressed at Kant’s theory of experience itself in the context of reception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.