The thesis examines the role that Australian graphic satirists play in the theatre of public life. The main focus of the thesis is on newspaper cartoonists but for the purposes of comparative analysis, there is a discussion of a representative selection of satiric texts across different media (essentially, television and radio) since the mid-1960s, and also an historical survey of the development of graphic satire from its origins during the Protestant Reformation in Europe. Apart from a small number of references, this study does not venture into the vast field of on-line satire, a topic more properly addressed in a separate scholarly investigation. Graphic satire in the medium of the newspaper is of particular interest because of its consistent production and wide circulation, its relative freedom from censorship and libel laws, and the ability of the cartoon image to condense and concentrate issues which would be too complex or defamatory in print or on television. Political cartooning as it is understood today emerged during the early nineteenth century, at about the same time as the modern newspaper and the profession of journalism, but graphic satire also has links with a venerable tradition of the artist as social critic and has historically been associated with movements for social justice and democracy. It is in the context of these latter associations that I consider political cartoonists as belonging to the sphere of the public intellectual. The discussion of cartoonists as public intellectuals is framed against a discourse of decline that has been circulating for more than a decade, acquiring an urgency in this country during the later years of the Howard administration. This declinist narrative covers a number of areas of cultural and political life and is not confined to the Australian context; as British writer Helen Small points out, it is “an increasingly transnational conversation” (02:1). Briefly outlined, there is a perception that the terms of public debate have narrowed; that citizens have become disengaged from the democratic process; that between the ‘celebrity intellectual’ and the tenured academic, the life of the mind is not what it used to be, and even political satire itself has been seen by some commentators as being in terminal decline. The different arguments about cultural and social decline can be placed under the more encompassing subject heading of an ongoing debate about democracy and in particular, whether it is functioning as well as it should. With the adoption of neo-liberalism as an overarching political ideology by most western governments in the early 1980s, anxieties about whether the principles of democracy were gradually being usurped or even eroded by the primacy of market values have gathered momentum during the past two decades. The volume of these concerns has been amplified in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, with the state’s increased emphasis on security and control of its citizens being interpreted as threats to some of the basic tenets of the democratic system, such as free speech and the rule of law. In contrast to the various narratives of decline, my thesis proposes that democracy is still very well served by the kind of vigorous and long-standing practice of dissent that the public intellectual represents, and more specifically, the embodiment of this tradition in contemporary newspaper cartoonists. By definition, graphic satire questions and challenges the status quo and at least since Hogarth in the eighteenth century, it has always been a public art-form. Hogarth’s personal involvement in many of the social issues and philanthropic schemes of his day (such as anti-gin legislation and state care for orphans) also exemplifies an important aspect of the extra-professional work of graphic satirists which further links them to the public intellectual. A commitment to social activism and making use of the different platforms available (for example, public speaking and donating work to charities) in order to support, publicise or promote issues of social justice began with Hogarth and continues with contemporary Australian cartoonists.

The present thesis investigates two theoretically novel processes of change in groups relevant to agents for change. Specifically, it examines the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on group members’ evaluation of ingroup change-agents. Group opinion change is operationalized as the group adopting the position advocated by a change-agent, and reintegration is operationalized as the group responding more positively towards a change-agent. These formulations of change processes within groups extend past theorizing in opinion deviance research (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1951; Marques & Paez, 1994) by a) examining how contextual differences that result from changes in the group may affect group members’ reactions to opinion deviates, and b) considering contingencies that result in acceptance or rejection of change-agents and their messages. In addition, this thesis investigates the psychological processes that may mediate and moderate the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on appraisals of change-agents. Specifically, it considers attributed motives of change-agents (i.e., perceived constructiveness; Hornsey, 2005), and target prototypicality (e.g., Hogg, 1993; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) as two possible mediators of these novel effects. Finally, group members’ identification with the group is examined as a moderator of these processes. Chapter 3 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of group opinion change on the evaluation of change-agents. Experiment 1 (N=100) was a scenario-based study that had a change-agent express a non-conformist view of giving water to an outgroup state at a time when the ingroup state was experiencing a water crisis. Experiment 2 (N=103) was a scenario-based study that looked at a change-agent who expressed pro-immigration views to the ingroup country at an earlier time when popular attitudes toward immigration were poor. In both experiments the deviants were marginalized initially because they endorsed non-conformist opinions. Depending on the condition, group opinions either shifted toward the positions advocated by the deviants or remained unchanged. Results showed group members’ target evaluations shifted as a function of group opinion change. Target evaluations became less favourable in Experiment 1, and more favourable in Experiment 2. There also was evidence that increased perceived constructiveness mediated more favourable target evaluations in Experiment 2. Chapter 4 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of reintegration and group members’ identification on the evaluation of change-agents. Both Experiments 3 (N=103) and 4 (N=94) involved a scenario where there was a severe drought in the ingroup state. In Experiment 3, a deviant politician argued for more investment on water infrastructure 10 years earlier when water shortage was not a critical problem. Thus, the politician expressed a minority opinion. In Experiment 4, a deviant water commissioner expressed a controversial opinion to give water to an outgroup state at the height of the drought. Both deviants were marginalized/excluded initially by the group. Reintegration was manipulated by showing that popular support for the deviant had increased (Experiment 3) or the deviant was reinstated (Experiment 4), or the group did not increase support for the deviant at all (not reintegrated). Results showed that high identifiers evaluated the deviant less positively, and perceived the deviant as more destructive after he or she was reintegrated than when marginalization continued. Further, perceived destructiveness mediated the effects of reintegration and identification on trait evaluations. Experiment 4 also showed that high identifiers were less willing to support change after the deviant was reintegrated, than when marginalization continued. Finally, Chapter 5 tested the interactive effects of group opinion change and reintegration on evaluation of change-agents. I also assessed group members’ responses to change-agents in light of the group’s resistance to change even though the change-agents were right and the groups were wrong. Experiment 5 was a scenario-based study in a minimal-groups situation that had a deviant arguing for a more equitable research funding than the existing distribution. Experiment 6 was a scenario-based study on the disagreement between Galileo Galilei and the Catholic Church on planetary motion. Again, the deviants initially were marginalized by the groups. For opinion change, the groups either adopted or rejected the deviants’ opinions. For reintegration, the groups either treated the deviants more favourably or continued to reject them. Results showed that either opinion change or reintegration was sufficient to defuse negativity towards the deviants. More importantly, group members continued mistreating the deviants when the groups rejected opinion change and reintegration. That is, negativity towards the deviants was highest when opinion was unchanged, and marginalization continued. Overall, this thesis shows that group members’ evaluations of deviant agents for change can shift as a function of group opinion change and reintegration. Group opinion change and/or reintegration defuse negativity toward change-agents in the absence of psychological threat (i.e., perceived destructiveness). However, if threat is present, opinion change or reintegration may ironically elicit more group members’ negativity towards these targets. This thesis also contributes to the literature by showing how change promotes or inhibits group members’ endorsement of change-agents.

The present thesis investigates two theoretically novel processes of change in groups relevant to agents for change. Specifically, it examines the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on group members’ evaluation of ingroup change-agents. Group opinion change is operationalized as the group adopting the position advocated by a change-agent, and reintegration is operationalized as the group responding more positively towards a change-agent. These formulations of change processes within groups extend past theorizing in opinion deviance research (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1951; Marques & Paez, 1994) by a) examining how contextual differences that result from changes in the group may affect group members’ reactions to opinion deviates, and b) considering contingencies that result in acceptance or rejection of change-agents and their messages. In addition, this thesis investigates the psychological processes that may mediate and moderate the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on appraisals of change-agents. Specifically, it considers attributed motives of change-agents (i.e., perceived constructiveness; Hornsey, 2005), and target prototypicality (e.g., Hogg, 1993; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) as two possible mediators of these novel effects. Finally, group members’ identification with the group is examined as a moderator of these processes. Chapter 3 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of group opinion change on the evaluation of change-agents. Experiment 1 (N=100) was a scenario-based study that had a change-agent express a non-conformist view of giving water to an outgroup state at a time when the ingroup state was experiencing a water crisis. Experiment 2 (N=103) was a scenario-based study that looked at a change-agent who expressed pro-immigration views to the ingroup country at an earlier time when popular attitudes toward immigration were poor. In both experiments the deviants were marginalized initially because they endorsed non-conformist opinions. Depending on the condition, group opinions either shifted toward the positions advocated by the deviants or remained unchanged. Results showed group members’ target evaluations shifted as a function of group opinion change. Target evaluations became less favourable in Experiment 1, and more favourable in Experiment 2. There also was evidence that increased perceived constructiveness mediated more favourable target evaluations in Experiment 2. Chapter 4 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of reintegration and group members’ identification on the evaluation of change-agents. Both Experiments 3 (N=103) and 4 (N=94) involved a scenario where there was a severe drought in the ingroup state. In Experiment 3, a deviant politician argued for more investment on water infrastructure 10 years earlier when water shortage was not a critical problem. Thus, the politician expressed a minority opinion. In Experiment 4, a deviant water commissioner expressed a controversial opinion to give water to an outgroup state at the height of the drought. Both deviants were marginalized/excluded initially by the group. Reintegration was manipulated by showing that popular support for the deviant had increased (Experiment 3) or the deviant was reinstated (Experiment 4), or the group did not increase support for the deviant at all (not reintegrated). Results showed that high identifiers evaluated the deviant less positively, and perceived the deviant as more destructive after he or she was reintegrated than when marginalization continued. Further, perceived destructiveness mediated the effects of reintegration and identification on trait evaluations. Experiment 4 also showed that high identifiers were less willing to support change after the deviant was reintegrated, than when marginalization continued. Finally, Chapter 5 tested the interactive effects of group opinion change and reintegration on evaluation of change-agents. I also assessed group members’ responses to change-agents in light of the group’s resistance to change even though the change-agents were right and the groups were wrong. Experiment 5 was a scenario-based study in a minimal-groups situation that had a deviant arguing for a more equitable research funding than the existing distribution. Experiment 6 was a scenario-based study on the disagreement between Galileo Galilei and the Catholic Church on planetary motion. Again, the deviants initially were marginalized by the groups. For opinion change, the groups either adopted or rejected the deviants’ opinions. For reintegration, the groups either treated the deviants more favourably or continued to reject them. Results showed that either opinion change or reintegration was sufficient to defuse negativity towards the deviants. More importantly, group members continued mistreating the deviants when the groups rejected opinion change and reintegration. That is, negativity towards the deviants was highest when opinion was unchanged, and marginalization continued. Overall, this thesis shows that group members’ evaluations of deviant agents for change can shift as a function of group opinion change and reintegration. Group opinion change and/or reintegration defuse negativity toward change-agents in the absence of psychological threat (i.e., perceived destructiveness). However, if threat is present, opinion change or reintegration may ironically elicit more group members’ negativity towards these targets. This thesis also contributes to the literature by showing how change promotes or inhibits group members’ endorsement of change-agents.

The thesis examines the role that Australian graphic satirists play in the theatre of public life. The main focus of the thesis is on newspaper cartoonists but for the purposes of comparative analysis, there is a discussion of a representative selection of satiric texts across different media (essentially, television and radio) since the mid-1960s, and also an historical survey of the development of graphic satire from its origins during the Protestant Reformation in Europe. Apart from a small number of references, this study does not venture into the vast field of on-line satire, a topic more properly addressed in a separate scholarly investigation. Graphic satire in the medium of the newspaper is of particular interest because of its consistent production and wide circulation, its relative freedom from censorship and libel laws, and the ability of the cartoon image to condense and concentrate issues which would be too complex or defamatory in print or on television. Political cartooning as it is understood today emerged during the early nineteenth century, at about the same time as the modern newspaper and the profession of journalism, but graphic satire also has links with a venerable tradition of the artist as social critic and has historically been associated with movements for social justice and democracy. It is in the context of these latter associations that I consider political cartoonists as belonging to the sphere of the public intellectual. The discussion of cartoonists as public intellectuals is framed against a discourse of decline that has been circulating for more than a decade, acquiring an urgency in this country during the later years of the Howard administration. This declinist narrative covers a number of areas of cultural and political life and is not confined to the Australian context; as British writer Helen Small points out, it is “an increasingly transnational conversation” (02:1). Briefly outlined, there is a perception that the terms of public debate have narrowed; that citizens have become disengaged from the democratic process; that between the ‘celebrity intellectual’ and the tenured academic, the life of the mind is not what it used to be, and even political satire itself has been seen by some commentators as being in terminal decline. The different arguments about cultural and social decline can be placed under the more encompassing subject heading of an ongoing debate about democracy and in particular, whether it is functioning as well as it should. With the adoption of neo-liberalism as an overarching political ideology by most western governments in the early 1980s, anxieties about whether the principles of democracy were gradually being usurped or even eroded by the primacy of market values have gathered momentum during the past two decades. The volume of these concerns has been amplified in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, with the state’s increased emphasis on security and control of its citizens being interpreted as threats to some of the basic tenets of the democratic system, such as free speech and the rule of law. In contrast to the various narratives of decline, my thesis proposes that democracy is still very well served by the kind of vigorous and long-standing practice of dissent that the public intellectual represents, and more specifically, the embodiment of this tradition in contemporary newspaper cartoonists. By definition, graphic satire questions and challenges the status quo and at least since Hogarth in the eighteenth century, it has always been a public art-form. Hogarth’s personal involvement in many of the social issues and philanthropic schemes of his day (such as anti-gin legislation and state care for orphans) also exemplifies an important aspect of the extra-professional work of graphic satirists which further links them to the public intellectual. A commitment to social activism and making use of the different platforms available (for example, public speaking and donating work to charities) in order to support, publicise or promote issues of social justice began with Hogarth and continues with contemporary Australian cartoonists.

The present thesis investigates two theoretically novel processes of change in groups relevant to agents for change. Specifically, it examines the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on group members’ evaluation of ingroup change-agents. Group opinion change is operationalized as the group adopting the position advocated by a change-agent, and reintegration is operationalized as the group responding more positively towards a change-agent. These formulations of change processes within groups extend past theorizing in opinion deviance research (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1951; Marques & Paez, 1994) by a) examining how contextual differences that result from changes in the group may affect group members’ reactions to opinion deviates, and b) considering contingencies that result in acceptance or rejection of change-agents and their messages. In addition, this thesis investigates the psychological processes that may mediate and moderate the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on appraisals of change-agents. Specifically, it considers attributed motives of change-agents (i.e., perceived constructiveness; Hornsey, 2005), and target prototypicality (e.g., Hogg, 1993; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) as two possible mediators of these novel effects. Finally, group members’ identification with the group is examined as a moderator of these processes. Chapter 3 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of group opinion change on the evaluation of change-agents. Experiment 1 (N=100) was a scenario-based study that had a change-agent express a non-conformist view of giving water to an outgroup state at a time when the ingroup state was experiencing a water crisis. Experiment 2 (N=103) was a scenario-based study that looked at a change-agent who expressed pro-immigration views to the ingroup country at an earlier time when popular attitudes toward immigration were poor. In both experiments the deviants were marginalized initially because they endorsed non-conformist opinions. Depending on the condition, group opinions either shifted toward the positions advocated by the deviants or remained unchanged. Results showed group members’ target evaluations shifted as a function of group opinion change. Target evaluations became less favourable in Experiment 1, and more favourable in Experiment 2. There also was evidence that increased perceived constructiveness mediated more favourable target evaluations in Experiment 2. Chapter 4 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of reintegration and group members’ identification on the evaluation of change-agents. Both Experiments 3 (N=103) and 4 (N=94) involved a scenario where there was a severe drought in the ingroup state. In Experiment 3, a deviant politician argued for more investment on water infrastructure 10 years earlier when water shortage was not a critical problem. Thus, the politician expressed a minority opinion. In Experiment 4, a deviant water commissioner expressed a controversial opinion to give water to an outgroup state at the height of the drought. Both deviants were marginalized/excluded initially by the group. Reintegration was manipulated by showing that popular support for the deviant had increased (Experiment 3) or the deviant was reinstated (Experiment 4), or the group did not increase support for the deviant at all (not reintegrated). Results showed that high identifiers evaluated the deviant less positively, and perceived the deviant as more destructive after he or she was reintegrated than when marginalization continued. Further, perceived destructiveness mediated the effects of reintegration and identification on trait evaluations. Experiment 4 also showed that high identifiers were less willing to support change after the deviant was reintegrated, than when marginalization continued. Finally, Chapter 5 tested the interactive effects of group opinion change and reintegration on evaluation of change-agents. I also assessed group members’ responses to change-agents in light of the group’s resistance to change even though the change-agents were right and the groups were wrong. Experiment 5 was a scenario-based study in a minimal-groups situation that had a deviant arguing for a more equitable research funding than the existing distribution. Experiment 6 was a scenario-based study on the disagreement between Galileo Galilei and the Catholic Church on planetary motion. Again, the deviants initially were marginalized by the groups. For opinion change, the groups either adopted or rejected the deviants’ opinions. For reintegration, the groups either treated the deviants more favourably or continued to reject them. Results showed that either opinion change or reintegration was sufficient to defuse negativity towards the deviants. More importantly, group members continued mistreating the deviants when the groups rejected opinion change and reintegration. That is, negativity towards the deviants was highest when opinion was unchanged, and marginalization continued. Overall, this thesis shows that group members’ evaluations of deviant agents for change can shift as a function of group opinion change and reintegration. Group opinion change and/or reintegration defuse negativity toward change-agents in the absence of psychological threat (i.e., perceived destructiveness). However, if threat is present, opinion change or reintegration may ironically elicit more group members’ negativity towards these targets. This thesis also contributes to the literature by showing how change promotes or inhibits group members’ endorsement of change-agents.

Trata-se de um ensaio teórico que propõe a aproximação entre a psicologia e a Filosofia do Absurdo de Albert Camus. Como condição de possibilidade para essa aproximação, são problematizadas as noções de ética e política, além da materialização dessas duas na noção proposta aqui de dissidenz, isto é, a dissidência propriamente absurda. É apresentada a possibilidade de recolocar como especificidade dessa psicologia não mais suas técnicas, referenciais, conteúdos ou métodos, mas, em lugar disso, priorizar a própria dimensão ética como meio e fim dessa psicologia. Ao invés da pretensão de buscar fundamentos no estreito âmbito da ciência ou mesmo na amplidão da filosofia, sugere-se como possibilidade para essa atuação o ocupar-se com a condução de si diante da condição humana perspectivada desde o absurdo. Para tanto, são propostos fundamentos e pressupostos éticos, políticos, ontológicos e epistemológicos derivados da Filosofia do Absurdo. Essa psicologia – intitulada neste trabalho de Psicologia Absurda – tem seu estatuto deslocado, passando agora a se afirmar como uma práxis filosófica que enseja o cuidado de si e dos outros mediado não mais por regras ou inclinações a priori, mas tão somente pelo poder ser derivado do movimento poético do próprio viver, este potencializado pela absurdidade constitutiva do ethos absurdo desenvolvido aqui. / This is a theoretical essay that proposes the approximation between psychology and philosophy of the Absurd of Albert Camus. As a possible condition for this approach are problematize the notions of ethics and politics, beyond the materialization of these two on the notion proposed here dissidenz, ie properly absurd dissent. It presented the possibility of replacing as specificity of psychology no longer their techniques, references, content or methods, but instead prioritize the very ethical dimension as a means and end of that psychology. Instead of pretense of seeking foundations in the narrow realm of science or even philosophy of spaciousness, it is suggested as a possibility for that role the mind with the driving itself on the human condition envisaged from the absurd. To this end, they propose fundamentals and ethical assumptions, political, ontological and epistemological derivatives Absurd Philosophy. This psychology – titled this work Absurda Psychology – have their displaced status, and will now be stated as a philosophical practice which entails care of themselves and others mediated not by rules or priori inclinations, but only by the power be derived the poetic movement's own life, this powered by the constituent absurdity nonsense ethos developed here.

Trata-se de um ensaio teórico que propõe a aproximação entre a psicologia e a Filosofia do Absurdo de Albert Camus. Como condição de possibilidade para essa aproximação, são problematizadas as noções de ética e política, além da materialização dessas duas na noção proposta aqui de dissidenz, isto é, a dissidência propriamente absurda. É apresentada a possibilidade de recolocar como especificidade dessa psicologia não mais suas técnicas, referenciais, conteúdos ou métodos, mas, em lugar disso, priorizar a própria dimensão ética como meio e fim dessa psicologia. Ao invés da pretensão de buscar fundamentos no estreito âmbito da ciência ou mesmo na amplidão da filosofia, sugere-se como possibilidade para essa atuação o ocupar-se com a condução de si diante da condição humana perspectivada desde o absurdo. Para tanto, são propostos fundamentos e pressupostos éticos, políticos, ontológicos e epistemológicos derivados da Filosofia do Absurdo. Essa psicologia – intitulada neste trabalho de Psicologia Absurda – tem seu estatuto deslocado, passando agora a se afirmar como uma práxis filosófica que enseja o cuidado de si e dos outros mediado não mais por regras ou inclinações a priori, mas tão somente pelo poder ser derivado do movimento poético do próprio viver, este potencializado pela absurdidade constitutiva do ethos absurdo desenvolvido aqui. / This is a theoretical essay that proposes the approximation between psychology and philosophy of the Absurd of Albert Camus. As a possible condition for this approach are problematize the notions of ethics and politics, beyond the materialization of these two on the notion proposed here dissidenz, ie properly absurd dissent. It presented the possibility of replacing as specificity of psychology no longer their techniques, references, content or methods, but instead prioritize the very ethical dimension as a means and end of that psychology. Instead of pretense of seeking foundations in the narrow realm of science or even philosophy of spaciousness, it is suggested as a possibility for that role the mind with the driving itself on the human condition envisaged from the absurd. To this end, they propose fundamentals and ethical assumptions, political, ontological and epistemological derivatives Absurd Philosophy. This psychology – titled this work Absurda Psychology – have their displaced status, and will now be stated as a philosophical practice which entails care of themselves and others mediated not by rules or priori inclinations, but only by the power be derived the poetic movement's own life, this powered by the constituent absurdity nonsense ethos developed here.

Ideology and Material Reality. The Problem of Imagination”. Are there no more options of freedom than those determined not only by the real conditions under which each one of us live, but by the scheme of functions which force us sometimes to make/feel and sometimes only let us make/feel according to a certain number of action and passion possibilities? With this question in mind, we test the hegemony and antagonisms model (Laclau and Mouffe), more with the aim of problematizing” the theoretical alternatives whose treatment of freedom and of the role of people and groups does not emerge from transcendental considerations on the subject and her connatural rights; than with the aim of finding an answer for the determinations proposal. In this paper we propose a problematic approach to the issue of knowing whether we can or cannot give ourselves a political organization which gathers the effects of the State’s repression devices, which ignores the obscure conception of ideology as a false interpretation or as a reality deforming illusion and which does not base its considerations on the concept of subject on the already far too well known postulates of freedom, rationality, legitimate adscription to the law, dialogue and consent. Our hypothesis is that in so far as every agreement entails the at least partial stabilization of differences without implying the dissolution of antagonisms, the possibility for the complex and incomplete articulation of the involved agents arises. Consensus is therefore arrived at without exclusion. Consensus is the undecidable issue of keeping open the political link for the questioning of agents according to their demands, needs, perspectives, interests, etc. Finally, we claim that any political project with aspirations to change has a possibility in the violence of imagination. / ¿No hay más opciones de libertad que las determinadas ya no solo por las condiciones reales en las que cada uno de nosotros vive, sino por el esquema de funciones que nos obligan en ocasiones a hacer/sentir y en otras tan solo nos dejan hacer/sentir de acuerdo con cierto número de posibilidades de acción y pasión? Con esa pregunta en frente probamos el modelo de la hegemonía y los antagonismos (Laclau y Mouffe) pensando, más que en una respuesta al planteamiento de las determinaciones, en problematizar” las alternativas teóricas cuyo tratamiento de la libertad y del papel de las personas y los grupos no provenga de consideraciones trascendentales acerca del sujeto y sus derechos connaturales. Proponemos una aproximación problemática a la cuestión de saber si podemos o no darnos una organización política que conjure los efectos de los aparatos de represión de Estado, que haga caso omiso a la oscura concepción de la ideología como falsa interpretación o ilusión deformante de la realidad y que no base sus consideraciones en la concepción del sujeto en los ya muy manoseados postulados de la libertad, la racionalidad, la adscripción legítima a la autoridad, el diálogo, el consenso. La hipótesis es que en la medida en que cualquier acuerdo supone la estabilización parcial de las diferencias sin la disolución de los antagonismos, se abre la posibilidad de la articulación compleja e incompleta de los agentes en pugna. El consenso se plantea, en consecuencia, sin exclusión. El consenso, si se permite decirlo nuevamente, es el indecidible asunto de mantener abierto el vínculo político a la interpelación de los agentes según sus exigencias, urgencias, perspectivas, intereses, etc. Al final sostenemos que cualquier proyecto político que tenga aspiraciones de cambio tiene posibilidad en la violencia de la imaginación.

(in English): The topic of the present thesis is the image of Castro's Cuba in the work of dissident writers. The theoretical part is dedicated to the historical and political circumstances of Cuba in the second half of the 20th century, it briefly outlines the origins and evolution of the Cuban dissent and, most importantly, it pays attention to the literary dissent. The main part of the present thesis concentrates on to the dissident Generation Mariel and its main characterics, and especially on life and literary work of his most important member, Reinaldo Arenas. The theoretical background serves as the basis for the practical part of the thesis, in which the image of Castro's government in the work of Reinaldo Arenas, Before night falls and The color of summer: or The New Garden of Earthly Delights, is examined.

This study examined the impact of dissent and workplace freedom of speech on employees’ well-being (subjective, psychological and workplace well-being). Data for the study were collected through an online survey distributed to employees of various organizations. The findings revealed that upward dissent was positively related to subjective well-being (consisting of life satisfaction, positive affect and negative affect), psychological well-being, workplace well-being, and workplace freedom of speech. Lateral dissent was positively related to negative affect, workplace well-being and negatively related to life satisfaction and positive affect. However, there was no relationship between lateral dissent and psychological well-being. Workplace freedom of speech was positively related to psychological well-being and workplace well-being. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.