Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição municipal brasileira, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número real de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de Plurality (Maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de Majority Runoff (maioria absoluta)? Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de Plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de Majority Runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país. / We investigated the effect of the electoral formula in the Brazilian city, more precisely, in the elections for the office of Mayor in 2008 and 2012. We use the concept of electoral competition that corresponds to the number of effective candidates competing in each election. To measure this, we use the number of effective candidates (NCE), an index that establishes the actual number of applications that have weight in an electoral contest. Our guiding question is whether there would be differentiation on competition policy in cities with a single round using the formula Plurality (simple majority), compared with those cities that have the possibility of runoff using the formula Majority Runoff (absolute majority)? Our goal is to test the Laws of Duverger indicate that when using the formula Plurality tend to bicandidaturas while when we use the formula Majority Runoff tend to multicandidaturas in majority contention. This task is performed by the comparative analysis of municipal competitions in all Brazilian cities, using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that holds the results of the general elections in the country.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:25:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissEAC.pdf: 453086 bytes, checksum: adffd8356f5e2c14e6238c04faa71f7b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-12-07 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / Emphasizing the existing disproportions in the Brazilian electoral system, the present work analyses some of the elements which distort its proportionality such as, the formula for converting votes into seats - highest average (d'Hondt version) -, the clause of electoral exclusion, the electoral coalitions, and the unequal allocation of seats to each Brazilian state. Additionally, this work shows through simulations that an electoral system, which is free of clauses and coalitions and followed by redistribution of electoral district boundaries, leads to a considerable reduction in the country s existing electoral disproportion. / A presente pesquisa, dando ênfase às desproporcionalidades existentes no sistema eleitoral brasileiro, examina alguns dos elementos que distorcem a proporcionalidade do mesmo a fórmula de conversão dos votos em assentos (d Hondt de maiores médias), cláusula de exclusão eleitoral, coligações eleitorais e alocação desigual das cadeiras entre as unidades federativas. A mesma ilustra, por sua vez, através de simulações, que um sistema eleitoral isento de cláusulas e coligações e, ainda, seguido de uma redistritalização tende a reduzir consideravelmente a desproporcionalidade eleitoral do país.

Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição municipal brasileira, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número real de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de Plurality (Maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de Majority Runoff (maioria absoluta)? Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de Plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de Majority Runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país. / We investigated the effect of the electoral formula in the Brazilian city, more precisely, in the elections for the office of Mayor in 2008 and 2012. We use the concept of electoral competition that corresponds to the number of effective candidates competing in each election. To measure this, we use the number of effective candidates (NCE), an index that establishes the actual number of applications that have weight in an electoral contest. Our guiding question is whether there would be differentiation on competition policy in cities with a single round using the formula Plurality (simple majority), compared with those cities that have the possibility of runoff using the formula Majority Runoff (absolute majority)? Our goal is to test the Laws of Duverger indicate that when using the formula Plurality tend to bicandidaturas while when we use the formula Majority Runoff tend to multicandidaturas in majority contention. This task is performed by the comparative analysis of municipal competitions in all Brazilian cities, using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that holds the results of the general elections in the country.

Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição municipal brasileira, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número real de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de Plurality (Maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de Majority Runoff (maioria absoluta)? Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de Plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de Majority Runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país. / We investigated the effect of the electoral formula in the Brazilian city, more precisely, in the elections for the office of Mayor in 2008 and 2012. We use the concept of electoral competition that corresponds to the number of effective candidates competing in each election. To measure this, we use the number of effective candidates (NCE), an index that establishes the actual number of applications that have weight in an electoral contest. Our guiding question is whether there would be differentiation on competition policy in cities with a single round using the formula Plurality (simple majority), compared with those cities that have the possibility of runoff using the formula Majority Runoff (absolute majority)? Our goal is to test the Laws of Duverger indicate that when using the formula Plurality tend to bicandidaturas while when we use the formula Majority Runoff tend to multicandidaturas in majority contention. This task is performed by the comparative analysis of municipal competitions in all Brazilian cities, using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that holds the results of the general elections in the country.

The diploma thesis deals with regional differencies in voting results of individual Czech political parties. The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part describes a theory of voting systems, focuses on their variants and explains also impact on voting results. The second part contains various types of analysis of voting results of elections into Czech Parliament during period of years 1996 -- 2006. In analysis there we calculate with voting results and social-econimic characteristics for each region. The target of analysis is to find out measure of correlation between mentioned datas.

Contemporary electoral system of Czech Republic is not optimal. It is really difficult to find favorable and also acceptable system. After the velvet revolution and the political and economic transformation was hard to find operational governments. The winning party is not able to create a majority government. There are just minority governments or governments with support of some opposite M.P.s. Is it the change of electoral system the possible way to solution of problematic situation after elections? The thesis takes into account historical context and present discussion about possible changes of electoral systems.

This thesis is focused on analyzing the reforms of the electoral system in Ukraine, during the period from gaining independence to the present. The main goal is to determine the reasons of the electoral reforms, and which political entities have become initiators of those changes in case of (non) existence inherent factors. The hypothesis of the thesis is whether political entities sought to maintain or strengthen its position in the Parliament, rather than contribute to the improvement of the electoral process.

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the formation and the development of the electoral system to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, with a focus on the impact of the decisions of the Constitutional Court on the current variables of an electoral system. The first part (the theoretical one) offers an explanation of the main terms used in the area of electoral systems. It especially deals with a classification of electoral systems by presenting the two main families of the electoral systems. Furthermore, an explanation of the basic terms used in the area of electoral systems is provided. The two main formulas for a seat allocation to parties are explained. The second part of the thesis is broader. It concentrates on the electoral system used in the Czech Republic for elections to the Chamber of Deputies. First of all, it pays attention to the formation of a constitutional provision concerning the electoral system. After that, it examines the electoral law relating to elections to the Czech Parliament, taking into account amendments of this piece of legislation. This part of the thesis also provides an in depth analysis of the decisions of the Czech Constitutional Court relating to the dimensions of the electoral law. Moreover, extensive parts are devoted not only to the implemented reforms of the electoral systems, but also to the ones that were not put into practice. Finally, recent proposals for amendments of the variables of the electoral systems are mentioned and evaluated.

Because of contemporary unsatisfactory political situation in the Czech Republic, caused by presence of widespread corruption networks, many civic initiatives have been established to improve the status quo. This diploma thesis describes two NGO's, which focus on electoral system change of the lower chamber of the parliament of the Czech Republic. These organizations are Přímá volba poslanců 2014 (Direct election of Members of Parliament 2014) and electoral reform of Karel Janeček which is promoted by NGO Pozitivní evoluce (Positive evolution). The thesis is a comparative case study of these two organizations. The main goal is to do complex analysis of these two organizations, and identify interests, which lead them to pursue the electoral system change. Furthermore, basic effects of electoral systems and their changes are described. One of the chapters describes the development of the debate over the electoral system change in the past 20 years and mentions the attitude of contemporary political parties and their representatives to electoral system reform.

Esta pesquisa traz 3 estudos independentes, sobre temas ligados às questões do que é nacionalização partidária e como nacionalização, regionalização e localismo são afetados por e afetam os sistemas eleitorais e partidários. Mais especificamente, no capítulo 1 proponho uma nova definição teórica de nacionalização dos partidos e sistemas partidários. Argumento que tal conceito pode ser dividido em 4 dimensões, que são a nacionalização da organização partidária, da oferta eleitoral, da demanda eleitoral e dos resultados eleitorais. Em seguida, aplico esse quadro teórico ao caso brasileiro para mostrar como, de fato, maior precisão conceitual altera a leitura empírica que se faz de um sistema. No capítulo 2, exploro uma das consequências da nacionalização partidária, que vem sendo teorizada pela literatura mas nunca testada de modo direto. Trata-se da ideia de que nacionalização seria o que conecta as circunscrições eleitorais e faz as proposições de Duverger passarem do nível local ao nacional. Para testar isso, incluirei nacionalização dos sistemas partidários pela primeira vez num modelo de número de partidos - aptos lidar com problemas de endogeneidade que vêm impedindo autores de fazerem isso. Assim, será possível provar e demonstrar que a não inclusão de nacionalização vem causando viés de variável omitida nos modelos da literatura. Quando esse é corrigo, através da inclusão de nacionalização por um sistema de equações simultâneas, altera-se algumas das interpretações canônicas sobre a fragmentação partidária. Por fim, no capítulo 3 reavalio a ideia comum de que sistemas eleitorais com voto pessoal levariam candidatos a ter apoio eleitoral geograficamente concentrado, portanto localista. Ofereço uma discussão teórica e evidências de que tal padrão territorial não é a regra do que vem ocorrendo, por exemplo, em sistemas de lista aberta. Além disso, tanto concentrar votos como espalhá-los vem dando dividendos eleitorais e poucos candidatos conseguem atingir patamares altos de concentração, a um nível que prediga real aumento nas chances de eleição. / This research oers 3 independent studies on the questions of what is party nationalization, how nationalization, regionalization or localism are aected by and aect the electoral systems and the party systems. More specically, in the 1st chapter a new theoretical denition of party and party system nationalization is presented, dividing such concept into four dimensions - the nationalization of party organization, of the electoral supply, of the electoral demand and of the electoral outcome. After that, such a theoretical framework is applied to the Brazilian case to demonstrate how, in fact, more conceptual precision can alter empirical readings about a given party system. The 2nd chapter explores one of the consequences of party system nationalization, which literature has theorized but never tested directly. Namely, the idea that party nationalization would be what puts the electoral circumscriptions together and what makes Duvergerian propositions move from the local to the national level. To test that, party system nationalization is included for the rst time in a model of eective number of parties, after handling endogeneity problems that have prevented scholars from doing the same. With such inclusion, it will be proven and demonstrated that omitting party nationalization from models of number of parties, which is a common practice, incurs in omitted variable bias. In fact, such correct inclusion of party nationalization trough a system of simultaneous equations corrects that bias, altering some of the canonical interpretations about party system fragmentation. Lastly, in the 3rd chapter I reevaluate the common idea that electoral systems with personal voting would lead to geographical concentration (i.e. localization) of candidates\' electoral support. I oer a theoretical discussion and then empirical evidence that such territorial pattern is not the rule of what happens for instance in open-list PR. Besides, both concentrating and spreading votes are electorally protable results and very few candidates achieve levels of concentration that predicts eective increases in the odds of being elected.