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The purpose of this essay is to examine why some countries in the world decided to support Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, while others did not. The essay is a type of case study, with Kosovo’s independence as the main focus. For the purpose of the essay, main focus will be on the United States of America, Russia, China and Serbia. The countries’ actions will be examined through the theoretical perspectives presented in the book Essence of Decision: Rational Actor Model, Organizational Behavior and Governmental Politics. The conclusion drawn is that countries put their own interests before the good of the international community, sometimes putting other countries at risk of conflict or war, to achieve their own goals. This can be seen in the cases of Russia and China especially, as they did not accept Kosovo’s independence partly because they have similar conflicts in their own states to that of Serbia’s with Kosovo.

The polemical debate, within feminist theory in North America, in the 1980s, around essentialism is the central focus of this thesis. / In particular, this work attempts to critically examine the notion of essentialism, the resistance to accepting a feminine "essence," and the loosely defined and employed terminology surrounding this field of inquiry. In accomplishing these objectives I draw upon, and critique, the more recent work elaborated around theorizing with/through the "body." / Aspects of feminist theory which are examined as contributive towards the above aim are an analysis of the explicit, and implicit, dangers of accepting or discarding essentialism, and an analysis of the inherent ontological and philosophical tenets that function within this present discourse. / It is maintained that by addressing the issue of essentialism, the relationship between subjectivity, identity, and gender, within feminist theory, will be liberated from further constraining propositions.

In this thesis I develop an account of Marx's concept of "freedom" through its relation to other key concepts in Marx's work. First, I distinguish Marx's understanding of "freedom" from historical liberal conceptions of freedom, or "liberty," and show that Marx has a concrete understanding of freedom. This leads to a close analysis of Marx's concept of freedom primarily through two texts, the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and the later Grundrisse. Although in both dimensions of the problem I utilize the relation of the concept of "freedom"' to the concepts of "alienation"-- which gives aspects of freedom through its obverse relation to freedom, and "human essence"--which underlies both concepts but is given through them as well, the problem is developed differently in each due the orientation of each text. I give further aspects of Marx's understanding of "freedom" through an analysis of Marx's account of capitalism and exchange value. After having developed an account of Marx's concept of "freedom," I explore avenues for developing a viable Marxism and the grounds of possibility for the realization of freedom.

M.A. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Throughout his career, Husserl characterizes the philosophical program he calls “phenomenology” as a “science of essences” (Ideas I, Introduction). But there are two distinct senses in which phenomenology is a science of essences. The first is that phenomenology has the essences of conscious acts for its subject matter. The second is that phenomenology is supposed to constitute a methodology for determining the essence of any natural kind. While the first sense has been a central theme in Husserl scholarship, very little critical analysis has been devoted to the second. My aim in this dissertation is to fill this lacuna by providing a systematic account of how phenomenology can be used to acquire knowledge of the essences of natural kinds. In doing so I hope to show that Husserl’s phenomenology is valuable to the contemporary metaphysics and epistemology of natural kinds. My primary thesis is that the phenomenological method can be used to defend the controversial position that natural kinds have mind-independent essences. In Chapter 1 I develop a general account of natural kinds as universals that impart structure to their instances, i.e., explain their regimentation into their specific parts. In Chapter 2 I attempt to establish the most perspicuous ideology by which to articulate natural kind essentialism, and I draw on Husserl’s realist account of universals to vindicate the intelligibility of the claim that natural kinds themselves, and not their individual instances, can be the subjects of essential truths. In Chapter 3 I raise two fundamental challenges for the account of natural kind essentialism that emerges from the argumentation of the first two chapters, the first concerning the unity of natural kinds and the second concerning the extendibility of their features across possible worlds. In Chapter 4 I base a solution to the first of these challenges on the unity-making role that essence plays in Husserl’s ontology of parts and wholes. In Chapter 5 I defend a novel interpretation of Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essences, and I show how, on my conception, the method enables us to overcome the second challenge to natural kind essentialism. / 2024-03-30T00:00:00Z

Possibilities divide into two kinds. Non-qualitative possibilities are distinguished by their connection to specific individuals. For example, the possibility that Napoleon is a novelist is non-qualitative, since it is a possibility for a specific individual, Napoleon. In contrast, the possibility that someone---anyone at all---is a novelist is a qualitative possibility, since it does not depend upon any specific individual. Haecceitism is a thesis about the relation between qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities. In one guise, it holds that some maximal possibilities---total ways the world could be---differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively. It would, for example, be only a haecceitistic difference that distinguishes actuality from a maximal possibility where Napoleon and Nefertiti swap all of their qualitative properties and relations. According to this alternative possibility, things are the very same qualitatively, but which individuals occupy which qualitative roles differs: Nefertiti would be a stout conqueror, while Napoleon would be a beautiful consort. This dissertation is an examination of the nature of haecceitism, the arguments in its favor, and the consequences that follow from it. In Chapter One, I distinguish various conceptions of haecceitism and related theses concerning maximal possibilities, possible worlds, the identity of indiscernibles, and non-qualitative properties. In Chapter Two, I develop and defend conceivability arguments for haecceitism in the face of various anti-haecceitist challenges. In Chapter Three, I consider the relation between haecceitism and the Humean approach to plenitude, which aims to characterize the space of possible worlds in terms of combinatorial principles. In Chapter Four, I examine the distinction between qualitative properties like redness and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and argue in favor of fundamental non-qualitative properties. In Chapter Five, I present a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory, which employs bare particulars to reconcile modal realism and haecceitism. In Chapter Six, I clarify and defend quidditism, the property-theoretic analogue of haecceitism. I conclude in Chapter Seven by defending the modal view of essence.

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Ce projet en théologie pratique vise à explorer la création littéraire comme vocation chrétienne. Si nous sommes appelés à suivre le Christ, comment répondre à la tentation parfois impérieuse de l’écriture ? Est-ce qu’il s’agit d’une seule vocation ou est-ce que les « appels » à la vocation chrétienne et à la création littéraire ont plutôt des sources différentes ? Autrement dit, est-ce que les appels à mettre noir sur blanc ses pensées viennent aussi de Dieu et est-ce Dieu qui est source de l’inspiration littéraire ? J’ai développé ces questionnements parce que, dans mon expérience, les deux « appels » sont souvent en concurrence et je voulais me donner les moyens pour les discerner, sinon les réconcilier. J’ai donc observé ma propre démarche littéraire pour faire ressortir les dissonances, résonances et chevauchements entre ma pratique comme écrivaine et ma vocation chrétienne, et ainsi développer une théologie pratique de la vocation littéraire. Pour ce faire, j’ai créé « la méthodologie jazz », une méthodologie heuristique qui vise une observation distanciée de mes habitudes créatrices. Au cours de mes quatre années d’études doctorales, j’ai écrit une pièce de théâtre, des nouvelles et un livre, entre autres textes. Pendant la rédaction de chaque texte, j’ai tenu un journal de bord pour noter des remarques sur ma méthode. Après avoir assemblé un corpus représentatif, et inspirée par l’œuvre de Gérard Genette sur la fonction des paratextes, j’ai de nouveau observé ma pratique, rétroactivement, avec des notes de bas de page dans une autre langue. À partir d’une synthèse des annotations recueillies, j’ai réalisé une réflexion théologique avec l’aide d’une grille d’analyse basée sur les écrits du théologien Christoph Theobald portant sur des éléments de la vocation chrétienne. Premièrement, j’ai découvert que ma foi influence ma pratique littéraire. Par exemple, les appels à écrire viennent de l’extérieur comme de l’intérieur. Prendre une décision, à savoir comment répondre à ces appels, ou même seulement si l’on doit y répondre, exige un discernement qui s’adresse à mes valeurs chrétiennes. Deuxièmement, Theobald souligne le rôle capital joué par les malentendus, les « passeurs » et l’exil (par exemple, dans le récit de Samuel, pour qui Élie est le passeur). Ces éléments, comme je le démontre, sont également significatifs dans le processus d’écriture. Troisièmement, tout comme la vocation religieuse, la vocation littéraire est un appel à comprendre et à développer notre singularité profonde, tout comme elle peut facilement devenir un service rendu à soi-même plutôt qu’à autrui. En outre, j’ai observé que la nouveauté recherchée dans la création littéraire ne résonne pas nécessairement avec la nouveauté de la Bonne Nouvelle. Finalement, il y a dans une pièce bien réalisée un genre de vérité qui ressemble aux vérités ineffables de la foi. Ces résonances et ces dissonances aident à élaborer une théologie pratique de la vocation littéraire, où la clé du discernement au cours de la pratique quotidienne repose dans notre propre vérité ou dans la concordance avec soi, que nous ne retrouvons que dans la « sainteté hospitalière » du Christ. Par la contagion de l’authenticité, les espaces littéraires peuvent être autant hospitaliers que les espaces physiques ou sociaux. Si nous sommes vrais, comme Jésus, nous pouvons nous retirer des lieux publics, des moments passés en collectivité, pour répondre aux appels à la création littéraire sans être retenus par nos reproches à nous-mêmes, ou par les reproches (imaginées ou autres) de la communauté chrétienne. L’authenticité de Jésus l’a mené nécessairement loin de l’approbation générale de sa communauté, et par la contagion de cette authenticité, nous pouvons aussi donner un espace d’hospitalité aux autres de suivre leurs propres vocations. / This study in practical theology is an exploration of literary creation as a Christian vocation. If we are called to follow Christ, how should we respond to the imperious call to literary creation? Is the call to Christ and the call to create a single vocation, or do these “calls” come from different sources? Does the call to write also come from God, and is God the source of literary inspiration? I undertook this project because in my experience the two calls often compete, and I wanted to find a way to discern between them, if not reconcile them. I therefore observed my own literary practice to determine the dissonances, resonances and overlaps between my practice as a writer and my Christian vocation with the goal of creating, if possible, a practical theology of literary vocation. To do so I developed the « Jazz Method », a heuristic methodology for observing my practice from a distance. Over the four years of my doctoral studies, I had written numerous works of various kinds, including a play, some short stories, and a book. While I was writing these, I kept a journal. Having assembled some of the works into a representative collection, and inspired by Gérard Genette’s work on the function of paratexts, I observed my practice again, this time retroactively, by footnoting the collection, in another language. Then, based on a synthesis of all my observations, I undertook a theological reflection on my practice using the ideas of theologian Christoph Theobald on the elements of a Christian vocation. Firstly, I discovered that my dispositions as a Christian affect my writing practice. For example, the calls to write come from both inside and out, and deciding if and how to respond to these calls requires discernment for which I turn to my Christian values. Second, Theobald stresses the crucial role played by misunderstandings, passeurs (or mediators), and exile in the vocational call (for example in the story of Samuel’s call, mediated by Eli). As I show, these elements are also important in the practice of literary creation. Third, the call to write, like the call to Christ, is a call to understand and deepen our own singularity, but like a religious vocation, can easily turn into a service of oneself rather than of others. In addition, the novelty sought in literary creation is not necessarily of the same nature as that of the “Good News”. Finally, however, I observed that there is a literary truth found in a well-written piece that resonates with the ineffable truths of faith. These resonances and dissonances helped me to create a practical theology of literary creation, whereby the key to discernment in daily practice is our own truth, or the concordance with ourselves that is found in the “holy hospitality” of Christ’s presence. Through the wellknown contagion of authenticity, literary spaces can be as hospitable as physical or social spaces. If we are authentic, as Jesus was, we can withdraw from the crowd to respond to calls to creation without self-reproach and immune to the reproaches (real or imagined) of our community of faith, and through the contagion of our authenticity, give permission to others to find their own authenticity and their own vocation.

Thèse en cotutelle entre l'Université Laval et Universitat de València / À partir des années 1930, insatisfait des résultats de l'analytique existentiale qu'il a élaborée dans Être et temps, Heidegger reconsidère sa méthodologie philosophique. Le concept de Dasein, cet être que nous sommes à chaque instant, qui fonctionne en tant que point de départ et guide l'enquête ontologique sur le sens de l'être, sera désormais critiqué en raison de ses insuffisances foncières. Il se révèle notamment l'héritier du sujet transcendantal, voire le fondement d'une anthropologie philosophique renouvelée. Or le tournant (Kehre) dans la pensée heideggérienne constitue également une réélaboration de l'idée du Da-sein, un projet radical qui vise à fonder l'essence humaine dans un nouveau rapport à l'être. Dans ce travail, nous analysons en détail le concept de Da-sein, tel qu'il est esquissé dans les écrits privés et les Cahiers noirs de Heidegger, récemment publiés. Pour faire face à ce que le philosophe allemand dénonce comme une fixation de l'être humain à la fin de la modernité, et dans le cadre conceptuel d'un questionnement historique de l'Être, le Da-sein doit être compris désormais comme ouverture de la possibilité de transformer l'essence humaine. Cependant, cette possibilité de transformation radicale, héritière du projet nietzschéen, exige de faire un pas en dehors de la métaphysique - exigence qui va parfois trop loin, lorsqu'elle implique de laisser sombrer l'essence humaine dans le champ de l'inhumain. / A partir de los años 1930, cada vez más descontento con la analítica existencial que había elaborado en Ser y tiempo (1927), Heidegger se replantea su proceder metodológico. El concepto de Dasein, que orientaba la investigación como punto de partida para desarrollar la pregunta por el sentido del ser, es criticado ahora como un heredero del sujeto trascendental, incluso como el protagonista de una antropología filosófica renovada. El cambio radical del viraje (Kehre) en el pensar heideggeriano es también una reelaboración de la idea de Da-sein, un proyecto que la reciente publicación de los escritos privados (los tratados y los Cuadernos negros) nos permite analizar en detalle. Para combatir lo que el filósofo denuncia como fijación del ser humano al final de la época moderna, y en el marco de un preguntar histórico por el Ser, el Da-sein debe comprenderse ahora como la posibilidad de transformar la esencia humana. Sin embargo, esta posibilidad de transformación radical, heredera del proyecto nietzscheano, implica un paso fuera de la metafísica -un paso que va demasiado lejos a veces, hundiéndose en una especie de esencia inhumana.