No description available.

Over the past decade, a third wave of autocratisation has stormed the world, hitting democracies and autocracies alike. The ongoing democratic backsliding is attributed to a range of factors. From “executive aggrandisement” and strategic manipulation of elections to "autocratic lawfare”. Such autocratic tendencies are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa. If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa, then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. However, the literature on one-party dominance and democratic consolidation in Africa are a bit old, hence do not address the current debates on democratic backsliding in the continent. Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems because they have witnessed rapid erosion of democratic qualities over the decade. But what effects do these patterns of democratic backsliding have on the quality of democracy in dominant party systems in Africa? Employing a comparative research design (MSSD) and using historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory as well as relying on secondary data in Botswana and Tanzania (Mainly Afrobarometer surveys, V-Dem Index, CPI Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and Freedom Index), this study explores this question within the framework of peace and development research. It analysed four variables: management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. Findings suggest that a dominant party structure in Botswana and Tanzania creates conditions that erode the quality of democracy, hence democratic backsliding. Therefore, the thesis argues that autocratisation in Botswana and Tanzania suggests reproduction of one-party dominance at the expense of consolidation of substantive democracy. This way, a dominant party structure in Africa appears to be a peace and development research problem because it creates strong incentives for dominant parties to autocratise rather than democratise when challenged by a strong political opposition.

Despite promising prospects to transition towards a democracy after attaining its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe somehow fell into authoritarian rule and became increasingly undemocratic compared to other countries in southern Africa. Therefore, this thesis seeks to understand why a “most likely” case of democratization in the region failed and instead slipped into authoritarianism between 1980 and 2000. The single case study investigates a set of elite level dynamics, using components of process tracing and case study techniques. The analysis is built upon a theoretical framework focusing on dimensions of power dynamics in terms of Bratton’s power capture, power division and power sharing along with Svolik’s politics of authoritarian rule and the dominant party system. The research indicates that the political party Zanu-Pf, under the leadership of Mugabe, has dominated the political arena since the first democratic elections of 1980. With the help of the party’s majority, the ruling elites captured, divided, shared and controlled power; to serve authoritarian ends that ensured regime survival at the expense of democracy.

This thesis explores the manner in which political-economic forces born of democratisation have shaped media developments in Zambia, affected the welfare of journalists and the viability of the state owned press epitomised by the Times Newspapers. The aim is to inform the privatisation policy discourse. Using a political economy analysis, the thesis unveils the historical intimacy between nationalist administrations and multinational business elites and how these forces - often working in collusion - influenced patterns of media ownership, inhibited labour rights and controlled communicative activity – indicative of how the state and markets can constrain freedom of expression and association, despite democratisation. The thesis contends that the uncertainty of neo-patrimonial conditions that characterised the post colonial era has not dissipated to a great extent and continues to undermine media and institutional reform in today’s liberally inclined Zambia. Pervasive clientelism has also compromised popular perceptions of state media systems, subverting competitiveness and the propagandist function of the Times Newspapers in the liberalised market, a point empirically illustrated through the analysis of market and public opinion data. / Communication Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Communication)

This thesis examines the impact of one party dominant systems on liberal democracy in developing countries. It is insufficient to argue that one party dominant systems – systems where one party dominates over a prolonged period - need not be further scrutinised because they occur within democracies. Instead it is contended that the term ‘democracy’ is but one public virtue in a political system and thus needs to be prefixed for it to have meaning beyond a method of government selection. The importance of this is highlighted when looking at two major trends in the understanding of democracy. The first is democracy as rule by the people -a non-authoritarian democracy- where governmental control is limited, and agents of voice and accountability are protected. Voice and accountability refers to citizens being able to exercise power over the process of decision-making and not merely power to select decision-makers. The second type of democracy is rule for the people -an authoritarian democracy- where governmental control extends over all spheres of society, and the operating space for agents of voice and accountability is constrained. Since unchecked centralisation is the anti-thesis of a non-authoritarian democracy, the observed tendency of dominant parties to use their predominant position to further consolidate their control is a concern. The apprehension is, as power is centralised so the operating space of agents of voice and accountability (including political and civil society) is constrained. Despite differences in the type of one party dominant system, whether they be hegemonic (Mexico) or dominant (South Africa) the ruling dominant/ hegemonic party uses similar methods of consolidating dominance – they essentially centralise power through the establishment of (1) economic, (2) political, and sometimes (3) ideological monopolies. These monopolies are established using internal and external methods of control (centralising of political power; party controlled process of political leadership selection; institutional arrangements and electoral amendments, which favour the ruling party; patronage and corporatism), which in turn effectively close down or limit the operating space of civil and political society, especially in developing countries which do not have histories of liberal-constitutionalism, and have vast socio-economic inequalities making them especially susceptible to the manipulation of ruling elites. Although one party dominant systems may initially have a uniting, stabilising effect, if continued they tend to lead towards either the entrenchment of authoritarianism or the establishment of authoritarianism, since dominance is achieved at the expense of competition, and independent and alternative voices. Uncompetitive democracies result in unresponsive governments. Pursuing a liberal democracy, while simultaneously monopolising power is to indulge in serious programmatic contradictions. Eventually something has to give and it is usually liberal democracy. Voice and accountability inevitably become inhibited in one party dominant systems due to the mechanisms of internal and external control used by the dominant or hegemonic party. These mechanisms of control culminate in, as they did in Mexico, there being ‘no life outside the ruling party’. Only when the economic, political and ideological monopolies are dismantled through either economic liberalisation, opposition maintaining its integrity, civil society keeping its independence and societies refusing to be drawn into relationships of patronage, can the space for voice and accountability be prised open again. In the interests of its citizens and the future success of its country, the ruling party of a one party dominant system needs to recognise that it is not the sole channel for the voice of its citizens and to acknowledge the space for agents of voice and accountability. Ensuring that non-authoritarian democracy remains the only game in town in a one party dominant system requires responsive and accountable government and effective agents of voice and accountability. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

This thesis explores the manner in which political-economic forces born of democratisation have shaped media developments in Zambia, affected the welfare of journalists and the viability of the state owned press epitomised by the Times Newspapers. The aim is to inform the privatisation policy discourse. Using a political economy analysis, the thesis unveils the historical intimacy between nationalist administrations and multinational business elites and how these forces - often working in collusion - influenced patterns of media ownership, inhibited labour rights and controlled communicative activity – indicative of how the state and markets can constrain freedom of expression and association, despite democratisation. The thesis contends that the uncertainty of neo-patrimonial conditions that characterised the post colonial era has not dissipated to a great extent and continues to undermine media and institutional reform in today’s liberally inclined Zambia. Pervasive clientelism has also compromised popular perceptions of state media systems, subverting competitiveness and the propagandist function of the Times Newspapers in the liberalised market, a point empirically illustrated through the analysis of market and public opinion data. / Communication Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Communication)

The Parliament of Catalonia was restored in 1980 within the transition to democracy in Spain. From the beginning the coalition of Convergència i Unió was dominated in party system. This coalition was consisted by two parties and had absolute parliamentarian majority between years 1984 and 1995. Its dominance was disrupted by Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya in elections in 1999 and also in 2003. Until then, there was a bipolar system where CiU won elections to the Parliament of Catalonia and PSC-PSOE elections to Congreso de Diputados in this autonomous region. CiU won every Catalan parliamentary elections till 2012. After the collapse of CiU in 2015, one of its parties, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, started to cooperate with Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya primarily because of Catalonia's independence. The number of relevant parties started to increase in 2015. The aim of the thesis is to answer following questions: what party system according to Sartori's theory occurred/occurs in the Parliament of Catalonia and whether there was a change of party system or not. If yes, then which circumstances affected this change. Furthermore, the results of the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia and to Congreso de Diputados in Catalonia are compared. This comparison seeks to answer the question of...

In the period from 2009-2020, South Africa has witnessed the rise of "lawfare". Lawfare is understood as the judicialisation of politics - turning to the courts and the use of the law to resolve broadly political matters. This thesis explores the unfolding implications of the judicialisation of politics for judicial legitimacy. In the displacement of the political into the judicial the reach of the courts is expanded and the legitimacy of courts engaging in a "political" role is questioned. Situated in the field of judicial-political dynamics, the interplay between law and politics is observed through the adoption of a historical-institutionalist model. This thesis identifies the causes of the judicialisation of politics and then traces its consequences for broader constitutional stability and the impact on the judicial institution. Guidelines for the Court to navigate lawfare to achieve institutional resilience and maintain judicial legitimacy are then proposed. Judicialisation of politics is caused primarily through the failures of the other branches of government to fulfil their assigned constitutional role. Institutional imbalance in a dominant party democracy means that opposition parties and civil society organisations are left with little recourse but to appeal to the Court to be a constitutional bulwark. The Court is then compelled to step into the breach and fill the accountability vacuum. In identifying the causes of judicialisation, a fuller understanding of Lawfare emerges, expanding current scholarship beyond its traditionally abusive characterisation. It posits a duality to Lawfare in that it can be both an abuse of law and a last line of defence. Through observing the judicial political interactions, a trajectory from the judicialisation of politics to the politicisation of law is mapped. The politicisation of law sees political power refocused on the courts, exposing them to political aggression and attack by the dominant party. The judicialisation of politics that seeks accountability from recalcitrant political actors asks much of the courts, at a time when ensuring executive oversight is the most dangerous, because of the ease with which a hostile executive in a dominant party democracy can implement measures that may undermine the independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has shown a remarkable ability to navigate this era of Lawfare, remaining resolute under fire. However, the more successful the Court is in holding the line against executive abuse of power, the more the judicial route is identified as a powerful weapon to achieve more abusive political objectives. The relationship between Lawfare and legitimacy is identified as a wicked problem that demands expanding boundaries to observe the courts influence on the political environment, and the political environment's influence on the judicial role and its legitimacy. Through advancing a multi-dimensional paradigm of judicial legitimacy, the dialectics of judicial legitimacy are shown to be aggravated by the judicialisation of politics. In this respect it is argued that where the foundations and assumptions on which legitimacy is predicated shift, legitimacy must be re-examined. It is therefore argued that in a culture marked by an impunified disregard of non-judicial regulatory enforcement and increasing non-compliance with judicial orders, the impulse to preserve legitimacy through a detached, formalist stance will not be sufficient. Judicial legitimacy must be relocated in the ability of the Court to be responsive. Pulled into the role of judicial statesmanship, the Court must adopt a robust approach to assertively uphold the rule of law. In tracking the unfolding consequences of the judicialisation of politics, the Court is asked to resolve matters beyond its institutional capabilities. Absent the normative commitment to the rule of law, the internationalisation of constitutional norms, and the political interest to implement remedial orders, the Court is unable to effect workable relief. In tracing the dangers of the continued trend of Lawfare, the thesis sketches a downward spiral of reputational strength of the Court and a decline in democratic responsibility. This leads to an inability to achieve effective reform that ends in disenchantment, questioning the faith placed in the Constitution. It depicts how the Constitutional Court as 'constitutional saviour' can unravel into constitutional blame. The Constitutional Court has been able to hold the line in this era of Lawfare and repel assaults on its integrity and efforts to undermine its independence. However, without a broader culture of commitment to the rule of law, civil education and a suffusion of constitutional responsibility beyond the judiciary, the Court will not be able to continue to shoulder the weight of what is asked of it. This research depicts a circular model of Lawfare and legitimacy, where Lawfare is predicated on judicial legitimacy, but an overreliance on Lawfare will destroy judicial legitimacy.