This thesis offers an analysis of the possible harm of death, posing three questions: Who is the subject of the harm? What is the nature of the harm? And, when does the harm take place? Epicurus demonstrates on hedonistic grounds that given the irreversible annihilation of the subject and the impossibility of experience, death cannot harm the one who dies at any time. The experience condition is central to this claim, stating that experience is necessary for harm. Despite the strength of the Epicurean inspired No- Subject Thesis, it remains counter to pretheoretical intuitions regarding the harmfulness of death. This thesis proposes an alternative justification for the belief that death is harmful by extending the possible subjects of harm to include the bereaved. It is my view that the No-Subject Thesis successfully shows that death is not harmful to the one who dies, and in support of the Epicurean position, it will be defended against variations of Thomas Nagel’s antithetical position. Nagel’s view is motivated by the belief that death is bad because it deprives the deceased of some good he or she could have had, had death taken place at a later time. Criticisms of the Deprivation Thesis relate to the effectiveness of counterexamples to the experience condition, and the challenge of the temporal location problem, given that we will assume, along with Epicurus, that death annihilates the subject. However, this thesis argues that it is a restricted understanding of the possible subjects of harm that causes the counter-intuitive conclusion of the No-Subject Thesis. By extending the possible bearers of harm to include the bereaved, and characterising the nature of the harm as the loss experienced by the bereaved, one can posit an unproblematic account of the nature and subject of the harm of death. Indeed, by identifying a living person as the subject of harm, the experience condition can be satisfied. Furthermore, a clearly delineated temporal location of the harm can be identified insofar as the bereaved are harmed from the time at which he or she learns of the death of the loved other. However, it will be argued that the harm diminishes over time, reflecting the experience of the bereaved that he or she can recover after the loss of the beloved. A defence of this position will be offered, responding to the Epicurean claim that the death of a loved other does not constitute a significant loss in virtue of the belief that individual subjects are replaceable. By extending the scope of the possible harm of death to account for the social context within which death occurs, one can retain the logical strength of the Epicurean inspired No-Subject Thesis, and yet justify the intuition that death remains a bad thing for the bereaved, giving rational grounds for fearing death in terms of social deprivation.

nÃo hà / CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Este trabalho visa a compreender os fundamentos histÃricos e filosÃficos que ensejaram Epicuro a formular sua doutrina de pensamento e suas respectivas Ãreas, a partir dum conceito de liberdade sui generis, o qual està presente nÃo sà na Ãtica de Epicuro, senÃo tambÃm na FÃsica e na CanÃnica. No intuito de estudar as liÃÃes de Epicuro, bem como as principais categorias em que se alicerÃam suas ideias, esta pesquisa se desenvolve sob o mÃtodo bibliogrÃfico de carÃter exploratÃrio, encontrando naquelas alguns remÃdios aos males da vida humana, implicando, assim, nÃo apenas como finalidade desta Ãltima a consecuÃÃo da felicidade, senÃo como dever Ãnsito à prÃpria Filosofia: a emancipaÃÃo do ser humano de todas as causas imaginÃrias e reais de sofrimento. / This work aims to understand the historical and philosophical foundations that resulted Epicurus formulated his doctrine of thought and their respective areas, from a sui generis concept of freedom, which is present not only in Epicurusâ Ethics, but also in his Physics and Canonical. In order to study the lessons of Epicurus, as well as major categories in which his ideas are rooted, this research develops itself under the bibliographical method exploratory, finding some remedies to the ills of human life, thus implying not only as latter purpose the attainment of happiness, but as a inherent duty to own Philosophy: the emancipation of human beings from all imaginary and real causes of suffering.

Friendship and hedonism are both major components of Epicureanism. I attempt to relieve the tension that seems to follow from endorsing both of these. I argue that Epicurean friendships require valuing a friend’s well-being in the same way as one’s own and that embarking on such friendships is what David Schmidtz terms a maieutic end – one that is achieved by taking on a new set of ends. This conception fits with other-regarding concern that is espoused throughout the Epicurean texts discussing friendship and, as I argue, remains consistent with other psychological and ethical commitments of Epicureanism.

According to Epicurus, philosophy’s sole task is to ensure the well-being of the soul. Human souls are often riddled with diseases; the most serious are the fear of the gods and the fear of death. Thus, the Epicureans offered several arguments designed to demonstrate that, for instance, “death is nothing to us,” and should therefore not be feared. Since their creation there has been much discussion, both in antiquity and by contemporary philosophers, about these arguments. In this thesis, I argue that Epicurean philosophical arguments are patient-relative; they necessarily adapt themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended audience. The end result is that when we evaluate Epicurean philosophical arguments, we must do so in light of the audience for whom they were intended.

Friendship and hedonism are both major components of Epicureanism. I attempt to relieve the tension that seems to follow from endorsing both of these. I argue that Epicurean friendships require valuing a friend’s well-being in the same way as one’s own and that embarking on such friendships is what David Schmidtz terms a maieutic end – one that is achieved by taking on a new set of ends. This conception fits with other-regarding concern that is espoused throughout the Epicurean texts discussing friendship and, as I argue, remains consistent with other psychological and ethical commitments of Epicureanism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1938. / Vita. "List of abbreviations": p. 122-127.

Le conseil épicurien d’éviter la participation politique a reçu maintes interprétations, souvent obscures et mal fondées. L’attitude apolitique ne peut être définie comme un simple manque d’intérêt ou de préoccupation pour la politique ; en effet, selon l’opinion de Pierre Hadot, la philosophie ancienne est profondément ancrée dans l’existence et les doctrines philosophiques n’acquièrent de l’importance que lorsqu’elles assistent le praxis. L’attitude d’Épicure est donc enracinée dans le refus de vivre selon des normes prescrites par l’établissement politique. Selon lui, la politique traditionnelle est vouée à l’échec puisqu’elle poursuit aveuglément le pouvoir et la richesse. En réaction à cette situation, Épicure crée une communauté qui instaure de nouvelles valeurs et au sein de laquelle il est possible de vivre conformément à ces nouvelles valeurs. Se situant en totale opposition aux modes de vie les plus fondamentaux de la cité, les adeptes d’Épicure, s’ils participaient à la vie politique, déclencheraient une grande hostilité de la part des partisans des valeurs traditionnelles. Pour cette raison, l’attitude épicurienne peut d’abord représenter une manière d’éviter la persécution politique. De plus, s’il est admis que la politique implique la poursuite du pouvoir, les épicuriens ne peuvent s’y adonner puisque cela serait contradictoire à leur quête d’ataraxie. À tous égards et indépendamment de ces deux motifs justifiant le retrait de la vie politique, il est clair que si l’attitude d’Épicure ne reposait pas sur une conscience politique, alors, ses critiques à l’égard de la vie politique, son désir de s’y soustraire et la création d’une communauté distincte n’auraient pas été. La politique a le pouvoir de profondément modeler la vie des gens. Considérant que ce conditionnement s’appuie sur des valeurs malsaines, le projet épicurien s’applique donc à remodeler, à la lumière de nouvelles valeurs, la vie de ceux qui ne trouvent aucune satisfaction à poursuivre la vie de la cité. / Epicurus’ advice to avoid political participation has been the object of a number of confusing and sometimes ungrounded interpretations. Based on Pierre Hadot’s view that ancient philosophy was fundamentally rooted in existence, and that philosophical doctrines were only important insofar as they assisted a praxis, the apolitical attitude cannot be understood merely as a lack of interest and concern for politics. On the contrary, Epicurus’ attitude was rooted in a refusal to live the way of life prescribed by the political establishment. For him, traditional politics failed at making the life of citizens better on account of their excessive lust for power and wealth. In response to this situation, Epicurus’ project was aimed at creating a community in which it was possible to develop new values and live by them. Had the Epicurean community participated politically, being in direct opposition to the most fundamental ways of life of the city, it would have involved a great deal of hostility from partisans of traditional values. Thus, Epicurus’ attitude may be justified first as a means to avoid political persecution. Second, since politics implied a significant amount of struggle for power, its pursuit clearly went against the prescribed undisturbed life of Epicureanism. At any rate, regardless of these two motives to avoid political participation, it is clear that if Epicurus’ attitude had not been politically inspired then his criticism of political life, his avoidance of it, and the creation of an alternative community would have never taken place. Politics has the power of shaping the life of people in profound ways. Seeing how this conditioning was based on unhealthy values, Epicurus’ project, therefore, was to reshape anew, under the light of new values, the life of those who did not find satisfaction in the way of life of the city.

This investigation constitutes an attempt towards(1) understanding issues and problems relating to the notions of one, many, part and whole in Parmenides and Plato; (2) extracting conditions for a successful account of multiplicity and parthood;(3) surveying Deleuzian conceptions and uses of these notions; (4) appraising the extent to which Deleuze’s metaphysics can answer some of these ancient problems concerning the status of multiplicity and the nature of mereological composition, that is, of the relations that pertain between parts and the wholes that they compose.

In this thesis, I examine the rhetorical strategies in Jenn Schiffer’s satirical conference talks in which she comments upon her own tech community. In part, I consider her arguments under the theoretical lenses of Burke, Epicurus, and Camus, theories placed alongside the reflective writing of Ullman as a queer woman in that selfsame community. I also discuss the pedagogical opportunities of such an analysis–of tech conference talks in general–to the modern student in our technologically-connected age. Finally, in the long term, I plan to connect the outcomes of this project to a larger project in partial fulfillment of a doctorate degree in Information Science, a project which will investigate the feedback loops between policy, software development, users of information and communications technology (ICT), and humanistic self-expression.

Although the Epicurean ethical system is fundamentally egoistic and hedonistic, it attributes a surprisingly significant role to friendship. Even so, I argue that traditional discussions of Epicurean friendship fail to adequately account for the value (or pleasure) of individual friends. In this thesis I present an amended notion of Epicurean friendship that better accounts for all of the pleasure friends afford. However, the success of my project requires rejecting an Epicurean ethical principle. Because of this, I explore textual evidence both in favor and against the amended notion I propose and the problematic ethical principle. After arguing against the problematic ethical principle and dispelling additional objections to my project, I conclude that Epicureans should endorse the amended notion of friendship I have developed.