The aim of this thesis is to address and problematize how an undemocratic event like the Capitol riot on January 6th, 2021 could occur in the United States, the nation that for so long has been perceived to be the world’s leading democracy. The thesis takes a point of departure in French philosopher Jaques Derrida’s theory of autoimmunity, which is a theory aiming to explain how democracies are at constant risk of developing autoimmune reactions within their institutions, causing them to undermine their own values and principles. Three theoretical areas were derived from the theory: Hospitality, Ipseity, and Democracy to come, and through an interpretive content analysis of the nine public committee hearings taking place after the riot, these areas could detect symptoms of democratic autoimmunity in the event. The findings of the research thus shed light on the autoimmune tendencies that exist within the very core of democracy, and that was brought to the forefront on January 6th, 2021. Further, the results point to the fact that because of these autoimmune tendencies, the democratic institutions in the United States are still - after this event - exposed to simultaneous threats and opportunities that can come to change the course of democracy in the nation.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation asks what it means to be faithful to the friend. From Aristotle onward friendship has often been taken as the foundation of political life, but as it is a private relation that excludes many fellow citizens, fidelity to the friend may conflict with the duties of citizenship and endanger the political realm. What is more, one can never be perfectly faithful to one’s friend, so is true friendship impossible? I argue that friendship, though always a risk, directs us toward a justice that is higher than the political. Moreover, friendship is a great good that is suited to our finitude. While our finitude renders perfect fidelity impossible, it is also the horizon within which alone friendship can take place. Friendship is possible for those who admit its impossibility, who love precisely that the other – whether the other person or a language – escapes them.Chapter 1 considers selected ancient and medieval examinations of friendship in order to clarify friendship’s unstable place in the borderlands of hostility and hospitality. Only the dispossession of the self opens it to alterity. Thus if friendship is possible, it is possible only between strangers, not citizens secure in their ipseity. To bind people into a community, it must also shatter open any community in which they believe themselves to be comfortably at home. Chapter 2 further explores, in light of Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics, the conflict between friendship and one’s obligation to others. Levinas posits a self who is absolutely responsible for every other according to an asymmetrical ethical relation; how then can one prefer the friend to others? I reply that friendship serves as a forceful reminder of the singularity of the other and of the inadequacy of the comparisons among people that politics must employ to determine whose interests will win out. Friendship is not, however, only a signpost that points to ethics: it is a good that needs no justification to be worthwhile. Chapter 3 proposes that friendship arises from our finitude. Drawing on Emmanuel Falque’s work, I maintain that finitude is a positive good that is suited to humans. Friends translate the world for each other – but what of the fact that translation is always unfaithful? It is impossible, as Jacques Derrida has emphasized, to maintain infinite fidelity to the friend, but this impossibility is constitutive of friendship. Stepping beyond this horizon would not lead to better friendships but would destroy the possibility of friendship by taking us outside the limits that constitute humanity, when it is as humans that we love each other in friendship. Chapter 4 further investigates the possibility of friendship by taking up the suggestion, raised in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, that friendship is an illusion because it pretends to offer knowledge of another even though such knowledge is impossible. I argue that a careful reading of the Search reveals that writing itself functions as an act of friendship: the narrator discovers that through writing his world can encounter the worlds of others. True friendship is a relation across absence. Finally, chapter 5 shows how the promise of fidelity to the friend constitutes the self: the promise creates the very world that the self is called to translate for the friend. I conclude that although one can never achieve perfect fidelity to the friend, this is no reason to despair of fidelity: the very infidelity of the self’s witness to the friend may still bear witness to the friend’s irreplaceability. Bearing witness to the friend is a task to be undertaken in fear and trembling but also in gratitude and joy, for friendship is a great good of our existence within finitude. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

In Eavan Boland’s Domestic Violence, it is through the conflation of the secret with the female body that secrets become the way to simultaneously expose, as well as mediate, one of Boland’s most often addressed themes: a split between the public image of Irish woman as mythic symbol and the private realities of the lives of actual women. This paper argues that these are poems that, even as they explore the relationship between the secret and the body, simultaneously begin to embody the secret themselves. In so doing, it is the poems themselves that ultimately become the secret possessors, revealing and concealing in equal measure as they open up a counter-narrative to the public myths of the Irish woman through their repossession of the body and of desire.

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<p>This dissertation interrogates the ways in which the ethical rhetoric following September 11th, 2001 (particularly that of the administration of U.S. President George Bush) and contemporary globalization (which Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have called "Empire") implicate one other, as well as the ways in which these interlinked discourses are currently shaping the post-9/11 global "ethical climate" and its universalized human subject. Drawing upon Jacques Derrida's concept of "hauntology" which he introduces in Specters of Marx (1994), the main argument of the thesis is that the dominant post-9/11 ethical rhetoric is a specter of Empire, such that it is both a symptom of and a particularly influential force-of-law shaping the "Spirit" of contemporary globalization/Empire. The thesis claims that in their shared universalism, neo-Hegelian remainders of idealism, and theocratic impulses to contain and ethicopolitically manage the entire world, globalization/Empire and its most serious recent symptoms-Bush's post-9/11 ethical rhetoric and the global war on terror--contain suicidal auto-deconstructive tendencies that threaten to destroy themselves from within in spite of their utopic visions of themselves. Finally, the dissertation investigates some of the key spectral remainders of "9/11" and contemporary ethical thought which contradict and/or corroborate the dominant post-9/11 discourse of Empire and its universalized ethico-political human subject.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Despite recent scholarship, critics have yet to offer a sustained, interdisciplinary interpretation of John Milton's engagement with millennial ideas that takes into equal account the historical context of seventeenth-century religious and political controversy, the ways in which the pending apocalypse transformed how people imagined and experienced time, and how we see evidence of this cultural shift in Milton's poetry. This dissertation opens new possibilities of understanding Milton's relation to apocalyptic belief in the Revolutionary and Restoration era through an investigation of how millennial thinking cut across a variety of discourses including theology, politics, and science. At its most basic level, my dissertation argues the seventeenth-century anticipation of the apocalypse fundamentally altered the way people imagined time; this new way of conceptualizing temporality changed early modern religious beliefs, conceptions of history, the scientific imagination, and practices of reading philosophy, politics, and literature. My project proposes that the poetry of Milton helps us better understand these extensive cultural transformations. I explore this new understanding of time that is both reflective of discursive changes in the seventeenth century as well as characteristic of Milton's aesthetics, by offering an understanding of Milton's relationship with millennial ideas and their constitutive temporal structure. I argue that, in response to the inevitable and immanent "end of time" suggested by seventeenth-century apocalyptic temporality, Milton's poetry creates an alternative temporality, opening up an experience of time that is not necessarily unidirectional, closed, and speeding towards its end. I suggest that this different experience of time can best be understood through the framework of a temporality explored by contemporary philosophers Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben--messianic time. Put in its most basic terms, messianic time is a way of thinking about temporality differently, of calling into question our narratives of how time and history function. The messianic invites us to interrogate the notions of closure, certainty, and inevitability that are implicit in our linear, apocalyptic notion of time. Milton's texts continually constitute the possibility of a messianic temporality that can be read as a response to changing conceptions of time in the seventeenth century, millennial anticipation, and the belief that the apocalypse was close at hand. Entering a recent critical conversation regarding Milton's engagement with millennial and apocalyptic thinking, I suggest that we can understand this involvement through the alternative temporality his poetry creates. Each chapter of this dissertation fuses a formalist close reading of the temporality and uncertainties opened up by generic revisions, literary allusions, and rhetorical devices in Milton's poetry with a reading of how ideologically-conflicting interpretations of millennial time are articulated in the text and are reflective of contemporary discourse. I demonstrate how messianic time functions in each text and I prove the importance of this experience as it relates to historical and ideological questions about the millennium. This dissertation contributes to an ongoing conversation regarding how political, religious, scientific, and aesthetic texts are interconnected, and explores the plurality of Milton's ideological positions as they emerge out of the ambivalence and tension in the language of his poetry. In my reading, Milton's texts articulate a way of being in the world--both structural (created through language) and historical (tied to seventeenth-century millennial thinking)--that suggests uncertainty is the condition of knowledge and truth. / English

This dissertation answers three questions relating to Jacques Derrida’s writings: why is Derrida concerned with human/animal difference? How should his deconstruction of this distinction be understood in the context of his broader philosophical project? Finally, do the answers to these questions complicate the belief that Derrida’s thought promotes a post-human ethics? Whereas Derrida’s sensitivity to the suffering of non-human creatures partially explains his interest in “the animal,” there are complex reasons for why he frequently returns to interrogate this theme–reasons that can only be understood by first clarifying core features of his philosophy. I maintain that what obsesses Derrida in virtually all of his writings is how a longstanding, “metaphysical” view of human consciousness proves deconstructable. Following Derrida, I term this view “living presence”–the belief that experience happens presently to beings who are present to themselves. In undermining this view, Derrida reimagines experience as what I term “survival,” where the very things traditionally thought to be foreign to human subjective life are required for experience to carry on happening. Importantly, the fact that philosophers repeatedly describe human consciousness in terms of presence is not simply an error. It is rather an effort to preserve the living present against the threat that everything opposed to presence plays in its very possibility. This explains why human/animal difference is so strenuously affirmed throughout the history of Western thought on Derrida’s view. Animals are not simply inferior kinds of beings compared to humans; there is rather thought to be an essential difference between the two. Whereas humans encounter themselves and their world presently, animal are utterly instinctual, reactional, and non-present to themselves. However, by deconstructing the human/animal distinction, Derrida reveals that those features traditionally associated with animals are necessary for any life, human or otherwise, to exist. For this reason, “the animal” is a “pharmakon”: it both sustains and upsets a long-held understanding of what we uniquely are. In my final analysis, I examine whether my reading of Derrida’s thought is compatible with a non-human ethics. I do so in two steps: first, I examine a prominent reading of Derrida’s thought that contends that it is. For a large number of thinkers in “animal studies,” Derrida’s thought is aligned with the philosophy Emmanuel Levinas in important respects: whereas Derrida rejects Levinas’ anthropocentrism, he retains the core of Levinas’ ethics. However, I argue that the conditions that Derrida believes make life possible undermine this reading of his work. In the end, I argue that if deconstruction is an ethics, it is so only because it promotes “life” understood in the sense developed in this dissertation. Yet we must be mindful of what deconstruction does not provide in the way of an ethics: on the one hand, any standard of ethical belief is deconstructible. On the other hand, deconstruction does not necessarily promote a more inclusive and compassionate future. Whereas it can do so, it might also inaugurate a future that is less inclusive and more savage. This is, I argue, precisely what cannot be known. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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Bien que la mouvance architecturale dénommée «déconstruction» ait fait l'objet de multiple traitement, les conditions formelles révélant comment divers projets hétérogènes se sont confrontés, doivent encore être éclaircies. Ce travail de recherche veut circonscrire le fonds commun à partir duquel récit, narration, histoire, archive, droit, et patrimoine, peuvent se nouer dans la forme construite, et s'y reposer en une configuration inédite. Les lignes de faille qui tendent les corps disciplinaires et qui participent, derrière des noms propres (Eisenman, Tschumi, Derrida), de divers projets conjoints et contradictoires, courent encore souterrainement au carrefour supposé entre quatre moments synchroniques, mais distincts : la conservation muséale, la théorie architecturale, le discours scientifique, et la philosophie. Or, dans la disputatio scolastique, la forme discursive admet justement la confrontation entre divers champs du savoir, et le dépassement des formes du pouvoir par la violence. La déconstruction se reconfigure alors dans l'appareil de la justice.