A Ciência Política no Brasil tem se preocupado, nos últimos anos, em compreender o comportamento dos partidos surgidos após o período de redemocratização. Dentre as possíveis variáveis capazes de servir para explicar o fenômeno estão as coligações eleitorais, ainda pouco exploradas nos estudos. O objetivo dessa tese é compreender a existência de uma lógica capaz de explicar o comportamento das legendas em seus acordos para a disputa de prefeituras em 2000 e 2004. O universo pesquisado compreende os cerca de 5.560 municípios brasileiros e mais de treze mil candidaturas por ano, onde serão destacados os dez principais partidos brasileiros - PP(B), PFL, PL, PTB, PMDB, PSDB, PPS, PDT, PSB e PT. Parte-se da hipótese central de que existem variáveis capazes de explicar parte significativa desse ordenamento. Para tanto, realizam-se duas análises cuidadosas: da bibliografia e das questões institucionais. Nessa primeira parte destacam-se os estudos brasileiros sobre as coligações, desenvolvidos a partir do período da redemocratização dos anos 80, e as considerações de dois teóricos dos partidos políticos e suas considerações sobre as alianças: Maurice Duverger e Ângelo Panebianco. Na segunda parte os esforços se concentram na análise das leis que orientam a celebração de acordos eleitorais e os estatutos dos partidos selecionados, uma vez que o quadro institucional do país torna as legendas relativamente livres para a celebração de suas coligações. As duas últimas partes do trabalho se concentram em investigar se o comportamento dos partidos nos seus acordos em eleições majoritárias municipais tem relação com aspectos ideológicos e governamentais no plano federal ou com aspectos ligados ao alinhamento das legendas em cada estado, com destaque para a relação situação x oposição em torno da forte figura do governador. A conclusão caminha no sentido de aceitar esse segundo ambiente. Os partidos se organizam nos estados, e tal questão tem reflexo sobre as eleições municipais. / Brazilian political science has occupied itself for the last few years with analyzing the behavior of political parties. One of the variables that has some explanation power, and as of yet underrated in the field, are pre-electoral coalitions. This PhD thesis aims to check if there is a logic behind the main parties behavior regarding pre-electoral coalitions for mayorships in the elections of 2000 and 2004. Over 5,560 cities and 13,000 candidacies are analyzed and the parties studied are Brazil\'s ten main political parties: PP(B), PFL, PL, PTB, PMDB, PSDB, PPS, PDT, PSB e PT. We depart from the notion that there are many relevant variables that can explain why certain parties enter coalitions with others. For starters, we review the sparse literature regarding pre-electoral coalitions worldwide and specifically in Brazil and the work of two great political scientists: Maurice Duverger and Angelo Panebianco. Then we analyze the ten parties statutes to see how they regard the issue, since federal electoral laws are relatively permissive. The two last chapters investigate if pre-electoral coalitions in municipal elections are related to ideological and coalitional matters at the federal level or at the state level. The data show that the parties tend to organize themselves according to the governor\'s political position.

O sistema partidário-eleitoral brasileiro é tido como um dos mais fragmentados do mundo. As inferências para esse diagnóstico são extraídas do padrão de competição nas eleições proporcionais. O propósito da tese é estudar o sistema partidário brasileiro a partir das eleições majoritárias de 1989-2006. A tese tem como foco entender a dinâmica da competição política nessas disputas a partir da ação estratégica das elites partidárias. Do ponto de vista substantivo, o trabalho busca contribuir para o entendimento dos mecanismos que garantiram a dominância de PT e PSDB nas eleições presidenciais a partir de 1994. A tese busca demonstrar, ainda, a existência de estabilidade das clivagens políticas se tomarmos os Estados individualmente. O ponto de partida é que as eleições executivas são as mais importantes, tanto para as elites políticas como para os eleitores. Partidos políticos hierarquizam os diferentes pleitos. O argumento do trabalho é que o mecanismo central que garantiu a estabilidade da clivagem PT-PSDB foi a articulação nacional das candidaturas por meio das eleições para o governo do Estado. Esses dois partidos foram capazes de reproduzir essa clivagem nas diferentes disputas estaduais. A evidência empírica utilizada na análise é a frequência do lançamento de candidaturas dos nove maiores partidos nas eleições executivas. O custo de entrada das eleições majoritárias leva à criação de mercados eleitorais distintos no interior do sistema partidário brasileiro. O alto custo decorrente da baixa magnitude das eleições executivas torna esse mercado bastante concentrado. Assim, o padrão da competição política nas eleições majoritárias não apenas se encontra de acordo com a literatura institucionalista mas também apresenta uma estabilidade na identidade dos competidores tanto nas eleições presidenciais como, em menor medida, nas eleições para o governo estadual. / The brazilian electoral-party system is considered one of the most fragmented in the world. That diagnosis is based on the pattern of competition in proportional elections. The purpose of this thesis is to study the brazilian party system from the perspective of executive elections from 1989 to 2006. This thesis focuses on understanding the dynamics of political competition in these disputes from the strategic action of the party elites. Our central aim is to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms that ensured the dominance of PT and PSDB in the presidential elections since 1994. This thesis seeks to demonstrate also the existence of stability of political divisions if the states are taken individually. The starting point of this work is that the executive elections are the most important for both political elites and voters. Political parties rank the different types of competition. The argument of this paper is that the central mechanism which ensured the stability of the PT-PSDB cleavage was the articulation of national contest through the elections to the government of the state. These two parties were able to reproduce the various disputes in the states. The empirical evidence used in the analysis is the frequency of the launch of applications of the nine major parties in the executive elections. The cost of entering the elections majority takes the creation of separate markets within the electoral party system in Brazil. The high costs of low executive elections make this market highly concentrated. Thus, the pattern of the executive elections is not only according to the institutionalist literature, but also shows stability in the identity of competitors both in the presidential elections and, to a lesser extent, in elections to the states governments.

Cette thèse se donne pour objectif de questionner l’idée de la non existence d’« Europe politique ». Les programmes électoraux sont mis au centre de cette recherche. Ils permettent l’analyse du politique à la fois dans sa dimension cognitive et pragmatique. La première dimension est examinée à travers les mythes que ces discours construisent. La deuxième est examinée à partir des configurations de la production des programmes. L’analyse du rapport dialogique de ces deux dimensions permet de démystifier le politique européen. Les constats sont issus d’une enquête comparative des programmes des élections européennes de 2009, prenant en compte des partis et des contextes nationaux différents. Si ces programmes présentent des proximités importantes qui renforcent l’idée d’une « technocratisation du politique », les programmes construisent également des mythes diversifiés selon leur appartenance partisane et selon leur origine culturelle. Ils construisent des situations de « mésentente », condition fondamentale pour le politique. L’Europe politique existe ! Cette thèse va au-delà de cette affirmation afin de discuter les modalités de l’existence et de la production de ce politique. Elle montre que les mythes produits s’articulent avec le mode d’action des parlementaires au sein de l’UE, l’origine des participants dans les processus de production des programmes. Les résultats mettent en avant aussi que les mythes produits au niveau européen ne circulent pas de la même manière dans tous les États-membres : ils dépendent des enjeux locaux et sont inscrits dans des rapports symboliques qui cadrent les relations entre les « grands » et les « petits » de l’Europe. / The aim of this thesis is to question the idea of a "political Europe". The electoral platforms are placed at the centre of this research. They enable the analysis of “the political” in its double dimension: cognitive and pragmatic. The first dimension is examined through the myths that these discourses construct, the second through the configuration of the production of the platforms. The analysis of the dialogic relation between these two dimensions contributes to demystifying the myths of Europe. The findings are drawn from a comparative study of the programs of the elections of 2009, taking into account different parties and national contexts. These electoral programs contain important similarities which reinforce the idea of a “technocratisation of politics”. But the programs also produce various and contradictory myths, according to party affiliation and to cultural origins. They produce situations of “dissensus”, a fundamental condition for the political. The conclusion is that political Europe does exist. However, this thesis goes beyond this statement and opens the discussion on the modalities of existence, production and recontextualisation of this political. It shows that the constructed myths can be articulated as part of the activities within the European Parliament, the origin of participants in the process of production of electoral programs. The results also highlight that the myths constructed at the European Union level do not circulate and are not re-contextualised in the same way in all member-states: they depend on and are mediated via local issues and are embedded in the symbolic relations between the grands and the petits of Europe.

據稿本複印 / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學硏究院傳播學部,1993. / 參考文獻: leaves 88-92 / 許冬華. / Chapter 1. --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- 理論架構 --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- 批判研究與馬克思理論 / Chapter 2.2 --- 政治經濟學觀點與傳統馬克思理論 / Chapter 2.3 --- 媒介擁有者對媒介的影響 / Chapter 2.4 --- 廣告對媒介的影響 / Chapter 3. --- 澳門概況 --- p.19 / Chapter 3.1 --- 澳門的政治情況 / Chapter 3.2 --- 澳門的經濟狀況 / Chapter 3.3 --- 澳門的傳媒 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 報業簡史 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 現代澳門報業 / Chapter 4. --- 假設及研究方法 --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1 --- 假設 / Chapter 4.2 --- 量度與研究樣本 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 因變量一報導傾向 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 自變量一報章擁有者與中國勢力的密切程度 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 自變量一報章廣告來源依賴中國勢力程度 / Chapter 4.3 --- 訪問 / Chapter 5 . --- 研究結果與分析 --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1 --- 報章擁有者與報導傾向 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- 報導篇幅 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- 報導位置 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- 報導取向 / Chapter 5.1.4 --- 小结 / Chapter 5.2 --- 廣告來源與報導傾向 / Chapter 5.3 --- 廣告來源與澳門報業結構 / Chapter 6 . --- 討論及總結 --- p.70 / 註釋 --- p.76 / 書目 --- p.88 / 附錄一：編碼表 --- p.93 / 附錄二 ： 候選人名單 --- p.95

by Yuet-lin Lee. / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1987. / Bibliography: leaves 137-142.

by Law Wun-sheng. / Title on added t.p.: UDHK and election in Hong Kong : the behavior, strategies and objectives of a political elite group. / Copy 3 contains chapter 6-7. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-105). / ACKNOWLEDGMENT / INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Problem and Hypothesis / Data and Methodology / The Setting / Crisis and Opportunity / Elections in1991 / Emergence of UDHK / Chapter CHAPTER 1: --- FOUNDATION OF UDHK --- p.20 / Liberal Groups / A Common Goal / Infrastructure of UDHK / Moral and Contractual Basis / A Party of Populism? / Chapter CHAPTER 2: --- HYBRID OF WESTERN AND CHINESE CULTURES --- p.31 / Descendants of Refugees and Sojourners / Esoteric Socialization of Elite / Christianity and Rationality / Impersonal Standard / Impact of ICAC / Political Fabians / Normative and Pragmatic Rules / Principle of Calculation / Chapter CHAPTER 3: --- ELECTORAL STRATEGIES OF UDHK --- p.51 / Constraints and Restraints / A Mobilization Meeting / Action-set and Quasi-group / Home-visit to Voters / Joint-ticket Strategy / Principle of Reciprocity / Denigration and Negative Campaign / Traditional Strategies / Chapter CHAPTER 4: --- OBJECTIVES OF UDHK --- p.73 / A Greater Democracy in Hong Kong / Legislative Restraints / Universalistic and Particularistic Interests / Prestigious and Pecuniary Goals / The Burden of Chinese Culture / From 'Rose Garden' to 'Rosy China' / Chapter CHAPTER 5: --- CONCLUSION --- p.92 / NOTES --- p.98 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.102 / Chapter APPENDIX I - --- Interview Questionnaire --- p.106 / Chapter APPENDIX II - --- Home-visit Survey Questionnaire --- p.109 / CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN HONG KONG --- p.112 / POLITICAL HISTORY

Thesis (MPA.) -- University of Limpopo, 2018 / This study analyses the national election manifestos of the African National Congress on the subject of service delivery between 1994 and 2014. One of the arguments advanced in this thesis and corroborated in the theory of democratization by elections is that elections play an important role in the struggle for better governance and democracy. The election manifestos, in this regard, serve as instruments of ensuring accountability to the voters as well as gauging the performance of those in government. The party in government must implement its election manifestos; otherwise it must face electoral consequences through a democratic election process. However, there is a view aptly sustained in the study that elections are at times not a reliable or credible measure of a democratic outcome because many voters do not have the necessary knowledge to make rational choices in order to counteract the effects of poor or lack of implementation of election manifestos regarding service delivery. Therefore, as cautioned in the thesis, conscious public participation will remain an empty slogan if the majority of the electorate is left and forgotten languishing in poverty and arrogance. The sustainability of participation by citizens is hugely compromised in an environment infested with rampant corruption and runaway impunity. The study followed an interpretivist paradigm with a qualitative approach. ANC members in four villages –Duthuni, Tshisaulu, Ha-Mushavhanamadi and Ha-Ratshiedana (ward 35, Thulamela Municipality) were purposively targeted as the research population for the study. For practical reason, not all members of the ANC in the villages were reached to participate in the study. Ultimately, 42 members of the ANC in the villages formed the research sample. Data collection techniques used were face-to-face interviews, semi-structured questionnaire and document review (data triangulation). The rationale for using data triangulation in the study was to ensure that the weaknesses of a single data collection strategy were minimized and to ensure that the strategies complemented and verified one another. A total of 12 interviews were conducted, 30 questionnaires were administered and five ANC national election manifestos were perused. Three qualitative data analysis strategies were adopted, namely, conversation analysis, discourse analysis and content analysis. Analysis and interpretation of qualitative data consisted of words and observations and not numbers or statistics because the researcher did not want to quantify nor generate numerical data for purposes of statistical analysis.

My thesis contains essays on voting theory, market structures and fiscal federalism: (i) One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation, (ii) Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser, (iii) On the Influence of Rankings when Product Quality Depends on Buyer Characteristics, and (iv) Redistributing Income under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance. (i) One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation (joint with Micael Castanheira) In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence. (ii) Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser A crucial component of Runoff electoral systems is the threshold fraction of votes above which a candidate wins outright in the first round. I analyze the influence of this threshold on the voting equilibria in three-candidate Runoff elections. I demonstrate the existence of an Ortega Effect which may unduly favor dominated candidates and thus lead to the election of the Condorcet Loser in equilibrium. The reason is that, contrarily to commonly held beliefs, lowering the threshold for first-round victory may actually induce voters to express their preferences excessively. I also extend Duverger's Law to Runoff elections with any threshold below, equal or above 50%. Therefore, Runoff elections are plagued with inferior equilibria that induce either too high or too low expression of preferences. (iii) On the Influence of Rankings when Product Quality Depends on Buyer Characteristics Information on product quality is crucial for buyers to make sound choices. For "experience products", this information is not available at the time of the purchase: it is only acquired through consumption. For much experience products, there exist institutions that provide buyers with information about quality. It is commonly believed that such institutions help consumers to make better choices and are thus welfare improving. The quality of various experience products depends on the characteristics of buyers. For instance, conversely to the quality of cars, business school quality depends on buyers (i.e. students) characteristics. Indeed, one of the main inputs of a business school is enrolled students. The choice of buyers for such products has then some features of a coordination problem: ceteris paribus, a buyer prefers to buy a product consumed by buyers with "good" characteristics. This coordination dimension leads to inefficiencies when buyers coordinate on products of lower "intrinsic" quality. When the quality of products depends on buyer characteristics, information about product quality can reinforce such a coordination problem. Indeed, even though information of high quality need not mean high intrinsic quality, rational buyers pay attention to this information because they prefer high quality products, no matter the reason of the high quality. Information about product quality may then induce buyers to coordinate on products of low intrinsic quality. In this paper, I show that, for experience products which quality depends on the characteristics of buyers, more information is not necessarily better. More precisely, I prove that more information about product quality may lead to a Pareto deterioration, i.e. all buyers may be worse off due. (iv) Redistributing Income under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance (joint with Marjorie Gassner and Vincenzo Verardi) From the literature on decentralization, it appears that the fiscal vertical imbalance (i.e. the dependence of subnational governments on national government revenues to support their expenditures) is somehow inherent to multi-level governments. Using a stylized model we show that this leads to a reduction of the extent of redistributive fiscal policies if the maximal size of government has been reached. To test for this empirically, we use some high quality data from the LIS dataset on individual incomes. The results are highly significant and point in the direction of our theoretical predictions.

Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-71).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 401-410).