Pour relever les défis de l’urbanisation, le législateur privilégie le recours à la planification urbaine, norme juridique unilatérale assurant la prévision et la réglementation de l’occupation et de l’affectation des sols. Ainsi, les lois SRU de 2000 et Grenelle 2 de 2010 assignent à la planification urbaine les fondamentales fonctions de solidarité sociale, de maîtrise de l’étalement urbain et de préservation de l’environnement, afin de circonscrire un urbanisme de séparation sociale, contenir les dépenses publiques afférentes à l’étalement des réseaux et la diffusion des équipements, ainsi que permettre un développement durable. Afin de porter cette planification urbaine à l’ambition renouvelée, le législateur impose le recours à l’intercommunalité pour la planification stratégique, le SCOT, et marque sa préférence pour sa compétence à propos de la planification réglementaire, le PLU. Effectivement, l’urbanisation et ses effets dépassent largement les frontières et moyens des communes. Le législateur mise alors sur l’institution intercommunale les regroupant, notamment via les lois Chevènement de 1999 et RCT de 2010 mettant exergue les communautés de communes et d’agglomération, les communautés urbaines et les métropoles. Seulement, le législateur échoue à créer un véritable pouvoir intercommunal. Qu’il s’agisse de l’ampleur de son périmètre ou du contenu de ses documents, l’intercommunalité est sous la domination politique des communes qui en font une agence à leur service et le lieu de conciliation de leurs intérêts. L’intercommunalité n’a donc pas une volonté et une représentation de l’avenir de son territoire propres. Or, la planification urbaine est une norme juridique dont l’efficacité exige la prise de décisions politiques autonomes. En conséquence, l’intercommunalité ne peut donner naissance qu’à des planifications urbaines consensuelles, éloignées des attentes législatives. En bloquant l’émergence d’un véritable pouvoir intercommunal, le pouvoir communal porte atteinte à l’ambition d’une régulation juridique efficace de l’urbanisation par la planification. La réussite de cette dernière est dès lors suspendue à la création d’un pouvoir intercommunal authentique ou à son transfert à une autre collectivité publique dotée d’un pouvoir politique. / To address the challenges of urbanisation, the legislator resorts mainly to urban planning, as a unilateral legal standard enabling to ensure the forecasting and the regulation of the occupation and allotment of land plots. Thus, such French laws as the “SRU” law and the “Grenelle II” law both devoted to urban planning the fundamental roles of social solidarity, of setting limits to urban sprawl and environment preservation, so as to circumscribe an urban development leading to social separation, and to limit public expenditures linked to the extension of networks and the spread of public facilities, as well as making possible sustainable development. In order to carry out this urban planning scheme endowed with a renewed and strengthened ambition, the legislator transfers the strategic planning, called the “SCOT”, to the “intercommunalité”, which could be defined as the putting together and sharing of resources of several towns and boroughs within the framework of a mutual local body, or inter communal entity, with the objective of achieving cost efficiency in the use of public funds. Furthermore, the legislator states its preference as to its scope of competence, for a system of regulated mandatory planning, the “PLU”. Indeed, urban planning and its resulting effects broadly exceed the boundaries and means of towns and local boroughs. So the legislator resorts to the implementation of these local joint policies or bodies called the “intercommunalité” or inter communal power or body to regroup them. This is enforced by the “Chevènement Law” of 1999 and the “RCT” of 2010 : both laws are applied to ensure the regrouping of single or local rural boroughs, towns, and big cities. However, the lawmaker has failed to create a genuine common power among towns and boroughs. Whether it relates to the scope of its area or the contents of its documents, the structure or body regrouping towns and boroughs is under the political domination of local councils, which transform this means of cooperation into a tool for their own purposes, and a place for conciliating their selfish interests. Yet, urban planning is a juridical standard whose efficiency requires taking independent political decisions. Consequently, town and borough cooperation can only result in consensual urban planning, quite far from legislative expectations. By hindering the emergence of a genuine inter communal power, the local town and borough powers impair the ambition of an efficient juridical regulation of urban development through planning. The success of the latter depends therefore on the setting up of a real inter communal power, or of its transfer to another public body endowed with a political power.

Dans cette thèse de doctorat, je m’attache à interpréter, à systématiser et à soumettre à un examen critique la pensée politique du droit de Hannah Arendt. En effet, alors que le versant politique de cette œuvre a fait l’objet d’une attention tout à fait considérable, on n’a toujours pas pris la mesure de l’intérêt évident de la philosophe pour le droit et les institutions juridiques et judiciaires les plus essentielles. Or, selon la thèse que je défends, l’une des raisons qui expliquent l’originalité de cette pensée et son caractère stimulant est à chercher du côté du positionnement qu’elle adopte vis-à-vis de la question du droit.<p><p>Pour atteindre ces différents objectifs, ma thèse est structurée en deux grandes parties qui correspondent à deux points de vue que l’on peut adopter par rapport au droit et qui se révèlent tout à fait opératoires si l’on accède à une vision panoramique des écrits dispersés qu’Arendt a consacrés au droit. Je distingue ainsi, et ne cesse de faire dialoguer dans ma thèse, le « pôle objectif » (première partie) et le « pôle subjectif » (seconde partie) de la philosophie du droit de Hannah Arendt.<p>1/ Dans la première partie de mon étude, je montre comment la philosophe s’attache, dans ses livres les plus célèbres, à construire des modèles politiques qui ont tous pour particularité d’être aussi – et de manière indissociable – des modèles juridiques. a) Mon premier chapitre est dédié à l’intérêt manifesté par Hannah Arendt pour les sources de l’Antiquité, et vise en particulier à clarifier le rapport qu’elle entretient vis-à-vis des sources romaines. b) Dans mon deuxième chapitre, je propose une interprétation de sa réflexion consacrée aux deux grandes révolutions modernes de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, les Révolutions française et américaine. Je mets en lumière de quelle façon Arendt, en s’inspirant du précédent américain, élabore un modèle républicain et peut ainsi approfondir sa conception de l’articulation entre droit et politique. c) Dans mon troisième chapitre, je précise les contours d’un contre-modèle élaboré par Arendt dans ses premiers écrits politiques d’envergure, ceux qu’elle a consacrés au totalitarisme.<p>2/ Dans la seconde partie de mon étude, je me concentre sur le « pôle subjectif » de la philosophie de mon auteur :j’indique comment Arendt mobilise des situations existentielles limites pour penser la condition de l’homme contemporain. a) Dans mon quatrième chapitre, je montre que c’est à partir de la situation des réfugiés et des apatrides de l’entre-deux-guerres que Hannah Arendt nous invite à repenser non seulement les droits de l’homme, mais aussi leur titulaire, que j’appelle l’« homme des droits de l’homme ». b) Dans mon cinquième chapitre, je m’attache à mettre en évidence, dans toutes ses nuances, la figure du « juge » que Hannah Arendt s’attache à reconstituer après avoir assisté au procès d’Adolf Eichmann, après avoir ressenti ce que je nomme le « choc » du procès Eichmann. c) Dans mon sixième et dernier chapitre, enfin, je m’interroge sur les raisons profondes qui incitent Arendt à voir dans les grandes campagnes de désobéissance civile qui éclatent aux États-Unis durant les années 1950 et 1960, non le signe d’un déclin des institutions, mais, au contraire, la marque d’une renaissance de l’action citoyenne.<p><p>Je conclus en synthétisant l’apport de Hannah Arendt à notre pensée juridique. Dans cette œuvre, le droit n’apparaît jamais comme une simple contrainte extérieure pour la politique, ni comme son « supplément d’âme », mais comme sa condition d’existence :en conférant à la liberté politique ses limites, limites spatiales mais aussi relationnelles et temporelles, en lui offrant un cadre stable au sein duquel elle peut s’épanouir, le droit n’ampute pas la politique d’une part d’elle-même mais, au contraire, participe de sa constitution. Me fondant sur trois catégories centrales de la réflexion juridique (législation, constitution, juridiction), je souligne en outre tout l’intérêt d’une confrontation approfondie et détaillée entre l’œuvre arendtienne et les questions classiques et contemporaines qui animent le champ de la théorie et de la philosophie du droit, ce qui me permet d’ouvrir un certain nombre de perspectives de recherches futures.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

General Introduction<p><p>The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator.<p><p>This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law.<p><p>This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning.<p><p>The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. <p><p>This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme?<p><p>These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem.<p><p>As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic.<p><p> Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”.<p><p>I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. <p><p>In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. <p><p>Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study.<p><p>This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable.<p><p>A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator.<p><p>Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few.<p><p>Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist.<p><p>On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” .<p><p>Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order.<p><p>The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory.<p><p>The book is divided into three parts.<p><p>In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter.<p>Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans.<p><p>The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. <p><p>As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose.<p><p>The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies.<p><p>Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. <p><p>The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church.<p><p>Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. <p><p>The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously.<p><p>A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter.<p><p>The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. <p><p>The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else.<p><p>On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. <p><p>Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom.<p><p>Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence.<p><p>The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation.<p><p>Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end.<p><p>The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project.<p><p>Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. <p><p>Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent.<p><p>To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom.<p><p>Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated.<p><p>Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them.<p><p>Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign.<p><p>The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. <p><p>On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box.<p><p>Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules.<p><p>This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book.<p><p>Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking.<p><p>The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed.<p><p>The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued.<p><p>The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence.<p><p>At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal.<p><p>Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. <p><p>The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction.<p><p>Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”.<p><p>Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book.<p><p>The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski.<p><p>Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text.<p><p>I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”.<p> <p><p> <p>1\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Ce mémoire porte sur la pensée politique du juriste allemand Carl Schmitt, plus précisément sur sa critique de l’universalisme libéral. Sur la base d’une analyse de ses principaux textes, nous démontrons que la pertinence de cet auteur controversé réside dans le défi renouvelé que présente son antinormativisme pour la pensée politique contemporaine. Nous soutenons qu’il y a chez Schmitt un souci constant de rattacher le droit à l’ordre concret, qu’il soit institué ou reçu. Nous démontrons ensuite comment l’antinormativisme se prolonge en droit international dans la critique de l’universalisme, entendu comme l’ambition de penser le politique à partir de l’humanité comme sujet unique. D’une perspective décisionniste, l’universalisme masque des intérêts impérialistes qu’il convient de dénoncer ; d’une perspective institutionnaliste, l’universalisme néglige l’ordre spatial concret sur lequel repose le droit international. Nous affirmons que Schmitt démontre l’importance de préserver l’autonomie de la science juridique envers la morale et la technique. / This essay examines Carl Schmitt’s political theory and more specifically his critique of liberal universalism. The aim is to show that the relevance of this controversial writer lies in the renewed challenge that his antinormativism represents to contemporary political theory. I maintain that there is in Schmitt’s thinking a constant attempt to establish the modalities of a relationship between law and order, whether it be instituted order or given order. I further illustrate how schmittian antinormativism, in international law, gives rise to a critique of universalism, understood as the attempt to think the political from the perspective of humanity considered in its unity. From a decisionist perspective, universalism hides imperialistic interests that must be unveiled; from an institutionalist perspective, universalism neglects the concrete spatial order on which international law is grounded. It is thus argued that Schmitt demonstrates the significance of preserving the autonomy of jurisprudence towards moral and technic.

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L'étude a porté sur deux outils élaborés par l’Union européenne à l'appui de ses politiques d'allocation d'aide extérieure au bénéfice principalement d'Etats en développement et participant à sa stratégie de promotion du respect de droits de l’homme dans les Etats tiers. Il s'agit du mécanisme de conditionnalité démocratique d’une part, et de la doctrine fondée sur le concept de gouvernance d’autre part. L'une des principales critiques que la doctrine adresse à l’Union au sujet de sa politique de conditionalité est son incapacité à répondre à l’une des attentes fondamentales qui la sous-tend, à savoir :la naissance d’une politique d’aide extérieure détachée des considérations géopolitiques et visant à protéger et promouvoir efficacement les droits de l’homme. Dans la mesure où la doctrine en attribue en général la responsabilité à l’absence de clarté et de prévisibilité du mécanisme de la conditionnalité démocratique, cette critique eut dû conduire à l’élaboration d’un régime davantage juridicisé. Or, l'émergence de la doctrine fondée sur le concept de gouvernance révèle que l’Union n’a pas opté pour une telle solution. C’est alors que, divisant mon étude en deux parties, la première affectée à l’étude du mécanisme conditionnel et la seconde affectée à l’étude de la doctrine de gouvernance, je me suis interrogée sur les raisons pour lesquelles l’Union avait pu choisir de recourir d’abord à un appel au droit, et ensuite à une repolitisation partielle de son mécanisme. Prenant appui sur une étude des documents officiels des institutions européennes, de la pratique de l'Union et des théories des relations internationales, l'étude tend à révéler les atouts et les limites théoriques de chacune de ces stratégies déstinées à suciter des réformes particulières dans les Etats partenaires de l’Union.Il apparaîtra que l’appel au droit opéré dans le cadre du mécanisme de conditionnalité répondait à des besoins et à une logique spécifiques lors de son institution, mais que la forme juridicisée du mécanisme conditionnel tel qu’institué se heurtait à diverses limites. La doctrine fondée sur le concept de gouvernance, dans le même temps qu’elle acte ces limites et tend à les dépasser, amène à de nouveaux questionnements.<p><p>The study related to both EU tools, affecting its external aid policies and contributing to its human rights strategy :conditionality and governance. One of the main critic that the doctrine addresses to EU conditionality, is its incapacity to lead to an external aid free of geopolitical considerations and acting to protect and promote effectively the human rights. The doctrine explains this weakness by pointing out the mechanism of conditionality’s lack of clearness and previsibility. Despite this critic is pleading for a more legalized mechanism, the governance strategy reveals that the Union did not choose such a solution.Then, dividing the study into two parts, the first assigned to conditional mechanism and the second assigned to governance, I’m asking the reason why a less legalized mecanism succeeded to conditionality. Based on cooperation agreements, strategic orientations, EU practice and the international relations theories, the study tends to reveal the assets and limits of the two strategies. It appears that the legalization process of conditionality can be explained by specific needs but it encountered various limits. At the same times, while strategy based on Governance adresses some of them, this new tool reveals new questions.<p><p> / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished