Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1981.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1987.

Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Cover title.

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Also available in print.

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Also available in print.

La déjudiciarisation des litiges est un sujet actuel et fondamental pour les pouvoirs publics au regard de l’engorgement des juridictions françaises. Il s’agit d’une préoccupation que partage l’assureur en responsabilité civile médicale pour lequel faciliter le règlement amiable des conflits signifie diminuer ses coûts de gestion internes, avoir une meilleure maîtrise des sommes allouées au titre la réparation des dommages résultant de soins et valoriser son image d’expert de l’indemnisation auprès de ses assurés. Aujourd’hui, le monde de l’assurance du risque médical s’engage publiquement en faveur de la recherche d’une solution négociée des litiges. Il présente cette dernière comme étant un mode opératoire bénéficiant à toute la société et particulièrement aux patients (ou à leurs ayants-droit), lesquels peuvent obtenir une indemnisation plus rapidement que devant les juridictions et en limitant leurs frais. Pour mettre en œuvre cette démarche, l’assureur se dote de processus internes afin d’optimiser les chances de succès des réclamations présentées dans un cadre amiable. Il s’appuie également sur l’action des pouvoirs publics, lesquels ont, notamment, créé les commissions (régionales) de conciliation et d’indemnisation des accidents médicaux, affections iatrogènes et infections nosocomiales, qui permettent de faciliter les solutions négociées aux litiges. Pour autant, force est de constater qu’il existe des limites à cette entreprise. En effet, outre le fait que la victime demeure la principale décisionnaire du choix du mode opératoire de l’examen de sa demande, d’autres acteurs directs et indirects voire le professionnel de l’assurance du risque médical lui-même, peuvent être à l’origine de la judiciarisation du différend. En tout état de cause, le recours aux juges ne doit pas être entendu uniquement comme un échec de la solution négociée dans la mesure où la jurisprudence peut se révéler être un atout pour faciliter la déjudiciarisation des litiges ultérieurs. / Solving disputes outside of the judicial system is a contemporary and a fundamental challenge for public authorities given the current congested workload of Courts. Medical liability insurers obviously share that concern. Indeed, facilitating amicable settlements is a way to decrease internal administration costs, to have better control over the damages awarded, and to enhance their image as Experts in their field. Nowadays, medical risk insurance companies are publicly committed to negotiated solutions. According to them, the out of Court approach can benefit the entire society and particularly the patients (or their beneficiaries), who can reach compensation more quickly than they would in front of a court, while limiting their fees. In order to implement this procedure, the insurance companies provide themselves with new internal processes, to optimize the chances of finding amicable settlements for the claims they receive. The success of this strategy also relies on the action of public authorities, whose decision to create the C(R)CI (Commissions of conciliation and compensation for medical accidents, iatrogenic disorders and nosocomial infections), has eased access to negotiated solutions.Nevertheless, this approach cannot always lead to a successfull outcome. As a matter of fact, the victims remain the last to decide on the way they want the litigation to be settled. Some other direct or indirect actors, or even the medical liability insurer itself, can bring the action before the Court. Either way, recourse to a Judge does not have to be only seen as a failure, since it allows jurisdictions to give orientations that will help parties position themselves in the event of further cases.

Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM / Unrestricted

Geography has been a central element in shaping conflict through the ages, and is especially important in determining which states fight, why they fight, when they fight, and more importantly, where they fight. Despite this, conflict literature has primarily focused on human geography while largely ignoring the geospatial context of ‘where' conflict occurs, or crucially, doesn't occur. Territorial disputes are highly salient issues that quite often result in militarized disputes. Terrain has been key to mitigating conflict even in the face of major variance in state capability and power projection. In this study I investigate how terrain characteristics interact with power projection, opportunity, and willingness and the impact this has across territorial disputes. Exploring terrain's interaction with these concepts and its effect among different types of conflict furthers our understanding of the questions listed above.

Although island disputes have returned to the geopolitical theatre on a small scale, to date, virtually no previous research on territorial interstate island disputes and violent escalation exists. This paper argues that when an island is positioned in a strategic location, because of its unique attacking, defending, and trade capabilities this may induce a willingness towards- and eventual use of violence in the attempt to conquer or defend the territory. This paper attempts to answer: under what circumstances do island disputes escalate? by modelling the influence of strategic locations on violent island disputes. It draws observations from Altman (2020c) and a novel data frame (1920 – 2020) with additional cases and an alternative operationalization of strategic locations along important lines of communication. It finds that island disputes are more likely to occur without BRD than non-island disputes. Meanwhile, island disputes escalate violently more often than they do not. An island’s strategic location, notwithstanding a broad or narrow operationalization, does not have a statistically significant effect on a violent outcome of a dispute. Instead, the presence of military garrisons, ceteris paribus, resulted in the most statistically significant effect. Consequentially, the causal mechanisms were adapted to include military garrisons.

This study looked at the effects of the labor process on the occurrence to industrial disputes. In Marx's view, changes in the capitalist labor process result in an increase of industrial disputes. However, Dahrendorf envisioned that there is a decrease of industrial disputes, especially a decrease of intensity and violence of disputes in industrialized societies, in which rationality is a dominant value. Thus, the relative validity of the two major theoretical accounts was assessed. Samples were drawn from two developed countries, the United States and Japan, to add a cross-national comparative dimension to the assessment. The results suggest that neither theory consistently accounts for the relationship between labor process variables and levels of industrial disputes in both countries. However, Marx's view appears better fitted to the results for the United States. Dahrendorf's theory seems to be the least appropriate for both societies. / Master of Science / incomplete_metadata