No description available.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es el análisis del concepto de vida al interior de la filosofía de Wilhem Dilthey. Wilhem Dilthey (19833-1911) consecuente con las preocupaciones de su época asume como primera tarea filosófica la fundamentación de las ciencias del espíritu. En el desarollo de tal proyecto, la vida en tanto realidad histórica-social de la humanidad constituye el objeto de estudio de las ciencias del espíritu y al mismo tiempo el fondo originario desde donde surge toda posibilidad de comprensión de las mismas. "Das Leben aus ibm selber verstehen zu wollen" (Querer entender la vida por sí misma) representa la motivación primera y permanente en el desarollo intelectual diltheyano, transformando sus preocupaciones metodológicas iniciales en una auténtica filosofía histórica fundamentadora de las ciencias del espíritu. / Trabajo de investigación

No description available.

Ce mémoire défend l’hypothèse que le sens de la critique de la raison historique de Dilthey peut être déterminé à partir du projet critique de Kant, à la condition que ce projet ait le sens que lui donne l’interprétation de Deleuze. Le premier chapitre tire de l’interprétation deleuzienne de Kant trois idées qui trouvent leur équivalent dans la philosophie de Dilthey, à savoir (1) que l’objet de la critique de la raison historique est la réalité humaine vivante, (2) que sa méthode, l’autoréflexion, distingue en elle trois dimensions essentielles (l’agir, le savoir et le sentir) et (3) que, malgré l’universalité de ces dimensions, la réalité humaine vivante présente une irréductible variabilité. Les trois chapitres suivants reconstituent successivement l’autoréflexion diltheyenne de l’agir, du savoir et du sentir. / This thesis argues that the meaning of Dilthey’s critique of historical reason can be determined by relying on Kant’s critical project, provided that this project receives its own meaning from Deleuze’s interpretation. The first chapter draws from this interpretation three ideas which find their equivalent in Dilthey’s philosophy, namely (1) that the object of the critique of historical reason is living human reality, (2) that its method, called self-reflection, distinguishes in it three essential dimensions (action, thought, feeling), (3) that, despite the universality of these dimensions, the living human reality presents an irreducible variability. The next three chapters successively reconstitute Dilthey’s self-reflection of action, thought and feeling.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-02-16T12:32:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Eduardo Morimatsu Lourenço.pdf: 1140043 bytes, checksum: 1c1895e1c02c1633bff57596ef191363 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-16T12:32:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Eduardo Morimatsu Lourenço.pdf: 1140043 bytes, checksum: 1c1895e1c02c1633bff57596ef191363 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This currently work aims to reconstruct some aspects of the epistemological project of Wilhelm Dilthey in the period between the years 1883 -1894, a period which is still not broadly studied, especially within the Brazilian context. The mentioned period has as characteristic the following Dilthey's claim: a descriptive and analytical psychology would be the more adequate foundation of the epistemology. In this sense, we will seek always to highlight the critical dialogue undertaken by the author with the philosophical tradition. In fact, if we are successful in our proposal, it will remains clear that text and context illuminates each other reciprocally / O presente trabalho tem como principal objetivo reconstruir alguns aspectos do projeto epistemológico de Wilhelm Dilthey no período entre os anos de 1883 -1894, período este ainda relativamente pouco estudado, especialmente no contexto brasileiro. O período mencionado tem como marca distintiva a pretensão do autor em constituir uma psicologia descritiva e analítica como fundamento de sua epistemologia. Neste sentido, procuraremos sempre destacar o diálogo crítico empreendido pelo autor com a tradição filosófica. De fato, se formos bem sucedidos em nossa proposta, restará claro que texto e contexto acabam por se iluminar reciprocamente

Wong Kin Keung. / Thesis submitted in: December 2004. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 167-171). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abbreviations --- p.iv / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- Prelude: the Two Broadly Generalized Theses of Dilthey's Project --- p.9 / Chapter (a) --- Thesis I: Behind Life Thought Cannot Go --- p.11 / Chapter (b) --- Thesis II: To Understand Life in terms of itself --- p.19 / Chapter 2. --- Toward the Original Givenness of Life --- p.25 / Chapter (a) --- Erlebnis as the Nexus of Facts of Consciousness --- p.25 / Chapter (b) --- The Relational Dimension of life --- p.29 / Chapter i) --- the Psychic Structural Nexus of Erlebnis --- p.29 / Chapter ii) --- the Objective World with Respect to Life-concern --- p.32 / Chapter (c) --- The Temporal-dynamic Dimension of Life --- p.36 / Chapter i) --- the Purposive Efficacy and Immanent Teleology --- p.36 / Chapter ii) --- the Temporal Dynamism of Life-course --- p.38 / Chapter 3. --- Toward an Epistemic Hermeneutics --- p.41 / Chapter (a) --- Reflexive Awareness as a kind of Pre-reflective Living-awareness' --- p.41 / Chapter (b) --- Meaning as the Part-whole relation of Life-nexus --- p.45 / Chapter (c) --- The Method of Verstehen --- p.47 / Chapter i) --- from Elementary Forms of Understanding --- p.50 / Chapter ii) --- to Higher Forms of Understanding --- p.52 / Chapter 4. --- Heidegger's Appropriation of Dilthey's Philosophy in KNS 1919 and Early Lecture Courses --- p.61 / Chapter 5. --- The Neo-Kantian Challenges --- p.72 / Chapter 6. --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources in ´بthe Phenomenological Beginnings' --- p.79 / Chapter (a) --- The Phenomenological Beginnings' --- p.79 / Chapter i) --- Phenomenological disclosure of the sphere of lived experience --- p.79 / Chapter ii) --- The theoretical infringement upon lived experience --- p.87 / Chapter (b) --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources --- p.94 / Chapter i) --- the immanent teleology of life' in KNS --- p.94 / Chapter ii) --- life and world --- p.97 / Chapter iii) --- self and the existential moments of life --- p.101 / Chapter 7. --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources in ´بthe Hermeneutic Breakthrough' --- p.113 / Chapter (a) --- The Hermeneutic Breakthrough' --- p.113 / Chapter i) --- the genesis of the theoretical from the pre-theoretical domain of lived experience and the corresponding moments of cognizing --- p.113 / Chapter ii) --- in search of the hermeneutic intuition --- p.117 / Chapter (b) --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources --- p.121 / Chapter i) --- the structural unity of 'the knowing' and 'the known' --- p.132 / Chapter ii) --- expressive formation of concepts --- p.139 / Chapter iii) --- formal indication --- p.144 / Chapter 8. --- Conclusion --- p.152 / Bibliography --- p.167

Orientador: Edgar Salvadori De Decca / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / O exemplar da BCCL pertence à Coleção Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (BCCL-SBH) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-22T20:07:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carvalho_MarcusViniciusCorrea_M.pdf: 7437634 bytes, checksum: 2d767ab83a2de01a8841a05cca71ce22 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1997 / Mestrado

El objetivo del presente trabajo es el análisis del concepto de vida al interior de la filosofía de Wilhem Dilthey. Wilhem Dilthey (19833-1911) consecuente con las preocupaciones de su época asume como primera tarea filosófica la fundamentación de las ciencias del espíritu. En el desarollo de tal proyecto, la vida en tanto realidad histórica-social de la humanidad constituye el objeto de estudio de las ciencias del espíritu y al mismo tiempo el fondo originario desde donde surge toda posibilidad de comprensión de las mismas. "Das Leben aus ibm selber verstehen zu wollen" (Querer entender la vida por sí misma) representa la motivación primera y permanente en el desarollo intelectual diltheyano, transformando sus preocupaciones metodológicas iniciales en una auténtica filosofía histórica fundamentadora de las ciencias del espíritu.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3057.pdf: 898107 bytes, checksum: bdde5947b8d4d5f970cbb80feb88610b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-10 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / This work has the dialectics as its main theme and aims to present Max Weber s thought before the legacy of German idealism, i.e., by the particular way that Hegel (as much as Marxism) has defined dialectics in history. Dialectics will be investigated inside Max Weber s historical typologies as a product of history and reason together. We serve ourselves of two histories of philosophy, that of the Windelband and of Lukács, and from those two perspectives our object is approached by a philosophical as well as a historical and sociological perspective. Thus, we shall observe how the uses of Weber s types are immerged inside the same limits and philosophical legacy of Kant and Hegel. / Este trabalho tem por temática a dialética e tenciona apresentar o pensamento de Max Weber diante do legado do idealismo alemão, ou seja, pela maneira particular que Hegel (assim como o marxismo) definiu a dialética histórica. Assim, a dialética será investigada nas tipologias históricas de Max Weber como conseqüências da união entre razão e história. Para isso, servimo-nos de duas histórias da filosofia, a de Windelband e a de Lukács, e a partir dessas perspectivas nosso objeto será abordado de um ponto de vista filosófico, mas, que não deixa de ser também histórico e sociológico. Deste modo poderemos observar a maneira como os tipos de Weber estavam imersos dentro do legado filosófico de Kant e Hegel e de seus limites.

La thèse interroge le sens et la portée de l’historicité de l’existence à partir de l’œuvre de Dilthey et de sa lecture par Heidegger :qu’est-ce qu’être historique et quelles sont les conséquences d’une telle historicité pour la pensée philosophique ?L’approche diltheyenne d’une telle question repose sur une « psychologie concrète » qui en tentant de saisir la vie dans sa Faktizität s’engage sur la voie d’une anthropologie historique. L’interrogation psychologique et historique de Dilthey est radicalisée par Heidegger, qui reprend la question de l’historicité à partir de son enracinement dans l’« être » de l’existence, c’est-à-dire également à l’horizon d’une pensée renouvelée de la temporalité. Cette dernière conduit au seuil d’une conception de l’« événementialité » de la vie qui, tout en rompant avec Dilthey, permet de réviser les grands thèmes de ce dernier. Le travail de recherche se penche notamment sur le passage d’une herméneutique philosophique à une philosophie herméneutique intégrant l’historicité de l’existence jusque dans la dimension première du sens. Est également examiné le réinvestissement, par cette herméneutique repensée à l’aune d’un concept radicalisé d’historicité, de certains thèmes et concepts de l’herméneutique diltheyenne. La question de savoir comment la philosophie doit assumer sa propre historicité peut dès lors être reprise. Tandis que Dilthey répond à la mise en cause de la possibilité de la métaphysique par l’histoire à travers l’élaboration d’une doctrine de la vision du monde, Heidegger procède à une radicalisation transcendantale du concept d’histoire – cette dernière étant toutefois appelée à être renversée au bénéfice de l’événement.<p><p>The Dissertation investigates the historicity of existence, its meaning and impact, from Wilhelm Dilthey’s Works and Heidegger’s reading of it: What does being historical mean, and what are the consequences of this historicity on philosophical thought? Dilthey’s approach to this problem is based on a “concrete psychology” which, by developing the implications of the facticity of life, leads to an historical anthropology. Heidegger radicalizes this psychological and historical Diltheyan questioning by reconsidering the problem of historicity from the point of view of the “being” of existence, which also involves a renewed conception of temporality. The latter leads to the threshold of a conception of life as “eventiality” which means both a break with Dilthey and the possibility of taking over an improved version of Dilthey’s major issues. The research examines in particular the transition from a philosophical hermeneutics to a hermeneutic philosophy based on the acknowledgment of the radical historicity of life. Heidegger’s appropriation of Diltheyan themes and concepts in the context of this transition is analyzed in a detailed manner. Finally, the question is raised how philosophy has to deal with its historicity. Dilthey’s response to the historical undermining of the very possibility of metaphysics consists in the development of a doctrine of worldviews. Heidegger carries out a transcendental radicalization of the concept of history – the latter however being soon anew reversed for the benefit of the “event”.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished