abstract: This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistocracy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either harms or violates rights as a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy---or, rather, democratic reform---over epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various institutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk, and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Philosophy 2018

This thesis examines the emergent role of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) in delivering organisational accountability of the Police Service of Scotland, following reform in 2012. The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 amalgamated the eight local police forces into a single force, ‘Police Scotland’, and replaced the concomitant local police authorities, responsible for maintaining and governing those forces, into a national governing body: the SPA. The study draws on a broad range of qualitative data that includes official policy documents, selected minutes of public meetings held by the Justice Committee, and the SPA, inspection reports by HMICS and Audit Scotland, and interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders including a former Minister, senior police officers, members of the SPA, and MSPs. This study chronicles the inception and early development of the SPA, and critically assesses the SPA’s emergent accountability processes in relation to the perennial problems of police governance. Firstly, the doctrine of operational independence of chief constables, rooted in the traditional, and to-date “sacrosanct”, notion of constabulary independence (Reiner, 2013: 169), makes organisational accountability of the police a complicated and contested matter (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010). Secondly, there is a perpetual debate about whether the governance of police should be situated within local government structures, or delivered through central government. There is consensus among policing scholars that the persistent trend towards greater centralisation, coupled with the operational independence doctrine, curtailed the performance of the local police boards and their ability to hold chief constables to account (Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Scott, 2011; Reiner, 2013). Amidst the tussle between central and local political actors for democratic control of the police, the recent policy discourse in Scotland, that led to the reforms and the creation of the SPA, has highlighted that the governance of the police requires expertise, skills and capacities, which the previous local police authorities lacked (Tomkins, 2009; Laing and Fossey, 2011). In light of the persistent difficulties of democratic governance, and the creation of the SPA as an expert body, the study presents an original conceptual framework outlining an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance. The framework seeks to reconcile democracy and expertise and offers a prescriptive solution to resolve the underlying problems of police governance. The study applies the notion of epistocracy or knowledge-based rule (Estlund, 2003, 2008) to the role of experts in institutional settings (Holst, 2012; Holst and Mollander, 2014). Conceiving the SPA as an institutional epistocracy, it is argued that such an arrangement needs to be underpinned by the right Composition, and that it needs Power, and Autonomy in order to function effectively and independently. It is further argued that principles of Deliberation, including reasoning and justification, can further strengthen epistocratic governance arrangements, as well as providing a crucial democratic dimension. The analysis of the SPA provides a strong empirical basis for the framework. The study shows that while the SPA was created as a professional body of experts, it was unable to resolve the underlying problems of police governance in its first three years. This was due to inadequacies in its composition resulting from insufficient expertise and a lack of training for new board members, differing interpretations of its role and statutory powers, and external pressures and impositions resulting in a lack of autonomy. Looking to recent developments, the study suggests that deliberative principles are now implicit in the SPA’s approach to more proactive scrutiny, which has started to serve to alleviate some shortcomings and problems it encountered in its formative years. However, the study concludes that further strengthening of the SPA’s composition, clarity around its role and powers, greater autonomy, and explicit focus on deliberative principles is needed.

In this paper, I will argue that given a choice between a global epistocracy and a global democracy, we ought to choose epistocracy. The reason for this is the need for stopping the ongoing climatic change that will cause a massive amount of suffering and death. Accordingly, I will demonstrate why the democratic process is inadequate in preventing the future climate disaster, and why an epistocracy have a better chance to succeed in this endeavour. My argumentation relies on four steps. First, I shall start with some initial housekeeping that explains why the outcome of continuing climate change is so repugnant. Secondly, I will demonstrate why implementing policies that halt climate change is something we ought to do and why it takes priority over other political concerns. Thirdly, I will argue that given psychological barriers coupled with the Condorcet Jury Theorem we have reason to believe a global democracy will fail to implement these necessary policies. Finally, I shall defend some fundamental claims that the epistocratic method relies on. This I do for two reasons: first, to give some moral credence to the epistocratic method and as a consequent close the door to radical authoritarianism. I do this because even if our priority is to prevent the impending climate disaster, we need to safeguard against a decision-making process that possibly could enact morally repugnant policies (perhaps in other political areas), e.g., bestow only one person with all political power.  Secondly, the defence of epistocracy will demonstrate why a proceduralist argumentation for democracy does not yield a great moral advantage vis-à-vis the epistocratic method.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adherence to absolute truth and moraluniversalism is compatible with democracy. The starting point is that there is absolute truthand absolute values.My thesis is that democracy in the form of universal suffrage is not necessarily in the wayof truth, but rather party politics and representative democracy. Abolishing the parties may besufficient to overcome both truth relativism and moral relativism, and thus provide analternative to abolishing universal suffrage. I suggest the problem lies in party politics, andthe way in which political talks are conducted, rather than in the right to vote.The investigation shows that democracy only have instrumental value. It shall be judgedbased on how well it promotes absolute truth and absolute values. Furthermore, representativedemocracy does not promote absolute truth and absolute values. One alternative isepistocracy. Another option is to abolish the parties, preserve universal suffrage, and createconditions for a new form of political dialogue. The conclusion is that the latter option is bestfor promoting the absolute truth.

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The purpose of this thesis is to address the criticism of democracy put forward by the American philosopher Jason Brennan in his book, Against democracy (2017). Brennan questions the people´s influence on political issues based on epistemic grounds and dismisses arguments for democracy based on procedural and semiotic principles. My argument aims to defend the equal distribution of political freedom and to argue for how democracy´s procedural and semiotic value is expressed. Additionally, I address Brennan´s views on knowledge and competence from a value-theoretical perspective. My results show, among other things, that Brennan´s argumentation contains contradictions and unclear valuetheoretical reasoning. Drawing on Rawlsian principles of justice, I point out why political freedom should be considered as a primary good and therefore distributed equally. Furthermore, I present arguments for how procedural justice can be legitimized for instrumental reasons and highlight the importance of the public recognition expressed by democracy´s semiotics. / Syftet med denna uppsats är att bemöta den demokratikritik som den amerikanske filosofen Jason Brennan ger uttryck för i boken, Efter demokratin (2017). Brennan kritiserar, utifrån epistemiska bevekelsegrunder, folkets inflytande i politiska frågor samt avfärdar argument för demokrati som vilar på proceduriell och semiotisk grund. Min argumentation syftar till att försvara den jämlika distributionen av politisk frihet samt argumentera för hur demokratins proceduriella och semiotiska värde tar sig uttryck. Vidare bemöter jag Brennans syn på kunskap och kompetens med utgångspunkt i värdeteoretiska ståndpunkter. Mina resultat visar, bland annat, att Brennans argumentation rymmer motsägelser samt dunkla, värdeteoretiska resonemang. Med utgångspunkt i rawlsianska rättviseprinciper har jag pekat på varför politisk frihet bör betraktas som en primär nyttighet, och således fördelas jämlikt. Jag har vidare lagt fram argument för hur proceduriell rättvisa kan legitimeras av instrumentella skäl och också belyst vikten av det offentliga erkännande som demokratins semiotik uttrycker.