This thesis provides an explanation of why Israel in the years between 1988 and 1994 decided on what might be termed a path to peace with both the Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It argues that, in Israel, peacemaking that entails any form of territorial concession is largely an issue that can be best understood in terms of domestic politics. Accordingly, at the heart of this thesis lies the assumption that the key to explaining Israel's road to peace lies in an appreciation of the dynamics of Israel's domestic politics. Part at least of this story is an understanding of certain key moments in the formation of Israeli thinking about movement towards a peace with the Palestinians. The thesis therefore examines the impact of the Intifada on Israeli thinking as well as detailing crucial turning points in domestic politics, not least Labour's electoral victory in 1992 and the subsequent formation of the most dovish government in Israel's history. The thesis also pays attention to the politics of personality and the role of key figures, such as Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, in the politics that permitted Israel's move to peace. To facilitate such an understanding, the study employs some analytical concepts from what might be described as the 'middle-range' theories, for example the so-called Bureaucratic Politics Model but its judgements are also fundamentally informed by both interview and primary source material. Hence, overall the thesis looks at the internal dynamics of Israeli peacemaking and demonstrates that, although external factors are certainly, as the last chapter argues an important part of the story, the decision to make peace was also rooted in the dynamic complex domestic politics of Israel.

Hugh Gaitskell was leader of the Labour Party between 1955-63. The Cold War was at a critical level and bi-partisanship in international affairs was expected. With Gaitskell's accession this appeared to end, marked in particular by the disputes over Suez, the independent nuclear deterrent and Britain's application to join the European Economic Community. Simultaneously, he was challenged by the Left over nearly every aspect of Labour's foreign and defence policy. Despite these major controversies, Gaitskell's influence over international affairs remains a neglected area of research, and he is remembered more for the domestic controversies over nationalisation, his ill-fated attempt to revise Clause IV and defeat at the 1960 Scarborough conference. This thesis addresses that imbalance by examining Gaitskell's contribution to foreign affairs and the following inter-related areas: bi-partisanship; policy formulation; internal divisions and the power struggle between Left and Right. In addition, it also considers how the structure of the Labour Party benefited the leadership during this turbulent period. The conclusions revise Gaitskell's reputation as a figure of unyielding principle, and demonstrates that his leadership was marked by a mixture of finesse and blunder. His responsibility for the end of bi-partisanship can be discounted, as Labour remained firmly committed to the policies laid down and followed since 1945. Yet, the personal control over policy that he exercised, allied to his determination to mould the Labour Party in his own image, needlessly accelerated the internal struggles for power. While the Scarborough defeat illustrates the limitations of his authority, Suez and Europe display his acute political awareness of the requirements needed to balance national interests, electoral prospects and maintain party unity.

Cette thèse a pour objet la politique étrangère de la France dans la crise du Golfe (1990-1991) et la crise irakienne (2002-2003). Afin d'expliquer les variations du comportement français la participation à la guerre du Golfe, l'opposition à la guerre d'Irak, trois approches, trois niveaux d'analyse, sont mobilisés. Le jeu gouvernemental met au jour la construction interne de la politique étrangère, retraçant les marchandages au sommet de l'État et révélant les biais par lesquels le champ politique national et les administrations influent sur la politique menée. Le jeu diplomatique, en restituant la complexité des processus d'interaction et de négociation interétatiques, montre comment les enjeux et objectifs tactiques se construisent dans les crises, sont sensibles à la configuration du jeu et aux prises de positions des autres diplomaties. L'analyse structurale souligne le poids de la structure du système international- son état comme sa tendance - et de la position d'un État en son sein sur la politique étrangère. Dévoiler les mécanismes par lesquels ces pressions structurelles agissent nécessite de mettre en relation la structure du système, l'ordre international, les perceptions des dirigeants et les comportements des États. C'est au final un mode d'articulation des niveaux d'analyse et des facteurs de détermination de la politique étrangère en temps de crise internationale qui est proposé - un mode qui puisse éclairer l'interpénétration, les combinaisons et interactions entre ces trois niveaux. / Analyzing the differing French policy during the Gulf and Iraq wars - military participation to the former, diplomatic opposition to the latter, requires a multi-level approach to foreign policy. Graham Allison's governmental game paradigm shows that foreign policy is the resultant of bargainings among central players. It is also capable of revealing the ways in which domestic and bureaucratic polities interfere in the decision-making process. The diplomatic game approach put forward in this work focuses on the interstate interactions. It underlines how much foreign policy stakes and goals are defined and constructed in the process of diplomatic negociation, influenced by other diplomacies' stances. Waltzian structural theory concentrates on the systemic determinants of foreign policy. A State's position within the system, and the structure of the system - its current state as well as its trend - strongly determine and shape foreign policy. Connecting and articulating structure of the system, international order, decision-makers' perceptions and States' behavior appears to be a fruitful way to understand the mechanisms through which structural constraints and incentives act and impact on foreign policy. Afterall, this research attempts to combine infra-state, inter-state and systemic levels of analysis in a novel way, in order to explain the complexity of foreign policy in international cri sis.

This thesis is a genealogy of the Thai conception of détente in the long 1970s (1968-1980), largely based on newly declassified documents in Thailand. It argues that Thai détente marked a history of rupture in Thai foreign policy narrative that was fundamentally different from the hegemonic discourse of anticommunism. By the late 1960s, the latter had become seriously challenged by the deteriorating situation in the Vietnam War and exacerbated by the concomitant prospect of American retrenchment. This sequence of events resulted in discursive anxiety in Thailand and the idea of 'flexible diplomacy' was initiated by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to cope with the changed environment. Since then, détente emerged as a new diplomatic discourse to normalize relations with the Communist powers in general, and specifically, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The thesis closely examines three episodes of Thai détente, including that of Thanat Khoman (1968-1971), M.R. Kukrit Pramoj and Chatichai Choonhavan (1975-1976), and General Kriangsak Chomanan (1977-1980). It argues that each episode, epitomized by varying concepts of 'flexible diplomacy' and 'equidistance', developed out of discursive struggles between détente proponents and Cold Warriors. These struggles precipitated attempts to sustain the anticommunist discursive hegemony, which culminated in the military coups in November 1971 and October 1976. The thesis demonstrates how these coups can be interpreted as events born out of foreign policy, and specifically to deter, or at least temper, the course of détente. The thesis also asserts that, throughout the long 1970s, détente in general transformed Thai foreign relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC from the discourses of 'enemy' towards 'friend'. This diplomatic transformation was represented in numerous diplomatic practices, such as ping-pong or sports diplomacy, petro-diplomacy, trade, cultural diplomacy, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and normal state visits. Despite its decline in the early 1980s, the détente discourse remained intact and determined Thai diplomacy toward the Communist powers. Finally, the thesis interrogates the so-called bamboo or bending-with-the-wind diplomacy, which is often treated as an ahistorical 'tradition' of Thai diplomacy, and argues that bamboo diplomacy emerged as a new narrative or knowledge only in the early 1970s. It aimed at not only legitimizing Thailand's changing diplomatic practices, namely détente, but also constituting the metanarrative that could explain and evaluate (the success or failure of) Thai diplomacy in the past. This narrative was then an invented tradition, which was socially and epistemically constructed as a result of the transformative practices of détente in Thailand. By tracing the birth of bamboo diplomacy, the thesis constitutes a history of the present.

The study explores Egypt’s foreign policy under President Hosni Mubarak. It focuses on the way Mubarak's regime dealt with internal and external threats to maintain security and bolster his internal hold on power. Two case studies are chosen to test the hypotheses: Egypt’s reluctance to reestablish diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Egypt’s response to the Greater Middle East Initiative proposed by the Bush administration and the series of Western efforts aimed at promoting political reform in the Middle East, in particular the measures it took to warm up its relations with Israel, including the signing of the QIZ treaty. The following arguments are made: 1- Security is central in understanding the behavior of Third World states. 2- The traditional 'balance of power' model should be substituted with the 'balance of threat' theory. 3- Faced with a combination of internal and external threats, Third World states most often tend to 'omnibalance' between both sets. 4- Foreign policy decisions in the Third World are determined by the level of internal and external threats, the availability of regional and international allies and the idiosyncrasies of leaders, their type of legitimacy and the interests of their ruling coalitions. 5- The foreign policies of Third World states, which tend to be lacking in strong institutions, democracy or national consensus and facing threats from within as well as without, are less likely to be shaped by or serve a national interest than a regime interest.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the function of the church as critic of society in the area of international relations. In order that the analysis will have some practical value as an evaluative tool, the goals of a particular nation, the United States, have been chosen as a specific context within which the criticism of the church regarding international affairs may be focused. The problem is basically concerned with analysis and application of the implications of the normative structure of the concept of the Responsible Society in the area of a responsible world community. Although many men have advanced elaborations and drawn forth implications of the concept formulated at Amsterdam, specifically Walter Muelder's contribution is considered in this dissertation, primarily because of its applicability in three areas: first, in the area of advancing the norms of the concept of the Responsible Society in an international context; second, in the context of a criticism of the specific goals of the United States regarding international relations policy; and third, as an evaluation of certain aspects of the church's witness regarding problems of war, peace, and disarmament. [TRUNCATED]

This dissertation is an investigation into the causes and consequences of ethnocentrism in Russia and Ukraine. It expands on the current literature in political science which has focused exclusively on data from the United States. By examining new countries, this work increases our knowledge about the characteristics of ethnocentrism and its effects. I also go beyond what has been done in previous work by examining ethnocentrism’s variable effects on different ethnic groups in a society. The dissertation is broken down into two parts. The first half, chapters one, two and three, look at the relationship between ethnocentrism and different ethnic groups. Using the ideas of William Sumner as a starting point, I investigate the differences in in-group and out-group attitudes across high-status and low-status ethnic groups using survey data from the United States, Russia and Ukraine. I also explore how group status influences individual levels of ethnocentrism. In chapters four and five I use ethnocentrism to help explain individual-level foreign policy attitudes and vote choice in Ukraine. Using survey data and multivariate logistic and linear regression models, I show that ethnocentrism has distinct effects on ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians living in Ukraine and that these effects are substantively significant. Ethnocentric Russians in Ukraine are much more likely than ethnic Ukrainians or non-ethnocentric ethnic Russians to support integration with Russia, to support fighting terrorism and to oppose NATO membership. They were also significantly less likely to vote for Viktor Yushchenko during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.

In looking at the history of U.S. aid, three general goals emerge: political stability, increased economic liberalization and expanding influence in the aid receiving country. While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has measures in place to assess the success of its aid endeavors, most U.S. aid, in the form of economic and military aid, is largely unevaluated in terms of achieving these broad foreign policy goals. The results of this study suggest that U.S. military and economic aid fail to achieve these three general foreign policy objectives in a sustainable manner. Conducting a regression analysis of U.S. aid indicates that, in the short term, economic aid does succeed in promoting increased economic liberalization, but the concurrent giving of military aid cancels the effect. In the long term, the giving of economic aid supports the stability of a state’s government, but the U.S. will want to assess what other methods might produce similar and more enduring results at less cost.

The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the relationship between the Sino-Soviet conflict and contemporary events in Indochina. I have yet to find a satisfactory analysis of this relationship. Of course there have been innumerable specialized books on related subjects, (such as the Sino-Soviet conflict, or Soviet and Chinese aid and trade policies with Indochina) but as far as I can gather, no study has focused on the Sino-Soviet conflict and its relationship with the Indochina countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia). By the very nature of the topic, I am forced to place limitations on the scope of this paper. Firstly, by necessity, it will concentrate on events which have occurred in Indochina, since the United States withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. This I hope will prevent the paper from becoming a long winded narrative, Secondly, I have tried to place this study into a broader analytical framework, consequently I have placed little emphasis on describing events. A final caveat is necessary. The outside observer is often tempted to impose a great deal of rationality - or his own notion of what is rational - on a foreign policy process, which, in reality, may be marked by ambiguity, contradictions and idiosyncracies. I have tried to guard against this by allowing different notions of rationality and by a blending of different rationality concepts that characterize the countries dealt with, (former President Thieu of South Vietnam for example, consulted his horoscope so as to make better policy decisions; his astrologer was a high ranking intelligence officer, a former head of the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence Agency.) 1. 1. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke. "Strategies of Survival the foreign policy dilemmas of smaller Asia States" 1st Edition St. Lucia. Queensland 1978 page IX.

Galt vor 1990 das ungeschriebene Gesetz, dass 1948/49 die Bundesrepublik nicht als Staat auf der Suche nach einer eigenen Außenpolitik, sondern als Ergebnis amerikanischer Außenpolitik auf der Suche nach einem Staat gegründet wurde, stellt Deutschland heute immer weniger ein Stück Amerika mitten in Europa dar. Die neue „Berliner Realität“ beinhaltet also die Tatsache, dass Deutschland nicht mehr Objekt der weltgeschichtlichen Situation ist, „sondern auch Subjekt, verantwortlich für weit mehr als das eigene Schicksal“5. Der damit verbundenen Verantwortung kann sich Deutschland nicht entziehen. Es ist deshalb an der Zeit, für einen deutschen Pragmatismus zu plädieren, der weniger von tagespolitischen Erwägungen geprägt sein sollte, sondern mit Werten (wie Verantwortungsbewusstsein und Ehrlichkeit) und Zielen (wie wirtschaftlicher Wohlstand und Sicherheit) unterfüttert werden muss. Daraus ergeben sich außenpolitische Visionen, die das Handeln der Politiker antreiben und legitimieren. Mittelfristig können diese deutschen außenpolitischen Visionen immer mehr mit denen der anderen 24 EU-Mitgliedstaaten verschmelzen, sodass hier tatsächlich eine gewisse Überwindung der Nationalstaaten – aber eben nur innerhalb der EU – zu beobachten wäre. Allerdings würde sich an diese Entwicklung unmittelbar die Frage anschließen, ob die neue europäische Selbstbestimmung nur im Verhältnis zu den USA zu gewinnen, oder ob sie nicht viel weit reichender zu formulieren ist.