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¡iabract¡j From the past to the present, we can find no matter mass media, public opinion, and even the government party and opposition party is in support of neutrality of the Speaker, nevertheless, it had been unable to accomplish the purpose in past decade. What we see is endless arguments, as often as there is election of the premier of legislative yuan or bill battle. Hence, the author thinks there is a gap between our subjective expectation and objective reality about neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan, otherwise why we can¡¦t put neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan into practice for a long time. So this text thinks whether the premier of legislative yuan should be development toward neutralization, it is worth to discuss. It is necessary to inspect the possibility of neutral development for the premier of legislative yuan. In this article, we define the meaning of neutrality of the Speaker includes three levels, such as neutrality of agenda, neutrality of political party and neutrality of electoral district, etc., and under the prerequisite of these three meaning, the Speaker acted multiple roles including congress chairman, legislative chief, representatives of political party, representatives of electoral district and coordinator, etc. And some of them are useful to neutrality; some of them are conflict and contradictive to neutrality. Further, these roles would be influenced by the historical background, political culture, constitutional government system, political party, electoral system, and parliamentary norm and convention. So from this point of view, we observe experience of foreign the Speaker and inspect key factor influencing role of the Speaker. At the same time, we also explored key factor influencing role of the premier of legislative yuan, and compared with both, to present useful and unfavorable conditions about neutrality. Eventually, according to these conditions, we analyze the possibility of neutral development for the premier of legislative yuan, and make the relevant suggestions. We find out something in the course of studying. At first, our government trends towards presidential government in constitutional government system, the administration and legislation is split, it is useful to strengthen orientation of representatives of political party of the premier of legislative yuan. Secondly, if the premier of legislative yuan wants to be the Speaker, he has to rely on the strength of the political party in election, it makes the premier of legislative yuan cant¡¦t keep neutrality. Finally, the establishment of legislative yuan is very short, norm and conventions that it is useful to neutrality is not formed, such as the Speaker withdrawing from the political party or setting up several vice speakers to share agenda resources. And this also makes neutral development of the premier of legislative yuan more and more difficult. So we get a clear understanding of our current institutional reality, it is unfavorable to neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan. Consequently, we should develop towards the American type of the Speaker, to strengthen authority of the premier of legislative yuan, to make him lead the political party and integrate the legislative to restrict the executive power, to improve the entity of the whole legislative yuan. Key word: the premier of legislative yuan, the Speaker , neutrality of the Speaker , neutrality of agenda , neutrality of political party , neutrality of electoral district, Constitutional government system , political party , electoral system , parliamentary norm and convention

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Submitted by Cristiane Oliveira (cristiane.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T20:52:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200029.pdf: 793251 bytes, checksum: 75ecb8c6d1adbcbf262a678b56a7ee11 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T20:54:52Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200029.pdf: 793251 bytes, checksum: 75ecb8c6d1adbcbf262a678b56a7ee11 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T20:55:35Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200029.pdf: 793251 bytes, checksum: 75ecb8c6d1adbcbf262a678b56a7ee11 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-10T21:35:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200029.pdf: 793251 bytes, checksum: 75ecb8c6d1adbcbf262a678b56a7ee11 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-17 / Constitutions arose as a proper tool to establish and legitimize the government bound to the sovereign will of the people. Currently, Constitutions are also guarantors of political, social, economic, cultural and diffuse rights. The constitutional concept is founded on the idea of supremacy of the Constitution, and from this idea, results the judicial review of laws. After the middle of the twentieth century, the judicial review was expressly incorporated into various jurisdictions. There is, however, a strong democratic objection to the judicial review, under the rationale that judges are not elected by popular vote and therefore could not control rules issued by those to whom the people delegated the exercise of political power. In this debate, one can identify three positions: a more radical one, defending the judicial self restraint, and two others advocating the legitimacy of the judicial review by the judicial procedure (to preserve the integrity of the democratic process) or by substance (to ensure moral rights to individuals, aimed at the collective welfare). Despite this discussion, the possibility of judicial review is confirmed in the Brazilian legal system since the Constitution of 1891. Under the 1988 Constitution, the task of "guardian of the Constitution" rests with the Federal Supreme Court, which exercises it both by means of concentrated control or when it analyzes, in the higher instance, constitutional issues raised in the sphere of diffuse control. It is worth mentioning that STF is not far from its function of protecting the Constitution, even when it performs other roles conferred on it. From the analysis of decisions issued by Federal Supreme Court in hard cases regarding the political-representative system, this thesis aims at inquiring how the Federal Supreme Court understands its institutional role in defining political issues and to what extent the constitutional jurisdiction contributes to the maturing of the Brazilian democratic system. / As Constituições surgiram como um instrumento apto a constituir e legitimar o governo vinculado à vontade soberana do povo. Atualmente, as Constituições são também garantidoras de direitos políticos, sociais, econômicos, culturais e difusos. A proposta constitucionalista é fundada na ideia de supremacia da Constituição e, deste ideal, decorre o controle de constitucionalidade das leis. Após meados do século XX, o controle de constitucionalidade foi expressamente incorporado a diversos ordenamentos jurídicos. Existe, no entanto, uma forte objeção democrática ao controle judicial de constitucionalidade, sob o argumento de que os juízes não são eleitos pelo voto popular e, por isso, não poderiam controlar normas editadas por aqueles a quem o povo delegou o exercício do poder político. Nesse debate, é possível identificar três posições: uma mais radical, que defende o self restraint judicial, e outras duas que defendem a legitimação da jurisdição constitucional pelo procedimento (para preservar a integridade do processo democrático) ou pela substância (para assegurar direitos morais dos indivíduos, voltados para o bem-estar coletivo). Apesar de tal discussão, a possibilidade de controle judicial de constitucionalidade está positivada no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro desde a Constituição de 1891. Nos termos da Constituição de 1988, a tarefa de 'guardião da Constituição' cabe ao Supremo Tribunal Federal, que a realiza tanto por meio de controle concentrado ou quando analisa, em última instância, questões constitucionais levantadas em sede de controle difuso. Cumpre observar que o STF não se distancia da sua função de proteger a Constituição, mesmo quando exerce outras funções que lhe foram conferidas pelo texto constitucional. A partir do estudo de decisões do STF proferidas em casos difíceis relacionados ao sistema político-representativo, o presente trabalho visa a perquirir como o STF compreende seu papel institucional na definição de questões políticas e, em que medida, a jurisdição constitucional contribui para o amadurecimento do regime democrático brasileiro.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo fazer uma análise das coligações presidenciais vencedoras entre 1994 e 2010 comparando duas dimensões de análise: a ideologia e o pragmatismo eleitoral. A dimensão ideológica mediu a consistência das coligações. A dimensão pragmática avaliou o horário gratuito de propaganda eleitoral, a representação ministerial dos partidos que compunham a coligação vencedora (excluído o partido do presidente), e a representação eleita à Câmara dos Deputados. O estudo apresentou evidências de que os partidos atribuem maior importância à dimensão pragmática do que a ideológica quando definem suas estratégias de campanha. / This work aims to make an analysis on the winning electoral presidential coalitions between 1994 and 2010, comparing two different dimensions: ideology and electoral pragmatism. The ideological dimension of the presidential coalitions was based on their consistency. The pragmatic dimension assessed the campaign time available on TV for each coalition, the distribution on the representation of the coalitions’ parties on the presidential cabinet (presidential party excluded), and the amount of representation concerning the coalitions’ parties elected on the Chamber of Deputies. The study shed light on evidences that generally the parties give more importance to pragmatic aspects than ideological ones when they define their electoral strategies.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo fazer uma análise das coligações presidenciais vencedoras entre 1994 e 2010 comparando duas dimensões de análise: a ideologia e o pragmatismo eleitoral. A dimensão ideológica mediu a consistência das coligações. A dimensão pragmática avaliou o horário gratuito de propaganda eleitoral, a representação ministerial dos partidos que compunham a coligação vencedora (excluído o partido do presidente), e a representação eleita à Câmara dos Deputados. O estudo apresentou evidências de que os partidos atribuem maior importância à dimensão pragmática do que a ideológica quando definem suas estratégias de campanha. / This work aims to make an analysis on the winning electoral presidential coalitions between 1994 and 2010, comparing two different dimensions: ideology and electoral pragmatism. The ideological dimension of the presidential coalitions was based on their consistency. The pragmatic dimension assessed the campaign time available on TV for each coalition, the distribution on the representation of the coalitions’ parties on the presidential cabinet (presidential party excluded), and the amount of representation concerning the coalitions’ parties elected on the Chamber of Deputies. The study shed light on evidences that generally the parties give more importance to pragmatic aspects than ideological ones when they define their electoral strategies.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo fazer uma análise das coligações presidenciais vencedoras entre 1994 e 2010 comparando duas dimensões de análise: a ideologia e o pragmatismo eleitoral. A dimensão ideológica mediu a consistência das coligações. A dimensão pragmática avaliou o horário gratuito de propaganda eleitoral, a representação ministerial dos partidos que compunham a coligação vencedora (excluído o partido do presidente), e a representação eleita à Câmara dos Deputados. O estudo apresentou evidências de que os partidos atribuem maior importância à dimensão pragmática do que a ideológica quando definem suas estratégias de campanha. / This work aims to make an analysis on the winning electoral presidential coalitions between 1994 and 2010, comparing two different dimensions: ideology and electoral pragmatism. The ideological dimension of the presidential coalitions was based on their consistency. The pragmatic dimension assessed the campaign time available on TV for each coalition, the distribution on the representation of the coalitions’ parties on the presidential cabinet (presidential party excluded), and the amount of representation concerning the coalitions’ parties elected on the Chamber of Deputies. The study shed light on evidences that generally the parties give more importance to pragmatic aspects than ideological ones when they define their electoral strategies.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Roberto Venegeroles Nascimento / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Matemática , 2017. / Neste trabalho foram apresentados, contextualmente, os métodos de "eleições por ordem de mérito" e de "eleições particulares", ambos propostos em [1] pelo matemático francês Jean Charles Borda (1733 ¿ 1799) em 1770 como alternativa ao "método usual de contagem de votos". Borba percebeu que o "método usual de contagem de votos" apresenta falhas porque em eleições com mais de dois candidatos pode-se não reproduzir adequadamente a preferência da maioria dos eleitores. Posteriormente, foi apresentado o "método de Condorcet", proposto em [2] pelo matemático francês Marie Jean Antonie Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet (1743 ¿ 1794) em 1785 para responder às falhas identificadas nos métodos propostos por Borda e, consequentemente, no "método usual de contagem de votos". Condorcet percebeu que, embora menos que o "método usual de contagem de votos", os métodos propostos por Borda também apresentam falhas porque é possível que sejam utilizados votos ou candidatos de maneira estratégica para manipular o resultado da eleição. O referido método foi apresentado com base no método publicado pelo matemático e economista americano Hobart Peyton Young (1945 ¿) em 1988 na obra "Condorcet¿s Theory of Voting" [3] pelo American Political Science Review. Por conseguinte, foram apresentadas três demonstrações distintas do "Teorema da Impossibilidade de Arrow", proposto em [4] pelo matemático e economista americano Kenneth Joseph Arrow (1921 ¿ 2017) em 1950, no qual, mostrou que considerando determinadas condições, em eleições com mais de dois candidatos, não há um método democraticamente consistente de escolher um candidato vencedor, pois não existe uma forma perfeita de construir uma preferência social a partir das preferências individuais dos eleitores. As referidas demonstrações foram apresentadas com base nas demonstrações publicadas pelo matemático e economista americano John Geanakoplos (1955 ¿) em 2005 no artigo "Three brief proofs of Arrow¿s Impossibility Theorem" [5] pelo Journal Economic Theory. Por fim, foram apresentadas as conclusões e consequências do "Teorema da Impossibilidade de Arrow" sobre sistemas eleitorais. / In this work were presented, contextually, the methods of "elections in order of merit" and "private elections", both proposed in [1] by the french mathematician Jean Charles Borda (1733 ¿ 1799) in 1770 as an alternative to the "usual method of counting votes". Borda realized that the "usual method of counting votes" presents flaws because in elections with more than two candidates it doesn¿t reproduce the adequately preference of the majority of voters. Posteriorly, the "Condorcet method" was presented, proposed in [2] by the french mathematician Marie Jean Antonie Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet (1743 ¿ 1794) in 1785 to respond to the flaws identified in the methods proposed by Borda and, consequently, in the "usual method of counting votes". Condorcet realized that, although less than the "usual method of counting votes", the methods proposed by Borda also present flaws because it is possible that votes or candidates are used strategically to manipulate the election result. This method was presented based on the method published by the american mathematician and economist Hobart Peyton Young (1945 - ...) in 1988 in the work "Condorcet¿s Theory of Voting" [3] by the American Political Science Review. Therefore, three distinct demonstrations of the "Arrow Impossibility Theorem" were presented, proposed in [4] by the american mathematician and economist Kenneth Joseph Arrow (1921 ¿ 2017) in 1950, in which, it has been shown that given certain conditions, in elections with more than two candidates, there is no democratically consistent method of choosing a winning candidate, as there is no perfect way to build a social preference based on the individual preferences of voters. These statements were presented based on the statements publishe by the american mathematician and economist John Geanakoplos (1955 - ...) in 2005 in the article "Three brief proofs of Arrow¿s Impossibility Theorem" [5] by the Journal Economic Theory. Finally, the conclusions and consequences of "Arrow¿s Impossibility Theorem" on electoral systems were presented.

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

This master thesis focuses on the changes in domestic and foreign policy during the presidency of Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2006-2010). The goal of this study is to find out whether systemic changes in domestic politics and/or reorientation in foregin policy have taken place within the regional shift to the left. The paper is divided into four logically connected chapters. The conclusion is that, despite several partial changes in domestic sphere and a major emphasis in regional aspects of foreign policy, no aforementioned profound changes have occurred.