Las conjugadas nociones del Lugar y del Alcance pretenden promover aquí una forma inédita y potente de cuestionar la misma naturaleza de la (no) experiencia que nos proporcionan la pintura y el dibujo, apuntando para un (no) espacio y un (no) tiempo específicos de los (no) objetos pintados y/o dibujados, que no son en absoluto el espacio, el tiempo, y los objetos de nuestra experiencia perceptiva consciente de serdiciente tal como fue diseñada de un modo globalmente fenomenológico, por Kant o por Husserl por ejemplo.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T17:22:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo6700_1.pdf: 1257623 bytes, checksum: 23fe6a878ebb326c75bef27269a59c6f (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / A desconstrução irrompeu à tradição filosófica ocidental enquanto uma marca do filósofo Jacques Derrida. Em Força de lei: o fundamento místico da autoridade, o filósofo franco-argelino problematiza o direito e a justiça a partir da perspectiva desconstrutivista. Sua conclusão cabal: a desconstrução é a justiça. Nesta dissertação, busca-se explicar a concepção derridiana de justiça. Para tanto, é preciso definir introdutoriamente a desconstrução: trata-se de um acontecimento inscrito na estrutura teórica da metafísica ocidental. Ela se apresenta contra o pensamento dogmático, rompendo a cristalização estrutural do pensamento. Na tradição filosófica, a justiça é concebida em uma estrutura metafísica ordenadora. Categoricamente, há uma metonímia entre direito e justiça: esta é uma consequência ou fim daquele. Nesse sentido, Derrida produz uma análise do discurso jurídico. O direito possui uma linguagem calcada em performatividade. Sob a influência de John L. Austin, filósofo da linguagem inglês, Derrida assume os atos de fala, radicalizando a ação da força simbólica sobre o contexto institucional. O direito prescreve normas, toma decisões e autoriza instituições na medida em que enuncia atos performativos e performáticos. Logo, o discurso jurídico é agenciado por forças sobre forças construindo interpretações. Em suma, a justiça enquanto direito constitui-se sobre camadas discursivas, configurando-se por meio do jogo de forças imanentes. Apontar a justiça como o centro desse discurso é apenas encobrir essas tensões violentas que a controlam. A expressão tomada como título do livro, força de lei, cunhada no direito romano, exemplifica a justificação ideológica da justiça como direito, uma vez que consiste em uma força metafórica para a legitimação da violência fundadora do direito. Ao passo que se questione o fundamento último dessa razão jurídica, encontra-se a interdição da lei, ou seja, a lei está interditada ao conhecimento daquele que a busca. Assegura-se apenas a instituição. Destarte, lança-se a conjuntura mística da autoridade, pois o fundamento está guardado no silêncio dessa interdição. O ordenamento jurídico é forma vazia. Não é à toa que este aparato tenta dissimular uma aporia fundamental - o abismo entre a universalidade da lei e as singularidades da vida. Por isso, Derrida pinça a justiça da metonímia estruturante a fim de transformá-la em um indecidível, o conceito limite que promove um deslocamento estrutural através do evento temporal. Então, A justiça torna-se um acontecimento dentro da estrutura teórica e institucional do direito. É sua destruição para transformar a ordem; porvir excede a instituição jurídica e a cinde temporalmente. Ela desajusta o direito nos gonzos da historicidade. Portanto, a justiça verte-se como experiência do impossível, de outro modo, no tempo do outro. As singularidades múltiplas se emancipam em uma revolução da temporalidade. No contratempo da história, a justiça vem a ser a desconstrução

This study concerns a contemporary articulation of the age-old limit/possibility (truth/scepticism) contest in Western metaphysics. Traditional `either/or' logic advises that scepticism is a necessary consequence of the assailability of truth; hence the concerted effort in the history of philosophy to preserve the possibility of truth against any flicker of uncertainty. Here, it is argued that contemporary thinking sees the possibility of `absolute' truth lose its ground. However, a concomitant shift to a `logos of difference' averts the consequence of scepticism. Thus, the justification for this study could be articulated in terms of the imperative, if a cardinal moment in contemporary thought is to be sustained, to understand this shift in logos, work through its implications and learn to live with its effects. In this respect, an attempt is made throughout to situate and interpret Derrida's `deconstructive thinking' as exemplar. Derrida's thinking finds roots (not without signs of insurrection) in Kant's `Copernican revolution,' construed as the first shift towards the contemporary logos in question. Here, Kant refuted the postulate of an independent `world' by demonstrating that `reality' was the result of a cognitive order imposed on what `exists' by the rational subject. Knowledge, therefore, depended not on matching statements with pre-existing `things,' but on knowing the `rules' that determined how an object had to be if it was to be known at all. Kant maintained that certain, objective knowledge was possible, due to the completeness and universality of the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. Kant's `Copernican revolution' provided the opening for a second shift inaugurated by the so- called `linguistic turn.' Here, thinkers contested what Kant took for granted; namely that `constitutive interpretations' (cognitions/concepts) formed a `reality' independently of language. The basic premise underpinning the `linguistic turn,' therefore, is that language (signification) and `reality' are inseparable. Henceforth, the possibility of final, enduring `constitutive interpretations' whose `truth,' in principle, is discoverable, depends on whether or not the language which mediates human rationality can form a complete and universal system. This question resurrects the very limit/possibility debate (in the form of a structuralism/postmodernism stand-off) that Kant thought he had resolved in mediating between rationalist and empiricist extremes. In contemporary terms, philosophers who, bound by either/or logic, wish to avoid the sceptical trap of `anything goes' postmodernism, must assume that language (signification) can form a complete and universal system. However, in his deconstructive readings of Husserl, Saussure and `structuralism,' Derrida demonstrates the untenability of this assumption. At the same time, he shows that the sceptical `alternative' may be avoided by recognising the limitations of `either/or' logic. Again, Derrida's thinking may be traced to Kant's; this time to his analysis of the `first antinomy.' In accordance with Kant's analysis here of what is ultimately the logic of `complex systems' (Cilliers), Derrida offers a `logos of difference,' which skirts the strictures of structuralism while avoiding the trap of postmodern scepticism by accommodating both moments of limit and possibility in an indissoluble interplay.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / Autor no autoriza el acceso a texto completo de su documento. / La siguiente tesis tiene como objetivo general elucidar las principales posiciones semióticas propuestas por el filósofo franco-argelino Jacques Derrida en textos publicados durante los años sesentas, sobre la base de que aquellos desarrollos no han sido suficientemente explicitados o formalizados. En el cuerpo analítico central la tesis presenta dos capítulos dedicados a los principales ejes de recepción crítica a los cuales Derrida dedica especial atención: La fenomenología de Edmund Husserl y la semio-lingüística estructural de Ferdinand de Saussure. La hipótesis inicial de trabajo propone que –dentro de aquel corpus derridiano– el problema semiótico de la caracterización del signo y el “origen del sentido” no ocupa un lugar accesorio. ¿Qué es el signo, el sentido y la significación según Jacques Derrida? En principio “signo” será un “viejo nombre” que permite deconstruir la metafísica de la presencia, que sistemáticamente ha reprimido y secundarizado toda escritura y significación como recurso técnico, exterior y accidental al lenguaje y el “sentido”. Tal tradición logocéntrica habría definido la conciencia, la verdad y la fenomenalidad a través de un fonocentrismo que declara un maridaje natural entre voz y sentido, palabra y significado. Por lo tanto el concepto de “signo escrito” en general y el movimiento de “significación” han representado un peligro exterior que amenaza usurpar la integridad plena del sentido y la verdad. En dicha dirección Jacques Derrida propone, críticamente, una generalización radical de la noción de escritura, donde sería más bien una archi-escritura la que originariamente ha hecho posible toda diferencia y oposición binaria, toda verdad e idealidad, etcétera. Donde, además, el rendimiento de la recepción de la semiótica peirceana tendrá como resultado una re-configuración del concepto de signo como “huella” y de la significación como reenvío y remisión sígnica, fuera de toda arqueo-teleo-logía del sentido: proceso ininterrumpido de semiosis, sin origen ni fin. En última instancia, esta formalización de la problemática semiótico-semiológica nos permite reinterpretar la noción de “textualidad” que subyace en todos estos planteamientos mediante el análisis de su célebre y enigmática frase: «no hay fuera-de-texto». Sin embargo, ¿Cuáles son los alcances y límites críticos de aquellas posiciones, tanto para la propia disciplina semiótica, como para algunos planteamientos más tardíos –presuntamente más políticos– del filósofo?

Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss.

Notre question est la suivante : à partir du programme philosophique inauguré et élaboré par Derrida autour de la question du signe dans De la grammatoloqie (1967), est-il possible de déceler et de juger de la cohérence de sa démarche et par là de comprendre son «interprétation» innovatrice de la pensée de Heidegger dont l'un des aboutissements théoriques se trouve, selon nous, dans son livre intitulé Heidegger et la question (1987)? Le programme philosophique inaugural de De la grammatologie démontre que le concept derridien d'écriture excède le phonocentrisme de la tradition métaphysique occidentale et qu'il est le fondement sans cesse différé de l'expérience de la vérité. Tout cela se reproduit-il dans les lectures derridiennes de Heidegger ?

This study postulates the existence of a notion of transcendence in immanence in the thought of Jacques Derrida. The deconstruction of, amongst others, Husserlian phenomenology and Saussurean structuralism, affords Derrida the opportunity of presenting a thought of contamination, haunting and impurity, which is a thought of transcendence in immanence. The hypothesis of a notion of transcendence in immanence in Derrida’s thought is refined by specifying it as temporal transcendence in immanence. Accordingly, the intimation of transcendence in immanence does not amount to the ontological acceptance of a separate transcendent realm. On the contrary, what appears is a monism: the infinite finitude of temporality. In conversation with the notion of temporal transcendence in immanence intimated in Derrida’s thought, this study proposes a notion of theological transcendence in immanence. Theological transcendence in immanence is presented as an inflected interpretive performance of salient themes from the tradition of Christian theology prior to the advent of modernity. From this perspective, all being is referred to God and finite creation is deemed to be a contingent, non-necessary participation, at an unquantifiable analogical remove, in the life and being of God. The notions of space, time and meaning that emerge from such a premise are subsequently explored, and brought into conversation with the corresponding notions in Derrida’s work. The study concludes by asking whether the conversation between the notions of temporal and theological transcendence in immanence can in any way be furthered, or whether the two positions should rather be regarded as irreconcilable, that is, as lying separatively transcendent to each other. In response, it is suggested that the notion of transcendence in immanence implies the attempt to relate juxtaposed positions after the fashion of transcendence in immanence. The possibility of temporal transcendence in immanence inhabiting theological transcendence in immanence after the fashion of transcendence in immanence is firstly considered and rejected. Thereupon, the reverse option, namely that of theological transcendence in immanence making use of temporal transcendence in immanence, iii while at the same time transcending it, is considered and judged to be a suitable provisional outcome of the conversation with Derrida. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

This study postulates the existence of a notion of transcendence in immanence in the thought of Jacques Derrida. The deconstruction of, amongst others, Husserlian phenomenology and Saussurean structuralism, affords Derrida the opportunity of presenting a thought of contamination, haunting and impurity, which is a thought of transcendence in immanence. The hypothesis of a notion of transcendence in immanence in Derrida’s thought is refined by specifying it as temporal transcendence in immanence. Accordingly, the intimation of transcendence in immanence does not amount to the ontological acceptance of a separate transcendent realm. On the contrary, what appears is a monism: the infinite finitude of temporality. In conversation with the notion of temporal transcendence in immanence intimated in Derrida’s thought, this study proposes a notion of theological transcendence in immanence. Theological transcendence in immanence is presented as an inflected interpretive performance of salient themes from the tradition of Christian theology prior to the advent of modernity. From this perspective, all being is referred to God and finite creation is deemed to be a contingent, non-necessary participation, at an unquantifiable analogical remove, in the life and being of God. The notions of space, time and meaning that emerge from such a premise are subsequently explored, and brought into conversation with the corresponding notions in Derrida’s work. The study concludes by asking whether the conversation between the notions of temporal and theological transcendence in immanence can in any way be furthered, or whether the two positions should rather be regarded as irreconcilable, that is, as lying separatively transcendent to each other. In response, it is suggested that the notion of transcendence in immanence implies the attempt to relate juxtaposed positions after the fashion of transcendence in immanence. The possibility of temporal transcendence in immanence inhabiting theological transcendence in immanence after the fashion of transcendence in immanence is firstly considered and rejected. Thereupon, the reverse option, namely that of theological transcendence in immanence making use of temporal transcendence in immanence, iii while at the same time transcending it, is considered and judged to be a suitable provisional outcome of the conversation with Derrida. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

Zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss.

This project is a critique of the connection between lethal violence and justice within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Our critique focuses on three specific moments—moments that Derrida touches upon in Glas, but does not address in detail—namely, heroic vengeance, execution and warfare. By subjecting each of these moments to a close reading we will be calling into question the very possibility of an act of violence that can lay claim to being absolutely ‘necessary’ or ‘just’ either within its specific historical moment or from beyond it. The theoretical basis of the project closely parallels Jacques Derrida’s work on Hegel, in that it stems from a deconstruction of the connection between epistemology and ontology. This also has serious implications for the question of ethics. By tracing the play of différance through the semeiological structure of both theoretical and practical cognition Derrida’s work makes it possible to address the ethical implications of speculative dialectics from a non-dialectical angle. Figuratively speaking, the relationship between theoretical and practical cognition can be thought of as the relationship between reading and writing. As such, the title of the project is to be taken as a figurative reference to the connection between theoretical (i.e. reading) and practical (i.e. writing) cognition and by extension to the connection between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Addressed in this manner our project begins by tracing the silence (i.e. the ‘a’ of différance) that is, at one and the same time, a condition of the possibility and impossibility of meaning. This silence has serious ramifications for Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel’s system sets out to ground the law within the ‘positive’ infinity of the Concept [Begriff] and thus, close the circle of philosophy. This project will attempt to expose the ethical stakes—and the ultimate impossibility—of Hegel’s ‘positive’ infinity by taking up the thread of lethal violence in the Philosophy of Right.