Les droits français et allemand ont, par des dispositions constitutionnelles ou des lois d’exception, contribué à l’avènement des régimes autoritaires des années 30 et 40. Et l’on sait qu’à la suite de la seconde guerre mondiale, les attaques se sont multipliées contre la doctrine positiviste, accusée d’avoir favorisé une attitude de passivité à l’égard de l’instrumentalisation du droit par les forces antidémocratiques. C’est pourquoi,à l’encontre de la neutralité des théories juridiques et politiques de l’avant-guerre, il est assez généralement admis depuis que les valeurs de la démocratie méritent d’être défendues, en particulier en distinguant l’état d’exception (légal ou non) démocratique et de l’état d’exception antidémocratique. Or, loin de naître après la seconde guerre mondiale, l’idée d’après laquelle le formalisme juridique rendrait les constitutions démocratiques impuissantes à se préserver de leurs ennemis émerge dès l’entre-deux guerres chez le sulfureux juriste allemand Carl Schmitt. C’est la genèse du déplacement qui conduit à faire de l’état d’exception une question proprement démocratique et substitue à la question du respect de la légalité celle de la préservation de la démocratiequi fait l’objet de notre travail de doctorat. Nous examinons d’abord comment les conflits qui scindent la réflexion juridique portant sur les pouvoirs de crise répondent en France à la crise du parlementarisme en prenant appui sur les travaux de Hauriou, Duguit et Carré de Malberg ; nous montrons ensuite qu’elle correspond en Allemagne à de véritables alternatives opposants des conceptions antinomiques de la démocratie en prenant appui sur les travaux de Schmitt, que nous éclairons par l’étude des auteurs auxquels le juriste fait référence – en particulier Kelsen. / French and German law contributed, through constitutional provisions or laws of exception, to the rise of the authoritarian regimes of the 1930 and 1940s.Following the Second World War, positivist doctrine increasingly came under attack for having induced passivity when law was used to serve antidemocratic purposes.Accordingly, the interwar vision of legal and political theories as neutral gave way to the view that the values of democracy must be defended, particularly by distinguishing between the democratic state of exception (legal or not) and the antidemocratic state of exception.But interestingly, the idea that legal formalism rendered democratic constitutions powerless to protect themselves from enemies was first formulated not after the Second World War, but during the interwar period,by controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt. The genesis of a shift that turned the state of exception into a democratic issue, substituting respect for legality with conservation of democracy, is the object of this work. Drawing on Hauriou, Duguit and Carré de Malberg, we first examine how conflicts over the emergency powers that opposed legal theorists emerged as a solution to the crisis of parliamentary government in France. We then show how in Germany the theory constituted a real alternative to conflicting conceptions of democracy. The works of Schmitt are examined in the light of other authors, particularly Kelsen, to whom he referred.

A presente dissertação trata da relação entre democracia e poderes emergenciais tendo como análise o caso dos Estados Unidos depois dos atentados terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001. Fundamentalmente, tratamos da expansão dos poderes do presidente norte-americano, George W. Bush, propiciada pela chamada “guerra contra o terrorismo”. Nosso objetivo é o de demonstrar como se deu essa ampliação dos poderes do presidente, tratando especificamente das questões atinentes à Ordem Militar de novembro de 2001 que possibilitou a prisão de suspeitos de terrorismo por parte das forças armadas norte-americanas e seu envio à Base Naval de Guantánamo, Cuba. Além disso, analisamos o comportamento da população, do Legislativo e do Judiciário durante a primeira administração republicana, demonstrando a fragilidade do sistema de checks and balances durantes emergências. Por fim, concluímos que ocorreu, por parte do Executivo, uma interpretação soberana da Constituição e das leis que, com o maciço apoio da população, impôs restrições ao funcionamento dos checks and balances e possibilitou a violação de direitos de cidadãos e estrangeiros, como mostrou o caso dos detentos em Guantánamo e em solo norte-americano. / This dissertation deals with the relationship between democracy and emergency powers, analyzing the case of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Fundamentally, we study the expansion of the powers of U.S. President George W. Bush, provided by the "war on terror”. Our goal is to demonstrate how did this expansion of presidential powers, dealing specifically with issues related to the Military Order of November 2001 that led to the arrest of suspected terrorists by the armed forces of U.S. and sent to the Naval Base Guantanamo, Cuba. Furthermore, we analyze the behavior of the population, the legislature and the judiciary during the first Republican administration, demonstrating the fragility of the system of checks and balances during emergencies. Finally, we conclude that occurred by the Executive, a sovereign interpretation of the Constitution and laws, with massive popular support, has imposed restrictions on the operation of checks and balances and the possible violation of rights of citizens and foreigners, as shown the case of detainees in Guantanamo and U.S. soil.

A presente dissertação trata da relação entre democracia e poderes emergenciais tendo como análise o caso dos Estados Unidos depois dos atentados terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001. Fundamentalmente, tratamos da expansão dos poderes do presidente norte-americano, George W. Bush, propiciada pela chamada “guerra contra o terrorismo”. Nosso objetivo é o de demonstrar como se deu essa ampliação dos poderes do presidente, tratando especificamente das questões atinentes à Ordem Militar de novembro de 2001 que possibilitou a prisão de suspeitos de terrorismo por parte das forças armadas norte-americanas e seu envio à Base Naval de Guantánamo, Cuba. Além disso, analisamos o comportamento da população, do Legislativo e do Judiciário durante a primeira administração republicana, demonstrando a fragilidade do sistema de checks and balances durantes emergências. Por fim, concluímos que ocorreu, por parte do Executivo, uma interpretação soberana da Constituição e das leis que, com o maciço apoio da população, impôs restrições ao funcionamento dos checks and balances e possibilitou a violação de direitos de cidadãos e estrangeiros, como mostrou o caso dos detentos em Guantánamo e em solo norte-americano. / This dissertation deals with the relationship between democracy and emergency powers, analyzing the case of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Fundamentally, we study the expansion of the powers of U.S. President George W. Bush, provided by the "war on terror”. Our goal is to demonstrate how did this expansion of presidential powers, dealing specifically with issues related to the Military Order of November 2001 that led to the arrest of suspected terrorists by the armed forces of U.S. and sent to the Naval Base Guantanamo, Cuba. Furthermore, we analyze the behavior of the population, the legislature and the judiciary during the first Republican administration, demonstrating the fragility of the system of checks and balances during emergencies. Finally, we conclude that occurred by the Executive, a sovereign interpretation of the Constitution and laws, with massive popular support, has imposed restrictions on the operation of checks and balances and the possible violation of rights of citizens and foreigners, as shown the case of detainees in Guantanamo and U.S. soil.

Scholars of human rights and constitutional law have described in great detail the abuses perpetrated by the armed forces and secret services of the United States in the context of the ‘war on terror’. There is copious literature explaining why these violations of fundamental human rights are not justifiable, and why they are not consistent with international treaties or that nation’s constitution. This thesis builds upon this research, but strikes out in a new direction. It does so by asking whether these abuses, combined with the changes to the legal order of the United States that made them possible, have produced a qualitative transformation of its constitutional structure. In particular, this thesis tracks the empowering of the executive. Increasingly, whenever it purports to act in the interests of national security, the executive claims the authority to act unilaterally in a manner that overrides even non-derogable rights. These novel constitutional reserve powers, which this thesis demonstrates were derived from President Nixon’s theory of the executive, were used to justify indefinite arbitrary detention, torture, mass surveillance without warrants, and extra-judicial execution. This thesis seeks to determine if the constitutional crisis inaugurated by this theory of executive supremacy over the laws has been terminated, or whether it has continued into the Obama Administration. If this theory is current within the executive branch, and especially if the violations of jus cogens norms has continued, it signifies a cross-party consensus about a paradigm shift in American constitutionalism. Accordingly, given the fact that the abuse of executive supremacy is what led to the development of the rule of law, this thesis will ask the question of whether the United States is being governed in accordance with its basic minimum norms. This thesis explores whether the executive is still subject to checks and balances from the legislature and the judiciary, such that it cannot violate non-derogable rights at will and with impunity. If the contrary proposition is true, it demonstrates that the crisis of the rule of law in the United States is ongoing, and this permanent state of exception demands significantly more scholarly attention. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD

Scholars of human rights and constitutional law have described in great detail the abuses perpetrated by the armed forces and secret services of the United States in the context of the ‘war on terror’. There is copious literature explaining why these violations of fundamental human rights are not justifiable, and why they are not consistent with international treaties or that nation’s constitution. This thesis builds upon this research, but strikes out in a new direction. It does so by asking whether these abuses, combined with the changes to the legal order of the United States that made them possible, have produced a qualitative transformation of its constitutional structure. In particular, this thesis tracks the empowering of the executive. Increasingly, whenever it purports to act in the interests of national security, the executive claims the authority to act unilaterally in a manner that overrides even non-derogable rights. These novel constitutional reserve powers, which this thesis demonstrates were derived from President Nixon’s theory of the executive, were used to justify indefinite arbitrary detention, torture, mass surveillance without warrants, and extra-judicial execution. This thesis seeks to determine if the constitutional crisis inaugurated by this theory of executive supremacy over the laws has been terminated, or whether it has continued into the Obama Administration. If this theory is current within the executive branch, and especially if the violations of jus cogens norms has continued, it signifies a cross-party consensus about a paradigm shift in American constitutionalism. Accordingly, given the fact that the abuse of executive supremacy is what led to the development of the rule of law, this thesis will ask the question of whether the United States is being governed in accordance with its basic minimum norms. This thesis explores whether the executive is still subject to checks and balances from the legislature and the judiciary, such that it cannot violate non-derogable rights at will and with impunity. If the contrary proposition is true, it demonstrates that the crisis of the rule of law in the United States is ongoing, and this permanent state of exception demands significantly more scholarly attention. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD

L’analyse de l’évolution des normes juridiques relatives aux pouvoirs de crise, principalement depuis le milieu du XXe siècle, permet de mettre en lumière le profond renouvellement de la matière du point de vue du droit international et des droits internes des États. Il existe un processus dynamique entre les deux sphères : l’expérience des États contribue aux développements du droit international qui lui-même nourrit l’évolution du droit interne. Ce processus dynamique est guidé par l’émergence du concept de l’État de droit et par la nécessité pour les États de garantir le respect des droits et libertés des individus. Il engendre la création d’un régime juridique international de l’état d’exception, c’est-à-dire la mise en place d’un ensemble cohérent de règles relatives aux pouvoirs de crise. Ce régime vise à faire de l’état d’exception une institution de l’État de droit, au même titre que la séparation des pouvoirs ou que l’existence de recours juridictionnels visant à protéger le principe de juridicité. Au niveau interne, la grande majorité des États, du moins ceux soumis à la juridiction de la Cour interaméricaine ou à celle de la Cour européenne qui sont l’objet de cette étude comparée, retiennent l’idée d’institutionnalisation des pouvoirs de crise. Les constituants prennent en compte les évolutions internationales en la matière et développent de nombreux mécanismes visant à inscrire l’état d’exception dans les principes de l’État de droit. Il en ressort un travail d’ingénierie constitutionnelle qui s’attelle à encadrer les pouvoirs de crise de manière minutieuse, en espérant ainsi garantir l’existence de ces pouvoirs, dans l’assurance que ceux-ci ne serviront pas à des fins détournées. / Analysis of the evolution of norms relating to emergency powers, essentially beginning in the mid-twentieth century, is an excellent way of highlighting the far reaching renewal in this particular area both in terms of international law and in terms of internal law within individual States. A dynamic relationship can be observed between these two spheres in that the experiences of individual States contribute to the development of international law which in turn leads to an evolution of internal law. The emergence of the concept of the rule of law and the need for States to ensure respect for individual rights and freedom serve as guidelines for this dynamic process. Thus is born an international legal regime governing emergency powers, the establishment of a coherent set of rules concerning powers available at times of crisis. The objective of such a regime is to make emergency powers an essential part of the rule of law, much like the separation of powers or the existence of judicial remedies. With regard to domestic law, the majority of States, or at least those under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights which constitute the body of this comparative study, retain the notion of institutionalization of emergency powers. Constitution making takes account of international developments in this particular field, putting in place and developing a variety of mechanisms with the aim of establishing emergency powers within the principle of the rule of law. The result is a work of constitutional engineering aimed at meticulously framing emergency powers, thereby guaranteeing the existence of these powers but also ensuring that they are not used for nefarious purposes. / El análisis de la evolución de las normas jurídicas relativas a los poderes de crisis, principalmente a partirde la segunda mitad del siglo XX, permite poner de manifiesto la profunda renovación de la materia, tantodel punto de vista del derecho internacional como del derecho interno de los Estados. Existe un procesodinámico entre las dos esferas : la experiencia de los Estados contribuye al desarrollo del derechointernacional que, a su vez, participa en la evolución del derecho interno. Este proceso dinámico, guiadotanto por la emergencia del concepto de Estado de Derecho como por la necesidad de los Estados degarantizar el respeto de los derechos y libertades de los individuos, engendra la creación de un régimenjurídico internacional del estado de excepción, es decir un conjunto coherente de reglas relativas a lospoderes de crisis. Este régimen se destina a hacer del estado de excepción una institución del Estado deDerecho, al mismo nivel que la separación de poderes o que los recursos juridiccionales destinados aproteger el principio de juridicidad. A nivel interno, al menos la mayoría de los Estados que se someten ala jurisdicción de la Corte Interamericana ou a la del Tribunal Europeo, que son el objeto de este estudiocomparado, acatan la idea de institucionalización de los poderes de crisis. Los constituyentes toman encuenta las evoluciones internacionales en la materia y desarrollan numerosos mecanismos destinados ainscribir el estado de excepción en los principios del Estado de Derecho. El resultado es un trabajo deingeniería constitucional que circunscribe los poderes de crisis minuciosamente, esperando garantizar deesta manera la existencia de estos poderes asI como la limitación de los abusos.