This study investigates payouts in Swedish family firms by focusing on both the level and speed of adjustment of dividends. In addition, the use of dual-class shares in family firms is examined to further identify potential drivers of payout differences between family-controlled companies and non-family firms. Agency theory and previous studies suggest that high and stable payouts are used by controlling families to mitigate minority shareholders’ concerns of being expropriated. We find that family firms in Sweden do not differ from non-family firms in their payouts. The results could be seen as an indication of expropriation if minority shareholders should be compensated for higher agency costs, but it could also be that family control does not worsen agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. Rather, other ownership structures such as the use of dual-class shares to gain control in excess of ownership seem to be associated with higher levels of payouts. Neither do family firms smooth their dividends more than non-family firms. Instead, they adapt towards their target dividend at a higher pace.

This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance. The first essay investigates the relationship between dual-class shares and firm’s risk-taking. While costs associated with dual-class shares are widely documented, the benefits are seldom studied in the literature. We attempt to fill this gap and find that dual-class firms tend to have fewer business segments, higher volatilities in their cash flows, earnings, and investment opportunities compared to propensity-matched single-class firms. Business segments within a dual-class firm are also more positively correlated in their cash flows, earnings, or investment opportunities than those in single-class firms. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that dual-class shares can potentially shield insiders from short-term market pressure so they can focus on riskier projects to enhance long-term shareholder value. To provide a possible channel through which dual-class firms can increase corporate risk-taking, we examine one of the most important corporate investment decisions: mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Dual-class firms are more likely to engage in M&As, especially nondiversifying M&As. Corporate risks increase following M&As, and the increase is more for dual-class firms than for single-class firms. The second essay shows how CEO skills affect operating performance using a sample of 109 spin-offs from 1994 to 2009. Since a variety of studies indicate that firms in need of external financing are more likely to engage in spin-offs, we hypothesize that parent firms prefer to appoint financial experts as CEOs at spun-off units around spin-off transactions. We find that appointing spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise brings significant and positive wealth effects. Furthermore, the CEOs with financial expertise significantly improve firms’ access to capital markets and subsequent operating performance. Conversely, we do not observe positive wealth effects at the spin-off announcement or improved operating performance following spin-offs when parent firms decide to assign non-financial experts as spun-off unit CEOs.

This thesis investigates the long- and short- run stability of Cointegrated dual share equity pairs on the Swedish Equity Market. Testing for a cointegrated relationship on each pair are executed for a 13 year period to establish the cointegrated pairs. The stability of each cointegrated pair is then estimated using a rolling two year period. An Arbitrage Trading strategy is applied to the cointegrated pairs for the following one year period. The long-run relationship of the pairs are found to be stable. The short-term relationship varies from pair to pair, where some pairs break their cointegrated relationship for some time periods. But generally, most pairs are stable over the short- term as well. The trading strategy generate the highest returns during volatile market conditions and underperforms during positive market conditions with low volatility. The Sharpe ratio is far better than the Index during the whole period.

Uppsats undersöker tvåklassaktier, där olika aktieklasser representerar samma tillgång men med olika rösträtt. Trots liknande risk och avkastning har A-aktien historiskt sett haft ett högre värde än B-aktien, vilket resulterar i en prisskillnad som forskning har visat variera över olika marknader. Ägarkontroll och likviditet har identifierats som faktorer som påverkar röstpremiet. Genom att undersöka ägarkontrollens inverkan tillsammans med likviditetens effekt avser uppsatsen att identifiera orsaken till prissättningen av tvåklassaktier. I studien undersöks företag noterade på Nasdaq Stockholm med minst två aktietyper under perioden 2002 till 2023. Totalt 36 företag inkluderas, dock exkluderas vissa av dem på grund av avsaknad av data eller olikheter i aktieklasserna. Undersökningen är avgränsad till den svenska marknaden och inkluderar endast företag med noteringar där. Uppsatsen visar att det har funnits ett genomsnittligt röstpremium på 5,42 % på den svenska börsmarknaden mellan 2002 och 2023, vilket är relativt lågt jämfört med andra marknader. Utländskt ägande och likviditet tycks inte ha en signifikant direkt påverkan på röstpremiet. Koncentrerat ägarskap, där den största ägaren innehar mer än 50 % av rösterna tenderar att minska röstpremiet. Emellertid har modellen en låg förklaringsgrad, vilket antyder att andra faktorer, såsom makroekonomiska händelser och specifika företagsförhållanden, också kan påverka röstpremiet. / This paper investigates dual-class shares, where different classes of shares represent the same asset but have different voting rights. Despite similar risk and return, the A-share has historically had a higher value than the B-share, resulting in a price difference that research has shown varies across different markets. Ownership control and liquidity have been identified as factors influencing the voting premium. By examining the impact of ownership control together with the effect of liquidity, this essay aims to identify the cause of the pricing of dual-class shares. The study examines companies listed on Nasdaq Stockholm with at least two types of shares during the period 2002 to 2023. A total of 36 companies are included, though some are excluded due to lack of necessary data or differences in share classes. The study is limited to the Swedish market and includes only companies with listings there. The paper shows that there has been an average voting premium of 5,42% on the Swedish stock market between 2002 and 2023, which is relatively low compared to other markets. Foreign ownership and liquidity do not seem to have a significant direct impact on the voting premium. Concentrated ownership, where the largest owner holds more than 50% of the votes tends to reduce the voting premium. However, the model has a low explanatory power, suggesting that other factors, such as macroeconomic events and specific company conditions, may also influence the voting premium.

The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004

Diss. (sammanfattning) Göteborg : Univ., 2004. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

This paper examines the relative price spreads between dual-class shares issued by the same firm on the Swedish market in order to investigate if a voting premium exists and what factors contribute to it. Previous research has found diverging explanations for the variation in price spreads between dual-class shares. Some find explanatory power in the concentration of ownership whilst others find trading costs and liquidity to determine the size and direction of the voting premium. This study tests factors of control and liquidity against the relative price spread in the Swedish market and in accordance with earlier research, the results indicate that a statistically significant voting premium exists in Sweden, although it is relatively small in comparison to many other markets. The paper contributes to the current pool of research by the choice of market, and by adding up-to-date information regarding the voting premium as well as evidence that increased domestic institutional ownership affects the voting premium negatively. At the same time, foreign institutional ownership has an opposite effect and leads to increased price differences between share classes. The general conclusion of this paper is that while some factors related to control and ownership concentration show significance long-term, other unobserved aspects could provide greater explanatory power of the voting premium in the short term.

The ownership structure in Sweden is characterized by a few controlling owners who often base their ownership of a lower capital investment than in many other countries. The separation of ownership and control is determined by control-boosting mechanisms and is a constantly debated topic. These mechanisms are used to control companies without having to bear the bulk of the capital, and the criticism centers around concerns that companies with control-boosting mechanisms are not managed as well as companies without them. The purpose of the study was to examine the use of control enhancing mechanisms and its effect on the market value of Swedish companies on Nasdaq Stockholm. The study adopted a quantitative form with hypotheses testing. The data collection has been made through annual reports of the sample and then statistically tested in SPSS through multiple regression. The use of vote-strong shares was shown to have a strong positive effect on the value of a company. Minor effects proven came from the difference between the largest owner's voting share and capital contribution, and of the percentage of the total votes held by the largest owner. These two, however, counteracted each other in approximately equal amounts. Not offering their vote-strong shares to on the public exchange is suggested to be strongly negative, but this could not be ascertained. Type of ownership and age were both insignificant in their ability to explain company value.

Inledning: Huruvida insynsägande påverkar finansiell prestation är ett beforskat område där tidigare studier kommit fram till olika slutsatser. Utifrån agentteorin torde insynsägande ha en positiv påverkan på finansiell prestation, utifrån entrenchment-teorin torde insynsägande påverka finansiell prestation negativt i och med ökad makt. Samtidigt utifrån stewardship-teorin torde det inte finnas en relation mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att analysera sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation i svenska bolag vilka präglas av en hög förekomst av aktier med skilda röstvärden och en hög ägarkoncentration. Vidare är syftet att teoretiskt förklara de resultat som framkommer i denna uppsats för att redogöra för vilka befintliga teorier inom området som kan appliceras i en svensk kontext. Metod: För analysera sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation i svenska bolag har uppsatsen tagit en kvantitativ ansats med ett deduktivt synsätt där teori har testats genom en panelregression innehållande 300 observationer. Slutsats: Uppsatsens resultat påvisar att sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation, operationaliserat som Tobin's Q, tar sitt uttryck som ett inverterat U. I spannet 0 till 37,75 procent insynsägande finner vi stöd för en alignment-effekt samtidigt som vi finner stöd för entrenchment-effekten vid nivåer av insynsägande över brytpunkten på 37,75 procent. Vidare finner vi inget stöd för stewardship-teorin. Den brytpunkt som noterats i svenska bolag är lägre än den brytpunkt som påvisats i länder så som USA och Storbritannien. Förklaringen till detta kan vara den höga prevalensen av aktier med skilda röstvärden och den höga ägarkoncentration som präglar svenska företag. / Introduction: Whether Managerial Ownership affects financial performance is an area of research where previous studies have come to different conclusions. Based on Agency Theory, Managerial Ownership should have a positive impact on financial performance, and based on Entrenchment Theory, Managerial Ownership should have a negative impact on financial performance due to increased power. At the same time, based on Stewardship Theory, there should not be a relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance. Purpose: The purpose of the essay is to analyze the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance in Swedish companies, which are characterized by a high prevalence dual-class shares and a high ownership concentration. Furthermore, the purpose is to theoretically explain the results that appear in the essay to explain what existing theories in the field that can be applied in a Swedish context. Method: To analyze the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance in Swedish companies, the essay has taken a quantitative and deductive approach where theory has been tested through a panel regression containing 300 observations. Conclusion: The essays results show that the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance, operationalized as Tobin's Q, takes its expression as an inverted U. In the range 0 to 37.75 percent Managerial Ownership we find support for an alignment effect while also finding support for an entrenchment effect at levels of Managerial Ownership above the inflection point of 37.75 percent. Furthermore, we find no support for Stewardship Theory. The inflection point noted in Swedish companies is lower than the inflection points detected in countries such as the US and the UK. The explanation for this may be the high prevalence of dual-class shares and the high ownership concentration that characterizes Swedish companies.