直銷進入中國近20年，因為中國特殊法規環境，造成多數的中國消費者對直銷抱有一種懷疑的態度。但是近年來不少中國直銷企業，投入相當程度資金與人力在參與慈善公益和社區責任，形成以『參與社會公益為榮』，以『履行社會責任為傲』的行業風氣，進而大幅度提升中國直銷企業的社會形象。如此不僅有利於中國直銷長期持續的發展，並且中國直銷企業在實行企業社會責任作法，對於台灣直銷企業在深耕台灣本土市場或進軍大陸市場，具一定參考作用。 本研究以中國直銷標竿企業作為主要研究分析對象並以世界公認全球永續報告書綱領比較兩岸直銷企業在實行社會責任的差異，以發現標竿企業實行社會責任的特色並歸納其在中國成功實施企業社會責任九個關鍵因素 : 一、提升企業倫理境界，樹立社會責任理念。 二、將企業社會責任納入企業的發展戰略。 三、專職企業社會責任執行單位與企業社會責任發展平臺設置。 四、建立擁有企業獨特優勢與競爭特色的志願者服務隊伍。 五、保證產品與服務品質是最基本的社會責任。 六、制定完善的消費者保障制度。 七、掌握產品與顧客獨特優勢，舉辦適合自身企業文化的公益活動。 八、尊重中國傳統文化和中國政府。 九、積極宣傳企業社會責任或社會慈善履行情況。 / There are almost 20 years after Direct Selling commenced in China, due to complicated and restricted regulatory issues, the image of Direct Selling is always being argued and the perception of consumer is disadvantage for the development of Direct Selling in China. Recently some of Direct Selling companies have heavily involved corporate philanthropy and social responsibility, which are very instrumental for securing the recognition of general public today and enhancing the sustainability of the Direct Selling development in future in China. Furthermore, the experiences on the Corporate Social Responsibility of the Direct Selling in China are the best practice for penetrating the domestic market in Taiwan and new development in the Mainland China. It is applied to compare the planning & execution of Corporate Social Responsibility through Global Reporting Initiative between Taiwan and China : analyze the unique features of benchmark company of Direct Selling in China we select and find its comparison with Direct Selling companies of Taiwan and summary the 9 key success factors of the implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility as following : 1. Elevate the standard of business ethic and build the concept of social responsibility. 2. Select the Corporate Social Responsibility as one of the corporate strategies. 3. Develop the dedicated organization & platform for the execution of Corporate Social Responsibility. 4. Build the unique features and core competences of volunteer taskforce within Distributor/Employee. 5. Ensure the product-guarantee and service-quality are the basic of social responsibility. 6. The establishment of full consumer protection system. 7. Conduct the best corporate philanthropy activity in connection with unique features of product & customer and corporate culture. 8. Respect Chinese culture & custom and China government. 9. Promote the execution & results of Corporate Social Responsibility or Corporate Philanthropy.

Unter Benutzng von 90.4/fb Daten, die das BABAR-Experiment in den Jahren 1999 bis 2002 genommen hat, wurden die Zerfälle Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0 und Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma mit zwei verschiedenen Methoden rekonstruiert. Die Rekonstruktions-Effizienzen wurden mittels Signal-Monte Carlo-Ereignissen und D*0-Zerfällen ermittelt. Auf diese Weise wurde das Partialbreiten-Verhältnis Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0) / Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma) auf vier verschiedene Weisen gemessen. Zusätzlich wurde das Partialbreiten-Verhältnis Gamma(D*0 -> D0 pi0) / Gamma(D*0 -> D0 gamma) gemessen. / Using 90.4/fb of data taken at the BABAR experiment in the years 1999 to 2002, the decays Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0 and Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma have been reconstructed with two different methods. Signal Monte Carlo events as well as D*0 decays have been used to determine the reconstruction efficiencies. Thereby, the partial widths ratio Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0) / Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma) has been measured in four different ways. Additionally, the partial widths ratio Gamma(D*0 -> D0 pi0) / Gamma(D*0 -> D0 gamma) has been measured.

The aim of this work is the reconstruction and development of the distribution network of DS to ensure electricity supply in the required quality to existing customers and new customers connecting to the planned industrial zone Šlapanice. The first part deals with the inclusion of a distribution network in power system, its distribution and composition. Subsequently, the work deals with the description of the management of distribution networks, cable and outdoor leadership and their parameters. It also contains guidelines for the design of high voltage networks. The end of the first part is devoted to calculating the steady operation of the network. In the second part, the proposed project using the PAS DAISY Off-line v 4.00 Bizon. Based on the available evidence is developed steady state operation. We found that lines are overloaded and need to be strengthened with regard to the development of industrial zones and adjusting the network to ensure safe and reliable operation. The conclusion focuses on the economic evaluation of proposed alternatives.

The aim of this thesis is to interpret how the European Union was constructed in discourse of Slovak political parties from 2002 to 2012. The thesis departs from the social constructivist assumption of mutual constitutiveness of structures and agents. Focusing on the role of ideas in European integration, a concept of polity ideas or normative ideas about the legitimate political order, as defined by Markus Jachtenfuchs, is applied. Applying discursive analysis to political programmes, political parties' utterances about European integration, in particular about democracy, rights and internal security, foreign policy and security, welfare and identity are assigned to four ideal types: Federal state, Intergovernmental cooperation, Economic community and Network. For the research purposes political programmes of three Slovak political parties are analysed: Christian Democratic Movement, Direction - Social Democracy and The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party. The analysis of the political programmes showed that the Slovak political parties do not have a consistent vision of the future of European integration. A high number of descriptive utterances was found in the programmes. Moreover, beliefs about democracy, rights and internal security, foreign policy and security, welfare...

Unter Benutzng von 90.4/fb Daten, die das BABAR-Experiment in den Jahren 1999 bis 2002 genommen hat, wurden die Zerfälle Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0 und Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma mit zwei verschiedenen Methoden rekonstruiert. Die Rekonstruktions-Effizienzen wurden mittels Signal-Monte Carlo-Ereignissen und D*0-Zerfällen ermittelt. Auf diese Weise wurde das Partialbreiten-Verhältnis Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0) / Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma) auf vier verschiedene Weisen gemessen. Zusätzlich wurde das Partialbreiten-Verhältnis Gamma(D*0 -> D0 pi0) / Gamma(D*0 -> D0 gamma) gemessen. / Using 90.4/fb of data taken at the BABAR experiment in the years 1999 to 2002, the decays Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0 and Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma have been reconstructed with two different methods. Signal Monte Carlo events as well as D*0 decays have been used to determine the reconstruction efficiencies. Thereby, the partial widths ratio Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ pi0) / Gamma(Ds*+ -> Ds+ gamma) has been measured in four different ways. Additionally, the partial widths ratio Gamma(D*0 -> D0 pi0) / Gamma(D*0 -> D0 gamma) has been measured.

Uppsaten utreder hur förslaget om maskeringsförbud vid idrottsarrangemang är utformat i förhållande till legalitetsprincipens krav på tydlighet och precision och dess förutsättningar med hänsyn till behov - och proportionalitetsprincipen att kunna tillämpas i praktiken.

Uppsatsen utreder om det förslag på att kriminalisera att maskera sig vid idrottsarrangemang är förenligt med RF:s skydd för yttrandefriheten, och om om den föreslagna kriminaliseringen uppfyller legalitetsprincipens krav på förutsebarhet och tydlighet.

This thesis investigates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tactically managed and defused major crises between 2002 and 2008 which put its credibility and legitimacy to the test. Contrary to conventional wisdom that major crises are likely to challenge and threaten regime stability in authoritarian systems or even undermine their viability, this thesis argues that the CCP has managed to sustain its political hegemony to date through the manipulation of these major crises and through the maximum tinkering with the current political system it reigns over. In order to explain why manipulation is the key in the CCP’s successful crisis management, this thesis first develops a critical reassessment of the conception of crisis and elaborates on crisis’s tripartite political utilities. These are (a) shift the dominating paradigm, (b) centralise political power and (c) (re) gain popularity and legitimacy. These altogether form an analytical framework for crisis, which is followed by a chapter that sets the backdrop against which our case studies unfold and explains why the Chinese context is particularly favourable for crisis manipulation. The thesis then proceeds with three case studies: the 2003 SARS epidemic, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk scandal occurred in the same year. The thesis suggests that although the CCP’s responses were not flawless, and not always timely, it managed to manipulate all three crises in its favour via the aforementioned political utilities and subsequently defused these crises. At the same time, its Leninist structure was able to unleash formidable mobilisation capacity to help the regime rapidly bring situations under control. Overall, the CCP’s crisis management efficacy was satisfactory in the short term. Nevertheless, the thesis concludes that despite the short term usefulness of crisis manipulation, in the long term the efficacy of the same strategy as well as the political utility of crisis are decaying, as illustrated in reference to more recent crises that stretched the CCP’s credibility. Therefore, the CCP is in need of embarking on substantive political reform in order to develop an alternative crisis displacement mechanism. This thesis makes an original contribution to the existing literature in the field. It complements the public administration and public management literature by bringing politics back in. It also updates the empirical knowledge base of past studies as well as offering a comparison of crisis responses. This is a timely contribution to the study of Chinese crisis management and to the study of the nature of Chinese politics.

The dramatic phenomenon which appeared soon after Stalin's death in March 1953 in the Communist world was the strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the two largest socialist countries - the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The most important reason was that the Soviet leaders wanted to make use of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain their leading position in the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. For the Chinese, the main reason was economic rather than political. They wanted to obtain as much aid as possible from the Soviet side, while implementing their first five-year-plan (1953-1957). Only two and a half months after the death of Stalin, an important agreement was signed in Moscow for assistance to China in the construction and reconstruction of 141 industrial sites. By the end of 1953, China's share of the USSR's total external trade turnover amounted to 20 per cent, while the Soviet Union's share of China's trade was 55.6 per cent. From mid-1958 the Chinese method of building socialism began to take shape: the grouping of agricultural co-operatives into large People's Communes combining small-scale industry with agriculture, the Great Leap Forward. In the eyes of the Soviet leaders this was a great challenge not only to orthodox Marxist thinking, but also to the leading position of the CPSU. What is more, it was in 1958 that it first became apparent that China and the Soviet Union shared different views on a number of foreign policy issues which brought the conflict to a state of high tension. First it was the bombing of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) . Then came the Sino-Indian border clash. On 9 September, in spite of a Chinese request, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a `neutral' statement, providing the first public indication that relations were deteriorating rapidly. Khrushchev's China policy appeared to have two elements. 1) To increase the scale of Soviet economic aid to China, thus reassuring it of friendship while increasing Soviet penetration of its economy. 2) To oust Mao Zedong and anti-Soviet elements from the Chinese leadership. The period from 1960 to 1969 was characterised by the Sino-Soviet `cold war', beginning with polemics in ideology and expanding to economic, political and military confrontation. Until the end of 1962 both sides refrained from attacking each other directly. The Chinese directed their attacks against `revisionism' in general and the Yugoslavs in particular; the Russians directed their attacks against `dogmatism' in general and the Albanians in particular. The first major ideological confrontation took place at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in Bucharest from 20-25 June 1960. Then on 16 July the Soviet government informed the Chinese government of its decision to withdraw all Soviet technicians working in China. This unilateral decision, which aroused greater resentment in China than any other action, struck a crushing blow at China's economy at a time when the country was suffering from the failure of the Great Leap and a series of natural disasters. The Chinese government replied with charges of revisionism. But as the economic links between the two countries deteriorated, the Chinese leaders eventually published their well-known nine comments, from 15 August 1963 to 14 July 1964, strongly criticising both Soviet internal and external policies. Sino-Sovient relations deteriorated after Khrushchev's fall in October 1964. There were at least two events contributing to this. One was a quarrel about taking `unity of action' to aid North Vietnam, suggested by the Soviet leaders. The other was a dispute about holding an international conference of all Communist parties in 1965. Party relations were broken, although no-one at the time thought that this break could continue for the next 23 years. 1966-1969 witnessed the high-tide of the `Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, and this put the PRC in full confrontation with the USSR for two decades. There is no doubt that the struggle against `Soviet revisionism' which dominated Mao's mind in his later years was one of his main motives for starting the Revolution. Kiu Shaoqi whom he regarded as China's Khrushchev and the representative of the revisionist line inside the Chinese Party, had to be denounced. Smashing revisionists at home meant smashing them abroad and therefore the necessity of ending the few remaining contacts between the Russians and their last Chinese informants. Simultaneously, the first frontier confrontations took place. The boundary question between the PRC and the USSR has occupied an important position in the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations. However, it only led to fighting when relations between the two countries deteriorated for other reasons. Armed clashes occurred on 2 and 15 March 1969, on the Island in the Wusulijang (River Ussuri) called Zhen Bao, just a few weeks before the Ninth Congress of the CCP. Mao concluded that the USSR was behaving like a young imperialist power on the offensive and found ample evidence in the behaviour of Brezhnev. The Soviet Union's policy towards China in the 1970s seemed to want to knock together an `Asian collective security system', aimed at isolating China; to build up its armed forces in the Far East to put pressure on China and Japan in order to compete with the United States in the Pacific Ocean; to use the `Cuba of Asia', Vietnam, as its agent, to seize the whole of Indochina and dominate Southeast Asia, edging the United States out of the continent. The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan seemed to be bent on controlling that country, but also on furthering its long-term strategic objective of expanding its power in South Asia and the Middle East. The Chinese response was inevitably hostile, to try to: a) reduce or eliminate the threat of a `two front war' involving China with more than one major enemy; b) more generally deflect any political and military pressure against the PRC by seeking to prevent `encirclement' by the PRC's enemies; c) form the broadest possible international united front against hegemonism; d) gain stable, diversified foreign trade partners and sources of advanced technology for the PRC, thereby enabling China to modernize its economy. Under Mao's guidance the theory of the Three Worlds was put into practice. China established diplomatic relations with many capitalist countries; and in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a limited Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union. Mao's death and Deng Ziaoping's succession led to a fundamental change in China's internal economic policy and its accompanying ideology, and gradually also to a change in its attitude to the Soviet Union. With Gorbachev's succession in the Soviet Union in 1985 there were corresponding changes, making an eventual rapprochement possible. The evolution of Soviet policy towards China began on 24 March 1982 when Brezhnev made his speech in Tashkent, developed through 28 July 1986 when Gorbachev made his speech in Vladivostok, and culminated in May 1989 when Gorbachev came to Beijing to have the first Sino-Soviet summit. The process of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was complex and full of difficulties. China identified the three major obstacles as both a barrier to positive change and as a genuine test. The year 1988 saw a breakthrough in eliminating the three obstacles as the Soviet Union promised to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and reduce its forces

The object of this study is to assess the extent to which the Turkic people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang have been aligned politically and socially with the socialist societies of their respective countries. It is not intended to consider this question in the light of success or failure. There are several reasons for not doing so. It would be realistic to consider the question in this light only if a definite goel was to be achieved within a specified period of time. This was not the case in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang. There was and is no definable period of time within which Communism is to be I I achieved. Equally important, Communism remains a hazy expression for a state of existence that yet has to be defined in a manner that is universally accepted. In this study the various political, cultural, religious and educational aspects of the Turkic people will be considered. The intention is to discover to what extent these traditions have been replaced by the social institutions of the socialist societies. This in turn should allow some insight into the advances made by both the Russian and Chinese Communists in their attempts to transform their respective Turkic people. At the same time the study deals with specific difficulties that the Governments had to overcome in the course of the transformation process. These include getting the Turkic people to participate in the various socialist institutions. From this there arise new questions and problems. The Islamic society of the Turkic people had not prepared the latter to participate in a modern, industrial society. They lacked the required educational background to be usefully employable in the bureaucracy on any but a superficial level. As a result non-Turkic cadres had to be used in many leading positions. This raised the question of great Russian and Han-Chinese chauvinism. Another problem was that of attacking the traditional Turkic way of life without alienating the Turkic people. The direct attack on Islam was complex. In general both Governments demonstrated a lack of understanding for the Islamic way of life. As a consequence they launched an attack on an Islamic orthodoxy that did not exist. Also, the Soviet policy of an outright attack forced the Soviet Government to define a new way of life for the Kazakh and other Muslim people. In China the need for this was avoided because of the less antagonistic attitude towards Islam. To a great extent this study compares the policies of the Soviet and Chinese Governments. This in itself raises some questions. The Russian revolution preceded the Chinese by nearly 32 years. This gave the Chinese a considerable advantage. They did not have to make the same mistakes that ha~ been made by the Soviet Union, particularly the collectivisation drive in Kazakhstan. But the Chinese not only benefitted from the Soviet mistakes. They'were able also to make use of the advanced experience of the Soviet Union in advancing their economic development programme. In addition the more industrially advanced Soviet Union could and did assist the Chinese in their industrialisation. From the discussion of the connection between the two countries their logically follows an assessment of the inter-state relationship. The intention is to discover to what extent the Turkic people influenced the Sino-Soviet relationship. But the economic question hardly can be excluded from the discussion. This in turn leads to the analysis of some of the historical)-political, ideological and economic causes of the Sino-Soviet rift.