This thesis examines the effects of linguistic input on the development of children’s epistemic concepts. It draws upon two fundamental questions in the field of cognitive development: (a) whether distinctions between automatic and controlled forms of cognitive processing are indicative of underlying conceptual differences, and (b) whether language is critical to the process of concept development. To establish the background of the current research, a summary of how these theoretical questions have been addressed in other fields of cognitive psychology is first provided (Chapter 1). These questions are then re- examined within the specific domain of epistemic concept development (Chapter 2). Changes in false-belief processing that occur between infancy and the early preschool years are discussed in relation to two competing theories of false-belief development. A framework to explain how language promotes children’s transition between automatic and controlled forms of processing is then provided. It is suggested that language facilitates change by both reducing the cognitive demands associated with controlled response tasks as well as assisting with the formation of robust epistemic representations. An empirical study that was designed to examine the effects of epistemic language (i.e., verbs and syntax) on children’s automatic and controlled processing of belief is then described (Chapters 3 to 5). Eighty-four children (Mage = 3;5 years), who initially failed elicited measures of false-belief, were trained with visual contexts of true- and false-belief. The critical manipulation across three conditions was the linguistic input presented in conjunction with these contexts. Children heard narrations that contained either (a) the description of an agent’s actions without an epistemic verb, (b) a familiar epistemic verb (thinks) across both contexts, or (c) the familiar epistemic verb in contexts of true-belief and a novel epistemic verb (gorps) in contexts of false-belief. Results demonstrated a significant advantage for children who were trained with epistemic verbs on spontaneous measures of false-belief (i.e., anticipatory gaze). Significant effects of epistemic verb exposure were also demonstrated in novel contexts of belief induction. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to theories that make distinct predictions about the role of language in epistemic concept development (Chapter 6).

Studies indicate that young only children are more likely than those with siblings to have egocentric tendencies. Egocentrism is a maladaptive behavior from a lack of Theory of Mind understanding, which is the ability to take on the perspectives of others and to discern emotional cues. The current study determines whether or not only children are more likely respond negatively to teacher criticism. Only children (N=100) and those with siblings (N=100) aged six years were be tested on tasks measuring egocentrism, ToM understanding, and their response to teacher constructive criticism. Only children are expected to have lower ToM task scores, respond more negatively to criticism, and to be more likely to display traits of egocentrism than those with siblings. These potential results indicate that there is something developmentally beneficial in having a sibling(s), which promotes social and emotional competency in young children that is not necessarily prevalent for only children. Further research should examine children at an even younger age to determine when and how the difference in ToM understanding occurs.

Research based on children's performance on standard false-belief reasoning tasks indicates that theory of mind (ToM) understanding, (i.e. the ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about one's own and others' mental states) is initially absent and develops around the age of four years (Wellman et al., 2001). Recently, researchers have investigated the relationship between language and ToM development. According to de Villiers & Pyers (2002) understanding of embedded complement structures is necessary for children to be able to understand false belief, because both require the ability to handle misrepresentation. Following Perner (1991), Smith et al. (2003) argued (contra De Villiers & Pyers) that the developmental link between embedded clauses and false belief reasoning skills stems instead from a requirement to handle metarepresentation. They proposed that children's aptitude with double-event relative clauses predicts their false-belief reasoning ability. Previous research on linguistic precursors of false belief understanding has focused largely on English speaking children. The current research hypothesized that crosslinguistic differences in the emergence of ToM understanding could result because of the potential for a developmental link between ToM understanding and other linguistic properties (e.g. scrambling), found in free word order languages, such as Russian. The current research sought to determine whether there is a correlation between the development of false belief reasoning skills and the acquisition of relativization in monolingual Russian speaking children; and to find out whether the acquisition of scrambled word orders (e.g. OVS) is a better predictor of false belief reasoning in child Russian. The participants of the study were 36 monolingual Russian children: 18 3-year-olds (Mean age = 3;6) and 18 4-year-olds (Mean Age= 4;6). We assessed the children's false belief understanding using the unexpected contents task and the unexpected transfer task and their ability to handle relative clauses and scrambled (OVS) word order through a Truth-Value judgment (TVJ) act-out task (Crain & Thornton, 1998). Our results confirm the previously established link between age and false belief reasoning. However, the results failed to support previous findings regarding the status of relative clauses as a linguistic precursor for the development of False Belief reasoning. The results also failed to confirm our predictions regarding the privileged role of scrambling (i.e. OVS sentences) in Russian children's ToM development. Our findings suggest that OVS sentences might be more difficult for Russian children to handle compared to relative clauses with the canonical SVO order, regardless of age the Russian children performed better on relative clauses than on scrambled OVS sentences -- this leads us to conclude -- "Syntax is easy! Pragmatics is hard!" Also there were no age related differences in relation to either relative clauses or scrambled word order sentences. Additionally, for child Russian, de Villiers & Peyers proposal regarding the privileged role of embedded complement clauses as a linguistic precursor to TOM development cannot yet be ruled out.

Despite numerous studies of the development of theory of mind, how children express their understanding of mind in less structured, play settings has gone largely unstudied. Many developmental accounts, regardless of disagreement on other theoretical issues, agree that the child’s engagement within social contexts is crucial to the development of understanding of mind. Our goals were to collect a detailed account of how children use their understanding of mind and how mothers align their support to the child’s capabilities within social interactions. In this longitudinal study, typically developing preschoolers (N = 52) engaged in a hiding game with their mothers in a semi-structured play setting when the children were 42-, 54-, and 66-months old. Aspects of children’s understanding of mind were rated including understanding of knowledge access, deception, false belief, and emotional response to false belief, as well as, affective charge and engagement with the task. Mothers’ utterances were coded for various characteristics, particularly role and content. Children’s understanding of mind increased across visits and positively correlated with false belief task performance at the 42- and 54-month visits, rs = .35 and .39, p < .05, but not the 66-month visit, rs = –.25, p = .10. Children’s enthusiasm was positively related to their understanding of mind at the first and second visits, but not the last. Mothers tailored the content of their utterances to the child’s growing expertise, but whether mothers adjusted the role of their utterances to children’s understanding of mind remains unclear. Observing children’s playful use of their emerging understanding of mind in social interactions allowed for the capture of subtle variations in how children express and caregivers support their understanding.

<p>Despite recent evidence that infants under one year of age have implicit understanding of theory of mind, three-year-old children repeatedly fail in traditional false belief tasks. A serious of 4 studies investigated two possible sources of errors. First, children's comprehension of theory of mind questions was tested in an elicited imitation task. Second, their understanding of mental events was measured using anticipatory eye movements in non-verbal tasks. Results showed that young children's performance in verbal false belief tasks is limited by their understanding of linguistic representations of beliefs and their ability to monitor mental states in real-time. This implies the limitations of young children in keeping track of complex social events in real time and in understanding language conventions in real time.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis focuses upon the abilities of children with severe learning difficulties to contemplate the psychological states of other people, what is often referred to in the literature as 'mindreading' (Whiten and Perner, 1991). The first section contains a review of the literature on children's developing understanding of the mind and their conceptual representational abilities. This is followed by two studies investigating non-learning disabled children's abilities to attribute first-and second-order false belief. The first of these uses an adaptation of the Sally-Anne test (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985). The second study uses an original false belief story scenario, which involves children in drama. The researcher uses a technique called 'split-briefing' to provide children with first-hand experience of first-and second-order false belief. Simplified versions of the two false belief story scenarios are then used with children with severe learning difficulties to investigate their abilities to represent first-and second-order false belief. The relationship between children's scores on belief attribution tasks and their scores on tests of non-verbal intellectual reasoning (Ravens Coloured Matrices) and receptive language ability (TROG) is also examined in this study. The third section outlines the findings of a questionnaire-based study examining parental reports of spontaneous internal state use by two groups of children: non-learning disabled children aged 1-5 years and pupils with Down's Syndrome aged 4-19 years with severe learning difficulties. 'Internal state language' is language which refers to intentions, cognitions and feeling states (Bretherton and Beeghly, 1981). This is followed by a further investigation of internal state language among a group of students with severe learning difficulties. This study uses a series of playlets written by the author to provide students with an interactive, participatory medium in which to draw their attention to people's internal states. The thesis concludes with a final statement on research into the social-cognitive development of children with severe learning difficulties, with recommendations for future research and intervention.

Data from a growing number of research studies indicate that children with hearing loss are delayed in Theory of Mind (ToM) development when compared to their typically developing, hearing peers. While other researchers have studied the developmental trajectories of ToM in school-age students who are deaf and hard of hearing (DHH), a limited number have addressed the need for interventions for this population. The present study extends the current research on ToM interventions to the PreKindergarten and Kindergarten levels. This study used a single-case multiple-baseline multiple-probe across skills design with replications across classrooms to examine the effects of a ToM intervention on participants’ false belief understanding as well as outcomes on a near generalization measure (i.e., Sally-Anne Task, Baron-Cohen, Firth, Leslie, 1985) and a far generalization measure (i.e., five-task ToM developmental scale, Wellman & Liu, 2004). A thought bubble intervention (i.e., a visual representation of what people are thinking) developed by Wellman and Peterson (2013) was modified in key areas: (a) participants were substantially younger than the population in the original study and thus required a pre-teaching phase addressing vocabulary and materials, (b) manipulable materials were created from the description provided in the Wellman and Peterson (2013) study along with parallel materials used in assessment probes, (c) a certified teacher of DHH children provided direct instruction to participants in a small group setting, (d) study length was increased to 25 weeks, and (e) methodological design change (i.e., group design to single-case design). These modifications addressed the need for evidence-based ToM interventions that are both proactive and easily implemented by teachers in a classroom setting. Results from the single-case design portion of the study indicate a functional relation between the thought bubble intervention and the participants’ acquisition of the targeted skills in each stage, although progress was not uniform. Results from the pre-post assessments indicate that the children did make progress up the scale, however, children who used spoken language tended to proceed faster through the stages than those who used sign language. These results inform the field in regard to the efficacy and feasibility of a ToM intervention for young DHH children.

No description available.

Human social interaction crucially depends on the ability to attribute thoughts and beliefs to other individuals. This ability is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM), and understanding that other people can have false beliefs about the world is considered to be a critical test of ToM. In childhood, a developmental breakthrough is achieved around the age of 4 years, when children start explicitly reasoning about others’ false beliefs. The cognitive and neural developments that lead to this milestone of human cognition, however, are currently unknown. Moreover, recently, novel im- plicit paradigms have shown that, already before the age of 2 years, infants display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The processes that underlie these expectations and their relation to the later-developing explicit false belief reasoning, however, are unclear. The current thesis addresses these open issues in three studies. The first study investigates the developmental trajectory and robustness of an implicit false belief task longitudinally from the age of 2 to 4 years. We find that children only perform above chance by the age of 4 years, but not at 2 and 3 years. This indicates that early success on implicit false belief tasks is fragile. The second study examines the correlation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks with each other and with co-developing cognitive abilities. This shows a dissociation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in that performance on the two task types does not correlate, and that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false be- lief tasks do not. Finally, the third study shows that the maturation of white matter in brain regions that support false belief reasoning in adultsand of their dorsal connectivity to the inferior frontal gyrus, suggested to support hierarchical processing, is associated with the emergence of explicit false belief reasoning in 3- and 4-year-old children. These associations are independent of implicit false belief-related action anticipation and of developments in other cognitive domains. Taken together, our results speak for a dissociation of the processes underlying implicit and explicit false belief tasks. We suggest that the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief reasoning around the age of 4 years might result from improved belief processing, emerging hierarchical processing abilities, and the maturation of the connection between the relevant brain regions. Furthermore, I speculate on processes that might underlie early success on implicit false belief tasks in infancy.:Acknowledgements iii Summary xi Deutsche Zusammenfassung xvii 1 General Introduction 1.1 Theory of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1.1 Precursors of ToM in Infancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1.2 False Belief Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1.3 Relation between Implicit and Explicit False Belief Tasks . . . . . . . 8 1.1.4 Theoretical Accounts of the Emergence of ToM . . . 14 1.2 Relation to Other Cognitive Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.2.1 Executive Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1.2.2 Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1.2.3 Correlations with Implicit False Belief Tasks . . . . . 29 1.3 Neural Basis of ToM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 1.3.1 Neural Basis of ToM in Adults . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 1.3.2 Neural Basis of ToM in Development . . . . . . . . . 35 1.3.3 Structural Brain Development in Early Childhood . . 36 1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2 Study 1: Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds’ but not 2- and 3-year-olds’ false belief-related action anticipation . . . . . . . . . . . .45 3 Study 2: Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children . . . . . . . . . . . .73 4 Study 3: White matter maturation is associated with the emergence of Theory of Mind in early childhood . . . . . . . . . . . .91 5 General Discussion 5.1 Is there a continuity from early-developing to later explicit false belief abilities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 5.2 What is the relation of implicit and explicit false belief tasks to other cognitive domains? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 5.3 What is the neural basis of the emergence of ToM? And what does this tell us about the underlying cognitive processes? . . . . 114 5.4 What processes underlie implicit false belief tasks?. . . . . 118 5.5 Future Research and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 References . . . . . . . 128 A Supplements Study 1 . . . . . . . 161 B Supplements Study 2 . . . . . . . 163 C Supplements Study 3 . . . . . . . .181 Abbreviations . . . . . . . . 187 List of Figures . . . . . . . . 191 List of Tables . . . . . . . . 193

Yes / To understand the executive demands of the false-belief (FB) task relative to an alternative theory-of-mind (or mechanical causality) task, picture sequencing, the present study used path analyses. One hundred and sixty-six children between 3 and 6 years old completed the FB and picture-sequencing tasks, three executive function tasks (updating, inhibition, and shifting), and the receptive language test. The model with the best fit indicated that FB performance had a direct contribution from shifting of attention and inhibitory control, which was independent of the significant contribution made by picture sequencing. This model indicates that FB inference requires more executive processing than picture sequencing, which is used as an alternative task to measure theory of mind. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? The majority of researchers use the false-belief task to assess mentalizing ability in young children. Sources of information used in various different mentalizing tasks require different levels of cognitive demand. Many executive functions (EFs) are involved in children's judgements of false belief. What does this study add? A statistical model was created to compare processing requirements of false-belief and picture-sequencing tasks. The model supported the claim that the false-belief task involves considerably more than just mentalizing. Shifting the focus of attention was an EF that was found to be a key component of performance in the false-belief task. / Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science: KAKENHI Grant No. 16K04327.